

Enquiries
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A
CRITICAL
INQUIRY

INTO

The Opinions and Practice

OF

The Ancient Philosophers

CONCERNING

The Nature of the SOUL and a FUTURE
STATE, and their Method of the
DOUBLE DOCTRINE.

The SECOND EDITION,

IN WHICH

Two late ANSWERS by Mr. JACKSON and Dr. SYKES
have afforded an Opportunity of supplying what
was wanting to complete the Subject.

by the Rev M^r Town

With a PREFACE by

The Author of the DIVINE LEGATION, &c.

*Quid ergo Athenis & Hierosolymis? Quid Academiae &
Ecclesiae? Quid HÆRETICIS & CHRISTIANIS?*

Tertull. lib. De præscr. adv. Hær.

LONDON,

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MDCCLXVIII.

CRITICAL INQUIRY

INTO
The Opinions and Practices
OF
The Ancient Philosophers

CONCERNING
The Nature of the Soul, and a Few
STATES, and the Method of the
DOCTRINE.



THE SECOND EDITION.

Two Volumes in One, by Mr. John Locke, Esq.
Author of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, &c.
With a PREFACE by the Author.

The Author of the Divine Arithmetic, &c.

Sold by Mr. W. Woodcock, at the Sign of the Anchor, in Pall-mall, near the Theatre-Francoise, in the Strand, London.

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Printed for C. Davis, at the Sign of the Anchor, in Pall-mall, near the Theatre-Francoise, in the Strand.

— W —

P R E F A C E.

THE following Sheets, written by a Gentleman whose Modesty would not suffer him to put his Name to them, were communicated to me as they came from the Press. As I have bidden adieu to Controversy, I was not displeased to find an important Truth so well defended. In endeavouring as I did, in the *Divine Legation*, to expose the *vain Babblings* of the *Greek Philosophy*, I imagined I had effectually served the Interests of Revelation, and vindicated the Censures of the Propagators of it. The great Characteristic of our holy Faith is the Doctrine of *Life and Immortality*. Now there were two great Errors (explained in the *Divine Legation*, and defended in the following Treatise) in the *metaphysical Speculations* of the *Greek Philosophers*, concerning the nature of *G O D*, and of the *Soul*, which necessarily kept them from giving Credit to a Doctrine, highly probable in itself, and rendered so, even by themselves, from many moral Considerations perpetually preached up by them to the People. But it was their ill Fate to be determined, in their Opinions, rather by *metaphysical* than *moral Arguments*. Hence we see the Reason that, whenever the holy Apostles speak of, or hint at, the

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Philosophers or Philosophy of Greece, which is not seldom, they always do it in Terms of Contempt and Abhorrence. On this Account I was neither ashamed nor afraid to shew at large, that the Reasons they had for so doing were just and weighty. Nor did I think myself at all concerned to manage the Reputation of a Set of Men, who, on the first Appearance of Christianity, most virulently opposed it by all the Arts of Sophistry and Injustice: And when, by the Force of its superior Evidence, they were at length driven into it, were no sooner in than they began to deprave and corrupt it. For, from their *profane and vain Babblings*, Tertullian assures us, every Heresy took its Birth. *Ipsi illi SAPIENTIAE PROFESSORES, de quorum ingenio omnis hæresis animatur.* And, in another Place he gives us their Genealogy. *Ipsæ denique Hæreses à PHILOSOPHIA subornantur. Inde Æones & formæ nescio quæ, & trinitas hominis apud Valentinum: PLATONICUS fuerat. Inde Marcionis Deus melior de tranquillitate, a STÔICIS venerat; & uti anima interire dicatur, ab EPICUREIS observatur: ET UT CARNIS RESTITUTIO NEGETUR, DE UNA OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA SUMITUR: Et ubi materia cum Deo æquatur, ZENONIS Disciplina est; Et ubi aliquid de*

^a *Adv. Marc. 1. i.* The Author of a Fragment concerning the Philosophers going under the Name of Origen, says the same thing: *ἀλλ' ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς [Ἀρεταϊκοῖς] τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας λαβοῦσα, ἐκ δὲ μαθητῶν φιλοσοφούντων, καὶ ΜΙΕΤΗΡΙΣΝ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκζητημάτων καὶ ἀρετῶν ἐνταυτοῖς.*

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igneo Deo allegatur, HERACLITUS interve-
nit. Eadem Materia apud Hæreticos & Phi-
losophos volutantur; iidem retractatus impli-
cantur. Unde malum, & quare? & unde bo-
mo, & quomodo? & quod proximè Valentinus
proposuit, unde Deus? Scilicet & de Enthy-
mesi, Ectromate inferunt ARISTOTELEM, qui
illis Dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi
& destruendi, versipellem in sententiis coactam,
in conjecturis duram, in argumentis operariam,
contentione molestantem, etiam sibi ipsi omnia re-
tractantem, nequid omnino tractaverit. Hinc
illa fabula & genealogia indeterminabiles, &
quæstiones infructuosæ & SERMONES SERPEN-
TES VELUT CANCER, a quibus nos Apostolus
refraenans^b, &c. One would almost imagine,
from these last Words, that Tertullian had
foreseen that Aristotle was to be the Founder
of the School Divinity.

He observes, that the Heresy which *denies*
the Resurrection of the Body arose out of the
 whole School of Gentile Philosophy. But he
 omits another, which we have shewn in the
Divine Legation stood upon as wide a Bottom,
 namely, that which holds *the human Soul to be*
of the same Nature and Substance with God;
 espoused, before his time, by the *Gnostics*; and
 afterwards, as we learn by the following
 Words of *St. Austin*, by the *Manichæans* and
Priscillians: “ Priscillianistæ, quos in Hispania
 “ Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum
 “ & Manichæorum dogmata permixta sectan-

^b De præsc. adv. Hæret. p. 70, 71. Ed. Par. 1580.

“ tur. Quamvis et ex aliis hæresibus in eas
 “ fordes tanquam in sentinam quandam horri-
 “ bili confusione confluxerint. Propter occul-
 “ tandas autem contaminationes & turpitudines
 “ suas habent in suis dogmatibus, & hæc ver-
 “ ba, Jura, perjura, secretum prodere noli. *Hi*
 “ *animas dicunt ejusdem naturæ atque substan-*
 “ *tiaæ, cujus est Deus.*”—Why the *Heathen*
 Philosophers of our times should be so much
 displeased to see their ancient Brethren shewn
 for Knaves in Practice and *Fools* in Theory,
 is not difficult to conjecture: But why any
 Friend to Revelation should be offended at the
 Force and Fidelity of the Drawing, I confess
 I cannot yet see. For a stronger Proof of
 the Necessity of the Gospel of *Jesus Christ*
 would be hard to find than what I have there
 given, That the *Sages of Greece*, with whom
 all human Wisdom was supposed to be depo-
 sited, had philosophized themselves out of the
 most evident and useful Truth with which
 Mankind hath any Concern. And what
 more honourable Regard could be shewn to
 the Authority of the Sacred Writers, than to
 justify their Censure of the *Greek Philosophy*,
 which both Deists and Fanatics have concur-
 red to represent as a Condemnation of human
 Learning in general!

But as we have often seen Writers deceived
 in their Representations of *Pagan Antiquity*;
 and while zealously busy in giving *such* as they
 imagined favourable to *Christianity*, they have

• *Aug. de Hæresibus.*

been

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been all the time dis-serving it: Lest I too should be suspected to have fallen into the same Delusion, I shall beg leave to shew, that it is just such a Representation of *Antiquity* as is given in the *Divine Legation* which can possibly be of Service to our holy Religion. And that, consequently, if what we have there given be the *true*, it does much Service to it.

This will best appear by considering the two usual Views Men have had, and the consequent Methods they have pursued, in bringing in *Pagan Antiquity* into the Scene.

Their Design has been either to illustrate the *Reasonableness*, or to shew the *Necessity* of *Christianity*.

If the *first*, their Way was to represent Antiquity, as comprehending all the fundamental Truths, concerning God and the Soul, which our holy Religion hath revealed. But as greatly as this Representation was supposed to serve their Purpose, the Infidels, we see, have joined Issue with them; and from their own *Fact*, have endeavoured to shew, with much Plausibility of Reasoning, that therefore *Christianity* was not *necessary*: And this very Advantage, *Tindal* (under Cover of a Principle, which some modern Divines seemed to afford him, of *Christianity's* being only a Republication of the Religion of Nature) obtained against some Writers of great Name.

If their Design was to shew the *Necessity* of *Christianity*, they have then taken the other Course, and (perhaps, out of a Sense of the

former Mischief) run into the opposite Extreme; in representing Antiquity as quite ignorant of the first Principles of Religion, and moral Duty. Nay, not only that it knew nothing, but that nothing could be known: For that human Reason was too weak to make Discoveries in these Matters. Consequently, that *there was never any such thing as natural Religion*: And what Glimmerings of Knowledge Men had of this kind, were only the dying Sparks of primitive Tradition. Here again the Infidels turned their own Artillery upon them, in order to dismount that boasted *Reasonableness* of *Christianity*, on which they had so much insisted: And indeed what room was there left to judge of it, after human Reason had been represented as so weak and blind?

Thus while they were contending for the *Reasonableness*, they destroyed the *Necessity*; and while they urged the *Necessity*, they risked the *Reasonableness* of *Christianity*. And these Infidel Retortions had an almost irresistible Force on the Principles our Advocates seemed to go upon; namely, *that Christianity was only a Republication of a primitive Religion*.

It appears then, that the only View of Antiquity which gives solid Advantage to the *Christian Cause*, is such a one as shews natural Reason to be *clear* enough to perceive Truth, and the *Necessity* of its Deductions when *proposed* and shewn; but not generally *strong* enough to *discover* it, and draw right Deductions from it. Just such a View we have

have given of Antiquity, as far as relates to the Point in question; which we presume to be the *true*, not only in that Point, but likewise with regard to the State of natural Religion in general: Where we find human Reason could penetrate very far into the essential Difference of Things; but wanting the true Principles of Religion, the Ancients neither knew the Origin of Obligation, nor the Consequence of Obedience. *Revelation* has discovered those Principles, and we now wonder, that such Prodigies of Parts and Knowledge could commit the gross Absurdities, that are to be found in their best Treatises of Morality. Which yet does not hinder us from falling into a greater and worse Delusion. For having seen of late several excellent Systems of Morals, under the Title of *The Principles of natural Religion*, that disclaim the Aid of Revelation; we are apt to think them indeed the Discoveries of natural Reason; and so to regard their Excellencies as an Objection to the *Necessity* of any farther Light. The Pretence is plausible; but sure there must be some Mistake at Bottom: and the great Difference in point of Perfection, between these *imaginary* Productions of Reason, and those *real* ones of the most learned Ancients, will increase our Suspicion. The Truth is, these modern System Writers had Aids, which as they do not acknowledge, so, I will believe, they did not perceive. These Aids were the true Principles of Religion,

delivered by *Revelation*: Principles so clear and evident, that they are now mistaken to be amongst our first and simplest Ideas: But those who have studied Antiquity, know the Matter to be far otherwise.

For to conclude with the remarkable Words of *Cicero*, Nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum & ingeniis, ut res tantas quisquam, nisi monstratas, possit videre: neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo adspexerit.

Notwithstanding all that can be said, much Clamour will ever attend Novelties, tho' never so strongly proved, and tho' never so well directed. But Truth seldom thrives the worse for unreasonable Opposition: And it would seem not to be far from its Establishment, when such Writers as the following appear in it's Defence. I could wish indeed he had had an Adversary more worthy him: However, he has made the best of a bad Reasoner. The Nature of his Design has confined him rather to confute Mr. *Jackson's* Sentiments, than to explain his own; yet he hath established those he undertook to defend with such Extent of Learning, and Force of good Argument, that I dare become responsible for all he says; and am willing that those of my Opinions here debated, may stand or fall by the Strength or Invalidity of this Defence.

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CH A P. XVI.

A C R I

CRITICAL INQUIRY
INTO THE
OPINIONS and PRACTICE
OF THE
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, &c.

THE learned Mr. *Jackson*, in his two late Pamphlets, has undertaken to attack several Parts of the *Divine Legation*^a. As to the Merit of the first Piece, we have the following Account of it in his own Words: " I have opposed many Paradoxes of this Author [Mr. *Warburton*] advanced and supported, as he thought, with much Learning. All which I have confuted within a few Pages, and shewn to be nothing but bold Assertions, destitute of Evidence and Truth; and that with all his Glare

^a The first of these Pieces is intitled, *The Belief of a Future State proved to be a Fundamental Article of the Religion of the Hebrews; and the Doctrine of the Ancient Philosophers concerning a Future State, shewn to be consistent with Reason, and their Belief of it demonstrated.*

The second is called, *A Defence of a Book intitled, The Belief of a Future State proved to be a Fundamental Article of the Hebrews, &c.*

" and

“ and Pretences, he has not shewed a Taste of
 “ real Learning in any one of all the Points he
 “ has treated of.” Again ; “ I could easily shew
 “ (if it was worth while) the Weakness and Ab-
 “ surdity of every other Notion advanced in our
 “ Remarker’s Writings^b.”

A complete Victory indeed! not to leave *one single Truth* in the two Volumes. What will become then of those Points which are maintained by Mr. Jackson himself, in common with his learned Adversary? Are the very same Notions plain and clear Truths in his own Writings, and yet bold Assertions, destitute of all Evidence, when found in the *Divine Legation*? Or is the learned Writer so desperately enamoured and fond of Controversy, that, rather than spare his Adversary, he will even answer and confute himself?

“ I could (says he) easily shew the Weakness
 “ and Absurdity of every other Notion advanced
 “ in our Remarker’s Writings.” But, alas! this is no Time to talk of *new Conquests*; it may better become the learned Gentleman to review what is already past. However, I shall make no Exception to what he here says; I do really believe that he could confute every Position in the two Volumes, in as effectual a Manner as he has done any single Point that he has hitherto attacked.

In the following Sheets I shall treat this Gentleman with all the Decency and Respect which are due to his Character in the learned World: If I differ from him with regard to some ancient Facts, ’tis only because he seems, to me at least, to differ from Antiquity itself; ’tis only because I cannot prevail with myself to embrace an Hypothesis, however confidently asserted, when I find

^b Pag. 51. 59. of the second Piece, or *Defence*.

it contrary to plain Fact and the clear Testimony of the best Writers.

CHAP. I.

That the Philosophers did not invariably profess their Belief of a future State; and this Inconstancy of Profession shewn to be a Proof that they did not really believe it.

IN his first Piece the learned Writer undertakes to demonstrate that the Philosophers believed a future State. 'Tis pity but he had given us his Demonstration in a more regular and exact Form. He brings several Passages, (p. 94, 5, 6, 7) in which, according to him, the ancient Sages profess their Belief of another Life. But the Circumstance which he principally insists upon, is, *that they were constant and uniform in this Profession*. This he asserts in more than one Place; p. 73. speaking of a future State, he says, "Surely it is very unreasonable to charge Men with Infidelity in a Point, which they *constantly* and *invariably* profess to believe." Again: "The Philosophers did undoubtedly believe, as well as *constantly* profess a future State of Happiness and Misery," p. 75. And it is remarkable that all his Testimonies are brought to prove this very Point. He ushers them in with these Words: "I shall therefore add, for the more full Satisfaction of the Reader, a few other Passages besides those before set down in these Papers, to shew their [the Philosophers] *constant Profession and Belief* of this most important Doctrine of Religion." p. 94.

Upon

Upon what then does the learned Writer build his Demonstration? Why, upon the *constant* and *uniform* Profession of the Philosophers upon this Subject. Hence he infers their real Belief of another Life; hence he thinks it as unreasonable to charge them with Infidelity in this Point, as the most sincere Believers of *Christianity* itself, p. 99.

Had he represented them as various and inconstant in their teaching on this Head; this, I presume, would have greatly weakened the Force of what he calls his *Demonstration*. To give it therefore the most plausible Appearance, to set it off in the best Colours, he roundly affirms, that they were *uniform* and *constant*, fix'd and *invariable* in their teaching on this Point. Here then I readily join Issue with him, and take upon me to assert, that this *constant* and *uniform* Profession is all a mere Invention of his own, contrived only to serve an Hypothesis; that it has no Foundation in Truth or History; that, to use his own Words, " 'tis a bold Assertion, destitute of Evidence and Truth."

Let us examine it with regard to the School of *Pythagoras*. Mr. Jackson complains that I have said nothing of *Pythagoras* himself, but confined all my Arguments to his Followers and Disciples. "He wisely says nothing against *Pythagoras*, the Head of the School, whom I prov'd to be a constant Professor of this Doctrine," p. 14, 5. I have often indeed been told, that these *common Answerers* would stick at nothing. At the very time that the learned Author wrote this, he could not but know that my *ninth*^a Chapter was employed to prove, that *Pythagoras* did not believe this Doctrine, that the

^a It is the Tenth in this Edition.

Metempsychosis really espoused by him, was purely *physical* and *necessary*; that therefore it must be inconsistent with the Belief of future Rewards and Punishments. *Diogenes Laertius* does not barely say, that *Pythagoras* once profess'd this Doctrine, but that he was the *Author* and *Inventor* of it; and this Circumstance will, I suppose, be enough to shew, that he did *often* declare for it. *Ovid* too mentions this as the fix'd and standing Opinion of this Sect. And what now does Mr. *J.* say to these two, and the other Authorities which I have alledged in the same Chapter? He honestly affirms that I have never touched upon this Point. It is strangely perverse in this worthy Gentleman, to complain that I bring but *few* Testimonies, and yet so cautiously forbear examining those I do bring. However, to give him no just Reason of Complaint, I will add one more. I shall take it from the *D. L. Timæus* then observes, that, “ as to Men of liberal and well disposed Minds, Philosophy alone will be sufficient to keep them within the Bounds of Decency and Order. But when we have to do with Men of a more obstinate and perverse Turn, we are then to apply and inculcate the Doctrine of Punishments both *present and future*, as that endless Torments await the Shades of unhappy Men, and all those Stories which *Homer* records of the ^b infernal

^b *Timæus* here mentions the several Considerations that might be urged to incite Men to the Practice and Pursuit of Virtue. As for those of liberal and well-disposed Minds, Philosophy alone was sufficient for them. But the Multitude were to be influenc'd and restrain'd only by the fear of Punishment. It is evident from hence, that the Doctrine of future Punishment was taught only to and for the Sake of the Populace. Let us go now to Mr. *Jackson's* account of this Passage. “ *Pythagoras*

“ fernal Regions. For as we sometimes cure the
 “ Body with unwholesome Remedies, when such
 “ as are most wholesome have no Effect, so we
 “ restrain those Minds by *false Relations*, which
 “ will not be perswaded by the true: There is a
 “ Necessity therefore, of instilling the Dread of
 “ these *foreign Torments*. As that the Soul shifts
 “ and changes its Habitation; that the Coward
 “ is thrust ignominiously into the Body of a
 “ Woman; the Murderer imprison’d within the
 “ Fur of a Savage.”

It appears from hence, that, in the Opinion of
Pythagoras and his Followers, the common Account of future Punishments was supposed to be false and groundless. Now if they conceived these to be false, the plain Consequence is, that they

“ *thagoras*, to make this Doctrine have the stronger Impres-
 “ sion on the Minds of the Vulgar, represented it under the
 “ sensible fabulous Image of a Transmigration, as *Timæus Ló-*
 “ *crus observes*, imitating the Example of wise Physicians.”
 (p. 91, 2. of 1st Pamph.) Wellfare a good Assurance! He had
 a beggarly Hypothesis to provide for, and he ties it on old
Timæus's Shoulders. As *Timæus Lacrus observes*, says he.
 That is, if you will believe Mr. *Jackson*, this ancient *Pythago-*
rean intimates that there were two Notions of future Punish-
 ments, one more rational and exact, designed for the Philoso-
 phers, one more gross and fabulous, invented only for the
 People. This is said, I suppose, only to shew us what an
 Answerer is capable of; and to what height controversial Con-
 fidence can go. Otherwise on a less noble Occasion, sure he
 would never venture thus to insult the Understanding of every
 Man who has his Eyes, and can read: And who sees that *Ti-*
mæus his Complaint against the People was, not that they
 were influenced by one kind of Punishment rather than another,
 but that they were only to be influenced by the Fear of Punish-
 ment in general; and not to be govern’d by Motives of a more
 excellent and noble Nature? *Timæus* therefore, they will say,
 could never distinguish between different sorts of Punishments,
 and confine his Censure to one kind only, when it was his De-
 sign to shew that the People were wrong in being influenced by
 the Fear of any Punishments whatsoever.

could

could not hold any future Punishments whatsoever. This will be explained at large in the *fourth* Chapter.

It is evident from this Passage of *Timæus*, that *Pythagoras* must reject the common and popular account of a future State. The first Question then is, Did he substitute any other in the room of it? Dr. *Sykes* assures us that he did. The next Point then will be, What was that Account so substituted? Why, says the Doctor, (*Vindication*, p. 14.) “It was that the Soul was to pass and migrate, without Interruption, from one Body to another.” Let me then ask another Question, Had this new Migration any *moral* Purpose and Design, or not? If it had, how could it be said to be substituted by *Pythagoras*, as the *moral* Metempsychosis was known and taught so long before him? But if the Doctor will still say, that this Doctrine of *Pythagoras* was a novel and refined Notion, must he not allow too, that it had *no moral* Purpose and Design? And is not this allowing all that I contend for?

Mr. *Jackson* has mentioned two of the Followers of *Pythagoras*, as really believing a future State; *Empedocles* and *Epicharmus*, p. 91. It is not my Design to dispute with him, whether they professed this Notion: The only Question will be whether they were fix'd and settled, constant and invariable in the Profession of it. The learned Gentleman must say they were; but then he must say it at the Expence of Truth; in direct Contradiction to the Voice of Antiquity, which plainly and evidently speaks against him. *Plutarch*, in his fifth Book *De Placitis*, gives the following Account of the Doctrine of *Empedocles*. “*Empedocles* held Death to be a Separation of the fiery Substance from the other Parts, and
I “ therefore

“therefore supposed that Death was common to the Soul and Body.” Now here Mr. *Jackson* tells us, that *Plutarch* has made a GREAT BLUNDER. Was not the Man extremely habituated to ill Language, one might have expected that so very candid and learned an Ancient should have been treated with more Ceremony. But what stronger Proof can the Reader desire of the Falseness and Absurdity of Mr. *Jackson's* Account of ancient Philosophy, than this Confession that it contradicts *Plutarch's*, the most knowing of the Ancients^d?

However

^c Εμπεδοκλής τοι θάνατον γένησθαι διαχωρισμοί τε πυρός, ἐξ ὧν ἡ συγκρίσις τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συνέσθην. ὥς κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. c. 25.

^d *Empedocles* has been charged by considerable Writers with holding some very extravagant and wild Notions concerning the human Soul. To the Testimony of *Plutarch* we may add that of *Cicero*: *Empedocles* animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. 1 *Tusc.* 9. *Macrobius* affirms the same: *Plato* dixit animam essentiam esse se moventem; *Empedocles* & *Critias* sanguinem. In *Somn. Scip.* 1, 14. And the following Verse of *Empedocles* himself might furnish a fair Occasion for this Notion.

Αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικαρδίον ἐστὶ νοῦμα.

Vid *Davisius* ad *Cic. Tusc.* 1, 9. These are great Authorities; and have, I presume, betray'd some learned Moderns into a worse Opinion of *Empedocles* than he really deserv'd. *Empedocles* constabat animam ex æthereâ et aeriâ substantiâ. *Vossius* de *Orig. et Prog. Idol.* 3, 40. And the great *Gassendi* himself assures us, that the Soul, according to *Empedocles*, was supposed to be corporeal, naturæ igneæ, aeriæ, aqueæ, terrenæ. *Animad. in Diog. Laert.* l. 10. p. 495. Now I would not say with these learned Writers, that any of the Opinions hitherto assigned, was firmly and constantly maintained by *Empedocles* himself; all I would infer from the Testimony of the Ancients, is, that he did sometimes declare for some of them. Otherwise, whence comes it, that so good Authors charge him with making these Professions? Does not indeed the Verse, just cited, plainly shew that he sometimes deliver'd the Doctrine which they impute to him?

However, to save Time and cut short all unnecessary Cavil, let it be allowed that *Empedocles* was constant and uniform as to this Point; that he never declared for the Mortality of the Soul: Yet it must be remember'd that he was a *Follower* of *Pythagoras*; that therefore the Notion of a future State, really embraced by him, was nothing more than a mere physical Migration of the Soul from one Body to another, destitute of all moral Purpose and Design.

Let us go next to *Epicarmus*. *Sextus Empiricus* has charged him with the Denial of all future Rewards and Punishments, in Terms too strong to be evaded. "It is evident, that *Epicurus* stole his Principles from the Poets. As to that famous Tenet of his, that *Death is nothing to us*, he borrow'd it from *Epicarmus*, who says, I neither look upon the Act of dying, or the State that succeeds it, as of any Consequence and Importance to me." *Plutarch*, in one part of his Piece on *Consolation*, address'd

to
It is not my Business or Design to prove, that he was constant and uniform in these Professions; if he did sometimes declare on this Side, 'tis enough to justify the Argument I am here establishing.

But supposing he taught these Doctrines of the Soul, how does it follow, that he at the same time rejected and denied the Notion of a future State? To this I reply, that *Cicero*, in the Beginning of the first *Tusculan*, explains the several Opinions, which are here attributed to *Empedocles*; and whichever of these, says he, is admitted, the Consequence is, that the Soul must die with the Body.

* Ο δὲ Ἐπικύρου φησὶν αὐτὸν τὰ κρατιστα τῶν δόγμα τῶν παλαιῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων — τοῦ δὲ θανάτου οὐ μὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Ἐπικαρμὸς αὐτὸν προσημύνηκεν, εἰπὼν, ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τεθῆναι ἡ μὴ διαφέρει. *Sextus Empiricus* ad *Grammaticos*, Sect. 273. I did indeed know that I had to do with a Writer whom a little thing could not stop. However, I did not think he would have been hardy enough to attack this Passage. *Cicero* him-

to *Apollonius*, employs many Arguments to prove, that Death would not be attended with any real Misery. To establish and confirm this,

self, in his first *Tusculan*, interprets this Line of *Epicarmus* in the very Sense I have here given. A. *Agē jam concedo non esse miseros, qui mortui sunt; quoniam extorsisti ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne miseros quidem esse posse.* M. *Ecqui ergo intelligis, quantum mali de humanā conditione dejeceris?* A. *Quonam modo?* M. *Quia, si mori etiam mortuis miserum esset, infinitum quoddam et sempiternum malum haberemus in vita. Nunc video calcem, ad quam cum sit decursus, nihil sit præterea extimescendum. Sed tu mihi videris Epicarmi, acuti, nec infulsi hominis, ut Siculi, sententiam sequi.* “*Emorino: lo: sed me esse mortuum nihil æstimo.*” c. 8.

And does not *Sextus Empiricus* say, that these Words contain the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, as well as *Epicarmus*? Now if they contain the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, must they not of course be supposed to exclude all future Rewards and Punishments? However, if the Gentleman will insist that *Epicurus* himself believ’d another Life, I am not yet so fond of Controversy, as to dispute it with him.

However, let us hear him out. On this Passage he thus descants: “To die is not our Concern, it belongs only to God to dispose of Life and Death.”—But is it then of no real Concern or Interest to *one’s self*, whether Man is designed for a State of future Rewards and Punishments or not? No, says Mr. J. “It only belongs to God to dispose of Life and Death.” But, on Supposition, that there *are* future Rewards and Punishments, is it not of Concern to *me* too, in what manner God will dispose of me hereafter? Had *Epicarmus* taught, that God was to appoint the Soul a State of future Happiness or Misery, is it possible to conceive that *Epicurus* would have adopted this Principle? Or, in this Case, is it possible that *Tully* should alledge the Passage, as containing a Principle, on which Death must be considered as a State of mere Insensibility?

Well, but, says Mr. J. I have produc’d a Passage, in which *Epicarmus* profess’d the Doctrine of another Life. But, instead of one, had he produced one Hundred, would this have had any Force in the present Argument? Have I ever denied that *Epicarmus* does sometimes assert this Notion? Or will his sometimes speaking for it prove, in Opposition to plain and direct Evidence, that he never spoke against it?

he cites the following Words of *Epicarmus* :

“ The Parts of which you are compounded will
 “ be separated at Death ; and each will return to
 “ the Place from which it originally came. The
 “ Earth will be restored to Earth, and the Spirit
 “ will ascend upwards. What is there terrible
 “ or grievous in this ^f ?” But to this our Au-
 thor has a ready Answer. His *Rhetoric* is always
 at hand to help out his *Logic*. ’Tis no more than
 this, *Plutarch* was a GREAT BLUNDERER. But
 who is the *Blunderer*, that is, who is most
 likely to understand *Epicarmus*’s Meaning, whe-
 ther *Plutarch* or Mr. *Jackson*, I think I may
 safely leave to the Reader’s Decision.—But does
 not *Epicarmus* say, “ That the Soul was to
 “ ascend into *Heaven* ?” I would not advise our
 Author to trust too much to this single Circum-
 stance, till he has well considered the following
 Lines of *Lucretius* :

Cedit enim retro, de terra quod fuit ante,
 In terras : et quod missum est ex ætheris oris,
 Id rursus cæli rellatum templa receptant.

L. ii.

Teles, another Follower of *Pythagoras*, speaks
 strongly to the same Purpose ; he considers Death
 as the very End and Period of our Being ; com-
 pares the State which succeeds it, to that which
 precedes our Birth. He thus addresses himself
 to one grieved and afflicted for the Loss of a de-
 ceased Friend : “ You complain, says he, that
 “ your Friend will never exist more ; but re-
 “ member that he had no Existence ten thou-
 “ sand Years ago, that he did not live in the

^f Καλὸς οὖν οἱ Ἐπιχάρμης συνεκρίθη, φησὶ, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπὸ-
 δειν ὁδὸν ἤλθε πάλιν, γὰρ μὴ εἰς γὰρ, πνεῦμα δ’ αὖτις τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν
 λαμβάνει ; ὡς αὖ. Xyl. Ed. 110.

"Time of the *Trojan War*, nor even in much
 "later Periods. This, it seems, does not move
 "you; all your Concern is, because he will not
 "exist for the future &." How would *Epicurus*
 have

Ἐ ΑΛΛ' ἔστιν ἔσθαι. ὅδε γὰρ ἡ μνηστικὴ ἱστορία, ὅδ' ἐπὶ τῷ Τρωϊκῷ,
 ὅδε κατὰ τὰς προσηγορίας σου. σὺ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τούτων οὐκ ἀχθῇ, ὅτι δὲ
 εἰς ὕστερον οὐκ ἔσθαι, δυσχεραίνεις. Stobæus Mor. Ec. c. 106. What
 he here says, is, that it would be as absurd to complain, that
 any one does not subsist after Death, as that he did not exist
 before his Birth; as if we were no more interested in the State
 which succeeds our Death, than in that which precedes our
 Birth.

Fabricius has ranked this *Teles* among the Followers of
Pythagoras. But this we are told is a gross Mistake. How
 so! why, "*Jamblichus* gives a large Catalogue of all
 "the noted Scholars and Followers of *Pythagoras*, and yet does
 "not mention *Teles*." But if he only proposed a Catalogue
 of the most noted Followers of *Pythagoras*; is it not possible
 that he might omit *Teles*? And, what is more, does not
Jamblichus himself tell us, that many real and unquestion'd
 Followers of *Pythagoras* were not actually inserted in this List?
 τῶν δὲ συμπαντῶν Πυθαγορείων, τὰς μὲν ἀφ' ὧν τὰς τε καὶ ἀνώνυ-
 μοις τινὰς πολλοὺς εἰκος γέγονε. "I will, says he, here
 "mention only the most celebrated." And then he gives his
 Catalogue. De vit. Pyth. Sect. 267.

But the very Sentiment and Language of the Passage is such
 as could not possibly come from a Follower of *Pythagoras*.
 Why not? Has it not been just shewn that *Epicharmus*, an un-
 doubted Follower of *Pythagoras*, did actually sometimes use the
 same Language and Doctrine with *Epicurus*? Why then might
 not other Disciples of this School do the same? Did not *Ari-
 stoxenus* consider the Soul as the mere Harmony of the Body?
 Must he not therefore of Course deny all Future and Pre-ex-
 istence? And we are informed on very good Authority, that
 other Disciples of this School were in the very same Senti-
 ments. Olympiodorus in Phædōem, Pythagoreos animam
 ex harmoniâ ait composuisse. Gale in Jamblich. de Myst. p.
 226. And some others of the same Sect seem to have run
 into very extravagant and wild Notions concerning the hu-
 man Soul. *Aristotle* assures us that many of them agreed even
 with *Democritus* and *Leucippus*, and consider'd the Soul as no-
 thing more than mere Atoms. Εἰκοι δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν Πυθα-
 γορείων λεγόμενον, τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαβολὰν (as the Principles of *De-
 mocritus*

have accosted his Friend on the same Occasion?
Why, in the very same Language,

Respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas
Temporis æterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.
Hoc igitur nobis speculum Natura futuri
Temporis exponit, post mortem denique no-
stram.

Lucretius.

So much for *Pythagoras* and his Followers.
The learned Writer undertakes to *demonstrate*
their Belief of another Life: And for this he
appeals to their *constant* and *invariable* Professions
on this Head. But, in opposition to this, we
have shewn that they were far from being *uniform*
and consistent in what they taught on this Point.
Having therefore overturn'd the very Foundation
on which he builds, we need give ourselves no
farther Trouble; we may now leave his pretend-
ed Demonstration to shift for itself, as it best may.

Let us go next to *Aristotle* and his Disciples:
And here the learned Writer gives us but one

moeritus and *Leucippus*.) φασαν γὰρ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ΨΥΧΗΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ
ΤΑ ΕΝ ΤΩ ΑΕΡΙ ΖΙΣΜΑΤΑ. De Anima, 1, 2. In saying this,
I am far from any Thought of insinuating that this was the
general Sentiment of this Sect. All that I endeavour and in-
tend to shew, is the Rashness and Unreasonableness of what
this learned Man has been pleased to assert in so very dogma-
tical and overbearing a Manner, viz. that no Follower of *Py-
thagoras* could be supposed to deny the Existence of the Soul,
either in a prior or future State.

As for the rest, I readily allow that the general Principles
of this School, suppos'd the Existence of the Soul after Death;
but then they confin'd it to Migrations from one Body to ano-
ther by a Necessity *merely physical*. Here then was no room for
the Belief of future Rewards and Punishments, in the proper
and exact Sense of those Words. As to this *Teles*, the learned
Gataker speaks of him in the following Manner, in l. 5.
§ 33. of *Antoninus*: *Teles Pythagoricus, de exilio, apud Sto-
beum tom. 2. tit. 40.*

Testimony, and that from the Piece *De Mundo*.
 “ *Aristotle* says, Justice is always the Attendant
 “ of God, to punish those who depart from the
 “ divine Laws: Whoever therefore will be blef-
 “ sed and happy (hereafter) ought immediately
 “ in the Beginning of his Life to be Partaker of
 “ her.” p. 96. But does not Mr. J. know that
 this very Piece has been discarded and set aside,
 by Men of the first Name in the learned World,
 as not really belonging to *Aristotle*? Have not
 the two *Scaligers*, *Is. Casaubon*, *Salmasius*, *Dan.*
Heinfus, *Gassendi*, with several other Critics of
 the first Rank, long since endeavoured to prove
 that it is no Treatise of his? And if others have
 declared for the contrary Opinion, yet surely the
 Point is not yet determined in their Favour, nor is
 the Book in Dispute commonly received as the
 Work of *Aristotle*. He introduces it thus, “ *Ari-*
 “ *stotle* says.” Would not any one now imagine
 that he appeals to some real and undoubted Work
 of *Aristotle*? As his Argument rests on this single
 Authority, would not any one have presumed it
 should have been so circumstanced, that no rea-
 sonable Exception could lie against it ^h?

With

^h What is it which I here censure but this, That our Author
 should have appealed to some undoubted Work of *Aristotle*?
 some Work which was universally allow'd to belong to him;
 to which no reasonable Exception could be raised on this Score?
 What then had he to do in this Case? Why, to shew that
 this Piece *De Mundo* was a real and unquestioned Work of
Aristotle's? And how does he shew this? By observing that
 several Critics have declared it to be genuine. But this is no
 more than what I had allowed before; “ and if others have
 “ declared for the contrary Opinion, yet surely the Point is
 “ not yet determined in their Favour.” If then our Author
 would speak to the Purpose, he should shew that the Point is
 already determined in their Favour. Otherwise 'tis doubtful
 and uncertain whether this Work belongs to *Aristotle*; and
 therefore

With regard then to *Aristotle*, where has he proved his *constant Profession* of another Life? So far from it, he has not hitherto proved that he ever professed it.

And therefore 'tis doubtful and uncertain, so far as appears by Mr. *Jackson's* Evidence, whether *Aristotle* ever declared for another Life.

Well, but "better Evidence than mine have allowed the Book, and cited it as genuine." That is, greater Critics than the two *Scaligers*, *Jf. Casaubon*, *Salmasius*, *Dan. Heinsius*, and *Gassendi*.—But come, 'tis well it's no more. To confess the Truth, the least I expected was to hear them all called BLUNDERERS. Who then are these, who "must needs be" better Judges of the Genuineness of ancient Books than any "modern Authors can be?" The critical Reader will smile, as little disposed as Critics are to indulge themselves in this *weakness*, when he hears them named. They are *Stobæus* an old blind Scholiast, *Apuleius* a fanatic Platonist, and *Justin*, a pious *Christian* Martyr. But see now the *true Judgment*, and, what always goes along with it, the *Equity*, of our Author. Three Writers, none of them pretending to Criticism, are opposed in a Point of Criticism, in which their Age gave them no Advantage, to half a Dozen the most consummate Critics that ever lived: While, on the other hand, in a Matter of Fact, relating to ancient Opinions, Mr. *Jackson* opposes his own *modern Judgment* against *Plutarch* who was a Critic indeed. But has he never heard that many Works of Antiquity which have passed undisputed amongst the most learned Ancients have been detected, to the Satisfaction of the whole learned World by modern Critics? This he might have heard, tho' I don't suspect he knows any thing himself of the vast Improvements made in the *Art of Criticism* in these latter Ages.

But his laying so great Stress on the Testimony of *Justin* Martyr does Honour to his Judgment. If *Justin* was so able to judge what Works properly belonged to *Aristotle*, one would imagine he could not be an intire Stranger to his Sentiments on the Point in question. And yet, according to him, *Aristotle* maintain'd the *Mortality* of the Soul. *Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ, ἐντελέχεια ψυχῆς οὐμαζὼν ΟΥΚ ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ, ἀλλὰ ΘΝΗΤΗΝ αὐτῇ ἐναι βέλεται*. *Paræn.*

At last, conscious, as it were, that this Passage from the *Piece De Mondo* is nothing to his Purpose, he will now supply the Vacancy with one from *Plutarch*, "who says, *Aristotle*

And as he has not yet proved, so we may without Presumption venture to affirm, that he never will prove the Point in question. He must first set aside the Authority of *Aristotle* himself; the following Passages will prove this, and therefore may serve to shew that he pursues a desperate Adventure, whenever he engages in an Undertaking of this kind ⁱ. In one Place having said,
 “ That

“ taught, that the Body only and not the Soul was subject
 “ to Death, for that the Soul did not die.” To see how Things will change! *O World thy slippery Turns!* as the Poet says. This *Plutarch*, who was but now a great BLUNDERER, and whose Word would not be taken for a Farthing when he answers for the Opinion of *Epicharmus*, no sooner tells us what was the Opinion of *Aristotle* on the very same Point, but he becomes irrefragable. 'Tis pity that so neat a Piece of *passee passee* should be thrown away to no Purpose. For against whom does he urge this Testimony of *Aristotle* for the Soul's Immortality? Not against Mr. *Warburton* sure, who has not only allowed, but even asserted that *Aristotle* held the Immortality of the Soul. But this was very consistent with the Disbelief of all future Rewards and Punishments, as the Soul was to be resolved into the divine Substance, and, in consequence of this Refusion, to lose its separate and distinct Existence.

But, what is still worse, *Plutarch* does, in the very Book from which this Testimony is brought, assure us, that, according to *Aristotle*, the Soul was MORTAL. *Αριστοτέλης και Δικαιάρχος, το καθ' ενθουσιασμον μονον παρεισθαγοισι, ΑΘΑΝΑΤΟΝ ΜΕΝ ΕΝΑΙ ΕΥΝΟΜΟΝ ΖΟΝΤΕΣ ΤΗΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ, ΘΙΟΥ ΔΕ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΜΕΤΕΧΕΙΝ ΑΥΤΩ.* *De placitis* l. 5. 1. And if Mr. *J.* has any better way of reconciling these apparent Inconsistencies in the same Author than by the Doctrine of the *Refusion*, he would oblige the World with the Discovery.

ⁱ In the first Edition I alledged two Quotations to prove that *Aristotle* sometimes spoke of a future State with *Diffidence* and *Doubt*. In his *Ethics* to *Nicom.* (l. 10.) he proposes it as a Problem, “ Whether any Man can be happy after Death,” and asks, “ Whether this would not be strangely absurd, according to his own System, which supposes that Happiness consists in Operation.” I will now give these Passages with the Context. He begins the Chapter thus: “ May then no Man be denominated happy, while he remains in Life, but
 “ must

“ That many of the Powers and Faculties of
 “ Man would be destroyed at Death,” he adds,
 “ But the Mind *perhaps* is more Divine, and not
 “ so liable to Corruption and Decay.” Ο δὲ ψυ-
 χῆς θεοτερον τι, καὶ ἀφθαρ- 1519. De anima,
 1, 5. Again. “ As to the Mind and Under-
 “ standing, we can pronounce nothing certain
 “ concerning it. But it seems to be a kind of
 “ Soul;

“ must we, according to Solon, wait for the Day of his
 “ Death before we pronounce him so? And if we allow this,
 “ is he to be supposed happy after his Departure out of this
 “ Life? Or would not this be strangely absurd, especially ac-
 “ cording to my own System, which makes Happiness consist in
 “ Operation? Now if we do not pronounce the dead Man happy,
 “ and if Solon did not mean that the Dead enjoy any real
 “ Happiness, but only that they might be called happy, as
 “ being out of the Reach of all Evil and Misery; even still
 “ there will be room for Difficulties and Doubts. For there
 “ seems to be something Good and Evil to the Dead, as well
 “ as there is to the Living, *alibi* he is insensible of it, and
 “ does not really perceive it, as Honour and Disgrace, and the
 “ good and ill Fortune of his Children and Posterity.” Now
 is not my Inference modest and temperate enough, when I
 only endeavour to prove from hence that Aristotle sometimes
 speaks of a future State with Diffidence and Doubt? For does
 he not evidently argue on the Supposition that there was no
 future State? Or what was this Good and Evil, of which Men
 were not to be sensible, and which they were not to perceive?

I had cited another Passage from Aristotle, c. 11. in which
 he says, “ It may be disputed whether the Dead are sensible
 “ of any Happiness or Misery.” The Point he proposes to
 debate, is, “ Whether the Dead were affected with the good
 “ or ill Fortune of their Friends and Relations.” But, says
 he, it may be question’d whether the Dead are sensible of
 any Happiness or Misery. And on *Supposition* that they were,
 he declares that the Happiness or Misery of others would have
 a very slight and inconsiderable Effect upon them; would not
 deprive those of Happiness who were already in Possession of
 it, or confer it upon those who were already miserable. —
 When he speaks of the Happiness and Misery of the Dead,
 I suppose that he speaks only hypothetically, or upon suppo-
 sition that there was to be a future State. And indeed no
 other

"Soul, and the only kind that can exist separate and distinct from Body, as an immortal Substance from one that is mortal." l. 2, 2.

Περι δὲ τῆς νῦν καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως ΟΥΔΕΝΩ ΦΑΝΕΡΩΝ. ἀλλ' ΕΟΙΚΕ ψυχῆς ἅμους στερον εἶναι. καὶ τὸ το μόνον ἐνδεχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίον τῷ φθαρτῷ.

But let us come to Passages of more Importance; in which he delivers his Opinion in more positive and direct Terms. Speaking of his *Agens intellectus*, or active Intellect, he declares "That this only is immortal and eternal; and that the passive intellect is mortal^k." Since then he declares that the active Intellect only was immortal, it will be necessary to state and explain what he means by these Words; for if the human

other Method of Interpretation will be consistent with what he himself delivers on this very Point in the last Chapter. But Mr. J. assures us, that this Passage of *Aristotle* makes directly against me. And how does he prove this? Why, from these Words, "It seems therefore (adds he, viz. *Aristotle*) that the Dead are somewhat affected with the Prosperity and Adversity of their Friends, but so, and in such a Degree, as neither to make those unhappy who are happy, or vice versa." p. 21. Now, unluckily, this Passage does not belong to *Aristotle*; it contains, as *Victorius* observes, the Words of some Scholiast, that were afterwards inserted into the Text. As therefore the Gentleman's Argument receives all its Force from the Supposition that these were the Words of *Aristotle*, I need stay no longer upon it.

However let it be observed that no great Stress was laid on this Testimony. It was only brought to shew that *Aristotle* sometimes spoke of a future State with Uncertainty and Doubt; and that he did so, is very clear from other Places. If therefore any Exceptions be made to what I have observ'd on this Passage, I am not so fond of my Interpretation, as to engage further in the Defence of it. Whatever may be objected to the Exactness of this particular Quotation, it makes no Alteration in the Question itself. The Point which it was alledged to prove, is sufficiently made good by many others.

^k χωρίζεις δὲ, ἐστὶ μόνον τὸ ὅσπερ ἐστὶ. καὶ τὸ το μόνον, ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίον.

Soul was not supposed to be really and actually a Part of this *Agens intellectus*, it could not be supposed to be immortal on the Principles of *Aristotle*. "Now what *Aristotle's agent Under-*
standing is, and whether it be any Thing in
 "us, any Faculty of our human Soul or no,
 "seems to be a thing very questionable, and has
 "therefore caused much Dispute amongst his In-
 "terpreters; it being resolved by many of them
 "to be the *divine Intellect*, and commonly by
 "others, a foreign Thing." *Cudworth's Intel-*
lect. Syst. p. 55.

If it was something foreign, 'tis impossible that *Aristotle* should maintain the Immortality of the human Soul; because he expressly declares that his *Agens intellectus* only was immortal.

If the *Agens intellectus* and the *divine Intellect* were one and the same, what will become of the Immortality of the human Soul? Mr. *Jackson's* Principles will not suffer him to assert, that the human Soul was the same with the *divine Intellect*.

The general Opinion indeed is, that the *Agens intellectus* of *Aristotle* was the very same with the *Anima mundi* of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. Let then our Author tell us, was the human Soul supposed to be Part of the *Anima mundi* or not? If he answers in the Affirmative, he must give up one main Part of the Controversy, as he allows that the Soul of Man was consider'd as Part of the universal Soul, or God. If he answers in the Negative, he must no longer insist that the human Soul, according to *Aristotle*, was immortal; because *Aristotle* himself declares that nothing was immortal but the *active Intellect*.

But to proceed; it evidently appears from *Aristotle* himself, that all particular Sensations and
 Reflections

fections were to cease at Death. He tells us that the Soul would not *joy or grieve, love or hate*, nor be subject to any Passions of this kind after its Separation from the Body. This, it may be said, relates only to the animal Life. But let it be observed that the Soul was to be deprived of all its intellectual and reasoning Faculties, as well as the Passions and Affections above mention'd; it was no longer to *remember, think, or understand*¹, and must it not therefore be absolutely lost to all the Purposes and Intents of another Life?

We may then be certain that an ancient Writer did not carry his Censure too far, when he charges him with *denying a future State*, and giving great Encouragement to Men of perverse and wicked Dispositions by this Doctrine^m. I will give another

¹ το δε ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ, και ΦΙΛΕΙΝ, η ΜΙΣΕΙΝ, ουκ εστι κεινου παδη, αλλα τωδ' τη εχοντες κεινο η κεινο εχει. διο και τωτον φειρομενον, ουτε ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕΙ, ουτε ΦΙΛΕΙ. *De Anima*, 1. 5. And in the Passage last cited, having declared that the *active Intellect* only was immortal and eternal, he adds, ου μνημονοουμεν δε. ο δε τωτο μιν απαδεις. οδε παθητικος νους φθαγτος. ΚΑΙ ΑΝΕΙΤΟΥΤΟΥ ΟΥΔΕΝ ΝΟΕΙ 3, 6.

^m Συνεργος αν ουτος γε και συναγωνιστης των ειδωλων αδικειν. φανειν. πας γαρ τις ανθρωπος ων, και ταις ανθρωπιναις ορεξεισι κατισχημενος, αν καταφρονηση των θιων, και μηδεν νομιση προς αυτον, πορρω μιν αυτων απωχισματος εν τω ζην, ΑΙΟΘΑΝΩΝ ΔΕ ΟΥΔΕ ΕΤΙ ΩΝ, ετοιμος αν ελθοι προς το χαριζεσθαι ταις επιθυμiais. *Euseb. Præp. Evan.* 15, 5. They are the Words of *Atticus Severus*. Φοβερωτατος δ' ο θανατος. περας γαρ. και εδην επι τω τωδεσσι δοκει, οτε αγαθον, οτε κακον ειναι. *Eth. ad Ni.* 3, 6. Mr. J. translates the Words thus, "Death is the most dreadful (of Evils :) For it is the last of Evils, or the Period of them, and after this there remains, *as it seems*, to the Dead no Sense, of either Good or Evil.—Death is the most dreadful of all Evils." How so? Why, because it is "the last of Evils, or the Period of them." Excellent! as if the Ancients would have called it, "the most dreadful of all Evils," barely because it was to put a Period to all Evils.

When

other Passage from *Aristotle* himself: "Death,
 " says he, is of all Things the most terrible; for
 " it is the final Period of Existence; and beyond
 " that

When they consider Death in this Light, they represent it as a Benefit and Advantage. This appears from the Words of *Cæsar*. *Cicero*, speaking of Death, says, Sin perimit ac delet omnino, quid melius quam in mediis vitæ doloribus obdormiscere, & ita conniventem somno consopiri sempiterno? 1 Tusc. οἷος γὰρ ἐν πολλοῖσιν, ὡς ἐγώ, κακοῖς ζῆ, πῶς οὐ κατθανὼν ΚΕΡΔΟΣ φορεῖ. *Sophocles Antig.*

But *Aristotle* says, "There remains, as it seems, to the
 " Dead no Sense of either Good or Evil." Does not he then speak with Diffidence and Doubt? And well he may, when Mr. *Jackson* undertakes to be his Interpreter. But there is none in his own *Greek*, ὅθεν ἐπὶ τῷ τελευτῶντι δοκεῖ, ἐπὶ ἀγαθόν, ἐπὶ κακὸν εἶναι. Which is literally—and beyond that, it appears, there is neither Good nor Evil for the Dead Man to dread or hope. The Ambiguity, from which the supposed Diffidence arises, is only in Mr. *Jackson's English*. Besides, suppose *Aristotle* to intimate any Diffidence and Doubt of a future State in the last Words, you make him contradict himself in the very same Breath. "Death, says he, is the End of
 " our Being; no, adds he, it is not the End; it only seems
 " to be the End of our Being."

But Mr. *J.* very gravely asks, "What has this Passage to
 " do with a future State?" p. 23. To do, does he ask? Why, what has the Night to do with Darkness, or Mr. *Jackson* with his own absurd Reasoning? Are they not both connected by a Necessity of Nature? By long Controversy the Man has not only disputed away other People's Sense, but his own.

He objects too to my Version. I have translated Πέραν, *The final Period of Existence*. He translates it, *the last of Evils, or the Period of them*. The Absurdity of which I have exposed above; so that even the unlearned Reader sees his cannot be right. At the same time he sees that mine may, because the last Part of this Passage plainly confirms it. For if Death was not the final Period of our Being; why might there not seem to be some real Misery and Happiness beyond it?

Hoc magis de vulgario, quam de Aristotelis ipsius sententia dictum est. Muret. in ver. Πέραν. He would not willingly allow that *Aristotle* entertained this very impious and absurd Notion. However, as to the Meaning of this Word, he knew it could admit of no Dispute.

“ that, it appears, there is neither Good nor Evil
 “ for the dead Man to dread or hope.” Mr.
Botte, referring to this very Testimony, says,
 “ The Passage cited out of *Aristotle’s* *Ethics*, is
 “ *decisive enough*,” p. 152. It is indeed much
 the same with this of *Cæsar*, In luctu atque miseriis,
 mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse,
 eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere; *ultra neque*
curæ neque gaudio locum esse. Sallust *Waf.* Ed. p.
 161*. Our Author objects to my Translation of
 this Passage of *Aristotle*; “ The Words to *dread*
 “ or *hope* are to stand for the Sense of a single
 “ Verb (*ειναι*) which signifies neither of them.”
 And why not? It would be well if he never
 made worse Substitutes. *Aristotle* says, “ The
 “ dead Man has no Sense of Good or Evil.”
 And does not this necessarily imply that there was
 nothing for him to *dread* or *hope*? How then do
 I make this Passage bear more than it will strictly
 carry? Would we know what several of his Fol-
 lowers thought of this Point? *Stobæus* shall in-
 form us. Now he tells us very plainly, that they
 supposed the Soul to be a mere Quality; that it
 would at Death be resolved *εις το μη ειναι*, or sunk
 into a State of Non-existenceⁿ.

Let

* It would be strange (Mr. *J.* tells us) for *Aristotle* to say,
 that beyond a State of Non-existence there was no Good or Evil
 for the Dead to dread or hope, p. 23. How low will a di-
 stressed Caviller descend! *Aristotle* forms no such senseless
 Proposition: What he says is this, that Death is the Period
 of our Being; and then, by way of Amplification, adds,
 and beyond it there is no real Happiness or Misery. But when
 Mr. *J.* wants a Cover for his Blunders, it is fit that *Aristotle*
 himself, tho’ never luxuriant in the Dress of Words, should
 go naked.

ⁿ Εἰ δὲ ὡς δυναμὶς υποκείμενη, ὡς περ δὲ ἀρμονία λύρας ἡ τελειότης
 προαφιστάται τοῦ σώματος, οὕτω ἀποθνήσκει ἡ ψυχὴ προφθεύεται

μὲ

Let us come to the Stoics. And they too, we shall find, have often proclaimed their Disbelief of another Life, in the most absolute and strong Terms. The following Testimonies will prove this beyond all Exception, and so may serve to inform us, that the learned Author has all along been imposing a fanciful Hypothesis, as contrary to the Evidence of all Antiquity, as it is to the Principles of the *D. L.*

Quid hoc est, inquam, mors tam sæpe expetitur me? faciat. at ego illam diu expertus sum. quando, inquis? antequam nascerer. mors est non esse. id quale sit jam scio, hoc erit post me quod ante me fuit. siquid in hac re tormenti est, necesse est et fuisse antequam prodiremus in lucem. Atqui nullam sensimus tunc vexationem. Rogo non stultissimum dicas, si quis existimet lucernæ pejus esse cum extincta est, quam antequam accenderetur? Nos quoque accendimur et extinguimur, medio illo tempore aliquid patimur. Utrunque vero alta securitas est. In hoc enim, mi Lucili, nisi fallor, erramus, quod mortem judicamus sequi, quum illa et præcesserit et secutura sit. Quicquid ante nos fuit, mors est. Quid enim refert utrum non incipias an desinas, cum utriusque rei hic sit effectus, non esse? The learned *Gataker* refers us to this very Passage as a Proof that *Se-*

μην εδαμως, εδε γαρ δια κινήσεως προσιόν ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ, ΑΛΛ' ΕΞΑΙΦΡΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΜΗ ΕΙΝΑΙ αφιγεται αχρονως και ανευ φθορας, ωσπερ δε και εστιν οτ' εστι, αθροως, οιον αφεαπνης, ελλαμψεως, —
 ΗΕ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ ΠΕΡΙΠΑΤΗΤΙΚΟΙ ΔΟΞΗΣ ΠΡΟΒΕΙΣΤΗΚΑΣΙΝ.
Phys. Ecl. p. 116.

Grotius was so far from suspecting that *Aristotle* believed a future State, that he puts him on the same Foot with *Epicurus* himself in this Respect. Speaking of this Doctrine, he says, "Gentes vero nullam habebant ea de re divinam Revelati-
 onem. *Epicurus et Aristoteles nihil ejus credebant.*" *Ephes. ii. 12.*

Seneca sometimes declared against a future State.
(*Præloquium to Antoninus*.)

Brevis

• *Nil admirari* was the great Principle of *Horace's* wise Man: I am sure it ought to be the first Preparative of Mr. *Jackson's* wise Readers. Without this Viaticum they will be in Danger of falling into Surprise at this Author's Observation on this Passage from *Seneca*.—" *Seneca*, says he, is speaking " only of sensitive and bodily Passions, of the Pain and Death " which puts an End to the *animal Life*, and all the Affec- " tions of it." p. 26.

But does not this learned Man know, that this of *Seneca* is the very Language which the *Epicureans* themselves use? The very Language which the Ancients often employ, when they professedly design to represent Death as the utter End and Extinction of our Being? That this was the Language of *Epicurus*, appears by the Verses cited from *Lucretius* in the first Article. An *Epicurean* in *Cicero* delivers himself to the same Purpose: Mortem contemnit, qua qui affecti sunt, in eadem causa sunt, qua antequam nati. De Fin. l. 1. Omnibus a suprema die eadem, quæ ante primum. Nec magis a morte sensus ullus aut corpori aut animæ quam ante natalem. Plin. Nat. Hist. l. 7. c. 55. *Plutarch*, arguing on the Supposition, that Death was the full End and Destruction of our Being, has used the same Language as *Seneca*. " In this Case, says " he, we should be depriv'd of all Sense; as we should be " incapable of all Happiness, so we should be secure from all " Evil. Misery must have a Subject to inhere in as well as " Happiness. But that which is become nothing, and sunk " into a State of utter Extinction, is not sensible of either. " The Dead therefore return to the same State which they " were in before their Birth. As therefore we neither per- " ceiv'd Good nor Evil before we enter'd into the World, so " we shall perceive neither after we depart out of it. As we " are no ways interested in those Things which happen'd " prior to our Birth, so neither are we in what may be after " our Death." *Ad Apollonium* Xyl. E. 109. where there is much more to the same Purpose. *Cicero*, in one Part of the first *Tusculan*, reasons on the Supposition, that the Soul was mortal; and to represent our State and Condition after Death in this very Case, he has chose to express himself in the same Manner with *Seneca*: Natura se sic habet; ut, quo modo initium nobis rerum omnium ortus noster adferat, sic exitum mors. Ut nihil pertinuit ad nos ante ortum, sic nihil post mortem pertinebit. c. 38.

Mr.

Brevis morbus et præceptum alterutrum facit, aut
extinguetur aut extinguet. quid enim interest,
non sit, an non sim? In utroque finis dolendi
est. *Ep.* 79.

Illud potius admone nullum mali sensum ad
eum qui perit pervenire. Nam si pervenit,
non perit. Nulla, inquam, eum res lædit,
qui nullus est. Vivit, si læditur. Utrum putas
illi male esse, quod nullus est, an quod est adhuc
aliquis? Atqui nec ex eo potest ei tormentum
esse, quod non est; quis enim nullius sensus est?
nec ex eo quod est; effugit enim maximum mor-
tis, non esse. *Ep.* 100^p.

Mr. J. referring to this very Passage of *Seneca*, says, " I
allow him that *Seneca* speaks his real Opinion to his Friend
" *Lucilius*, and a Philosopher too; and it would be ridiculous
" to suppose that he amus'd him with any *exoteric* or vul-
" gar Opinions; or did not communicate his real internal
" Sentiments in the private Epistles wrote to him. *I hope I*
" *have conceded as much as he desires.*" p. 26, 7. He does
indeed concede all that I desire; enough, I am sure, to con-
fute and overthrow his whole Hypothesis. It is agreed that
we are to look for the real Sentiments of *Seneca* in this Epistle,
and that *Seneca* in this Epistle does absolutely exclude all fu-
ture Rewards and Punishments I need only appeal to the Pas-
sages above-cited. However, to confirm this I will add one
more.

An toti morimur? Nullaque pars manet
Nostri; cum profugo spiritus halitu
Immixtus nebulis cecidit in aera?

Post mortem nihil est, ipsaque mors nihil
Velocis spatii meta novissima.

Quæris quo jaceas post obitum loco?

Quo non nata jacent.

Mors individua est noxia corpori,

Nec parcens animæ.

Seneca; Troades.

It is almost unpardonable to trouble the Reader with more
Citations in so very clear a Case; however, he will be so
fair and candid, as to consider who it was that made it neces-
sary.

Let us pass on from *Seneca* to *Epicetus*. Mr *Botte* readily allows that he had not entertain'd any proper Notion of a future State. " It must
" not

tary. Our Author insists that these two Passages do not come up to the Point I contend for; and yet the Ancients use the same Language at the Time they would represent Death, as the absolute Ruin and Destruction of our Beings. It is indeed the very Language of *Epicurus*, *Θάνατος—οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῶν. σπένδεται ὅταν μὴ ἡμεῖς ὦμεν, ὁ θάνατος ἔστι παρὲν. ὅταν δὲ ὁ θάνατος παρὲν, τὸ δ' ἡμῶν οὐκ ἔστιν.* *Diog. Laer.* 10, 125. And *Cicero*, speaking on the Supposition that Death was a State of utter Extinction, says, *In quo quid potest esse mali? Cum mors nec ad vivos pertineat, nec ad mortuos; alteri nulli sunt, alteros non adtingit.* *1st Tus.* 38. *Hermachus*, a Follower of *Epicurus*, speaks to the same Purpose. *Εὐκαταφρόντος ὁ θάνατος. ἀπράκτος γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν, τὴ πασχόντος ἀνενημῆν.* *Mors facile contemni potest. Causa enim efficiens irrita fit, quum patiens interiit.* *Stobæus, Ser.* 116.

Debet enim, misere quoi forte ægreque futurum est,
Ipse quoque esse in eo tum tempore, quom male possit
Accidere. - - - - -

Seire licet nobis nihil esse in morte timendum,
Nec miserum fieri, qui non est, posse.

Lucretius, l. 3.

As to *Cicero*, *Epicurus*, &c. it will be allowed that these Expressions, when used by them, do actually exclude all possible Notions of a future State; and I must own I have not Sagacity enough to discover, how they can include it when used by *Seneca*.

So much for these three Passages. I will now add a Word or two to explain the general Doctrine and Profession of *Seneca* on this Point. He often speaks of another Life with great Diffidence, Uncertainty, and Doubt; not like a Man persuaded of its Reality and Truth, or one that entertained the Belief of it on any solid and rational Conviction. *Quod si modo solutæ corporibus animæ manent, felicior illis status restat, quam est dum versantur in corpore.* *Ep.* 77. Et fortasse, (si modo sapientum verâ fama est, recipitque nos locus aliquis) quem putamus periisse præmissus est. 64. As to the Arguments which were brought to demonstrate the Immortality of the Soul, he says, *Credebam enim me facilem opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gravissimam promittentium magis quam præbantium. Dabam me spei tantæ. Jam eram fastidio mihi*
—cum

a Sentiment
truly phi-
losophical.

“not be imagin’d, he had the least secret
 “Thought of better Things in another Place:
 “Since from several Passages in his Writings it
 “plainly

—cum subito expectatus sum, epistola tua accepta, et tam bellum somnium perdidit. 103. And here I cannot but take Notice, that he sometimes applies this very Language to the *Magnus Animus* itself, or, as Mr. J. calls it, the Soul of Heroes. *Magnus Animus Deo pareat, et quicquid lex universi jubet, sine cunctatione patiatur.* Aut in meliorem emittitur vitam, lucidius tranquilliusque inter divina mansurus, aut sine ullo futuris incommodo, naturæ suæ remiscebitur, & revertetur in totum. 72. And what says our *Defender* to this? Will he have Recourse to his favorite Distinction between the sensitive and intellectual Soul? Now ’tis Pity that a Distinction which was to work such Wonders; was to solve and explain every Difficulty that could possibly be urged against him; should be utterly unapplicable to every Testimony here produced. In one Passage *Seneca* speaks of *the Soul*, whose Immortality the Philosophers endeavour’d to demonstrate. And did the Philosophers endeavour to demonstrate that the sensitive Soul was to be Immortal? In the other Places he speaks of the Soul which was to enjoy a State of future Happiness in Heaven, if any future Happiness was to be enjoy’d at all.

2. In the following Passages *Seneca* denies all future Punishments: *Maximum malum judicabis mortem, cum illa nihil sit mali, nisi quod ante ipsam est timeri.* 105. Again, speaking of a dead Friend, he says, *Si illius nomine doleo, necesse alterutrum ex his duobus esse judicem. Nam si nullus defunctis sensus est, evasit omnia frater meus vitæ incommoda, et in eum restitutus est locum, in quo fuerat, ante quam nasceretur, et expers omnis mali nihil cupit, nihil patitur: quis est iste furor, pro eo me nunquam dolere desinere, qui nunquam doliturus est? Si est aliquis defuncti sensus, nunc animus fratris mei, velut ex diutino carcere emissus, rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitur, et humana omnia ex superiore loco despicit.*—*Quid itaque ejus desiderio maceror, qui aut beatus aut nullus est?* Ad Polyb. 27. I will just add, that other Passages are produced from him, c. 4. in which he excludes all future Punishments in the most absolute and full Terms.

3. In the last Part of the Piece *De Consolatione* address’d to *Martia*, he speaks of the future Happiness of Heroes; and yet c. 19. he says, *Mors omnium dolorum solutio est et finis, ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt, quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem, in quâ antequam nasceremur jacuimus, reponit.* Si

“plainly enough appears, he had no Notion of
 “any proper Futurity.” *Answer to the D. L.*
 p. 94. But let *Epictetus* answer for himself.
 Speaking

mortuorum aliquis miseretur, et non natorum misereatur. *Mors
 nec bonum nec malum est.* Id enim potest aut bonum aut malum
 esse, quod aliquid est: quod vero ipsum nihil est, et omnia ad
 nihil redigit, nulli nos fortunæ tradit. Mala enim bonaque
 circa aliquam versantur materiam. In another Passage, which
 I have often quoted, speaking of the Dead, he says, *Defuncti*,
 non pereunt. *Mors* INTERMITTIT vitam, non eripit. 36.
Bassus, an *Epicurean*, speaks of Death, as the utter Extinction
 of our Being. — Nec magis in ipsa quicquam esse molestiæ
 quam post ipsam. tam demens autem est qui timet quod non
 est passurus, quam qui timet quod non est sensurus. an quis-
 quam hoc futurum credit, ut, per quam sit ut nihil sentiatur,
 ea sentiatur? Upon which *Seneca* observes, *Hæc ego scio &
 sæpe dicta, et sæpe dicenda, sed neque cum legerem æque mihi
 profuerunt, neque cum audirem.* Ep. 30. One would con-
 clude from hence, that he had no Objection to the Principles
 of *Epicurus* on this Point. Quid interest utrum supra aliquem
 vigiliarium ruat an mons, aut turris? — Nunc me putas de
 Stoicis dicere, qui existimant animam hominis magno pon-
 dere extriti permanere non posse, et statim spargi, quia non
 fuerit illi exitus liber. ego vero non facio. qui hoc dicunt,
 videntur mihi errare. quemadmodum flamma non potest
 opprimi, nam circa id diffugit, quo urgetur; quemadmo-
 dum aer verberare aut ictu non læditur, nec scinditur quidem,
 sed circa id cui cessit refunditur. Sic animus qui ex tenuissimo
 constat, deprehendi non potest, nec intra corpus affigi; sed be-
 neficio subtilitatis suæ per ipsa quibus premitur erumpit. quo-
 modo fulmini etiam, cum latissime percussit ac fulsit, perexi-
 guum foramen est relictus, sic animo, qui adhuc tenuior est
 igne, per omne corpus fuga est. itaque de illo quærendum
 est, *an possit immortalis esse.* Hoc quidem certum habet, si *su-
 perstes* est corpori, propter hoc illum nullo genere posse perire,
 propter quod non perit: quoniam nulla immortalitas, cum
 exceptione est, nec quicquam noxium æterno est. Ep. 58.
 Here we may observe two Things. 1. According to the *gene-
 ral Doctrine of the Stoics*, the Soul, in the Case here sup-
 pos'd, was to be destroy'd and extinguish'd within the Body.
 2. *Seneca* declares, that it would escape and depart out of the
 Body. Now the Question is, Whether, in the Opinion of
Seneca, it was to continue in Existence, or perish after its Se-
 paration from the Body. “If, says *Seneca*, it remains after
 “this

Speaking of Death, he says, " But whither do
 " you go? No where to your Hurt: You re-
 " turn from whence you came: To a friendly
 " Consociation with your kindred Elements;
 " What there was of the Nature of Fire in your
 " Composition returns to the Element of Fire;
 " what of Earth, to Earth; what of Air, to
 " Air; and of Water, to Water. There is
 " neither *Hell, Acheron, Cocytus, or Pyriphle-*
 " *gethon.*" p. 392. 1. vol. D. L.

In another Place he says, " The Hour of
 " Death approaches. Do not endeavour to ag-
 " gravate, and make Things worse than they
 " really are; represent them in their true Light,
 " The Time is now come, *in which the Mate-*
 " *rials of which you are compounded, will be re-*
 " *solved into the Elements, from which they were*
 " *originally taken.* What Hurt or cause of Ter-
 " ror is there in this? Or what is there in the
 " World that absolutely perishes?" l. 4, 7. § 1.

Again; Death, says he, is a Change, not of
 " that which now is, into that which is not,
 " but into something which at present is not.
 " Shall I then cease to be? No, you will not
 " cease to be, but you will become something
 " else, which will serve to keep up the Order
 and

" this, it must be Immortal." Now our Author himself
 contends, that *Seneca* did not hold the Immortality of the
 Soul; hence I would conclude, that, according to him, it
 was not to subsist after its Dissolution from the Body.

And now, after all this, are we to be told, that the Phi-
 losophers were as *uniform* and *constant* in their Professions on
 this Point, as any the best and soundest *Christians*? As for
 myself; I am not, I own, so fond of depreciating our holy
 Faith, as to suppose that it had no Advantage over *Paganism*
 in this Particular, that it did not make its Followers more
 constant both in the Profession and Belief of a future State,
 than the best and wisest of the ancient Sages.

"and Harmony of the Universe." l. 3, 24.
Arrian 1.

We will go now to *Antoninus*. "Whoever,"
"says he, fears Death, either fears that he shall be

ἢ ἢδὲ καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν. μὴ τραγῶδει τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' εἰπὶ
ὡς ἔχει. ἢδὲ καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ἣν συνελθὼν, εἰς ἕκαστα παλιν
ἀναλυθῆναι, καὶ τί δεινόν; τί μὲλλει ἀπολλυθῆναι τῷ ἢ τῷ
κόσμῳ.

Θάνατος—μεταβολή—ἢ καὶ τὸ πῶ οἶσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ οἶν, ἀλλ'
εἰς τὸ πῶ μὴ οἶν. ἔστιτι ἢ ἰσομαι; ἢ ἴση, ἀλλ' ἄλλο τι, ὃ πῶ ο
κόσμῳ χρεῖται ἔχει.

In the first Passage he declares that the Soul at Death would
be resolved into the Elements, from which it was first taken.
Now this Resolution into the Elements was consider'd as a State
of mere Insensibility, as will appear from some Passages I
am going to quote from *Antoninus*, and from several Testi-
monies produced in the fifth Chapter. And indeed *Epicurus*
himself confines us to this Sense. Καὶ τί δεινόν; τί μὲλλει ἀπολ-
λυθῆναι. 'Tis indeed the very Language often used by the Phi-
losophers, when they would represent Death, as a State in
which we have no real Interest and Concern.

In the second Passage he asserts two Things. 1. Men at Death
were not to be annihilated and reduced to nothing. 2. That
they would be changed and transform'd into some other
Beings; such as might best serve to advance and pro-
mote the Order of the Universe. The first will hardly be
urged as of any Moment in the present Question. For tho'
the Substance of the Soul and Body was not to be destroy'd,
yet this would be the poorest Argument that could be alledged
to prove, that the *Man*, the *Person*, was to subsist in a future
State of Rewards and Punishments. *Epicurus* himself would
have maintain'd the First, and yet it will hardly be suspected
that he held the last:

Et si jam nostro sentit de corpore, postquam
Distracta est animi natura animæque potestas;
Nil tamen hoc ad nos, qui cætu conjugioque
Corporis atque animæ consistimus uniter apti.

Lucretius.

The second Point is not, I apprehend, more to the Purpose.
For if Men were to be changed into other Beings; if they
were to become something else, must not their Identity of
course be destroy'd and lost? And is not this Principle destruc-
tive of a future State, in the proper and religious Sense of
these Words?

"deprived

“ deprived of all Sense, or invested with Senses
 “ of another kind. If you are deprived of all
 “ Sense, you will no longer be subject to Pain
 “ and Misery. If you are invested with Senses
 “ of another kind, you will be transformed into
 “ another Creature, and so will continue in
 “ Being.” 8. 58. We are here told that Men,
 if they subsist after Death, are to be changed and
 reduced into other Beings, and indeed he often
 signifies that the Alteration at Death would be
 such, as could not possibly answer any moral
 Purpose and Design. “ I consist, says he, of
 “ Soul and Body; as neither of these was made
 “ out of nothing, so neither of them will be
 “ reduced to nothing. Every Part of me there-
 “ fore will by Change be resolved into another,
 “ and so on in infinitum. I myself and my
 “ Parents received our Being from such a con-
 “ stant Succession of Changes as this.” 5, 13.
 He does indeed often say that our Souls after
 Death would be disposed of in such a Manner,
 that they might serve for the Production of other
 Beings. The learned *Gataker* plainly understood
 him in this Sense. *Habent aliquid Stoici dogmati*
Pythagorico affine, quod ex animarum materiâ
quasi conflata et recocta novas procudi et produci
statuunt; in lib. 4, 21. As to these several
 Changes, the learned Emperor often informs us
 that we should receive no Prejudice or Hurt from
 them. But this, I apprehend, does not imply
 any moral Purpose and Design. *Lucretius* him-
 self held this very Doctrine.

ὁ τοῦ θανάτου φοβούμενος, ἥτοι αἰσθησίων φοβέται, ἢ αἰσθησίων
 στεροίαν, ἀλλ' ὅτε οὐκ εἰσὶν αἰσθησίων, οὐδὲ κακὴ τις αἰσθησις. οἷα
 ἀλλοιοῦται αἰσθησίων κτήνη, ἀλλοιοὶ ζῶντες, καὶ τὰ ζῷα καὶ πᾶν-
 σι. 8, 58.

Et nunc nil ad nos de nobis attinet, ante
 Qui fuimus. nec jam de illis nos adficit angor,
 Quos ne materia nostra nova proferet ætas.

L. 3.

I have added several Passages to the same Purpose in the fifth Chap. " You now have a separate and distinct Existence ; but at Death you will vanish into the whole or universal Substance." 4, 13.

In another Place he says, " That a Philosopher should expect Death with Calmness, as it was only a Dissolution of the Elements of which each Animal was compounded. Now if the Elements themselves receive no Prejudice by constantly changing into each other, why should any one suspect that the Dissolution and Change of them all will be attended with any Disadvantage ?" 2, 17. And what was this *Change* ? Why, " Upon Death all Things were

Τὸν θάνατον ἰδεῖν τῇ γνώμῃ περιμενοντα, ὡς ἕθεν ἄλλο ἢ λυσι τῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστος ζῶον συγκρίνεται. εἰ δὲ αυτοῖς τοῖς στοιχείοις μὴδὲν δέειν ἐν τῷ ἑκάστῳ διλυτικῶς εἰς ἕτερον μεταβάλλειν. διὰ τί ὑπιδέσθαι τις τῶν πάντων μεταβολὴν καὶ διαλυσιν. 2, 17.

Τῆς διαλύσεως εἰς ταῦτα γινομένης, ἐξ ὧν ἕκαστος συνίσταται ὅτοι γὰρ σκεδάσμος στοιχείων ἐξ ὧν συνεκρίθη, ἡ τροπὴ τε μὴ γίνομαι εἰς τὸ γενέσθαι. τοῦδε πνευματικῶς εἰς τὸ αἰετέσθαι. ὡς καὶ ταῦτα ἀναληφθῆναι εἰς τὸν τε ὅλον λόγον. 10, 7.

However, as our Author insists that the Philosophers were uniform and constant in the Profession and Belief of another Life ; as uniform and constant as any the best *Christians* : And has even carried his *Candour* and *Charity* so far, as to brand with the Names of *SCEPTICS* and *HARDEN'D INFIDELS* all who dare to differ from him on this Question ; I will now draw a few Testimonies from the *Meditations* of *Antoninus* to this very Point. " As to the Business of going out of the World, there is nothing terrible in it, if there be any Gods. *For they will not do you any Hurt.*" 2, 11. Si quidem dii sunt, inquit Stoici, nihil nobis grave post mortem futurum est, nec enim malis nos implicabunt ipsi non mali. Si vero nulli sunt, nec nos post mortem futuri sumus ipsi ; atque

“ were to be resolved into their first Principles ?
 “ Either the Elements of which you are com-
 “ posed will be scatter’d and dispers’d, or they
 “ will be changed ; what is solid will return to
 “ Earth ; what belongs to the Air will join
 “ that Element. And so they are convey’d into
 “ the Body of the Universe.” 10, 7. Now if
 the several Parts of Man were to return to the
 main Body of the Universe, must not he himself

atque hinc etiam sequitur, nihil post mortem passuros, cum
 existentium tantum sit pati. *Dacier in Loc.* Again in one
 Place he declares, “ That the Soul at Death will either be
 “ extinguish’d, or remov’d, and translated to some other
 “ Place.” 8, 25.—“ Death, says he, will either be a State
 “ of *Extinction* or *Removal*.” 5, 33. “ The Soul at Death
 “ will either be extinguish’d, dispers’d, or continued in Ex-
 “ istence.” 11, 3. “ Death will either utterly destroy our
 “ Being, or convey us to another State.” 7, 32. “ If you ar-
 “ rive in another World, you will find Gods even there.
 “ But if you sink into nothing, you will then be free from
 “ all Evils.” 3, 3. “ Whence, says the Emperor, comes it
 “ that the Gods, who have ordered most Things so excellent-
 “ ly, should neglect this Particular, and suffer the most vir-
 “ tuous and deserving Men, to be utterly extinguish’d by
 “ Death, without ever restoring their Beings to them again ?”
 To this he replies, “ If this be so, you may be certain it is best,
 “ otherwise the Gods would not have appointed it. For if it
 “ had been reasonable, it would have been possible. But from
 “ its not being appointed, if it actually is not appointed, you
 “ may be certain it was not fit and proper.” 12, 5. With what
Diffidence and *Uncertainty* does the Emperor here deliver
 himself on this Point ? In what plain and express Terms does
 he speak against it in the Passages cited in the Page above ?
 However, our Author assures us that the Language of the
 Philosophers on this Subject was the very same as that of the
 most orthodox and sincere Believers ? But with what Sort of
 Believers has this strange Man convers’d, that he finds them
 thus sceptical and doubtful on this very important Article ?
 However he might have believed this as long as he pleased,
 would he but have excus’d me from believing it too, and not
 have charged me with SCEPTICISM and INFIDELITY for
 barely asserting a plain Fact, which is supported by the clear
 and concurrent Evidence of all Antiquity.

return

return to the very State he was in before his Soul and Body were united? And was not this supposed to be a State of mere Insensibility? I find but little Difference between the Language of *Antoninus*, and that of an *Epicurean* in *Minutius Felix*. Homo et animal omne quod nascitur, inspiratur, attollitur, elementorum ut voluntaria concretio est: in quæ rursus homo, et animal omne dividitur, solvitur, dissipatur. ita in fontem resiliunt, et in semet omnia revolvuntur. c. 5. I need not say that I compare these two Doctrines together only so far as they relate to the State of the Soul after it was resolved into the Elements.

Strange Language from these *constant*, these *invariable* Teachers of another Life! Innumerable Passages might be produced to the same Purpose, equally pertinent and strong with those already cited. To transcribe all the Declarations of the Stoics against a future State would be to transcribe all their Writings. As far as I can at present recollect, their Declarations against it are more numerous than those for it.

What now becomes of the *constant* and *invariable* Profession, so often repeated by the learned Author? And no Wonder he should often repeat it; 'tis the very Ground and Foundation, on which he labours to erect his projected Demonstration. But as to this Ground and Foundation, as he has not yet established it, so we may be certain that he never can establish it. Antiquity plainly declares against him; and, while the Testimonies above cited are allowed to be genuine and authentic, the Inference is plain and undeniable, *that the Ancients were not fixed and settled, constant and uniform in their Professions for another Life.*

But

But to proceed: Should we then allow Mr. *Jackson* that all the Testimonies, produced by him, to shew that the Philosophers did profess the Doctrine of a future State, are strictly and properly to the Purpose; what would he gain by it? All he could collect from thence is, that they sometimes declared for another Life. But then let it be remember'd that they sometimes did likewise declare against it. The real Fact therefore is, that they were very fickle and unsteady, very various and inconsistent in their Professions, I do not mean in their Opinions, on this Head. This is a certain and undoubted Fact, but never mentioned by the learned Mr. *Jackson*. I am not indeed surpris'd that he did not mention it: For, in whatever Light it is viewed, it will furnish an unanswerable Argument against his own Hypothesis.

As to these various and contradictory Accounts; they must either be charged to Fickleness and Inconstancy of Opinion in the ancient Sages; or to the Practice of the double Doctrine^t. If the learned Author imputes them to the first, he must allow that the Philosophers were very wavering and unsettled, with regard to their Notions of another Life: He must hold that they often rejected, as well as that they often maintained this Doctrine; in short, he must no longer tell us, That they *constantly* and *invariably*

^t When I speak of this Practice, I would not be understood to mean that every Passage, in which the Philosophers reject a future State, did really belong to the private Doctrine. All I contend for is, that this was the *general and common Custom*. It will be readily allowed that there might be some particular Exceptions to, or Deviations from it, as it never was imagined, that the Philosophers *always* conformed to it in the most uniform and exact Manner.

declared

declared for it. And yet he undertakes to *demonstrate* their Belief of a future State. But how can he do this, when his own Doctrine will oblige him to acknowledge, that they had no fixed and settled Principles in this particular? All he can pretend to demonstrate, is, that they sometimes did believe it: But then, by the very same Arguments, his Adversaries will be enabled to demonstrate, in their Turn, that they sometimes did not believe it.

But perhaps he may have Recourse to the double Doctrine, in order to clear the Philosophers from this Charge. Here then I desire to know, whether the Passages above cited make part of the popular and external, or of the secret and internal Doctrine. He will undoubtedly give them to the second^v; and yet this very Concession will of itself be sufficient and effectual to overturn every thing he himself has said, with regard to this Doctrine.

The secret Doctrine, he tells us, affects only the Circumstances, and not the Reality of a future State; it excludes the popular and fabulous Accounts, but then it goes no farther; it does not remove and discard all future Rewards and Punishments whatsoever. Now the present Passages strike much deeper; they represent Death as the very End and Extinction of our Being; they exclude every possible Mode and Notion of future Rewards and Punishments. As for the *Pythagoreans*, some of them, we see, give us the very Doctrine of *Epicurus*; and did *Epicurus* reject only the vulgar and poetical Accounts

^v 'Tis allowed on all Hands, that the public Doctrine did inculcate future Rewards and Punishments; but it is evident that these Passages exclude them in the most clear and open Manner.

of a future State? Others do indeed talk of a Migration of the Soul from one Body to another; but then it is a Migration merely physical; and without any moral Purpose and Design. Does not *Aristotle* strike at the very Essence and Being of a future State, when he tells us, "that Death is the ultimate Period of our Being?" And the *Stoics* surely express themselves in as full a Manner as any of the rest *.

What

* Mr. J. observes "there is a *DISTINCTION*, which, had I attended to it as I ought, would have cleared up all the Inconsistencies with which the Philosophers have been charged. The *Stoics*, he says, as well as *Platonists* and others, held a *sensitive Soul* of a distinct Nature from the *intelligent Soul*, or *Mind* or *Spirit*. This inferior Soul they thought to be the only Subject of *Pain* and *Pleasure*, which belonged to the animal Life. The *Platonists* agreed with the *Stoics*, that this Soul was material and died with the Body; but they both agreed that the superior Soul or Mind existed after Death." p. 29. This *Distinction* may indeed serve Mr. Jackson's Purpose; which is to cover him in his Retreat from a baffled Argument. But if he be serious in recommending it to me, I must tell him he understands neither the Testimonies produced by Mr. W. nor myself. Three or four Instances will be enough to shew, that it falls quite short and wide of all he aims at. When *Epictetus* says that the Soul was to return to the Element from which it came, and that therefore it would not go to *Styx*, *Acheron*, &c. is it not necessary to suppose that he speaks of the *intelligent* and rational Soul? For what but this was supposed to descend to the infernal Regions? When *Aristotle* said that the Soul after Death was no longer to *remember*, *reason*, or *understand*, did he speak of the sensitive Soul only? "I consist, says *Antoninus*, of Matter and Form, or Body and Soul. As neither of these Parts was made out of nothing, so neither of them will be annihilated or reduced to nothing. Every Part of me therefore will by a Change be resolved into another, and so on in infinitum." 5. 13. If every Part of him was to be changed and transformed into some other Substance, must not this of Course include the rational and intelligent Soul as well as the sensitive? Again; "Pythagoras and Plato, (says *Plutarch*) held the Soul to be immortal; for that launching out into the Soul of the Universe, it returns to its Parent and Original. The *Stoics* say that, on its leaving the Body, the

What shall we do then with these various and contradictory Accounts of the old Philosophers? If they are supposed to deliver their real Sentiments in every Passage, it will be impossible to demonstrate their Belief of another Life. In this Case it is evident that they could have no fixed and settled Principle, with regard to this Article. If they are said to practise the double Doctrine, this will effectually overthrow every thing Mr. *Jackson* has advanced on that Head.

How unlucky, then, was our Author, when he fixed on these Professions, to prove that the Philosophers believed another Life! He pretends, indeed, but we have confuted the Pretension, that they never varied in their Doctrine on this Point; that they always taught a future State of Rewards and Punishments. The Testimonies abovementioned disprove this, and so fully overthrow what he fondly calls his *Demonstration*.

But we have done more; we have shewn that the very Principle, on which he builds, is entirely destructive of his own Scheme. He builds on the Professions of the ancient Sages: Now these, when taken in their full Extent, will either prove,

“ more infirm suffers the Lot of the Body. But the more vigorous endures to the Conflagration.” *Plut. de Pla.* 4. 7. Mr. *W.* quotes this Passage to prove that the Soul, according to the *Stoics*, was to perish with the Body; as the Infirm or Ignorant necessarily includes the Bulk of Mankind. And what Soul was it, in these, which was to suffer the Lot of the Body, but the same which was to endure in the wise Man till the Conflagration? the same which *Plato* and *Pythagoras* held to be immortal. And was not this the rational and intelligent Soul? When Mr. *Jackson* brings the following Text against the Equality of the Son, *My Father is greater than I*, he can laugh at his Adversary’s *Distinction*, that *Jesus* spoke this *only of his human Nature*: And yet he expects we should be serious while he is playing the same Game. For who ever held either of the Opinions, which, the Propositions, qualified by these *Distinctions*, are made to oppose?

that

that they had no fixed and settled Principles, with regard to another Life; or, on Supposition that they had such Principles, will shew that the secret and internal Doctrine did really exclude all future Rewards and Punishments. And if the secret Doctrine did really and actually exclude all future Rewards and Punishments, it will not surely be denied that the Philosophers themselves did disbelieve them.

Again, as the Philosophers were thus various and inconsistent in their Declarations on this Head; this will furnish Matter for another Observation. If they firmly believed another Life, whence, let me ask, comes it, that they so often disclaim and disavow it? What Motive could they have to deny it, contrary to the real Sense and Conviction of their own Minds? I would not suggest that they always spoke their real Thoughts: I know very well that they held it lawful to lie, and deceive the People for the public Good. But this Principle could not operate in the present Case, As to the Notion of another Life, they deemed it to be of the utmost Use and Importance to Society ^y. Why then, I ask once more, *did they so often declare against it?* they must do this contrary to the Sense and Persuasion of their own Minds; they must do it, without any View to the public Good; they must indeed do it out of pure Wantonness, a Conduct, which one would not willingly ascribe to a set of serious and think-

^y *Diogenes Laertius* carries the Matter so far, as to say that *Plato* himself taught this Doctrine chiefly for its Utility and Use. 1. iii § 79, 80.

Ut aliqua in vitâ formido improbis esset posita, apud Inferos ejusmodi quædam illi antiqui supplicia improbis constituta esse voluerunt: quod videlicet intelligebant, his remotis, non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam. *Cicero Orat. iv. in Catilin.*

ing Men ; in a Matter which themselves held to be of the utmost Consequence. And yet Mr. Jackson must ascribe it to them, if he still insists that they entertained a firm and constant Persuasion of another Life.

But to conclude this Article : If this Matter is to be tried by the common Rules of Logic ; if no new Laws of judging are to be established in Mr. Jackson's Favour ; these opposite and contrary Professions of the ancient Sages will be plain Proofs that they did not believe a future State. In this, I say no more than what is contained in that general Rule, which the Critics give us, to fix and determine the Meaning of Authors, when they speak variously on the same Subject. *Quotiescunque scriptor quispiam loquetur ex sententia & consuetudine vulgo recepta, non est semper putandus cum vulgo sentire ; præsertim si periculosum sit dissentium eâ in re testari ; aut ambiguae sint locutiones ; ac si ab eâ sententiâ aut usitatis formulis aliquando manifeste recedat, tum vero ex animi sententia loqui censendus erit.* Le Clerc, *Ars Critica*, vol. iii. p. 56. If this be a good Rule, the Professions of the Philosophers against a future State, will be stronger Proofs that they did not believe it, than their Declarations on the other Side will be that they did believe it. The first indeed will be sufficient to shew that they did not believe it. For was not the Notion of a future State the common and established Doctrine ? and do not the Philosophers, in the Passages above cited, reject and disclaim it ? Now this Rule says, that we are to look for a strict Declaration of their real Sentiments, whenever they speak against the general and received Opinions. So far therefore as we may judge by their Professions, we have Reason to think that they did not hold this Notion

Notion; and yet, on the Strength of these very Professions, the learned Gentleman undertakes to *demonstrate* that they did hold it.

So much for his general Demonstration; Let us now descend to the particular Account of future Happiness, which he gives us as really believed by the ancient Sages.

C H A P. II.

The State of future Happiness, which Mr. Jackson gives us as believed by the Philosophers.—That it has no Relation to the present Argument.—That this was the popular and external, not, as he supposes, the secret and esoteric Notion of a future State.—That it was not really and actually believed by the Philosophers themselves.

WHAT then is the Doctrine of future Rewards, which he gives us as really entertained by the old Philosophers? Why, he tells us, their Notion was, “ That the Souls of virtuous and godly Men, after Death, resided in
 “ some luminous Orb, which was the Mansion
 “ of their Happiness, and where they enjoyed the
 “ Society of celestial Beings and other holy Persons who had lived on Earth; and, by divine
 “ Knowledge, Faith, and Virtue, were united
 “ to and had Communion with God, and were
 “ blessed with the Beatific Vision of the divine
 “ Perfections.” *Defence*, p. 8.

This is indeed a very fine and pompous Account of a State of future Happiness; but then let it be

D

remem-

remembered that this State of future Happiness was to be enjoyed in *Heaven*; that *Heaven* is assign'd as the Region of all this future Bliss and Glory: There needs no Pains to prove this; the learned Author himself, I dare say, will not deny it. He speaks of *luminous Orbs, celestial Beings, beatific Vision*.

I will throw together a few Passages of Antiquity, which may serve to give a more full and perfect Account of this future State; and at the same time shew that it is nothing to the Purpose of our present Question.

Cicero speaks much of this State; but then he speaks of it as belonging only to Persons of peculiar Excellence and Worth; to Men of singular and uncommon Merit. He speaks "of certain Seats in Heaven, which were assigned all those, who should greatly distinguish themselves in the Service of their Country." Again, He gives it only to those, *qui præstantibus ingeniis in vita humana divina studia coluerunt*. And, in another Place, *magnis & præstantibus viris*^a. *Lucan* speaking of these Abodes, says,

Quodque patet terras inter lunæque meatus
Semidei manes habitant, quos ignea virtus
 Innocuos, vitæ patientes Ætheris imi
 Fecit, & æternos animam collegit in ignes^b. *L. ix.*

To the Testimonies of *Cicero* and *Lucan*, I will next add that of *Josephus*. *Titus*, in a Speech to his Soldiers, speaks of this future Happiness; but

^a Omnibus qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in cælo definitum locum, ubi beati ævo sempiterno fruantur. *Somn. Scip.* 3. 5. 7.

^b Sapientes volunt spatium, quod inter terram et cælum est, possidere animas *nobilium defunctorum*. Inde verum de *Anchisa*, *Æris in campis latis*, &c. *Schol. in loc.*

then

then he confines it to Heroes and Dæmons.
 “ Who does not know (says he) that the Souls
 “ of those brave Men, who die in Battle, will
 “ be raised and exalted to the Regions of the
 “ purest Æther, and there be stationed amongst
 “ the Stars? and that they themselves will be-
 “ come *Heroes and Dæmons* ^c?”

Seneca too mentions this future Happiness; but then he mentions it in such a Manner as plainly shews that he thought it peculiar to the Souls abovementioned. Speaking of one, whom he supposes to be raised and advanced to this very State, he says, *ad excelsa sublatus, inter felices currit animas, accipitque illum cætus sacer, Scipiones Catonesque* ^d.—*Parens tuus, Martia, illic nepotem suum, quanquam illic omnibus omne cognatum est, applicat sibi, nova luce gaudentem, & vicinorum syderum meatus docet.* I said that he confined these Regions to the Souls abovementioned; and this is evident from the *Scipio's* and the *Cato's*, to whom he here gives it; it is evident too from the Confession of *Lipsius* himself, who says, *Cordum loquentem inducit mortuum, & inter Heroas* ^e.

Once more; *Cicero*, in his first *Tusculan*, is very exprefs for this Distinction: He tells us,
 “ That the *Cæci*, or old Inhabitants of *Italy*, did
 “ not conceive Death to be a State of mere Ex-
 “ tinction; they supposed it to be a Change or
 “ Migration from one Life to another. They
 “ thought that *Persons of great and eminent*
 “ *Qualifications would be raised and exalted*

^c Τις γὰρ ἢ οἶδε τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ὅτι τὰς μὲν ἐν παρα-
 τάξει ψυχὰς, σιδηρῶν σαρκῶν ἀπελευθερίας τὸ καθαρώτατον γαίχμιον
 αἰθρῇ ξειροδοχῶν ἀστροῖς ἐγκαθιδρύνει; δαίμονες δ' ἀγαθοί, καὶ ἡρώες ἡμε-
 ραντες, ἰδοὺς ἐκγονοὺς ἐμφανίζονται. *De Bello Jud.* l. vi. 1.

^d *Ad Martiam*, cap. ult.

^e *Physiol. Stoicorum*, l. iii. *Differ.* xi.

“into Heaven; while all the rest were left to grovel in these lower Regions.” Amongst those to be thus exalted, he reckons *Romulus*, *Hercules*, *Bacchus*, the Sons of *Tyndarus*^f, &c.— We here again see that these Mansions of Bliss and Immortality in *Heaven* were given only to Persons of illustrious and uncommon Worth: The List of Worthies just recited, proves this beyond all Exception. As for the rest of Mankind, *i. e.* the Bulk of the Species, they were to be excluded hence, and confined to the World below.

’Tis evident that these Passages relate to a State of future Happiness in *Heaven*, but then ’tis equally evident that they do not include the Souls of good Men in general; that they confine these Seats of Bliss and Glory to a few choice and select Spirits; to such as had distinguished themselves by their public Services, or some way greatly contributed to the Advantages of human Life. To those, according to *Cicero*, *qui patriam conservarint, auxerint, adjuverint*; to *Romulus*, *Hercules*, and other Worthies of the same Class. *Lucan*, speaking of these Seats, says, *Semidei manes habitant*; *Josephus* declares in very express and direct Terms, that these Regions were inhabited by *Dæmons* and He-

^f Itaque unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos *Casos* appellat *Ennius*, esse in morte sensum, neque excessu vitæ sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret.— Mortem non interitum esse omnia tollentem atque delentem, sed quamdam quasi migrationem commutationemque vitæ: quæ in *claris viris* & *fæminis dux in cælum soleret esse, in cæteris humi retineretur, & permaneret tamen*. Ex hoc & nostrorum opinione *Romulus in cælo cum Dis agit ævum*,— & apud Græcos, indeque perlapsus ad nos, & usque ad Oceanum, *Hercules* tantus & tam præsens habetur deus. Hinc *Liber* deus, *Semele* natus, eademque famæ celebrate *Tyndarida* fratris, &c. *Tusc.* i. 12.

roes. And, I presume, we need not remark, that *the Bulk of good Men*, that virtuous and godly Souls *in general* are not to be ranked amongst these.

All I aim to prove, is, that the State of Happiness, here described, was not to be shared by good Men in common; that it was confined to Souls of extraordinary and uncommon Worth. And if this be so, what becomes of Mr. Jackson's Argument? When the Author of the *Divine Legation* affirms, that the Philosophers disbelieved a State of future Happiness, he means such a State as was to include the Body of good Men; in which every virtuous and righteous Man was to be rewarded. The Question then is, whether the Philosophers held a future State of Rewards for good Men *in general*; and the learned Writer decides upon it, by sending us to a State that belongs only to *the very Flower of this Order*. The Point is, whether *all* good Men were to be happy; and he, to support the Affirmative, refers us to a State, that was not to be the Portion of *good Men in common*; but only of *a small and select Number*.

2dly, He very gravely affirms, that this was the secret and esoteric Notion, in respect to future

§ As this is a Point of great Moment in the present Controversy, the Reader will not be displeased with these further Authorities.

An fortes animæ dignataque nomina cælo,
Corporibus resoluta suis, terræque remissa
Huc migrant ex orbe, suumque habitantia cælum
Æthereos vivunt annos, mundoque fruuntur?
Atque hic Æacidas, hic et veneramur Atridas,
Tydidemque ferum, terræque marisque triumphis
Naturæ victorem Ithacum - - - - -
Quique animi vires, et strictas pondere mentes

ture Happiness. He may, if he pleases, believe this; but why should he be so unreasonable, as to expect that his Readers should believe it too?

Plato says, " That Rewards ought to be
" decreed to all who behave well in War;
" that those, who die in the Service of their
" Country, should be treated with particular

Prudentes habuere viri, quibus omnis in ipsis
Census erat, justusque Solon fortisque Lycurgus,
Æthereusque Platon, et qui fabricaverat illum,
Damnatulque suas melius damnavit Athenas.

Manilius, l. ii.

Scaliger in a Note on the Place says, Non decastris, aut bello, aut similibus sermo, sed tantum de viris fortissimis, et illis qui aliquo virtutis nomine claruerunt.

Seneca too mentions this Ascent into *Heaven*; but then he mentions it as a Privilege which belong'd to Men of singular and uncommon Virtue.

Nunquam Stygias fertur ad umbras
Inclyta virtus. *Vivete, fortes,*
Vos Le hæos sæva per amnes
Nec fata trahent: Sed cum summas
Exiget horas consumpta dies,
Iter ad superos gloria pandet. *Hercules Oetæus.*

One may observe that the State of Happiness in *Elysium* was not, as Mr. *J.* would persuade us, a mere Metaphor and Allegory invented only to represent a State of Happiness in *Heaven*. On this Supposition, the two States must have been designed for the same Persons: Whereas it appears that the first was assigned to the Body of good Men in common; that the last was confined to Men of extraordinary and uncommon Virtue.

The main Use I would make of these Testimonies is to shew, that this State of Happiness in *Heaven* was peculiar and confined to Men of great and uncommon Attainments. When I say this, I only mean that it is generally represented in this light; I readily own that it is sometimes represented in another: And this could scarce be otherwise. Where a *superior Virtue* was spoken of, or recommended, the *peculiar* Rewards of it would be distinctly insisted on. And where *Virtue only in general*, it was yet natural to encourage it by the Mention of the *biggest* Rewards that attended it, tho' those in truth belonged only to the highest Virtue.

" Marks

“ Marks of Honour and Respect ; that, after
 “ Death, they should be considered as *Dæmons*
 “ and Demi-Gods ; as Guardians of Mankind,
 “ who were to superintend and preside over this
 “ lower World.” And he afterwards subjoins,
 “ That every one, who arrived at any exalted
 “ and uncommon Pitch of Virtue, should be in-
 “ titled to the same Honour ^h.”

He here tells us, that brave Men, and, indeed, all Men of singular Worth and Merit were to be raised and erected into *Dæmons* : there can then be no Question but that he here speaks of the State of future Happiness in *Heaven*. But does he deliver this as a private and esoteric Doctrine? The very End and Purpose of his Writing will not suffer us to believe this. His Design was to make Men useful Members of Society ; to spur and incite them to Acts of Heroism and uncommon Virtue. And how could his Doctrine be supposed to do this, unless it was taught and preached up to the World at large? And if it was taught and preached up to the World at large, the Inference is certainly just, that it was a public, and not a private Doctrine.

^h Των δε αποθανόντων επι φραττίας, ος αν ευδοκιμησας τελευτηση, ας ε πρωτον μιν φησομεν τη χρυση γενεε ειναί; παιων γε μαλιστα. Αλλ' ε πεισομεθα Ησιόδω; επειδαν τινες τη τοιυτη γενεε τελευτησωσιν, ως αρα,

Οι μιν, δαιμονες αγνοι επιχθονιοι τελευτησιν,
 Εσθλοι, αλεξικακοι, φυλακες μεροπων ανθρωπων.

πεισομεθα μιν ουν. διακυβομενοι αρα τη Θεω, πως χρη τε; δαιμονες τε και θειες τιθεναι και τινι διαφορω, ητω και ταυτη δησομεν η ανεξηγηται. τι δ' ε μελλομεν; και τον λοιπον δη χρονι, ως δαιμονων, ητω θεραπεισομεν τε και προσκυνησομεν αυτων τας θηκας. ταυτα δε ταυτη νομιμην, οταν τις γηρα η τινι αλλω τροπω τελευτηση των οσων αν διαφοροτως εν τω βιω αγαδοι κριθησι. De Rep. l. 5.

This too appears from the following Passage of *Cicero*. “ It may be easily understood, that the
 “ Reason, why most Cities prosecuted the Me-
 “ mory of their valiant Men with divine Ho-
 “ nours, was to spur up their Citizens to Virtue,
 “ that every the most deserving of them might
 “ encounter Dangers with the greater Willing-
 “ ness for the Sake of his Country. This was
 “ the very Inducement the *Athenians* had to
 “ deify *Ereätheus* and his Daughters i.”

We are here told of the Consecration of dead Men, and the Reason of it. And does not this very Reason necessarily suggest that this must have been a public Notion? For what Impression could it be supposed to make on the Body of the People? how could it be supposed to work them up to gallant and heroic Actions, if, like the *secret Doctrines* of the Schools, it was all the time absolutely unknown to them?

One would imagine the very Descriptions of this State might suffice to shew, that this was really a popular and external Doctrine. When we hear of the *Entertainments, Feasts, and Marriages* of the Gods, is it possible to help concluding that these Stories were invented in order to lay hold of the gross Imaginations of the People? Are not these Accounts as much suited to the Taste and Relish of the Vulgar, as any that are given us of *Elysium* itself?

Lastly, we find that the Body of the People was really and actually possess'd of this very Doc-

i *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 94. Atque adeo in plerisque civitatibus intelligi potest, *acuendæ virtutis gratiâ*, quo libentius reipublicæ causa periculum adiret optimus quisque, viro- rum fortium memoriam honore Deorum immortalium consecratam: ob eam enim ipsam causam *Ereätheus* Athenis filiasque ejus in numero Deorum sunt. *Nat. Deor.* l. iii. 19.

trine. *Cicero* himself gives this Account of the *Casci*, or the rude and barbarous Inhabitants of old *Italy*. " They did not, it seems, consider
 " Death as the End and Destruction of their Being, but as a Change and Migration to another Life. They thought that Men of great
 " and singular Qualifications, that Persons famous and excellent in their Generations, would
 " be raised and exalted into *Heaven*; while all
 " the rest were left to grovel in the World below." But now is not this here represented as a popular and common Notion? We are told that the very lowest of the People were actually in Possession of it. Now if this be true, as it certainly is, what possible Ground can there be for what the learned Writer so often repeats and asserts, viz. that this was a *secret* and *hidden* Doctrine, imparted by the Philosophers to their Disciples only, and carefully concealed from the Body of the People^k?

3dly,

^k Mr. *Jackson* quotes the Passage from *Cicero*, which I refer to in this Paragraph, and then asks, " What says our Critic to this? By a peculiar Acuteness of Genius and Extent of Learning, he has discover'd that those *Casci*, or ancient Sages of *Ennius*, and whom *Cicero* makes to be of the highest Order and Dignity, and of the greatest Genius, were no other than the rude and barbarous Inhabitants of old *Italy*. The *CASCI*, which is a mere Noun Adjective in *Ennius*, and an old *Sabine* Word, which signifies ancient; our Critics took to be the Name of a People who lived somewhere, they know not where, in *Italy*, whom they call the *Casci*. They were not, it seems, polite and learned enough to be Infidels, who did not believe a future State; and therefore our Critic calls them rude and barbarous: But *Cicero* speaks of them as those whose Opinions were of the best Authority and highest Regard; Men of Dignity and the greatest Understanding." p. 51, 52. Here our Gentleman assumes an awkward Air of Gaiety, and aims at Mirth and Drollery. Optat ephippia bos.—" *The Casci*

3dly, Let us now see whether the Philosophers believed any thing of this State of future Happiness.

" *Casci*, which is a mere Noun Adjective in Ennius, and an old Sabine Word, which signifies ancient, our Critics took to be the Name of a People who lived somewhere, they know not where, in *Italy*." We see by this he does not so much as know the commonest and most natural Accidents in Language; that the *Epithets* of Men, Things, and People, perpetually become the *Appellatives*. Did not *Ancients* in *English* some time ago signify the Governors of a Society? Did not *Sapientes* in *Latin* signify Philosophers, and *Οι πολλοι* in *Greek* the People? Was not *Αυροχθονες* at first an *Epithet*, and yet did it not afterwards become an *Appellative*?

And now the Reader sees, why our Critics, (as he calls me, —nos numerus sumus) took *Casci* to be the Name of a People. The Name of a People quoth a! had I taken them for *Hedge-bogs*, it would have given this formidable Man of Letters a proper Occasion to have exposed my Mistake from *Cicero*, who, he says, makes them to be of the highest Order and Dignity. But pray, what did St. *Jerom* take *Casci* to mean when he says, *Rudes illi Italiae homines, quos Cascos Ennius appellat. Epist. xlii. ad Niceam.*

Our Critics too, I make no doubt, had they found the Words *Αυροχθονες*, where the *Athenians* were spoken of, would have called that likewise, the Name of a People. The whole of the Matter is this, The *Latins* were divided into two Races; those before the Building of *Rome*, and those after: The first were called *Prisci Latini*: This being their distinguishing Epithet was made their *Appellative*, just as *Αυροχθονες* was to the *Athenians*: There were other old People besides the *Latins*, and there were supposed to be other *Aborigenes* besides the *Athenians*.

Were I to speak of the ancient *Picti* as a People, I make no doubt, this great Critic would come over me and say, "The *Picti* which is a mere Noun Adjective in *Clau-dian*, —incaluit Pictorum sanguine Thule, and an old *Latin* Word which signifies painted, our Critics took to be the Name of a People, who lived somewhere, they know not where, in *Britain*, whom they call the *Picti*." —And then, to shew his Learning, we should have him quote in a Note, from the last Dictionary—quod pigmentis corpora ornabant. *Bede.*

So much for the Translation. But my great Offence is, that I have not spoken of these Men with the Reverence and Esteem,

ness. That we may be the better able to judge of this, let us attend to their own Account of it. They give it only to Persons of illustrious and
signal

Esteem, which their high Merit and Excellence requires; that I have not represented them as a *learned* and *polite* People; as a set of Men of the *best Authority*, and the *greatest Understanding*.

And is it indeed true, that Controversy has so depraved *his own*, that he could not see, *St. Jerom*, speaking of these *Casci*, (for now I suppose *the Casci*, for the future may go Toll-free from Criticism) delivered not only his *own*, but *Cicero's* Opinion of them, in the following Passages—*Rudes illi Italiae homines, quos CASCOS appellat Ennius, qui sibi, ut in Rhetoricis Cicero ait, RITU FERINO VICTUM QUÆREBANT*, ante chartæ et membranarum usum, aut in dedolatis e ligno codicillis, aut in corticibus arborum mutuo Epistolarum alloquia mussitabant.—Quanto magis igitur nos, exposito jam artibus mundo, id non debemus omittere, quod illi sibi præstiterunt, apud quos erat *cruda rusticitas*, et qui *humanitatem quodam modo nesciebant*. Epist. xlii.

Cicero himself speaks of them in the following Terms. Sed qui nondum ea, quæ multis post annis tractari cœpissent, *physica* didicissent tantum sibi persuaserant, quantum naturâ admonente, cognoverant: rationes et causas rerum nontenebant; visis quibusdam sæpe movebantur, hisque maximè nocturnis, ut viderentur ii, qui vitâ excefferant, vivere. 1 Tusc. xiii.

Such were Mr. *Jackson's* venerable Sages; his learned and polite People; Men of the greatest Genius, and most consummate Understandings! But *Cicero* calls them, *Altissimis ingeniis præditi*. And so he might do, had Mr. *J.* understood any thing of the Genius of that great Man or his Writings, without any Necessity of making a Rabble of *Barbarians* commence Masters of Arts, as if they had just come from School at *Athens*. The Truth of the Matter is simply this: *Cicero* is here upon proving the Doctrine of a future State from the general Consent and Belief of all Nations. And as is his way, in all Points, whether of Religion or Politics, his Love of his Country disposed him to insist much upon the Opinion of his own *Roman* Ancestors. Which on such Occasions he tells us, more than once, he esteems of the best Authority. And to do this with the better Grace, he always introduces them with the highest Encomium. But is this to be taken strictly according to the Letter? Let Mr. *J.* read over again the Passages quoted above, and, if it be possible, deceive himself.

signal Worth; they talk much of *the Society and Assembly of the Gods*. And who, pray, after all, were these Gods? Why, certain Sons of Men, who,

himself. For he can hardly hope any longer to deceive the Reader.

But our Critic is so totally ignorant of this great Man's Character, that he represents him as a poor narrow Bigot, founding a Doctrine of so great Importance on the Authority of his barbarous Ancestors; without daring to depart a Tittle from their Principles, or start any thing out of the Road and Train of popular thinking. And yet there is no Writer in Antiquity, whom this Character less suits. How great a Regard soever he may sometimes profess for some particular Men, yet he often declares that, in our Enquiries, we should be determined only by the Force and Weight of Reason; blames the Followers of *Pythagoras* for their *ipse dixit*, or implicit Belief in their Master; non enim tam auctores in disputando, quam rationis momenta querenda sunt—nec probare soleo id quod de Pythagoricis accepimus, quos ferunt, si quid affirmarent in disputando, cum ex iis quæreretur quare ita esset. respondere solitos, *Ipse dixit*. *De N. Deor.* l. ii.

Is it likely then that one in this way of thinking, would be influenced by the Authority of Men, who rationes et rerum causas non tenebant; visis quibusdam sæpe movebantur, hisque maxime nocturnis, ut viderentur hi, qui vita excesse-
rant vivere.

There is a Passage in the *Timæus* of *Plato* very nearly allied to this of *Cicero*; one may indeed safely affirm that *Cicero* copies from it. As to the popular Gods, *Plato* tells us, that we are to believe what the ancient Mythologists taught concerning them; We must, says he, believe those who have “related these things before us; who were Sons of the Gods, and well acquainted with the Affairs of their Parents. We cannot therefore disbelieve the Sons of the Gods, tho’ they speak without probable and clear Proofs, as they only report things with which they are well acquainted. We must then believe them in Compliance with the Laws.” *Ed. Ticin.* p. 530. *Cicero*, in the Place we are here examining, speaks much to the same Purpose. Autoribus quidem ad istam sententiam—uti possumus optimis—et primum quidem omni antiquitate; quæ quo propius aberat ab ortu et divinâ progenie, hoc melius ea fortasse, quæ erant vera, cernebat. c. xii. 1st *Tusc.* Now will any one say that *Plato*, in the Passage just re-cited, speaks his real Sentiments? *Eusebius* assures

who, for their eminent Services to their Fellow-Creatures, were said to be erected into a kind of Deities. *Plato* tells us, " That they were to become Dæmons; that they were to receive divine Honours; and exercise a Providence over this lower World." *Cicero* too, in a Fragment of his preserved by *St. Austin*, insists much on the Divinity of *Romulus*, and brings a particular Argument to maintain and defend it¹.

And

us, that he all the Time laughs at the popular Theology, which he would seem to recommend. *Præp. Evang.* l. xiii. c. 1. But now if *Plato* was not in earnest, why should we think that *Cicero* was? Does he not repeat and insist upon much the same Argument with *Plato*? And what was it in either more than a mere Compliment to their Ancestors? Besides; what is the grand Point in this Argument asserted by the Author of the *D. L.*? Why, that the Philosophers did not believe a future State. But what Philosophers does he mean? Only those who had entertained and imbibed the Principles of the *Greek* Philosophy; it is to the Influence of these Principles, that he imputes the Disbelief of this Doctrine. But had these Principles got any Footing in *Italy*, during the Time *Cicero* here mentions?

I shall just take Notice, in Conclusion, of a very gross and flagrant Misrepresentation. *Mr. J.* had produced this Passage from the first *Tusculan* to shew that the Philosophers believ'd a future State, and he would insinuate, that what I have observed in this Chapter, was designed as a proper and direct Answer to this Citation. (Having repeated the Passage, " *What, adds he, says our Critic to this?*") But all, except this bedimmed Controversialist, may see that I am here proving a very different Thing, viz. That this State of Happiness in *Heaven* was a publick and open Doctrine? If he saw it too, why did he not attempt to answer that? Why did he so studiously pervert my Argument before he ventured to answer it? Does he think to plead Prescription; and that his old and constant Practice will justify all his Arts of Controversy, or serve to recommend them to the Use or Approbation of any one Man in the World besides himself?

¹ Magis est in Romulo admirandum, quod cæteri, qui Dii ex hominibus facti esse dicuntur, minus eruditis hominum sæculis fuerunt, ut fingendi proclivior esset ratio, cum imperiti facile
ad

And when he designed to consecrate his Daughter, he speaks in this Manner, " That as the
 " Wisdom of the Ancients had consecrated and
 " deified many excellent Persons of both Sexes,
 " whose Temples were then remaining, the Pro-
 " geny of *Cadmus*, of *Amphitryon*, of *Tyndarus* ;
 " so he would perform the same Honour to *Tul-*
 " *lia*, who, if any Creature ever deserved it,
 " was of all the most worthy of it : I will do it,
 " therefore, says he, and consecrate thee; thou
 " best and most learned of Women, *now admit-*
 " *ted into the Assembly of the Gods*, to the Re-
 " gard and Veneration of all Mortals^m." These
 learned Ancients speak of the State of Happiness
 in Heaven ; and what do they say of it ? Why,
 a few excellent Persons are to be admitted to the
Society and Assembly of the Gods. But then did
 the Philosophers themselves believe any thing of
 this *Society and Assembly of the Gods*, of which
 they have said so much ? The very elegant and
 polite Writer of the *History of the Life of Cicero*
 says, " But it was not *Cicero's* real thought,
 " after all, to exalt his Daughter into a Deity ;
 " he knew it to be absurd, as he often declares,
 " to pay divine Honours to dead Mortals ; and
 " tells us how their very Publicans had decided
 " that Question in *Bæotia* ; for when the Lands
 " of the *immortal Gods* were excepted out of their
 " Lease, *by the Law of the Censors*, they de-
 " nied, *that any one could be deemed an immortal*
 " *God, who had once been a Man ; and so made*
 " *the Lands of Amphiaras and Trophonius pay*

ad credendum impellerentur. Romuli autem ætatem minus
 his sexcentis jam inveteratis Literis, atque Doctrinis, omnique
 illo antiquo ex inculta hominum vita errore sublato fuisse cerni-
 mus. *De Civ. Dei*, l. xxii. 6.

^m History of the Life of *M. Tullius Cicero*, vol. ii. p. 189.

" the

“ *the same Taxes with the rest.* Yet in a political
 “ View he sometimes recommends the Worship
 “ of those Sons of Men, whom their eminent
 “ Services to Mankind had advanced to the
 “ Rank of inferior Godsⁿ.” *Sigonius* declares the
 same; whose Words are so very much to our
 Purpose, that I cannot forbear inserting them.
 “ I do not know (says he) but those learned Men
 “ are in the right, who think that several excel-
 “ lent and brave Persons have been consecrated
 “ and deified, in order to incite Men to Acts of
 “ Heroism, and that they may encounter Dan-
 “ gers with more Readiness in the Service of
 “ their Country.” And he adds, “ That se-
 “ veral Persons were consecrated in Old Greece
 “ with this very View^o.” And however this
 false *Cicero* may fail in other Points, there can
 be no Question, but that he here copies the true
 and real Sentiments of *Cicero* himself; who, in
 one of the Passages above cited, declares, that
 these Deifications were made, *acuendæ virtutis*
gratiâ, quo libentius *reipublicæ causa* periculum
 adiret optimus quisque.

The Sum then of our Argument is this: The
 Philosophers mention a State of future Happiness
 in Heaven; they say, that some few excellent
 Persons shall be admitted into *the Society and As-*
sembly of the Gods. But then this *Society and As-*

ⁿ Ibid. p. 190.

^o Atque haud scio an rectè senserint viri doctissimi, quorum
 ea fuit opinio, viros *claros & fortes* idcirco *diorum immortalium*
honore consecratos, ut incitaretur virtus acrius, & acuerentur ve-
 hementius ad obeunda pericula, qui patriæ amore studioque
 tenebantur. — Quod optime agnovit & diutissime retinuit om-
 nium literarum præclara custos & altrix Græcia, quæ multos
 habet virtutis gratia factos ex hominibus Deos, quorum alios
 fatentur novos; alios multis jam sæculis receptos in cælum,
 consecratosque contendunt. *De Consolatione.*

sembly of the Gods was all a pure Fable and Fiction of their own. As therefore they believed nothing of the *Society and Assembly* into which these excellent Persons were to be admitted, 'tis impossible that they should believe any thing of the *Admission* itself.

Again; it is remarkable, the learned Gentleman every where allows that the Stories of the *Elysian* Fields were considered as mere Fictions; and here I cannot for the Life of me conceive, what it is which induces him to think that the State of future Happiness in Heaven was not viewed in the very same Light. For, let me ask him, whence does he conclude that the Philosophers believed nothing of *Elysium*? Is it because it made part of the popular and external Doctrine? Because 'tis sometimes mentioned as an Engine of Policy, contrived only for the Sake of Government? And does he think we will not say the same for the State of future Happiness in Heaven? Have we not indeed proved from History and real Fact, that this was the very Case of the last Doctrine?—But, perhaps, he may infer their Disbelief of *Elysium* from another Circumstance; from the *Fables* and *Histories* with which it is intermixed, and which, 'tis notorious and allowed on all hands, were not believed by the Philosophers themselves. For as to the *Judges of Hell, the Society and Assembly of the Gods* in the infernal Regions; these were considered by all Men of Sense as merely political, as invented only to keep the People in Order. But, pray, now does not this very Reason equally conclude against their Belief of the State of future Happiness in Heaven? The *Society and Assembly of the Gods*; their

their *Banquets, Entertainments^p, and Marriages,* are the principal Circumstances we find recorded of this State. But were not these as gross and rank Fables, as any that were feigned of the *Elysian Fields*? With regard then to the Philosophers, we have proved their Disbelief of this State of Happiness in Heaven, on the very same Principles, and in the very same Manner 'tis usual to prove their Disbelief of *Elysium*: Which the learned Writer, I am persuaded, had saved us the Trouble of doing, had he not been unluckily misled by the Ambiguity of Terms. *Elysium*, in whatever Sense you take it, is confessedly a fabulous and imaginary Place. But *Heaven*, in the Christian System, being a Reality, the good Man did not reflect that, in the Pagan Theology, its Existence was as visionary as that of *Elysium* itself; and the very same in *Greece* and *Italy*, as *Odin's Hall* amongst the Northern Nations.

And what says our Author in his last Pamphlet, to all this? Why, he asserts and insists STILL p. 35. that *Heaven* was as much a Reality in the *Pagan* as in the *Christian* System. But why then does he not consider the several Arguments which I have alledged to prove the contrary? Why does he not shew, that this Notion of

^p Illa autem Deorum vita, five Apotheosis, gemino capite præcipuè continebatur: *Convictu Jovis, & Deæ alicujus conjugio*. Sic apud *Horatium*, l. iv. od. 8. *Herculis Divinitas inde statuitur, quod Jovis interest optatis epulis impiger Hercules*. Idemque, ut notum est, *Heben, Juventutis Deam, accepit in conjugem*. *Ruæus in Virgil. Ecl. iv. Dearum connubio & Deorum convivio dii efficiuntur. Servius in Æneid. i.*

Tu mihi quodcunque hoc regni, tu sceptrâ, Jovemque Concilias; tu das *epulis accumbere Diqum*. *Æneid. i.*

Nec Deus hunc *mensâ*, Dea nec dignata *cubili* est. *Ec. iv.*

E

Heave

Heaven was founded upon better Authority than the common and popular Accounts of *Elyſium*? No, your Servant, Sir, ſays he, for that. He has ſtill, as often as he is confuted, (Thanks to the Genius of Controverſy!) a new Stock of Confidence, and the ſame Self-Satisfaction and Complacency, which enable him to repeat his Aſſertions, as if nothing had happened; and, as if he had not been confuted with a Force that would make a *Novice in the Art* bluſh himſelf into better Manners.

Upon the Whole; could the learned Author prove that they believed a future State thus circumſtanced, yet I would not adviſe him to triumph too ſoon, leſt his Adverſaries ſhould reply that it is nothing to the Purpoſe, as it was not ſuppoſed to include the Body of good Men. If we add to this, that this Notion was merely popular and external; that it never was entertained by the Philoſophers themſelves; we ſhall, I dare ſay, hear no more of it; at leaſt in way of Oppoſition to the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*⁹.

CHAP.

⁹ However Mr. *Jackson* ſays, “ I have with VERY LITTLE TROUBLE confuted every thing alledged in the *Critical Inquiry* againſt my Proof that the ancient Philoſophers “ did conſtantly and invariably profeſs and believe a future “ State.” p. 69.

If he has done this, and certainly in his Time he has done Wonders, Envy itſelf muſt own it was with *very little Trouble*; for he has overturned *all* my Arguments without ſo much as confuting, or even repeating any of them. However we muſt believe he will make amends for this, whenever the Public expreſſes an Inclination for a *ſecond Edition* of any of his Pamphlets. In the mean time I ſhall comfort myſelf, as well as I can, under this Diſgrace, with the Approbation of a Genius worth a Thouſand of theſe *Answerers by Profeſſion*, the Author of the Diſcourſe *on the Conversion of St. Paul*. And what greater Honour could be done an obſcure nameleſs Writer than to be approved by him, and condemn'd by the *Maſter*

C H A P. III.

That Mr. Jackson, in his first Piece, gives the Re-union of the Soul with God, as the only Notion of future Happiness entertained by the old Philosophers. His Account of it examined and confuted. That this Re-union, and the State of Happiness in Heaven, were conceived by the Ancients to be very different and distinct things.

SO much for the State of future Happiness in Heaven. And here I cannot but take Notice that the learned Writer himself gives a very different Account of this Matter in his first Pamphlet:

Master of Wiggton's Hospital. But to give him, what he never gives his Reader, a little Argument. The Points discussed in this Chapter are of the greatest Importance in the present Controversy. As to a State of Happiness for the Good, the Gentleman himself confines us to the particular Notion I have been here examining. Why then does he not endeavour to invalidate the Proofs, which I have alledged to shew that it did not belong to good Men in common? "*I have*, says he, "*confuted them all.*" But in what Corner of his blind Book lies this sculking Confutation, that no Reader before suspected it, and no one now can find it? Why does he so cautiously evade touching the several Arguments, that have been produced to shew, that this State of Happiness in Heaven was supposed to be a mere Fiction; was consider'd by all Men of Sense as a pure Engine of Policy, invented only for the Sake of Government?

He does indeed say, (and for roundly saying what he can't prove he never had his Fellow) that this State of Happiness in Heaven was described and represented in a more reasonable Light; was considered as a State of Contemplation, in which Men were to improve in Knowledge and Virtue. But tho' he say all this till he be black in the Face, it will never prove that Heaven was consider'd as a Reality in the Pagan System, because the same things are often said of Elysium itself, confessed to be considered as no Reality.

He there tells us^a, " That the Re-union of the
 " Soul, or its Return to God, was conceived to
 " be the peculiar Recompence and Reward of
 " good Men after Death; he gives this as the
 " *only Notion* of future Happiness, really believ-
 " ed by the Philosophers themselves." Since
 then he lays so much Stress on this Re-union, it
 may not be amiss to consider what he has ad-
 vanced on this Head. He every where represents
 it as a State of the most *absolute and perfect* *Hap-*
piness. This would be very much to his Pur-
 pose, could he prove it. I do indeed find that
 he asserts it again and again; but alas! all these
 Assertions will not amount to one Proof. How-
 ever, in Support of this Notion, he refers us to
Jamblichus, p. 89, 90. This is the sole Autho-
 rity produced by him; and this, unluckily, in
 the present Case turns out to be no Authority at
 all. Does not Mr. *Jackson* know that the Ar-
 gument of the *Divine Legation* relates to the Sen-
 timents of those Philosophers, who lived before
 our Saviour? " Such was the general Doctrine
 " on this Point, before the coming of Christi-
 " anity. But then those Philosophers, who held
 " out against its Truth, new modelled both their
 " Philosophy and Religion, making their Phi-
 " losophy more religious, and their Religion
 " more philosophical: Of which we have given se-
 " veral occasional Instances in the Course of this
 " Work. So amongst the many Improvements
 " of *Paganism*, the softening this Doctrine was
 " one; the modern *Platonists* confining the No-
 " tion of the Soul's being Part of the divine Sub-
 " stance, to those of Brutes: Every rational
 " Power, says Porphyry, is resolved into the Life

“ of the Whole. And it is remarkable that then,
 “ and not till then, the Philosophers really be-
 “ gan to believe the Doctrine of a future State
 “ of Rewards and Punishments.” (*Divine Le-
 gation*, vol. i. p. 430.) When the Question is
 thus plainly confined to the Period before our Sa-
 viour, why are we referred to *Jamblicus*, who
 lived so long after it? This surely looks like Di-
 stress. For why this *poaching* in *unlicensed Au-
 thors*, if the Gentleman could have started his
 Game like a fair Sportsman? But let him answer
 directly to this plain Question; Were the Doc-
 trines of the Philosophers the same, in the Days
 of *Jamblicus*, as in the times before our Savi-
 our?—Were the Notions of the human Soul
 the same in these two Periods? It is certain that
 he must answer in the Negative; and what clear-
 er Proof can there be than this, that the Testi-
 mony of *Jamblicus* is of no Force in the present
 Question^b?

It

^b However, as our Author lays so great Stress on the Testi-
 mony of this *Jamblicus*, as he makes no Distinction between
 the Philosophers who lived before and after the coming of our
 Saviour: I will just give him a short Character of these *last*,
 and that from some other-guise Writers than himself; from
 some of the best Scholars our Country has to boast of. The
 excellent *Stillingfleet*, speaking of these very Men, says,
 “ Whoever is conversant with the Writings of those Philoso-
 “ phers, who were of the sacred Succession, out of the School
 “ of *Ammonius* at *Alexandria*; such as *Plotinus*, *Porphyrus*,
 “ *Jamblicus*, *Hierocles*, will find them write in a higher
 “ Strain, concerning many weighty Truths, as of the De-
 “ generacy of Men’s Soul from God, and the way of the
 “ Souls returning to him, than the most sublime of the an-
 “ cient Philosophers had done. Which Speculations of theirs
 “ arose not so much from the School of *Plato* and *Pythagoras*,
 “ as of that great Restorer of Philosophy, *Ammonius* of *Alex-
 andria*; whose Scholars, *Herennius*, *Origen*, and *Plotinus*
 E 3 “ were

It may be said that I consider the Re-union of the Soul, and the State of Happiness in Heaven, as different and distinct things; whereas the learned Writer I have to do with, all along supposes that they were one and the same State.—I believe he does; however, I chuse rather to follow the Ancients, who always consider them as very separate and distinct things, than this great Modern, who hath been pleased to mix and confound them. *Seneca* says, *Magnus animus Deo pareat, & quicquid lex universi jubet sine cuncta-*

“ were, who living and dying a *Christian*, as *Eusebius* and “ *Jerom* assure us, whatever *Porphyrius* suggests to the contrary, did communicate to his Scholars the sublimer My- “ steries of divine Revelation, together with the Speculations “ of the ancient Philosophers.” *Origines Sacrae*, l. iii c. 3. p. 500, 1.

The great *Bentley*, speaking of the later Philosophers, declares, “ That for their professorial Interests, and to keep the “ *Pagan* System in Countenance against the Objections of “ *Christians*, they had quite alter’d the old Schemes of *Philos-* “ *ophy*; and pretended to more Impulses, Inspirations, Re- “ velations and Commerce with the Deity, than *Christians* “ could truly do. Not one of those sanctified Philosophers “ but had Dreams, Visions, and extatic Colloquies with Dæ- “ mons every Night, &c.” *Remarks upon a Discourse of Free-thinking*, part ii. p. 24.

The learned *Whitby* confirms the same; as to *Hierocles*, *Porphyry*, *Proclus*, and *Jamblicus*, “ I am apt to suspect, “ says he, that as in other things they apparently dressed up “ their Philosophy and Morality anew, to accommodate it “ the better to the *Christian* Philosophy, that so there might “ seem less need of *Christianity*; and particularly made the “ Felicity of Souls hereafter much like the *Christian* Doc- “ trine, that so they might destroy or render needless the “ Doctrine of the Resurrection.” 1 *Cor.* xv. 44.

But now let him not mistake the Purpose of these Quotations, and imagine they are given for any further End than to shew in general that the *Christian* Religion occasioned a Change in the philosophic Systems of *Paganism*: That it made this Change in the Points in question rests on the Arguments of the *D. L.*

tionc

tione patiatur; aut in meliorem emittitur vitam, lucidius, tranquillius *inter divina mansurus*, aut certe sine ullo futurus incommodo, *naturæ suæ remiscebitur & revertetur in totum*^c. It will not be denied that the first Part relates to the State of Happiness in *Heaven*, and the second to the Refusion of the Soul. But then are they not plainly and directly opposed to each other? must they not therefore have been considered as very separate and distinct States?

The same Author, in another Place, confirms the same thing: He speaks of the Bliss and Happiness of Heaven, but then he speaks of it, as previous to the Refusion of the Soul^d. *Nos quoque felices animæ & æterna sortitæ, cum Deo visum erit ista iterum moliri, labentibus cunctis, & ipsi parva ruinæ ingentis accessio, in antiqua elementa vertemur*; or, as *Lipsius* on the Place says, shall be resolved into *the universal Soul*^e. There can surely be no Question but these were thought to be different and distinct States, as the one was supposed both opposite to, and prior to the other. The Re-union was to begin at the very Time, when the State of Happiness in Heaven was conceived to end.

Again; Mr. *Jackson* gives the Re-union to the Souls of good Men in general: But I have proved that the State of Happiness in *Heaven* was reserved only for Men of great and exalted Merit; for those, whose eminent Services to Mankind had raised and advanced them above the rest of their Fellow-Creatures.

^c Epist. 72.

^d Cap. ult. *ad Martiam*.

^e *Animæ igitur tunc omnes iterum ad mundi animam, i. e. ad Jovem—resolvuntur. Physiol. Stoicor. l. iii. c. 11*

Having established this Difference, let us now see how it affects our present Question. The learned Author, in his *first* Piece, sends us to the Re-union, as *the only Notion* of future Rewards, really entertained by the old Philosophers. In the *second* he refers us to a State of Bliss and Happiness *in Heaven*, as the *only Doctrine* really believed by them. Did he then conceive these to be one and the same State? If he did; he may probably, by this time, be convinced that he was mistaken.

Did he conceive them to be separate and distinct States? If he did, the Doctrine of his first and second Pieces, are directly opposite and contradictory to each other. In the first, the Philosophers supposed all future Happiness to consist barely in the Re-union of the Soul. In the second, they believed a State of Happiness in Heaven, distinct from this Re-union.

And what says our *Defender* to all this? He says, what no charitable Reader will readily believe of him, *That I all along confound these two States, and make them one.* See his *Further Defence* p. 65. He ventured to say this, I suppose, because he knew I could not retort the Charge upon *him*; the Design of this Chapter being to shew that *he* speaks with so much Confusion and Inconsistency of these two States, that 'tis impossible to gather from his Talk, *whether he did consider them as one or two.* Or, perhaps it was because, in this Chapter, I bring several Authorities and Arguments to prove that they were considered *as two separate and distinct States*: Therefore his business being to *contradict* me, he says that I suppose them *to be one and the same.* If any of his Readers can give a better Account
of

of this Matter than I have done, I, but especially Mr. *Jackson*, shall be obliged to him.

Let us just recapitulate the real State of the Question: The learned Writer pretends to give us the *only* Notion of future Happiness actually believed and entertained by the Philosophers themselves. By this Means he brings the Dispute between us into a narrow Compass: For in this Case, what have we to do, but to consider this very Doctrine; to examine into the real State of it? And, as it does not appear from hence that the Philosophers believed a State of future Happiness, it follows of Course, from his own Principles, that we have hitherto no Proof, that they belived any future Rewards whatsoever.

C H A P. IV.

That the Philosophers did not believe a future State of Punishments.

LET us come now to that Part of the Question, which relates to their Belief of future Punishments. And here I shall confine myself to one single Argument: It has been indeed before mentioned in the *Divine Legation*; and, from its being yet unanswered, I shall not scruple to affirm, that 'tis effectual, and decisive of the Point in Question. It is grounded on a Passage of *Cicero*, where he declares, *That the common and popular Accounts of another Life were the only Foundation and Support of future Punishments.* Now it is allowed, even by Mr. *Jackson* himself,

himself; that the Ancients did not believe these common and popular Accounts: And therefore, with his Leave, I would conclude, *upon the Authority of Cicero*, that they believed no future Punishments whatsoever.

But let us review the Passage: It is taken from the Oration for *Cluentius*. Nam nunc quidem, quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? Nisi forte ineptiis ac fabulis ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud Inferos impiorum supplicia perferre, &c. Quæ si falsa sunt, ID QUOD OMNES INTELLIGUNT, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris? Our Argument supposes that these common

In this Passage *Cicero* declares that the common Account of the *infernal Torments* was the only Foundation and Support of a State of future Punishments. Now the learned Author of the History of his Life assures us, that he did not believe the first; and this would make one suspect that he could not believe the latter; because he himself tells us, that this last derives all its Credit and Authority from the Supposition that the first were true.

And indeed he frequently declares that he believes nothing of future Punishments; and this not only in a few scattered Hints, accidentally thrown out, and when he was not considering the Subject: But in those very Treatises, that were deliberately written on this Question; in those very Treatises, to which the fine Writer abovementioned refers us for his real Opinion on the Point in Dispute. In the first *Tusculan*, having mentioned the several Opinions of Philosophers concerning the Soul, he adds, "Which ever of these is admitted to be true, Death will not be attended with any Misery." Efficiet ratio, ut, quæcunque vera sit earum sententiarum quas exposui, mors aut malum non sit, aut sit bonum potius. c. 11.

Quid hoc? dasne aut manere animos post mortem, aut morte ipsa interire? A. Do vero; quod si maneant, beatos esse concedo: Sin intereant, non esse miseros, quoniam ne sint quidem. c. 11.

Gradietur ad mortem; in qua aut summum bonum, aut nullum malum esse cognovimus. c. 46.

Ut aut in æternam et plane in nostram domum remigremus, aut omni sensu molestiæque careamus. c. 49.

Multa

common Stories were the only Foundation and Support of future Punishments. And does not Cicero himself suppose the same? " If these
" (says

Multa primo die, cum de ipsa morte quæreremus; non pauca postero, cum ageretur de dolore, sunt dicta de morte: Quæ qui recordetur, haud sane periculum est, ne non mortem aut optandam aut certe non timendam putet. l. v. 40.

And in his Piece on *old Age* he speaks strongly to the same Purpose. Jam sensus moriendi aliquis esse potest, isque ad exiguum tempus præsertim seni; post mortem quidem sensus aut optandus aut nullus est.

O miserum senem, qui mortem contemnendam esse in tam longa ætate non viderit! quæ aut plane negligenda est, si omnino extinguit animum; aut etiam optanda, si aliquo eum deducit, ubi sit futurus æternus. Atqui tertium certe nihil inveniri potest. c. 19. 20.

Lactantius has preserved the following Passage from the Books of *Læwys*; Gratulamurque nobis, quoniam mors aut meliorem, quam qui est in vitâ, aut certe non deteriorem allatura est statum. Nam sine corpore, animo vigente, divina vita est; sensu carente, nihil profecto est mali. l. iii. 18. In the next Passage we are told that Death is terrible to them, who leave no Name and Reputation behind them; this is represented as the only Loss and Suffering that will really attend the wicked after their Departure out of this World. Mortemne mihi minitaris, ut omnino ab hominibus; an exilium, ut ab improbis demigrandum sit? Mors terribilis est iis, quorum cum vita omnia extinguuntur; non iis, quorum laus emori non potest. *Paradox.* ii. In his *Offices* he affirms that " God " could not be angry, nor hurt any one." And this in order to prove, that the *perjur'd Man* had nothing to fear from the *divine Vengeance*. But how could the Principle just cited prove this, unless it was supposed to exclude all divine Punishments?

Quid est igitur (dixerit quis) in jurejurando? Num iratum timemus Jovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum; non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii, et nihil exhibere alteri; sed eorum etiam, qui Deum semper agere aliquid et moliri volunt; nunquam nec irasci Deum, nec nocere. iii. 28.

Sæpissime et legi et audiivi nihil mali esse in morte, in qua si resideat sensus, immortalitas illa potius quam mors ducenda sit; sin sit amissus, nulla videri miseria debet quæ non sentiat. *Fam. Ep.* v. 16. And in the next Book, speaking of Death, he says, præsertim cum id impendat, in quo non
modo

“ (says he) are false, as all Men see they are,
 “ what has Death deprived him of besides a
 “ Sense of Pain ?” Does not this Reasoning evi-
 dently

modo dolor nullus, verum finis etiam doloris futurus est. *Fam. Ep. vi. 4.* To these we may add several Passages, produced by the Author of the *D. L.* Ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, *quam etiam beati contemnere debeamus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset habitura, nunc sic affectu non modo contemnere debemus, sed etiam optare.*
 — v. 21.

Nec enim dum ero, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem culpa; *et si non ero, sensu omni carebo.* vi. 3.

Non ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse doleam, *præsertim cum id sine ullo sensu futurum sit.* And again; *præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum.* vi. 4; 21.

Such plain and numerous Declarations from *Cicero* himself will at least shew, that he could not generally believe a State of future Punishments. How far the Testimonies here cited may serve to ballance and supersede those alledged by Dr. *Middleton* in support of the contrary Opinion, must be submitted to the Judgment of the Reader. I cannot indeed help observing that several of them are drawn from the same Books; and that these are the very Books, in which, according to the Doctor, we are to look for a Declaration of *Cicero's* strict and real Sentiments. One may too take Notice that these Passages are very numerous; far more numerous than those which have been brought to establish the contrary Doctrine. It may not be improper to add, that they are taken from very different Books, composed at very different and distant Times; if therefore they give us his real Opinion at these several Seasons, it will unavoidably follow that he generally disbelieved all future Punishments.

“ We must remember always, that *Cicero* was an *Academic*; and though he believed a future State, was fond
 “ of the Opinion, and declares himself resolved never to
 “ part with it, yet he believed it as probable only, not as
 “ certain: And as Probability implies some Mixture of
 “ Doubt, and admits the Degrees of more and less, so it
 “ admits also some Variety in the Stability of our Persuasion:
 “ Thus in a melancholy Hour, when his Spirits were de-
 “ pressed, the same Argument would not appear to him with
 “ the same Force; but Doubts and Difficulties get the
 “ Ascendant, and what humoured his present Chagrin, find
 “ the readiest Admission. The Passages alledged were all of
 “ this

dently suppose that there was a necessary Connexion between these popular Fables, and the Doctrine of future Punishments? If then a future

“ this kind; written in the Season of his Dejection, when
 “ all things were going wrong with him in the height of
 “ *Cæsar's* Power; and tho' we allow them to have all the
 “ Force that they can possibly bear, and to express what
 “ *Cicero* really meant at that time, yet they prove at last
 “ nothing more, than that, agreeably to the Character and
 “ Principles of the Academy, he sometimes doubted of what
 “ he generally believed. But after all, whatever be the Sense
 “ of them, it cannot surely be thought reasonable, to oppose
 “ a few scattered Hints, accidentally thrown out, when he
 “ was not considering the Subject, to the Volumes he had
 “ deliberately written on the other side of the Question.”
 (*History of the Life of Cicero*, p. 561, 2. vol. ii.)

This was said in answer to some Passages, alledged from *Cicero's* Epistles, in order to prove that he disbelieved a future State. It is obvious to observe that it will no ways affect the Testimonies I have here quoted. “ It cannot surely be
 “ thought reasonable to oppose a few scatter'd Hints, accidentally thrown out, when he was not considering the
 “ Subject, to the Volumes deliberately written on the other
 “ side of the Question”. My Argument does not rest, on a
 “ few scatter'd Hints accidentally thrown out, when he was
 “ not considering the Subject.” My Testimonies are many
 of them taken from those very Treatises, in which, as the celebrated Writer himself assures us, *Cicero* delivers his real Sentiments; from the very Treatises to which he himself thinks proper to appeal on the Occasion. For in this Number we must rank the *Tusculans*, the *Offices*, the Pieces of *Laæus*, and *old Age*. And does not *Cicero* discard all future Punishments in these very Volumes, in as full and absolute a Manner, as in his Epistles themselves? “ The Volumes deliberately written on the other side of the Question.” It is Pity but this fine Author had pointed out “ the Volumes
 “ that were deliberately written on the other side of the
 “ Question.” They can surely be no others than those from which these very Passages are taken; and if so, they can hardly prove that *Cicero* did generally believe a State of future Punishments.

Nor will the first Part of this Reasoning make any Impression to the Disadvantage of what I have advanced with regard to his Disbelief of the Doctrine. It goes all along upon a
 Supposition,

ture State was not believed under these Representations, is it not manifest that it could not be believed at all?

And

Supposition, that *Cicero* denied a future State, only in his most dark and melancholy Hours; that he threw out Hints against this Notion, only to humour the Chagrin he was then in. But after all, was this the Fact and real Case of *Cicero*? Have we not shewn, that he declared against all future Punishments, when the Circumstances here mention'd could have no Place? Did he not disclaim them, even in his *Tusculans*, his *Laws*, his *Offices*, and his Piece on *old Age*? And will the learned Author say, he was so eat up with the Spleen and Melancholy at the time of writing these, that "Doubts and Difficulties had got the Ascendant" on the Point in Question? He will not surely say this, because he appeals to these very Books as containing the religious Sentiments of *Cicero*, as giving his real Opinion of another Life.

I do not after all take upon me to say, whether *Cicero* did or did not believe a State of future Punishments. I only offer a few Hints to shew, that he was not so constant and uniform in the Profession of this Doctrine, as some Writers have ventured to assert. Had I indeed said, that he absolutely disbelieved this Notion, I should have said no more than what one of the Writers against the *D. L.* has said before me. "*Tully*, says *Mr. Botte*, always spoke of the future State, (in his philosophical Works) as either a State of Happiness, "or of no Sense at all; and could never conceive how a "third could be." (*Answer to D. L.* p. 175.) I have nothing to do with the Reason, which he here assigns in Support of his Opinion; nor indeed with his Opinion itself, any further than as it serves to shew, that one might without any Prejudice, or Fondness for an Hypothesis, charge *Cicero* with the utter Disbelief of all future Punishments.

I was obliged to dwell the longer on this Point, because the learned *Dr. Middleton* affirms that *Cicero* generally believed the Doctrine of future Punishments. But if he generally believed it, whence comes it that he so generally speaks against it? If these several Passages express what *Cicero* really meant at that time, it will be impossible to support the Opinion maintained by this celebrated Writer. But what most we think now of *Mr. Jackson*, who pretends that the Philosophers were constant and unvaried in the Profession and Belief of this Doctrine; that "one may as reasonably doubt, whether any *Christians* do, or ever did believe it, as whether

And here let me ask, what has the learned Writer said to this Argument of the *Divine Legation*? Why, not one Syllable. But will not every Reader reflect on what he should have said? He may perhaps tell us, that it was too trivial to deserve his Notice; but he must excuse me, if I ascribe his Silence to a very different Cause. This is not his usual Way of managing Objections, whenever he but dreams he can answer to the Purpose.

But, to resume our Argument: The learned Author allows that the Ancients did not believe the vulgar and poetical Accounts of future Punishments; and I ask no more to prove *that they believed no future Punishments at all.*

The Question then is, whether the Ancients had any Notion of future Punishments, not founded on the Fables of the Populace; whether they had any Conception of separate and distinct Punishments, in which the Stories of *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*, had nothing to do. The Author of the *Divine Legation*, in Support of the Negative, brought the Passage from *Cicero* abovementioned; I will here point out some other Testimonies, in which the very same thing has been maintained and asserted by other Writers of Antiquity. *Cogita nullis defunctum malis affici. Illa, quæ nobis Inferos faciunt terribiles, fabula est. Nullas imminere mortis tenebras, nec carcerem, nec flumina flagrantia igne, nec oblivionis amnem, nec tribunalia, nullos in illa reos libertate tam laxa, nullos iterum tyrannos. Mors omnium dolorum*

“ it was believed by the Philosophers amongst the *Pagans.*” But what Resemblance is there between the Doctrine of *Cicero*, and that of common *Christians*? Or when do the last use the Professions and Arguments of the first, unless it be in order to censure and confute them?

solutio

solutio est & finis, ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt &.

The Dead, we see, were subject to no Pain and Misery; and why? because the vulgar Accounts of another Life were fabulous and false. Is it not evident from hence, that these were the only Foundation and Support of future Punishments? Otherwise why might not the Dead be subject to Pain and Misery, tho' these Stories were false and groundless?

^b Mors contemni debet magis quam solet: Multa enim de illa credimus. Multorum ingeniis certatum est ad augendam ejus infamiam. Descriptus est carcer Infernus, & perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua

———— ingens janitor Orci,
Ossa super recubans antro semesa cruento,
Æternum latrans, exangues terreat umbras.

Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse, nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant, subit alius metus, æque enim timor ne apud Inferos sint, quam ne nusquam. He here mentions the poetical and fabulous Accounts of another Life; if these were false, the Consequence, you see, was that there could be no future Punishments at all. Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse, *nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant.*

^c Seneca ad Martiam, c. 19. Quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem, in qua antequam nasceremur jacuimus, reponit. Si mortuorum aliquis miseretur, et non natorum misereatur. Mors nec bonum nec malum est. Id enim potest aut bonum aut malum esse, quod aliquid est: Quod vero ipsum nihil est, et omnia ad nihil redigit, nulli nos fortunæ tradit. Mala enim bonaque circa materiem aliquam versantur: Non potest fortuna tenere, quod natura dimisit; nec potest miser esse, qui nullus est.

^b Seneca Ep. 83.

Again :

Again: Non sum tam ineptus ut Epicuream cantilenam hoc loco persequar, & dicam vanos esse Inferorum metus, nec Ixionem rota volvi, nec saxum humero Sisyphi trudi in adversum, nec ullius viscera & renasci posse quotidie, & carpi. Nemo tam puer est, ut Cerberum timeat, &c.—Mors nos aut consumit, aut exuit. Emis-
sis meliora restant, onere detracto: Consumptis nihil restat, bona pariter malaque submota sunt¹.

If there was no *Cerberus*, the Soul must either be extinguished, or raised to a State of Happiness. But why so, if there were future Punishments in Store, which did not derive their Credit and Authority from the common Fables?

Cicero, in his first *Tusculan*, undertakes to confute the Doctrine, *which makes Death an Evil*. But then, in this Confutation, he confines himself to two Points; the Notion of infernal Torments, and the Mortality of the Soul. The last, he tells us, is a State of Non-existence, and not attended with any positive and real Misery; *and the first was a pure Fiction*. Hence he infers that Death was no Evil. What a ridiculous and absurd Inference had this been, if he had admitted any Notion of positive and real Punishments besides those taught the Populace? *Tusc. i. c. 5, 6, 7, 8.*

My Reasoning stands thus: As *Cicero*, in this very Book, undertakes to answer the Arguments, which were commonly brought to prove, that Death is a real Evil, it was his Business to open and explain the several Circumstances, which were generally supposed to make Death an Evil. Now it is remarkable that he confines himself to the Doctrine of infernal Torments, and the Mor-

¹ Seneca, Ep. 24.

talities of the Soul. But what a shameful Representation had this been, had he himself all the time had another Supposition in reserve, on which Death might be shewn to be an Evil, without any Regard to the two Circumstances above mentioned?

But tho' he has only disproved the common and popular Accounts of future Punishments, he yet ventures to affirm, that Death could not be a State of Misery and Sorrow. Quid, hoc dasne aut manere animos post mortem, aut morte ipsa interire? A. Do vero; *quod si maneant, beatos esse concedo; sin intereant, non esse miseros, quoniam ne sunt quidem.* c. 11.

The learned Doctor *Davies* confirms what I have here said, that all future Punishments are rejected in the Passage just cited. And, upon the Place he observes, *Ita argumentati sunt Ethnici, quod Poetarum dicta de poenis apud Inferos pro nugis haberent. They rejected all future Punishments.* And what was the Reason of this? The learned Critic tells us, it was *because they disbelieved the poetical and fabulous Accounts of another World.*

I will next give a Testimony, as I find it cited in the *Divine Legation*, tho' not immediately to the Purpose of my present Argument; for this, like many other Passages there quoted, may serve to illustrate and support more than one Part of that incomparable Work. 'Tis brought from *Epictetus*, who, speaking of Death, says, " But
" whither do you go? No where to your Hurt:
" You return from whence you came: To a
" friendly Consociation with your kindred Elements: What there was of the Nature of
" Fire in your Composition, returns to the Element of Fire; what there was of Earth, to
" Earth;

“ Earth; what of Air, to Air; and of Water,
 “ to Water. *There is neither Hell, Acheron,*
Cocytus, or Pyriphlegethon.” *Divine Legation,*
 vol. i. p. 292.

“ Upon Death you go no whither to your
 “ Hurt; And why? because there is no Hell,
 “ *Acheron, Cocytus, or Pyriphlegethon.*” If
 therefore these were removed, all future Punish-
 ments were supposed to be removed with them.

The same thing is confirmed by those celebra-
 ted Lines of *Ovid*,

O genus attonitum stolidæ formidine mortis,
 Quid Styga, quid tenebras, & nomina vana timetis,
 Materiem vatum, falsique pericula mundi?
 Morte carent animæ, semperque, priore relictâ
 Sede, novis domibus vivunt, habitantque receptæ.

Met. L. xv.

’Tis the Design and Purpose of *Pythagoras*,
 who here speaks, to teach Men to despise the
 Terrors of Death; and he thinks it sufficient for
 this Purpose, to arm them against the Fears of
Styx, Acheron, &c. A plain Proof, he had no
 Conception of any future Punishments besides
 the popular ones.

Here then I could wish Mr. *Jackson* would re-
 flect, that his Argument is levelled at the learned
 Ancients above mentioned, as well as at the Au-
 thor of the *Divine Legation*. For what has Mr.
Warburton done more than repeated the Infe-
 rence, which they had before made? Now if
 this Reasoning be just and logical in their Wri-
 tings; how happens it to commence at once ri-
 diculous and absurd, when transferred into the
Divine Legation? Has he or his Books so ma-
 lignant an Influence as to poison and blast every
 thing, which comes within their Reach?

But, whatever the Ancients themselves say, Mr. *Jackson* insists that they had a Notion of future Punishments separate and distinct from those taught the Populace. If this was the true and real Sentiment of Antiquity, whence comes it, that it escaped the Notice of the learned Writers above cited? They give us the common Fables as the *single*, the *only* Support of future Punishments: They must therefore have been entire Strangers to the Doctrine, which the learned Writer would obtrude upon us as their own. Wherever therefore he got this Notion, we may be certain that he had it not from Antiquity: And if he did not draw it from thence, we need not be solicitous how he came by it.

But to close this Article: What has been said is, I think, sufficient to confute all the learned Gentleman has advanced on this Head; and that by the most effectual and decisive way of Confutation, the plain and necessary Consequences of his own Principles. He allows that the Ancients did not believe the *common and popular* Doctrine of future Punishments; and I have shewn, *upon their own Authority*, that they had *no other* to believe. With his Permission therefore, I would conclude that they believed no future Punishments at all^k.

C H A P.

^k If I have made good what I undertook to prove, we have enough here to overturn all Mr. *Jackson* has advanced in regard to the *double Doctrine*. He allows that the secret Notion did indeed exclude the poetical and fabulous Accounts of future Punishments. Now if so, it must of course exclude all possible Punishments with regard to another Life. For we have plainly shewn that these two were inseparably connected in the Ideas of several of the old Philosophers; they did not pretend to reject the first, and yet maintain the last. But what now says our trusty Advocate of *Pagan* Philosophy, who
scorns

C H A P. V.

That the Stoics did not believe a future State. Some Account of their Doctrine, concerning Providence, the general Renovation, and the Refusion of the human Soul.

IT would take up more time than all the Opposition to this Part of the *Divine Legation* deserves, to examine the various and particular Opinions of all the Philosophers with regard to a fu-

scorns to leave his Clients in Distress? Indeed not much: And, you may be sure, much less to the Purpose. But once dipt, in he goes: And Sense and Manners fly before him. "Our uninitiated Critics, says he, (meaning, perhaps, uninitiated in the secret Arts of Controversy) being unacquainted with these things, run into endless Absurdities, and fancy the Philosophers Notion of a future State was founded on their own Fictions; and because they allude to the mysterious Scenes, mention the Fields of *Elysium*, and the Darkness, Fire, and Filth of *Tartarus*, &c. therefore they conclude that the Philosophers had no Notion of a future State, but what was founded on the Fables of the Populace. This is want of Taste, and is just such Reasoning as if any Infidel should argue, that *Christians* do not believe a future State, because they do not believe literally the *Banquets* and *Marriage*, the *precious Stones*, the *Rivers issuing from the Throne of God*, mentioned by *St. John Apoc. xxi. xxii.* and in other Places of Scripture, which are figurative and very beautiful Expressions, by which the Happiness of this State is describ'd. When our Saviour taught the Doctrine of a future State under the Parable of the *rich Man* and *Lazarus*, which might be of his own framing; and talked of *Abraham's Bosom*, and a *great Gulph*; and of the Discourse between the *rich Man in Hell* and the *poor Man in Abraham's Bosom*; does it follow thence, that our Saviour did not believe a future State at all; or any but what was founded on his own Fictions? Would *Mr. Warb.* or our Critic hear with Patience an Infidel who should argue in

a future State : I will therefore confine myself to that Sect, which was the most famed for the Study of Logic and Morality of any in the ancient World ;

" this Manner." Mr. *Jackson's farther Defence*, p. 34, 5. Let him be under no Concern about that ; for having so long heard Mr. *Jackson*, with Patience, we are in no Danger of straining this Virtue, whoever comes after.—However I must just put the Reader in mind, that the several Arguments explained in this Chapter, relate only to the Doctrine of future Punishments. Now this very candid and ingenuous Writer charges me with asserting that the Philosophers disbelieved all future Punishments, *barely because they sometimes allude to, and mention the Darkness, Fire, and Filth of Tartarus*. Whereas the Reader sees my Argument stands thus ; The Philosophers represent the Stories of *Styx, Acheron &c.* as mere Fables, and they declare, that *if these were Fictions*, there could be no future Punishments whatsoever. Hence my Conclusion asserts, that the Philosophers believed no future Punishments. A very different thing surely from what this honest Man lays to my charge ; *viz* of asserting that the Philosophers denied all future Punishments, merely because they mention the Filth and Darkness and Fire of Tartarus.

I had said that several of the Ancients had no Notion of future Punishments, but what were founded on the Fables of the Populace. " This, says our Author, IS WANT OF TASTE." For what?—For Mr. *Jackson's* Writings. I own it. *Cicero, Ovid, Seneca, and Epictetus*, had spoil'd my Taste : For, unluckily, I read them before I thought of forming it on so great a Model as this second-hand Metaphysician. But it is now too late to mend ; these uninitiated Writers I must stick to : They say this very thing ; and I profess only to speak after them. But what ! because Mr. *Jackson* has long blustered, unchecked, on Subjects that no Body understood, does he expect the same Forbearance when he talks Nonsense on plain Matters, that lie level to the Capacity of all Men. If he has these Pretensions I would advise him to haste back again into his own Kingdom of SPACE, where he may *bombinate*, at his ease, in *vacuo*, and none venture to molest him. But here, on the *Terra Firma* of Reason, he won't be allowed an Inch but what he fairly wins. If then he would attack my Argument with Success, he must shew that the Passages, on which I support it, are *not* to my Purpose ; for while he leaves me, as he here does, in Possession of them, he gains nothing for himself but the Character of
a vain

World ; I need not say that I mean the *Stoics*. And here I shall proceed in the following Order. I will first consider the Testimonies and Arguments alledged by the learned Writer, to prove that

a vain empty Boaster.

" 'Tis, says Mr. J. just such Reasoning, as if any *Infidel* " should argue that *Christians* do not believe a future State," &c. Little need be said to shew the excessive Absurdity of this Comparison. Do Believers use the same Language, as the old Philosophers on this Subject ? Do they say that *the Flames of Hell are mere Fictions ; and that THEREFORE no Punishments are reserved for Men in another World* ? If they do not say this, they say nothing that can bring them into so ill Company as they are here coupled with ? And if any, who call themselves Believers, do say this, I know of no Rules of Charity, which can oblige us to suppose that they believe more of the Matter than the old Pagan Philosophers. " When our " Saviour (says he) taught the Doctrine of a future State under " the Parable of the *rich Man* and *Lazarus*," &c. What Shadow of Likeness is there for this wild Comparison ? Does our blessed Saviour ever profess that *the Flames of Hell are a pure Fable ; and that THEREFORE there are no Punishments after Death* ? Had he delivered himself in any Sort of Language like this, there might have been some Pretence for this Reasoning. As he has not done so, 'tis as impious as it is impertinent, to compare the Preaching of the eternal Son of God to the *vain and profane Babblings* of the *Greek Sophists*. And yet it was not without *Art* that he worked up his Comparison, ridiculous as it is : He was forced to falsify the Fact before he could bring things to fit. The popular Expressions used by the Founders of our Faith, to convey the *Christian* Doctrine of a future State, are *their own* ; and therefore he was forced to represent the popular Notions of future Punishments found in the Writings of the later *Greek Philosophers*, as *their own* : Tho' invented by the early Law-givers to make an Impression on barbarous Minds. For in the Passage last quoted, he censures it as the highest Absurdity in me, to suppose the *Philosophers* Notions were founded ON THEIR OWN FICTIONS. I supposed no such thing ; but, on the contrary, that they were the *Fictions* of the more *early* Law-givers. However, this we get by it, a lively Instance, that it is no such Rarity for a Man to found his Notions on *his own Fictions* ; the just Order of things so directing, that, to believe a Lye should at length become the Punishment of telling it.

that the *Stoics* did believe another Life.—I will next shew, from his own Principles, that they neither did nor could believe it.

“ IF

It is remarkable, that Dr. *Sykes* and Mr. *J.* all along take it for granted, that *Tartarus*, *Acheron*, &c. were mere Metaphors and Allegories, employed to represent the Pains and Torments of the Wicked in another Life, in Defiance of all the Proofs that have been brought to the contrary. *Had not the modern Management of Controversy sanctified this Practice*, I should be apt to take it a little ill, that confident Assertions should *still* hold the upper Hand of Argument. It has been clearly proved that many of the Philosophers rejected all future Punishments, *because* they rejected the Notion of *Tartarus*, and all the infernal Torments. This, one would think, if Logic be any thing real, and not, too, a mere *metaphorical Expression*, was proving they were something more than figurative Words. For had they been so considered, why might not the Philosophers have denied these in the literal Sense, and yet have retained the Doctrine conveyed by them? Is it not usual to reject the Metaphor, and yet hold the Notion represented by it? It has often been asserted in this very Controversy, that a *Christian* need not espouse the common Account of *Hell* Torments, while he maintains the Reality of future Punishments.

If, say these Gentlemen, *Tartarus*, &c. were Metaphors, might not the Philosophers hold these to be literally true, and yet admit future Punishments? To this I reply, Yes: And wish I could get as fair an Answer to my Question. For, say I, *if the Philosophers deny the Reality of all future Punishments, because there was no such Place as Tartarus; is not this Demonstration that Tartarus was considered by them as something more than a bare Metaphor?* But though Mr. *J.* may think fit to be silent, yet his very way of Reasoning, which owed him a good Turn, speaks for him, and supports the thing he opposes. For he all along takes it for granted, that the Rejection of a mere figurative Representation would not have obliged the Ancients to reject the thing conveyed by it: And yet it has been proved, as plain as Words and Facts supporting one another, can prove any thing, *that they did reject it*. The Conclusion, then, from his own Reasoning, is that *Tartarus* was not considered by them as a bare Metaphor.

A Passage from *Ovid*, cited above, plainly shews that the popular Accounts of future Punishments were something more than

“ If no one is to be allowed to believe a God,
 “ and Providence and future State, *which all de-*
 “ *pend on each other, and were uniformly pro-*
 “ *fess’d*

than mere Metaphors. To shew this in the clearest Light, it will be necessary to transcribe the following Passage from Mr. *Jackson’s first Pamphlet*. “ The Philosophers themselves believ’d nothing either of the corporeal Transmigration; or of a future State of sensitive Pains and Pleasures in *Tartarus* or *Elysium*, though they taught them in their *public Discourses* and *political Writings*, to keep up the Belief of a future State, in the Minds of the common People, who were not, as they alledged, capable of receiving them under any other, than a material Representation, and sensitive and corporeal Images.” p. 70, 71. We are here told that the Metempsychosis, and common Account of infernal Torments were only figurative and allegorical Representations of one and the same State. And this is just as true as the rest. *Ovid*, who was well acquainted with the *Greek Philosophy*, and probably transcribed some *Pythagorean* Accounts of the Disputations of their Master, makes him consider these as two inconsistent Accounts of very different and contrary States.

O Genus attonitum stolidæ formidine mortis!
 Quid Styga, quid tenebras et nomina vana timetis,
 Materiem vatum, falsique pericula mundi?
 Corpora five rogos flammâ, seu tæbe vetustas
 Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis.
 Morte carent animæ, semperque, priore relicta
 Sede, novis domibus vivunt habitantque receptæ.

Had they been consider’d as mere Metaphors, it is impossible that they should have been opposed to each other, as separate and inconsistent States. Metaphors may vary, and sometimes stand ill together; but they can never be inconsistent, while they have no Pretensions of *their own*, but are the joint Representatives of some *other*, and that the same thing. Future Punishments are sometimes figured in Scripture under the Image of the Worm that never dies; sometimes under the Image of Brimstone, fed with Flames of Fire. But who ever thought they were inconsistent with each other?

The *Court Clown*, in the *Comic Poet*, who had but one Answer to all kinds of Demands, and this, only,—O Lord, Sir, was not a greater Proficient in his Art than our Court-Divines are in theirs. A *figurative Expression* answers all Difficulties: And a *Metaphor*, as shadowy as it is, is the sure
 Refuge

“ *fess’d* by all Sects of Philosophers, but *Epicu-*
 “ *reans* and *Pyrrhonists*, or *Atheists* and *Scep-*
 “ *tics* ; because some metaphysical Notions may
 “ be mix’d with their Belief, which are either in
 “ themselves absurd, or which we fancy to be
 “ inconsistent with it ; what must become of
 “ *Christians* as well as *Pagans* ? ” *Last Defence*,
 p. 69. The learned Gentleman lays it down as
 a certain Maxim, that the Doctrine of a future
 State must be supported on true and proper No-
 tions of a Providence. Now, I’m afraid, it will
 appear, that several of the *Stoics*, how exact so-
 ever their Knowledge in Morality might be ;
 how highly soever they may be extolled by their
 modern Advocates, had entertained some very
 irrational and absurd Notions on this last Subject.
 Providence, according to them, was only to pre-
 side over the World in general ; it was not sup-
 posed to descend to particulars, or concern itself
 with you or me, or any Individual. “ *Zeno*,
 “ says the Author of the *D. L.*, held the same
 “ kind of Providence, (*i. e.* a general one) that

Refuge of every Blunderer who has got on the wrong Side
 the Question. If *Pagan* Philosophy is to be *exalted*, you can
 no sooner hint at the *Spinozism* that runs thro’ it, but the
 Answer is ready, — *Metaphorical Expressions* : If *Christian*
 Religion is to be *brought down* to a mere Republication of the
 Law of Nature ; and *Redemption*, *Satisfaction*, and *Sacrifice*
 stand in our way ; then, hey again, for *analogical* and *figu-*
rative Terms. This is the new Compendium of controvertial
 Divinity. By the Aid of this our Metaphysician has wrote
 three Books upon one Subject, without ever coming to the
 Question ; that is, without answering one Argument of the
 Adversaries he writes against. To be serious on this Matter,
 and ask such Writers for *their Love of Truth*, would, I am
 persuaded, give them a low Opinion of your Understanding.
 I would call upon them, by something they have more at
 Heart, *their Love of Controversy* : For if they go on thus, I
 must tell them plainly, it will soon be at an End : And what
 will they be then ?

“ *the*

“ the human Species was the Care of Heaven,
 “ but in such a Sense as the celestial Orbs are.”
Cotta, speaking of the Doctrine of the *Stoics*,
 says, Non animadvertunt, inquit, omnia dii:
 Ne reges quidem. Quid est simile? Reges enim
 si scientes prætermittunt, magna culpa est. (*Ci-*
cero de N. D. iii. 37.) Again, Non curat (Deus)
 singulos homines. Non mirum, ne civitates qui-
 dem. Non eas? Ne nationes quidem et gentes.
 (c. 39.) *Galen* too charges them with the
 same Notion; with holding that God was to di-
 rect and govern the World in general; but with-
 out extending his Care to, or giving any At-
 tention to the Affairs of Individuals^a.

Such were the Sentiments of many among the
 old *Stoics*; and I must leave it to the learned
 Gentleman himself to judge, whether Men pos-
 sess'd of such Notions were likely to believe a
 future State. Their Providence was so limited
 and confined, that it was not supposed to descend
 to Particulars. These therefore could not be con-
 sidered as the Objects of its Care and Inspection;
 and if so, it could not be concerned to punish or
 reward them in this World or the next.

If we may believe a learned Ancient, this
 Doctrine was intirely subversive of a future State;
 he tells us, that they who held it, did really and
 actually reject the Doctrine of another Life;
 and, what is more to our Purpose, that they did
 reject it in CONSEQUENCE of this very Notion.

^a Stoici rebus omnibus innatum (Deum) volunt, iisque si-
 milem effectum, cum iisdem moveri, atque illarum habere
 providentiam dixerant; ita tamen ut cuncta ille quidem guber-
 net, sed tamen nullius rei curam peculiariter habeat. Id ipsum
Epicurus confirmat, ait enim beatam æternamque naturam,
 nec molestiam capere, nec alteri asferre. *De Historia Phi-*
losophicâ.

“ There are some, says *Justin Martyr*, who endeavour to persuade us, that Providence presides only over the World in general, but does not extend to you or me or any Individual. — Now we may easily see the Drift and Design of this Doctrine. It was, adds he, that they might be at Liberty to indulge themselves in all kinds of Vice and Wickedness, as having no superior Power to check and controul them ^b.”

After all I shall readily allow that these very *Stoics* did often speak of a Providence in a more enlarged Sense. All that will follow from hence is; that they were very various and inconsistent in their Professions on this Head. I do not know whether Mr. *J.* will impute this to the Practice of the *double Doctrine*, or to real Inconsistency in these ancient Sages. But to whichever he imputes it, I know that it will be impossible for him to derive any Advantage to his Hypothesis from it. If he gives it to real Inconsistency, how were the Philosophers *uniform* in their Profession, as he tells us in the very Passage I have just cited? If he ascribes it to the *double Doctrine*, he must allow that this I have been here describing was a *secret* and private Notion, as it is hard to conceive with what View, it should be taught and inculcated to the People at large. Now if this was a secret and private Notion, it is evident that the Mode of Providence believed by the

^b Ημας επιχειροῦσι πείθειν, ὡς τὴ μὲρ ΣΥΜΠΑΝΤΟΣ, καὶ ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΩΝ ΓΕΝΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΔΩΝ, ἐπιμελεται θεός, ΕΜΟΪ δὲ καὶ ΣΟΪ οὐκ ἐστὶ καὶ τὴ ΚΑΘΕΚΑΣΤΑ — τὰτο δὲ οὕτως αὐτοῖς τελευτᾶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν συννοῆσαι. ἀδύνα γὰρ καὶ ἐλευθερία λέγειν καὶ ἐπιθεῖν τοῖς δοξάζουσιν τὰυτὰ, ποιεῖν τι ὅτι βυλονται καὶ λέγειν, μὴτε κολάσιν φοβούμενοι, μὴτε ἀγαθὸν ἐλπίζοντι τι εἶναι θεῶ. *Dial. cum Tryph.*

Stoics

Stoics was such as had no necessary Connection with the Doctrine of another Life.

And here I must beg Leave to cite a Passage of *Chrysippus*, in which he endeavours to obviate the Objection that is made against Providence from the Calamities and Afflictions of good Men. His Solution of the Difficulty is this. As to these Afflictions, " they may be owing to " mere Carelessness and Neglect in God, as a " few Grains of Corn may be scatter'd and mis- " laid in a large Family, while things are ma- " naged very well in the main. Or they may " be owing to the Influence of evil Beings, who " do things which really deserve Reproach and " Blame." But lest neither of these Solutions should be thought sufficient, he adds, " That " many things were owing to mere Necessity." It does indeed, as *Plutarch* upon the Place observes, shew great Levity, to compare the Sufferings and Afflictions of the best Men; the Execution of *Socrates*, the Tortures of *Zeno*, to the Trifles mention'd in the first Sentence. But after all, what an irrational and absurd Account of things is this? Had he supposed that Men were sent by their Creator into the present World as a State of Trial, or School of Discipline; that they were to improve and prepare themselves for Eternity; is it possible that he should have had recourse to any of the miserable Solutions here mentioned? However, take which you will of the three Suppositions, all you can infer from

^c Ποτερον (φησιν) αμελεωμενων τινων, καθαπερ εν οικιας μειζοσι παραιπιει τινα πιτυρα, και ποσει πυροι τινες, των ολων εν οικονομωμενων. η δια το καθιστασθαι επι των τοιουτων δαιμονια φαιλα, εν οις τω οντι γινονται και εγκληται αμελεια. φησι δε πολυ και το της ααλκης μειμχθαι. *Plutarch. De Stoicorum Repugnantiis.* p. 1051. Ed. Xyland.

it is, that his Notion of a Providence was strangely embarrassed and perplex'd; that it would not, by any clear and natural Consequence, lead him to the Belief of another Life.

Lastly, I must take Notice, that the learned Dr. Sykes has advanced a Principle, which, if admitted, will oblige us to conclude, that the *Stoics* could have no proper Notion of a Providence. "Were God the *Soul of the Universe*, united to it as our Souls are to us, he must be affected by it, as our Souls are by our Bodies. He would be a Part of the Universe, not the Governor of it. He would not be the Cause or Author of it more than our Souls are of our Bodies." *Connection of Natural and Revealed Religion*, p. 83, 4. Now 'tis certain and undeniable, that, according to the System of the *Stoics*, God was truly and properly the *Soul of the Universe*, united to it as our Souls are to us. "Nam e duobus aiunt componi; e spiritu, qui est mundi anima, et mundo, qui spiritus illius est corpus; haud aliter ac nos, ex anima et corpore constamus." p. 724. *Vossius de Theologia Gentili*. "The *Stoics*, says *Diogenes Laertius*^d, suppose that the World is governed by Mind, which permeates and pervades every Part of it, in the same manner as the human Soul permeates and pervades the Body." If then this Union must of course destroy the Notion of a Providence; if, as Dr. Sykes assures us, God, on this Supposition, could not be consider'd as Governor of the World; it is plain and evident, that the *Stoics* could not consider him in this light.

^d Τον δὲ κόσμον διοικεσθαι κατὰ νῦν καὶ προνοίαν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτὴ μερῶς διηκόνῃ τε καὶ, ΚΑΘΑΠΕΡ ΕΦ' ἩΜΩΝ ΤΗΣ ΨΥΧΗΣ. Lib. vii.

" But

But to proceed to another Point. In his Testimonies Mr. J. insists much upon the Notion of a general Renovation; he gives it as a clear and certain Proof, that the *Stoics* really believed a future State. To this Purpose he urges the following Words of *Chrysippus*. "It was the Opinion of the *Stoics*, that it was by no Means impossible (*i. e.* that it was probable) that, after Death, and some determined Periods of Time, we shall be restored again to the same State in which we now are."

Again^f: "After the general Conflagration, the *Stoics* believed a new State of things would follow, and a Restoration of all things (Men, Animals, &c.) which had existed before to a new State of Life and Being. This made some Christian Writers think that the Opinion of the *Stoics* was not much different from the Christian Doctrine of the Resurrection."

Before we enter upon this Argument, it will be necessary to say something of those Changes and Revolutions of Nature, so often mention'd by the *Stoics*. They held then that the present Frame of Things would subsist for a certain Period of Time; at the Conclusion of which it was to be dissolved and consumed by a general Conflagration. But, after the Destruction of the present World, another was to rise up in its stead; this was to remain for a fixed and stated time, was after that to be dissolved, and succeeded by a new one. Thus a Series of Worlds were to revolve in a regular and successive Order; the Duration of each was limited to a certain Age, beyond which it could not pass. The present Question is confined to the next Revolution, or that new World, which,

after the Dissolution of the present, was to be reared up and erected in its Stead Mr. *Jackson* presents us with this new State of Things, in order to confirm and establish his Opinion, that the *Stoics* believed the Doctrine of another Life; as if this Doctrine was plainly and necessarily contained in the Notion of the general Renovation. I, for my part, can find, in this Renovation, no Strokes, no Resemblance of the religious Doctrine of a future State. First,

Antiquity gives us two very different Accounts of this Matter. We are sometimes told that this new World was to be stocked and replenish'd *with the very same Men*, who had before lived in this. But then there are Writers who endeavour to persuade us, that the Inhabitants of this new World were to be as fresh and new as the World itself; that they were not the self same Persons, who had lived before in this, but others, who were to resemble them in a very particular and exact Manner. We need not stay to determine which of these Accounts is most authentic; for whichever Way the Question is decided, whichever of the two Opinions is allowed this learned Writer to make his best of, we shall be enabled effectually to overthrow every thing he has advanced on this Head. First, there are Authors who tell us, that the Inhabitants of the old World were not to be restored at the general Renovation; but that the new Scene was to be filled and occupied by a new Race of Men. "The
 " *Stoics* suppose these Revolutions not only with
 " regard to Mankind, but even the Gods and
 " immortal Beings. For after the general Con-
 " flagration, which has happen'd an infinite
 " Number of times in past Ages, and will hap-
 " pen as often hereafter, the same Face and Or-
 " der

“ der of Things, from the Beginning to the End,
 “ has been, and ever will be preserved. Now
 “ the *Stoics*, endeavouring to remove this Ab-
 “ surdity, say that the Persons, who are to live
 “ in these future Revolutions, will bear the most
 “ near and strict Resemblance to those who lived
 “ in the preceding ones. It was not the same
 “ *Socrates*, who was to appear and rise again,
 “ but some one exactly like him,—he was not
 “ to marry the same *Xantippe*, but one, who
 “ was to resemble her most exactly in all her
 “ good Qualities; he was not to be accused by
 “ the same Sycophants *Anytus* and *Melitus*, but
 “ by others of the very same Stamp and Cha-
 “ racter &c.”

*Stoicis tamen non eadem quæ nunc sunt renasci-
 tura, sed illis similia tantum (non eundem, verbi
 gratia, Socratem, sed huic & virtute & fortuna
 geminum) videtur potius placuisse^h.*

If now we admit this Opinion, which assigns
 this new World to different Men; the learned
 Writer will never be able to prove from hence,
 that the *Stoics* believed another Life, or that
 they held a future State, in which Men were to
 be rewarded, and punished in Proportion to the
 Merit and Demerit of their Actions in the pre-

Ε Στωικῶν οἱ πλείους ἢ μόνον τὴν τῶν θνητῶν περίοδον τοιαύτην
 εἶναι φασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὰς θέν-
 μετα γὰρ τὴν τε παντὸς ἐκπύρωσιν ἀπείρακις γενομένην, καὶ ἀπεί-
 ρακις ἐσομένην, ἢ αὐτὴ τάξις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους πάντων γε-
 γόνε τε καὶ εἶναι. πειρωμένοι μὲντοι θεραπεύειν πῶς τὰς ἀπείρασις
 οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, ὡς οἱδ' ὅπως, ἀπαρλλακτὲς φασιν εἰσθδαι
 κατὰ περίοδον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων περιόδων πάντα, ἵνα μὴ Σω-
 κράτης πάλιν γινηται, ἀλλ' ἀπαρλλακτὸς τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γα-
 μῶν ἀπαρλλακτῶν τῇ Εὐδιππῇ, καὶ κατηγορηθῆσομενος ὑπὸ
 ἀπαρλλακτῶν Ἀντύου καὶ Μελίτου. *Origenes contra Celsum*,
 l. iv. Ed. Spen. p. 208, 209.

^h Annotationes D' Acerianæ in Mar. Antonin. l. x. c. 31.

sent Life. For the Doctrine of a future State supposes that *the self same Persons* are to appear again in the next World; but the *Stoics* assign this new World to *different Persons*. They strike therefore at the very Essence and Foundation of another Life; they cut off all Possibility of Rewards and Punishments, as they do not introduce the *same Persons* into this new State. So much for the Diversity of Persons. But let us now suppose that the very same Persons were to revive and appear again; and then let us see whether this might be considered as a future State of Rewards and Punishments. When we speak of such a State, we mean a State, which is to rectify the Disorders, and correct the Inequalities of the present Life; where good Men are to be happy, and the Wicked miserable. But was this the Case in these future Revolutions? The very contrary. The Righteous were to suffer, and the Wicked to flourish and triumph, just as they do on this Side the Grave. Thus, "*Socrates* was
 " at the next general Revolution to live again in
 " the very same Circumstances,—to be born of
 " the same Parents, to be educated in the same
 " City, to apply himself to the same Studies,
 " and to undergo the same matrimonial Discipline. He was to be accused by the same Sy-
 " cophants; condemned by the same Judges,
 " and then to submit to the same Fate ⁱ."

ⁱ Origenes contra Celsum, l. v. p. 244, 5. Φασι τη εξης περιωδω τοιαυτα εισθαι, και Σωκρατη παλιν Σωφρονισκω υιον και Αθηναιον εισθαι.—Και Αυτος και Μελιτος αναστησονται, παλιν Σωκρατες κατηγοροι, και η εξ Αρειω παγε βελη καταδικασεται τον Σωκρατην.—And he adds, that *Phalaris* and *Alexander* were to rise again at this general Renovation, and to exercise the very same Acts of Tyranny and Cruelty, as they had done before.

This general Restoration is described by *Nemesius* in much the same Manner. He says, “ that
 “ at a certain Period the World would be de-
 “ stroyed: That it would be afterwards restored,
 “ that all things would happen in the very same
 “ Order as they had done before: That *Socrates*,
 “ and *Plato*, and every one else, would be again
 “ called into Being, live with the very same
 “ Friends and Citizens, and in every Particular
 “ meet with the same Adventures; That this
 “ Restitution was not to be made once only, but
 “ often; that it was to be repeated at certain Pe-
 “ riods, without End, and to all Eternity: That
 “ the Face of things would be no ways diversified
 “ and changed, not even with regard to the most
 “ particular and minute Circumstance. Some (he
 “ says) pretend that the Christians borrowed their
 “ Notion of another Life from this Doctrine:
 “ But (he adds) *they are grossly* mistaken. For the
 “ Scriptures teach that the Dead will be *once* re-
 “ stored to Life; and not that this will be re-
 “ peated at certain Periods ^k.”

And *Tatian* gives much the same Account:
 “ We must reject the Doctrine of *Zeno*, which

^k Cap. 38. Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου. — Ἐκάστον ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πε-
 ριόδῳ γινόμενον ἀπαρallaκτικῶς ἀποτελεῖσθαι, εἰσεῖναι πάλιν Σω-
 κράτην, καὶ Πλάτωνα, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων σὺν τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ
 φίλοις καὶ πολίταις. καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πείσσεσθαι καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μετα-
 χειρῆσθαι, καὶ πάσαι πόλιν, καὶ κώμην, καὶ ἀγροὺς ὁμοίως ἀπο-
 καθίσεσθαι. γινέσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀποκαταστάσιν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐχ ἀπαξ,
 ἀλλὰ πολλάκις. μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἀπείρου καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τὰ αὐτὰ
 ἀποκαθίσεσθαι. τοὺς δὲ θεοὺς τοὺς μὴ ὑποκειμένους τῇ φθορᾷ ταύτῃ
 παρακολουθήσαντας μία περιόδῳ γινώσκειν ἐκ ταύτης πάντα τὰ
 μέλλοντα εἰσεῖναι ἐν ταῖς ἐξῆς περιόδοις. ἔδει γὰρ ξῖνον εἰσεῖναι
 παρὰ τὰ γινόμενα πρότερον, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὡσαύτως ἀπαρallaκτικῶς
 ἀχρὶ καὶ τῶν ἐλαχίστων: καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν, φησι
 τινὲς τοὺς χριστιανούς τὴν ἀνάστασιν φανταζεσθαι, πολὺ πλανηθέντες;
 εἰς ἀπαξ γὰρ ταύτης ἀνάστασεως καὶ οὐ κατὰ περιόδον εἰσεῖναι, τὰ τῷ
 Χριστοῦ δοξαζέει λογία.

“ teaches, that, after the general Conflagration,
 “ the same Men will appear again, and be en-
 “ gaged in the same Actions.—*Anytus* and *Meli-*
 “ *tus* will again accuse the Innocent; *Busiris* will
 “ again sacrifice Strangers, and *Hercules* will un-
 “ dergo his former Labours ¹.”

And what was all this but a Revival of the old Scene, a bare Repetition of the former Life without any the least Difference in the most particular and minute Circumstance? The Identity of the Person will not therefore contribute much to support the Conformity which is here supposed between the Stoical Doctrine of a general Renovation, and the common Notion of a future State. If it be the self same *Socrates*, who is to appear and rise again; let it be remember'd that he is to marry the self same *Xantippe*, to be arraigned by the same Sycophants, and to be condemned by the same Judges. No Glympe or Shadow of any Retribution: Happiness and Misery are to be dispensed in the same unequal Measure as they are at present.

The very Passage produced by Mr. Jackson from *Chrysippus*, in Support of his own Notion, will of itself prove this. “ It was the Opinion
 “ of the *Stoics*, that after Death and some de-
 “ termined Periods of Time, *we shall be again*
 “ *restored to the State, in which we now are.*” Had I searched all Antiquity for a Passage to establish and confirm the Doctrine I am here maintaining, I could not have found one more pertinent, and decisive ^m of the Point I would support,

¹ Tatiani Oratio ad Græcos, § v. Τον γὰρ Ζηῆνα διὰ τῆς ἐκπύρωσεως ἀποφαινόμενον ἀνίστασθαι πάλιν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς, λέγω Ἀνύστον καὶ Μελίστον ἐπὶ τῷ κατηγορεῖν, Βούσιριν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ ξυνοκτονεῖν, καὶ Ἡρακλῆα πάλιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀθλεῖν, παραντῆστον.

^m Mr. J. has been pleased to refer to this Place in his usual

port, than this, which the learned Writer brings with a professed Design to confute and overthrow it; "We shall be restored again to the State in which we now are." And can a Restoration to a State like *the present* be compared to the common Doctrine of another Life? Are a State of *Retribution*, and a State destitute of Rewards and Punishments, one and the same thing?

Again; with regard to these several Renovations, whether of the *Stoics* or other Sects, we may observe that they were all purely *physical and fatal*; and therefore what Force can they have in the present Question, which is confined to a State of Retribution, that is allowed to be free

usual Manner. "Our Critic would have us think that *Chrysippus* believed nothing of a future State, because he believ'd that it was not improbable, but that *after Death and some determin'd Periods of times, we shall again be restored to the State, in which we now are.* And this our Critic thinks *decisive* against the Doctrine of another Life." p. 47. Now would not any one, who reads this, naturally imagine, that I had produced this Passage of *Chrysippus*, in order to prove that he disbelieved another Life? and yet we see it was only alledged to shew that the State and Condition of things after the general Restoration was to be just the same as it is now. Honest Man! how hard is he put to it, when he loves Truth so well to be thus forced to cog, and palm, and shuffle; and all to keep his Philosophers above Water. But he goes on. "*Chrysippus* believed the Souls of wise or good Men *existed with God after Death till the general Conflagration,* and that after that they might probably be restor'd again to the State they liv'd in here: Therefore, CONCLUDE our two acute Critics, it is decisive that *Chrysippus* believed nothing of another Life after this." p. 48. Let his best Friends now bear Witness of this my Promise, that on his shewing the Reader the Passage where I make this *Conclusion*, I will give him up the rest of the Controversy. This is all I will say to so notorious a Falshood. For no Language but his own can treat it as it deserves. And *that*, which is the only Thing he can teach, I confess I should be very unwilling to learn.

and moral? Origenⁿ, speaking of the Followers of Plato and Pythagoras, says, " They affirm that at certain fixed and stated Periods, the Stars will return to the same Order and Position which they had before; and that then the Face and Appearance of things upon Earth will be just the same, as when the heavenly Bodies were before in this Situation. When therefore the Stars return to the same Places, in which they were situated in the Times of Socrates, the necessary Consequence is, that Socrates shall undergo the same Sufferings, be accused by the same Persons, and condemned by the same Court of Justice." Servius confirms the same; he explains the Opinion of the Philosophers in this manner. " At the Conclusion of the great Year, the Stars will return to the very same Points, from which they originally moved; and then are to revolve again in the same Order. And if the Stars revolve in the same Order, all things, that have been, must be again repeated. For all things depend intirely on the Motion of the Stars."

It is remarkable that Servius speaks of the Philosophers in general, and does not confine himself to any one Sect. But Nemefius gives this very

" Των γὰρ ἀστέρων κατὰ τινὰς περιόδους τεταγμένας τῆς αὐτῆς σχηματισμῶς καὶ σχέσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους λαμβανόντων, πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ὁμοίως ἔχειν τοῖς ὅτε τὸ αὐτὸ σχῆμα τῆς σχέσεως τῶν ἀστέρων περιεῖχεν ὁ κόσμος. ἀνάγκη τοῖνυν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ λόγου, τῶν ἀστέρων ἐκ μακρᾶς περιόδου ἐλθόντων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν σχέσιν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ὅποιαν εἶχον ἐπὶ Σωκράτους, πάλιν Σωκράτη γενέσθαι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάθειν καθήσμενον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου βουλῆς. Contra Celsum, lib. v.

◦ Dixit etiam finitis sæculis omnia revocari, quod & philosophi ita colligunt; quod, exacto magno anno, omnia sydera in ortus suos redeunt; & rursus referuntur eodem motu. Si igitur idem est syderum motus, omnia quæ fuerunt, habebunt reiterationem. Nam universa ex astrorum motu pendent. Virgil. Eclog. iv.

Doctrine

Doctrine to the *Stoics* in the most direct and express Terms. “ The *Stoics*, says he, assert that “ when the Planets shall return to the very same “ Points in the Heavens, in which they were “ originally placed, when the World was made; “ a general Conflagration will arise and consume “ all things. But then the World will be re- “ stored again to its former State; and, *since the “ Stars are to move in the very same Order as they “ did before*, every Transaction and Event of the “ preceding State will be again repeated in the “ very same Manner. *Plato and Socrates* will live “ again in the same Country, converse with the “ same Citizens and Friends, &c. p”

If then the learned Writer could prove that the very *same* Men were to be restored at the general Renovation; that they were to be happy and miserable in *Proportion* to the Merit and Demerit of their former Lives; he would be still on the wrong Side the Post: For as all this would have been ascribed to pure *Necessity and Fate*, it would be quite wide of the present Question.

Again: Not content to demonstrate that the Philosophers believed another Life, he affirms too in his Title Page, that their Doctrine of it was CONSISTENT WITH REASON. In his second Piece he repeats the same, and tells us⁹, “ That he has “ shewn at large the REASONABLENESS of their “ Doctrine on this Head.” But if their Notion of

ΡΟΙ ΔΕ ΣΤΡΙΓΚΟΙ ΦΑΣΙΝ ΑΠΟΚΑΔΙΣΑΜΕΝΗΣ ΤΗΣ ΠΛΑΝΗΤΑΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ
 ΣΗΜΕΙΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΕ ΜΗΚΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΠΛΑΤΟΣ, ΕΝΔΕ ΤΗΝ ΑΡΧΗΝ ΕΚΑΣΟΥ ΗΝ, ΟΤΕ ΤΟ
 ΠΡΩΤΩΝ Ο ΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΣΥΝΕΣΗ, ΕΝ ΕΗΛΙΔΙΣ ΧΡΟΝΩΝ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΟΙΣ ΕΚΠΥΡΩΣΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΘΘ-
 ΡΑΝ ΤΩΝ ΟΝΩΝ ΑΠΕΡΓΑΞΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΛΙΝ ΕΞ ΥΠΑΡΧΗΣ ΕΙΣ ΤΟ ΑΥΤΟ ΤΟΝ
 ΚΟΣΜΟΝ ΑΠΟΚΑΔΙΣΑΣΘΑΙ. ΤΩΝ ΑΣΤΕΡΩΝ ΟΜΟΙΩΣ ΠΑΛΙΝ
 ΦΕΡΟΜΕΝΩΝ, ΕΚΑΣΟΝ ΕΝ ΤΗ ΠΡΟΤΕΡΑ ΠΕΡΙΟΔΩ ΓΕΝΟΜΕΝΟΝ ΑΠΑΡΑΛΛΑ-
 ΚΤΩΣ ΑΠΟΤΕΛΕΙΣΘΑΙ. And then follows the Passage above cited.
Nemesius de Fato, c. xxxviii.

a future State was such as he here gives it, upon the Authority of *Chrysippus*, its *Reasonableness*, I presume, may fairly be disputed. Is it *reasonable* that the Sufferings of the Righteous, and the Prosperity of the Wicked should be again repeated in another Life? Is it *reasonable* that Happiness and Misery should for ever be dispensed with the same Inequalities as they are now? For that they were *for ever* to be dispensed in the same Manner, was the clear and unquestioned Doctrine of the *Stoics*. Thus *Numenius* informs us, “ that these Revolutions were to succeed each other in a *perpetual* “ *and endless Circle*”.

But as the *Reasonableness* of their Doctrine is so much insisted on by this learned Gentleman, I must beg leave to mention another Circumstance, which seems to me intirely destructive both of his Reason and theirs. Observe then in what Manner they introduce Men into this new Scene. Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi *oblitos reduceret*. *Seneca Ep.* 36.

Strange Preparative for a future State of Rewards and Punishments! they were, you see, to be stript of all Memory and Sense of their preceding Lives; they were to be dragged into Existence, under a perfect Ignorance and Oblivion of all that had hitherto happened to them; they were not so much as to know that they had existed before. In this Situation, it was impossible for them to consider their State and Condition in this new World, whatever it was, as the Reward and Punishment of their Actions in the preceding State: And what

† Τῶν τοιούτων περιόδων ΕΞ ΑΙΔΙΟΥ γινόμενων ἀκαταπαύσις.
Eusebius Præp. Evang. l. xv. c. 19. And *Nemesius* told us, in very plain and direct Terms, that these Revolutions were to continue to all Eternity.

Judge

Judge ever thought of keeping the Objects of his Tribunal perpetually ignorant of their Sentence? Whether the learned Writer reflected upon this Circumstance, when he talked of the *Reasonableness* of the Philosophers' future State, I won't pretend to say: Or whether he considered that the very *EPICUREANS* themselves would go Snacks in his Compliment, is as little worth deciding. Yet we must do Justice to this illustrious Sect: For they too held it possible that the same Men after Death might appear again; that they might again be brought into Being in some distant Age. But then, as they were to be divested of all Sense and Memory of their former Lives, they did not look upon themselves as at all interested and concerned in the State and Condition of this future Life.

Nec si materiam nostram conlegerit ætas
Post obitum, rursusque redegerit ut sita nunc est,
Atque iterum nobis fuerint data lumina vitæ,
PERTINEAT QUIDQUAM TAMEN AD NOS ID
QUOQUE FACTUM,

INTERRUPTA SEMEL CUM SIT REPETENTIA
NOSTRA.

Lucretius.

And should we say that they held the very same Renovations with the *Stoics* themselves, we have the Authority of *St. Jerom* to justify us in this Point^s.

^s Nec putemus signa atque prodigia, & multa quæ arbitrio Dei nova in mundo sunt, in prioribus sæculis esse jam facta, & locum invenire Epicurum, qui asserit per innumerabiles periodos eadem, & iisdem in locis, & per eosdem fieri. Alioquin & Judas crebro prodidit, & Christus sæpe passus est pro nobis, &c. *In Ecclesiast. c. i.* This Testimony is designed for Mr. *Jackson's* sole Use; 'tis hoped he will receive it with proper Deference and Respect, as it comes from one of those very Writers, to whom he sends us for Information on this Point.

And

And now the learned Author, with the best Grace in the World, proceeds. "This made some Christian Writers think that the Opinion of the *Stoics* was not much different from the Christian Doctrine of the Resurrection." And for this we are referred to *Clemens of Alexandria* and *Nemesius*. As for *Clemens*, that he was, upon all Occasions, (as was the common Failing of his Time) fond of finding out some Resemblance between the Doctrine of the Scriptures and the Pagan System; that he was ever ready to strain and warp things, in order to give the better Colour to this imaginary Likeness, is an evident Fact, and known to all, who are the least conversant in the Writings of this great Man. Thus *Plato*, if we may believe him, stole his Notion of the Ideal World from Chap. xxii. of the Book of *Genesis*. (*Strom.* v. p. 583.) Now, after such a Discovery, we shall hardly be surpris'd to find him comparing the future Revolutions of the *Stoics* to the Scripture Doctrine of a future State. All we shall be surpris'd at, is, that he should at this time of day be cited to prove, not only against the Primitive Writers abovementioned, but even against *Chrysippus* himself, that this Renovation was considered as a State of future Rewards and Punishments. And, what increases the Surprise, is, that the learned Mr. *Jackson* could not but know, that this very Passage had been objected to *Clemens* on this Score; that he had hence been charged with supposing a Likeness between the Doctrines of Philosophy and the Gospel, without the least Foundation in Truth and real Fact^t.

The Authority of *Clemens* will then, I fear, add very little Weight to this other Side of the Que-

^t Le Clerc's *Epistolæ Criticæ*, p. 14.

tion. The Cause must surely be near expiring, or the learned Gentleman would never have had Recourse to such discredited Evidence.

For Proof of this he appeals too to *Nemesius de Fato*, c. xxxviii. Would not any one now imagine that *Nemesius*, or some *Christian Writer* had declared in this Place, " that this Opinion of the "*Stoics* was not much different from the Scripture Doctrine of a future State ? " But *Nemesius* is so far from affirming this, that he affirms the direct contrary, that is, he asserts the very thing I contend for, *that the two Doctrines were very different.*

He does indeed say, that *some* imagined the Scripture Doctrine to be borrowed from this Principle of the *Stoics*; but then he does not say, with Mr. *Jackson*, that these were *Christian Writers*. And if it was an Infidel Objection, 'tis nothing to the Purpose of our present Argument. However he does say, in direct Contradiction to Mr. *Jackson*, that they who talked in this manner, *were grossly mistaken.* But I have already given the whole Passage from *Nemesius*; and if the Reader can find any thing in it, in Favour of the Doctrine I am here opposing, I shall readily take upon *myself* the Shame of having endeavoured to support my Point by a Testimony, that makes directly against it.

As to this Notion of future Renovations, whether borrowed from the *Stoics* or other Sects, 'tis certain that it infected the Christian Church in the first Ages. St. *Jerom* charges it on *Origen*. Origeni tuo licet tractare μεταμψυχωσιν, innumera-biles mundos introducere, & rationabiles creaturas aliis atque aliis vestire corporibus; *Christumque dicere saepe passum, & saepius passurum* *. There

* Apologia ad Ruffinum.

cannot,

cannot, I think, be a more clear and convincing Proof, that these general Restorations were very different from the Scripture Doctrine of another Life : How horribly must we pervert and misrepresent Scripture, before we can make it give any Countenance to the execrable Doctrine I have here mentioned ?

And here, again, we see, as Mr. *Warburton* observes, the fatal Effects of too close an Attachment to the Pagan Systems ; how grossly it led Men to pervert and corrupt the Gospel in the early Ages.

It is, I find, after all, the Opinion of some learned Men, that these several Revolutions, which make so much Noise in Antiquity, do really bear a strong Resemblance to the Scripture Doctrine of another Life. Mr. *Fortin*, in his late very rational *Discourses*, seems to have considered them in this Light. He speaks of them as a *Restitution to a happier State ; a Restitution of things to their ancient Beauty and Perfections*, p. 102, 3. But in what did this *Perfection, Beauty, and Happiness* consist * ? The material World was to be framed in the very same Manner as it now is. If the moral World was to be restored to its ancient Beauty and Perfection, in this it had no Advantage over the present State. The first Ages were indeed to be distinguished by the Purity and Simplicity of their Manners, much in the same Manner, as the first Inhabitants of this World were said to have been before them. But then it was supposed that they would soon sink into the same De-

* Ita relinqui nihil præter ignem, a quo rursum animante ac deo renovatio mundi fieret, atque idem ornatus oriretur. *Cicero, de Nat. Deorum*, l. ii. c. 46.

pravity and Corruption, which so much prevails in the present State of things ^y.

This Sameness of the several succeeding Worlds was held likewise by *Pythagoras* and *Plato*. "At certain fixed and stated times, every thing which had before appeared, was to revive and rise again; but nothing new, absolutely new, was ever to be ^z."

Plutarch confirms the same, "That at the general Restoration there would be the very same Appearance of Things and Persons; the same Men were to be engaged in the same Scenes of Life, to discharge their several Offices in the same manner, and to share the same Fortune, without the least Vicissitude or Change ^a."

Celsus too declares, "That several Worlds were to succeed each other in a regular and fixed Order; that, at certain Periods, there would always be the same State and Condition of things in this new World ^b." This is the true State of the Affair, and let Divines make the best of it; but without forgetting, that there is something due to Truth and Scripture, as well as to System ^c.

But

^y Omne animal ex integro generabitur, dabiturque terris homo inscius scelerum, & melioribus auspiciis natus. Sed illis quoque Innocentia non durabit, nisi dum novi sint; cito nequitia surrepit. *Seneca, Nat. Quæst. l. iii.*

^z Οτι κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γινόμενα ποτὶς πάλιν γίνονται, ΝΕΟΝ Δ' ΟΥΔΕΝ ΑΠΛΩΣ ΕΣΤΙ. *Porphyrus de vita Pythagoræ.*

^a Πάλιν τοίνυν επειδαν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀφικηταὶ αἰτία τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως οὗτοι αὐτοὶ γινόμενοι πρᾶττον, ὥτω δὲ καὶ πάντες ἀνθρώποι, καὶ τὰ γὰρ ἐξ ἑκὼς κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἑκὼς αἰτίαν γίνονται καὶ πρᾶττον, καὶ πάλιν ὅσα κίτται, κατὰ μιαν τὴν ὅλην περίοδον καὶ καθ' ἑκάστην τῶν ὅλων ὡσαύτως ἀποδοθῆναι. *Plutarch de Fato.*

^b Ὁμοίᾳ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς τέλος εἶναι τὴν διηγουμένην περίοδον, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ταύτας ἀνακυκλήσεις ἀναγκάζονται τὰ αὐτὰ αἰ καὶ γίνονται, καὶ εἶναι, καὶ εἰσθῆναι ἐν τῇ τῶν διηγουμένων περίοδῳ. *Origen. cont. Cels. l. iv.*

^c Now as this Reasoning is supported by the clearest Testimonies

But to return to the Question: Having shewn the Weakness and Insufficiency of all Mr. Jackson has advanced with regard to this general Renovation;

Let

nies and the plainest Facts; by such Testimonies and Facts, as this Gentleman himself, who, in his time, has disputed almost every thing, has not dared to examine and contest: It must, in Spite of any Comment or Distinction, that he can frame upon it, plainly shew that he has all along been labouring to impose a weak and idle Notion, not only without any Authority from Antiquity, but even in Contradiction to all that Antiquity could say against him. In this Situation then how does our candid Author deport himself? Why, distressed above Measure, he now declares himself ready to abandon and give up the Point: But he does it in so captious and shuffling a Manner, as takes off all the Merit of an ingenuous and liberal Concession.

Ashamed, I suppose, of the *Impiety* and *Absurdity* of the Doctrine, which he had taken so much Pains to establish and defend; he now says, he never offered *these future Renovations* as a Proof that the *Stoics* believed another Life; that he confined their Notion of a future State to the Period that intervenes between Death and the general Restoration? "*Chrysippus*" (says he) believed the Souls of wise or good Men existed "with God after Death, till the general Conflagration; and "that after that, they might probably be restored again to "the State they lived in here.—This *Renovation* of the "*Stoics*, was by some ancient Writers, thought to be a Sort of "*Resurrection*: Not the same with the Christian Notion. I "did not cite *Clemens Alexandrinus* for that Purpose: But "only to shew there was something similar between them.— "The *Stoics* expressly taught that the Soul after Death continued happy or miserable till its Dissolution: The future "State of the *Stoics* was that which intervened between Death "and the general Conflagration, when all Beings were dissolved into God, and afterward restored to a new State of "Life." *Farther Defence*, p. 47, 8, 9. But if he could mean this, I will readily allow him to mean any thing; or what, perhaps, every thing considered, would be most for his Credit, that he had no Meaning at all. However let us follow him thro' all his Turnings and Doubles.

Vane Ligur, frustra que animis elate superbis,
Nequicquam patrias tentasti lubricus artes.

Let us now proceed to his other Testimonies. That from *Chrysippus* is immediately followed by this from *Arius Didymus*. Their (the *Stoics*)
 “ Notion

In his Attempt to *demonstrate* that the *Stoics* believed another Life, he offered the following Passages: And an Appeal to the common Sense of every Reader will be enough to convict him of his shameless Tergiversation. He begins with *Chrysippus*. “ It is by no Means impossible that *after* “ *Death and some determined Periods of Time, we shall be re-* “ *stored again to the State in which we now are.*” Mr. Jackson himself adds, “ *After the general Conflagration the Stoics* “ *believed a new State of things, and a Restoration of all* “ *things (Men, Animals, &c.) which had existed before to a* “ *new State of Life and Being.* This made some *Christian* “ *Writers* think that the Opinion of the *Stoics* was not much “ *different from the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection.*” These Christian Writers are *Clemens of Alexandria* and *Nemesius*. The Passage from *Clemens* runs thus: οἶδεν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς (the ancient Writer *Ephesus* he is speaking of) ἐκ τῆς βαρβαρῆς φιλοσοφίας μαθὼν τὴν διαπύρον καθαρίαν τῶν κακῶς βεβιωκότων, ἢ ὑψίρον ἐκπύρωσιν ἐκαλῶσαν οἱ Στωικοί. καθ’ οὗ καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου πῦρος ἀναστῆσθαι δογματίζουσι, τὰτ’ ἐκείνη τὴν ἀνάστασιν περιποιούτες.

As to *Nemesius*, he gives a large Description of the State of things after the general Restoration; it has been already cited; he concludes thus, “ it has been said that the *Christians* borrowed their Notion of the Resurrection from this “ *Doctrine.* But this (adds he) is a great Mistake; for the “ *Scriptures* teach that the Dead will be raised once, and not “ *that this will be repeated at certain Periods.*” These are the Passages produced by Mr. J. in his first Pamphlet; and, his Reflections upon them. Which shewing he cited them as a Proof that the *Stoics* believed a future State, I took upon me to shew that these *Renovations* had nothing to do with the future State in Question: And this proving unanswerable, What does this ingenuous Disputant now do? The Reader will hardly believe it; he now roundly affirms, That he never offered these *Renovations* in Proof of their Belief of a future State; but that he confined their Notion of it to the Period that intervened between Death and the general Renovation. He is got to his last Subterfuge. Let us drag him from this, and then there is an End of him.

These Testimonies, we now plainly see, were urged to prove that the *Stoics* believed another Life. But what Notion do they

“ Notion was, that the Soul was generated and
 “ corruptible, but did not immediately perish
 “ when it departed out of the Body, but con-
 “ tinued

convey of another Life besides that of the *general Renovation*? Do they give the least Hint of the State that is to *intervene* between Death and this Period? They do indeed mention the *Renovation* in very express and direct Terms; but as to the intervening State, they are altogether silent. With what Face then does he pretend they were *not* alledged to prove, that the *Stoics* believed the *general Renovation*? If they were not produced for this Purpose, it is evident they must have been produced for no Purpose at all.

Let us take them singly. As to the Passage of *Chrysippus*, it has *often* been alledged to prove that *Chrysippus* really believed a future State: And therefore to relieve our Author under the Disgrace, which seems so sensibly to affect him, I will just observe that divers Writers, both ancient and modern, have said the same thing before him. Who those Ancients were I will leave Mr. *Jackson* to find out as he can: And then, if he sees fit, by their Blunders to support his own. From amongst the Moderns I will select, for his Service, two. Dr. *Sykes* says, “ that the Philosophers had very different Notions of a *future State*.” Some of them maintained that the Soul would re-
 “ turn to a Body after a certain Number of Years,

Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
 ——— in corpora velle reverti.

“ *Pythagoras* thought them *instantly* to go out of one Body into
 “ another: *Chrysippus* said that we, after our Deaths, in certain
 “ revolving Periods of Time, should be *restored* to the Form we
 “ have now. *Connex. of Nat. and Rev. Rel.* p. 401. What
 then is the Notion of a future State, which is here given to
Chrysippus, but this, that *after* certain revolving Periods of
 Time, we shall be restored to the Form in which we now are?
 The learned and polite Author of the *Plea for Human Reason*,
 referring to this very Passage, says, “ And the *Stoics* (tho’ un-
 “ certain of a future State, yet) were fixed in the Belief of
 “ the Happiness of virtuous Men, if God pleased to give them
 “ Existence in another State, to whose good providential Dis-
 “ posal they intirely resigned both their Souls and Bodies, *not*
 “ denying but he might restore them to a new Life and Being.”
 p. 23 — In his *Defence* of his first Pamphlet, he delivers him-
 self in the following Manner. It may be doubted whether the

“tinued to exist for a certain Term of Duration.
 “That the Souls of good Men existed till the
 “general Conflagration and Dissolution of the
 “Universe; but those of the wicked continued
 “only to a certain Period.” p. 97, 8.

Never

“the Stoics had any clear or express Sentiments of a future
 “State. I said that they were *uncertain* about it, but however,
 “*that they did not deny*, but that God, after Death, *might restore*
 “both their Souls and Bodies to a new Life. For this I cited
 “a Passage of *Chrysippus* the famous Stoic” (the very Passage
 we are now upon.) “This Author thinks that it expresses
 “no more than a bare Possibility of being restored to the same
 “System of things; but the Words imply more than a
 “bare Possibility of future Existence. The Words (*δηλον ως*
ως ἂν ἀδυνατον) “are *emphatical*, and imply a Probability; as
 “if he should say, *it is manifestly far from being impossible*, or
 “*it is nothing like impossible*; which Expression elegantly im-
 “plies a strong Probability, which this Author did not con-
 “sider, and the Word [*σχῆμα*] relates to the Body; and so
 “*Chrysippus* means, *that it is probable, that after Death, in*
 “*some Revolutions of time, we shall be again restor’d to the*
 “*same Form of corporeal Existence, which we had in the pre-*
 “*sent State.* And so it is a Testimony of an eminent Stoic
 “for the Probability of a future State.” *Seneca*, the Stoic,
 has a remarkable Passage to this Purpose, which illustrates that
 of *Chrysippus*, “Death, says he, *discontinues* our Life, but
 “does not wholly destroy it: A Day will come that will re-
 “store us to this State again,” p. 79, 80. I will give the
 whole Passage from *Seneca*. *Mors nullum habet incommodum. Esse enim debet aliquid cujus sit incommodum. Quod si tanta cupiditas longioris ævi te tenet, cogita nihil eorum, quæ ab oculis abeunt, et in rerum naturam, ex quâ prodierunt et mox processura sunt, reconduntur, consumi; desinunt ista, non pereunt. Et mors, quam pertimescimus ac recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit. Veniet iterum, qui nos in lucem reponet dies, &c.* When he says in the first Part, “That
 “God might restore both their Souls and Bodies to a new
 “Life.”—When he insists so much on the Words, *δηλον*
ως ἂν ἀδυνατον: on the Word *σχῆμα*:—When he asserts
 that this Passage is “the Testimony of an eminent Stoic for
 “the Probability of a future State:”—Does he not all the
 way plainly point at the *general Renovation*? But what ne-
 cessarily confines us to this Sense, is the last Passage from *Se-*
neca.

Never sure were two Passages joined together so inconsistent with and utterly destructive of each other. Yet are they produced by this learned Man to prove that the *Stoics* believed a future State of Rewards and Punishments. The first refers us to the general Renovation for these Rewards

Seneca. Is it possible he could offer this as a Testimony, that the *Stoics* believed another Life, and yet have his Eye only on the Period which was to intervene between Death and the general Conflagration? For is not this here represented as a State of mere Insensibility; as an absolute Discontinuance of our Life and Being?

What does indeed demonstrate that he alledged this Passage of *Chrysippus* for the Purpose I here contend for, is, he urges the Words of *Seneca* as a remarkable Passage to the same Purpose; as serving to explain and illustrate that of *Chrysippus*. For how can a Passage, which represents the intermediate State above mentioned, as the *Discontinuance of our very Life and Being*, be to the same Purpose with, and serve to illustrate one, which supposes that departed Souls were to be happy or miserable during this Period?

If the learned Author contradicts this in other Parts of the Controversy, that, I apprehend, is his concern and not mine. The Truth of the Matter is barely this; he undertakes to prove that the *Stoics* believ'd another Life: And his Testimonies sometimes relate to the State between Death and the general Conflagration; and sometimes to the State which was to succeed the last. No doubt the Gentleman himself consider'd each as a State of future Rewards and Punishments. If then we reflect that this Passage of *Chrysippus* has often been cited to prove that the *Stoics* believed a future State; that the Author of the *Plea for Human Reason* had produced it with this very View, it cannot surely be thought reasonable to suppose that Mr. J. himself did not alledge it for the same Purpose.

Let us attend next to what Mr. J. himself says, in order to illustrate and explain this Doctrine of the *Stoics*. Now he says, "That after the general Conflagration, Men, Animals, and all things that had existed before, were to be restored to a new State of Life and Being." Does not he here confine the Stoical Notion of another Life, to the Period that was to succeed the general Conflagration? Would any one conclude from hence, that he was speaking only of the State, which is to intervene between Death and the general Renovation?

As

wards and Punishments ; but the second plainly tells us, that the Souls of good Men would be extinct and lost long before this Period ; and that the Souls of the Wicked would perish even before them. For whom then were these future Rewards

As to *Clemens of Alexandria*, he tells us, " that the *Stoics* " maintained the Doctrine of the Resurrection, because they " maintained the Notion of the general Restoration." In what then does he compare the two Doctrines together ? Why, only so far as both promise a future Restitution. Not a Word do we find of the Period between Death and the general Renovation.

As for *Nemesius*, he says, that the *Christians* were charged with borrowing the Doctrine of the Resurrection from that of the general Restoration. " But, he adds, the Charge is false ; " because the Resurrection was not to be repeated at certain " successive Periods, like the general Renovation." In what then did he compare the two Doctrines together ? Why, only so far, as they relate to the State which was to succeed the general Conflagration ?

To espouse wrong Systems, to support them by as bad Reasoning, are amongst the commonest Occurrences in the learned World : And *modern Controversy* one may define to be, *An Art of keeping them from Conviction after they are detected.* Hence *Distinctions, Qualifications, Refinements*, rise like the arm'd Men from the Serpent's Teeth : and tho' they soon destroy one another, they make, at first starting up, a formidable Appearance. But the Author we have to do with is above this Management. Downright *Denial*, and the Ribaldry of *ill Language*, are the *direct* and *bonest* Ways he takes to cover Error and ill Argument. They have at length indeed succeeded ill ; and are now seen to be the last Struggles of a sinking Reputation.

Before I conclude this Note, I will just take Notice of a very singular Observation of our Author, which relates to the Argument I am here upon. " Mr. *Warburton* (says he) thinks " that the Denial of the Resurrection of the Body arose out of " the *Gentile Philosophy*. It is true, it did so ; tho' the *Stoics* " held it in their way." *Last Defence* p. 7. But I must desire to be informed, upon what grounds he confines this Notion to the *Stoics* ? Did not the Schools of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* hold it in the very same Way ? If he thinks not, why did he make no Reply to the Testimonies I brought from *Plutarch*, *Ori-*

Rewards and Punishments reserved? For Mr. *Jackson's Defence* of the ancient Philosophers. It was done like a Workman to tell us, the *Stoics* said that Men should be punished and rewarded at the general Revolution; and then, in Confirmation of it, to give us another Passage, which says that they will cease to exist before that Period!

His other Testimony runs thus: *Esse inferos Zeno Stoicus docuit, & sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas; & illos quidem quietas & delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in coeni voraginibus horrendis.* This Passage evidently relates to the popular Account of a future State; and therefore it is impossible to know with what View it is here brought, unless it be to confute the Passage from *Chrysippus* cited above. *Chrysippus*, if we allow Mr. *Jackson's* Interpretation, says that these Punishments and Rewards were not to begin till after the general Conflagration: But *Zeno* as plainly

gen, and Porphyry? But he despised them ('tis his own modest Language) for their *Rauness and Imbecillity in all kinds of Learning.*

It may, after all, be natural to ask, what it was that could mislead so many learned Men (for many very learned Men have been misled) to mistake this *Renovation* for the *new Heavens and the new Earth of Revelation.* If I might be allowed to offer my Conjecture, I should suppose it arole from hence. The ancient Mythologists had made four Ages, Gold, Silver, Brass, Iron. Now at this *Renovation* the *Golden Age* was to appear first. This is the ground of *Virgil's Pollio.* But a *golden Age* looked so like a *Kingdom of the Just*, that they never stayed to reflect, that, in this *Pagan Scheme*, it was to be followed with others of *Silver, Brass, and Iron:* And that none were to enjoy this *new Golden one* but who had been Partakers of the *old.* The most virtuous and holy Men that lived after, were each to be ranked under his own respective Class of *Silver, Brass, or Iron,* just as the Iniquity of his former Fate had thrown him.

tells

tells us, that they were to be over, and intirely cease at this very Period; for this was the Case of the infernal Torments, and the Happiness of *Elysium*: But few indeed of the Righteous would then be found in *Elysium*, as their Continuance there was limited to a thousand Years. But that the infernal Regions themselves were to be destroyed at the general Conflagration, we have the exprefs Testimony of *Seneca*, who says, in *Hercules Oetaeus*,

Jam jam legibus obrutis
Mundo cum veniet dies,
Coeli regia concidet,
Certos atque obitus trahet,
Atque omnes pariter Deos
Perdet mors aliqua, & Chaos.
Discedet via Tartari,
Stratis ut pateat polis.
Pontum, Sydera, Tartara,
Regna unus capiet tria.

The learned Writer will pardon me, if I say that this last Testimony of *Zeno* is inconsistent with the second as well as with the first Passage. In the second, he plainly supposes that the Souls of the Wicked *will not subsist till the general Conflagration*: In the third, he as plainly supposes that *they will*. It never was imagined that the Punishments of *Tartarus* would end before this time.

So much for the first Point; or the Testimonies brought by Mr. *Jackson* to prove that the *Stoics* believed another Life. There needs, we see, no great Pains to answer and confute them; they are indeed chosen in so singular a manner, as even to answer and confute themselves. But had they been ever so consistent, what would he have gained by them? All they would prove, is, that

the *Stoics* sometimes declared for another Life; and who ever denied this? But then let it be remember'd, that they did often declare against it. Let the learned Writer take in this Consideration, and then shew how the Professions of the *Stoics* make any thing in favour of his pretended Demonstration.

2dly, I am now to prove from a Principle, which we both allow to be truly *Stoical*, that this Sect neither did nor could believe a future State. The Principle is this; that the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, was to be *resolved* into the divine Nature, or God. This I conceive to be destructive of all future Rewards and Punishments. The learned Writer considers it in a very different Light. He every where represents it as a State of the most absolute and perfect Bliss; gives it as the *esoteric* Doctrine, or *only* Notion of future Happiness really entertained by the Ancient Sages. If then we shew, that the Sense he puts upon the Principle is a mere Novel Refinement, unknown to Antiquity, there is an End of him and his Argument.

Let us attend to his own Words, " They (the
 " Philosophers) taught that the human Soul was
 " congenial with the Soul of the World, and that
 " the Happiness of it after Death consisted in its
 " Return to and intimate Union with the divine
 " Nature or God, from whom it was derived:
 " On the other hand, that the Misery of it consisted
 " in being excluded from this Union with
 " God, &c. &c. All agreed, that as Happiness
 " consisted in the Improvement of the intelligent
 " or rational Soul in divine Knowledge and Virtue,
 " so in the future State the Soul, they constantly
 " believed, was rendered more perfect in
 " Knowledge and Virtue, by its Union and Com-
 " munion

"munion with the divine Substance or Deity.
 "This was a rational and exalted Notion of a
 "future State, and very agreeable to the Doctrine
 "of it taught by Revelation. This was the es-
 "oteric Doctrine of the Philosophers concerning a
 "future State^d." In his second Piece he says,
 "that the Souls of the Virtuous were to be united
 "to God by *divine Knowledge, Faith, and Virtue*;
 "were to have *Communion* with him; and were to
 "be blessed with the beatific Vision of the di-
 "vine Perfections." p. 8. Thus, we see, he every
 where gives us this Refusion as a State of the
 most perfect and complete Happiness. He talks
 much of *Communion* with God; *beatific Vision*, and
 so forth. This is indeed the Language of our
 modern Mystics; and the ingenious Mr. *W. Law*
 has retailed a System of the rankest *Spinozism* un-
 der these fine Words; but the following Observa-
 tions will perhaps shew that it is not very nearly
 allied to that of the old *Stoics*. As to this Refu-
 sion, first, It was not supposed to be peculiar to
 the human Soul. The *Stoics* held that their infe-
 rior Gods would all share the same Fate. "*Chry-*
 "*sippus* and *Cleantes*, when they filled the Hea-
 "vens, the Earth, the Air, and Sea with Gods,
 "held that none of these was immortal and in-
 "corruptible but *Jupiter*. They held that all the
 "rest were to be absorbed and consumed into him.
 "He therefore must destroy others, which implies
 "the same Imperfection, as if he was to be de-
 "stroyed himself. For as it is a Mark of Imper-
 "fection to perish by being dissolved into another
 "Being, so it is an Imperfection for a Being to
 "be nourished and supported by the Dissolution
 "of others into it. And this is not, like many

^d *The Belief of a future State, &c. p. 72.*

“ other Absurdities charged upon them, a mere
 “ Consequence of their own Principles, but a
 “ Doctrine openly proclaimed and asserted by
 “ them, in their Books concerning the Gods,
 “ Providence, Fate, and Nature; where they
 “ say that the Gods were generated and will be
 “ destroyed by Fire, *as if they would be melted,*
 “ like Substances of Wax or Lead.”

Again: “ *Cbrysippus* in his first Book on Provi-
 “ dence, affirms, That *Jupiter* will *increase and be*
 “ *enlarged*, till he has *absorbed all things* into him-
 “ self. For since Death consists in the Departure
 “ of the Soul from the Body, and the Soul of the
 “ World never does depart, but is *augmented con-*
 “ *tinually till every thing is consumed into it*; we
 “ cannot say that the Soul dies^f.”

Here we see with what Purpose and Design the
 Gods and other Substances were to be dissolved
 into the *Anima Mundi*, or supreme God of this
 Sect. It was only in order to nourish and support
 it, to recruit its Losses, and to prevent it from
 consuming and wasting into nothing.

* Plutarch adver. Stoicos, p. 1075. Ed. Xyl.—Χρυσιππος και
 Κλειανδης εμπεκληκοτες τω λογω θειω τον ουρανον, την γην, τον αιρα,
 την θαλασσαν, ουδενια των τοσωντων αφθαρτοι εδιδου αιδιον απολειπειν, α-
 πλιν μινου τε Διος. εις ον παντας καταναισκεισιν της αλλης ωσε-
 και τετω το φθειρειν προσειναι τε φθειρισθαι μη επιεικετερον[†] ασθι-
 ρεια γαρ τινι και το μεταβαλλειν εις ετερον φθειριλαι, και το τοις αλλοις
 εις εαυτο φθειρομενοις τρεφομενον σωζεται ταυτα δε ουχ ως αλλα
 πολλα των ατοπων συλλογιζομενα εχει τας υποδεσεις αυτων. και τοις
 δογμασιν επιται, αλλα αυτοι μεγα βωνης εν τοις περι θεων, και
 προνοιας ειμαρμενης τε και φυσικης γραμμασι, διαρρηδην λεγουσι της
 θειας απαντας ειναι γιγιοιτας και φθαρτησμενης υπο πυρος, τηλικης
 κατα αυτες, ωσπερ κηρινος η κατλιτιρινος οίλας.

^f Plutarch de Stoicorum Repug. p 1052.—Εν δε τω πρώτῳ
 περι προνοιας τοι Δια φησιν αυξιδαι, μηχεις αν εις αυτον απαντα
 καταναιωση[†] επι γαρ ο θανατος μιν εις ψυχης χωρισμος απο του
 σωματος, η δε του κοσμου ψυχη η χωριζεται μιν, αυζεται δε συν-
 χως, μηχεις αν εις αυτην εξααλωση την υλην, ου ερητιον αποδησκειν
 του κοσμου.

Antoninus gives much the same Account of this Refusion; the human Soul was indeed to be *changed* by it: But then this Change was *purely physical*. It was not wrought with any *moral* Purpose and Design, but was only to support the Order and Harmony of the Universe. We have already seen that the Gods themselves were to be dissolved, *like so many Pieces of Wax or Lead*, into the *Anima Mundi* for this very Purpose; why therefore might not the human Soul? But to come to *Antoninus*, “ I consist (says he) of Form
“ and Matter, or of Soul and Body. As nei-
“ ther of these Parts was made out of nothing,
“ so neither of them will be annihilated or re-
“ duced to nothing. Every Part of me there-
“ fore will by a Change be resolved into another,
“ and so on *in infinitum* ^g. ”

“ Consider that in a short time you will cease
“ to be; all things which subsist now, must be
“ changed, altered, and destroyed, *that they may*
“ *serve for the Production of others* ^h. ”

Lib. x. § 1, he speaks of God or the Universal Soul, “ as containing all things that are dis-
“ solved into him, *in order that others of the*
“ *same kind may again be generated out of him* ⁱ. ”

He tells us too “ that the World is to be
“ perpetually renewed by these Revolutions and
“ Changes; that some Things must die *that*
“ *others may arise out of them* ^k. ”

Ἐξ αἰτιῶδους καὶ υλικοῦ συνιστῆκα· οὐδὲτερον δὲ τῆται εἰς τὸ μὴ οὐ
φθαρεσται· ὥσπερ ὕδωρ ἐκ τῆ μὴ ὄντος ὑπερῆ· ἡκὼν καταταχθῆ-
σεται παρὲς μέρος ἐμὸν κατὰ μεταβολῆς μέρος τι τῆ κοσμοῦ· καὶ πάλιν
ἐκεῖνο εἰς ἕτερον μέρος τῆ κοσμοῦ μεταβαλεῖ. καὶ ὕδωρ εἰς ἀπειρον. l. 5. 13.

^h Ὅτι, μετὰ πολὺν, ὕδωρ ὑδάτων ἐστὶν· ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν γὰρ μεταβαλεῖν,
καὶ τρεψίσθαι καὶ φθίρεσθαι πεφυκέν, ἵνα ἕτερα ἐφ᾽ ἐκείνης γε-
νηται. l. 12. 21.

ⁱ L. x. 1. Πάντα περιεχοῦσας [Θεῶν] καὶ περιλαμβανοῦσας διαλυο-
μένα εἰς γενέσιν ἑτέρων ὁμοίων.

^k vii. 25.

As

As to the Consequence and Effect of this Change it is very clearly described by him in another Place¹. "The things thus changed do not receive any Prejudice or Hurt by it; and as to those which are produced by this Change, they have no Benefit or Advantage from it." It could not therefore be a Translation to a State of Happiness or Misery; or be consider'd with any moral View. It is indeed evident, that Souls were sent into the *Anima Mundi*, barely to furnish it with Materials; purely to supply what might be wanting for the Production of new Beings. *Plutarch* tells us, "that it was to be *nourished* and *supported* by the Dissolution of other Beings into it," that "it would *augment* continually till all things were consumed into it." And does not *Antoninus* say the same? He tells us, "that all things were dissolved into God, that others of the same Nature might again be generated out of him^m."

Having thus explained the Nature and End, the Purpose and Design of this Re-union of the Soul with the universal Substance; I may surely presume so far upon the Privilege of common Sense as to take it for granted that this Refusion will no longer be considered as a *State of perfect and complete Happiness*. Will any Man pretend that there is the least Conformity between this Re-union and the Scripture Doctrine of future Happiness? That there is any Trace or Footstep of

¹ Οὐδὲν ἐστὶ κακὸν τοῖς ἐν μεταβολῇ γινομένοις· ὡς οὐδὲ ἀγαθόν ἐκ μεταβολῆς υφισταμένοις; l. iv. 42.

^m Habent aliquid Stoici dogmati Pythagorico affine, quod ex animarum materiâ quasi constât & recoctâ novas produci & produci statuunt. Verum hac ratione non magis animæ quam corpori immortalitatem asserunt; non minus animæ quam corpori corruptionem & mortalitatem adscribunt. *Gataker* on *Antoninus*, l. iv. § 21.

the *beatific Vision*; the *Communion with God*; which the learned Mr. *Jackson* pretends to discover in it? In short, will any one but himself say, that "this was a rational and exalted Notion of a future State?"

2dly, Who, but would imagine from his Description, that this Refusion was conceived to be a Privilege peculiar to the Righteous and Innocent? That it was reserved for *them only*, as a Reward for their Integrity and Virtue? But Antiquity gives us a very different Account of this Matter; it tells us, that this Refusion was given to the Souls of the Good and Bad without Distinction. *Numerius*, speaking of some *Stoics*, declares "that, according to them, the Soul of the Universe would be eternal, but that *all others* would upon Death be blended and mixed with it."

"Every Body (says *Antoninus*) will be lost and buried in the universal Substance. *Every Soul* will be absorbed and sunk into the universal Nature;" or God. Here this Refusion is given promiscuously to the Souls of the Good and Bad. This single Consideration may serve to inform us that it was not looked on as a State of Rewards and Happiness. — But what becomes now of future Punishments? Mr. *Jackson* makes them consist in an Exclusion from the Union with the divine Nature. But it appears that the old *Stoics* did not hold any such Exclusion; that they admitted the Souls of the Good and Bad indifferently to this Union; and therefore, according to *him*, they could not believe any future Punishments. I shall here spend a Word or two more on another Cir-

ⁿ Eusebius Præpar. Evang. l. xv. c. 20. Εποί δε την μεν ψυχην τε όλων, αιδιον. ΤΑΣ ΔΕ ΛΟΜΙΑΣ ΣΥΜΜΙΓΝΥΣΘΑΙ ΕΙΗ ΤΕΛΕΥΤΗ ΕΙΣ ΕΚΕΙΝΗΝ.

^o Παν το ανυλον εμφανιζεται ταχιςα τη των όλων εσια και παν αιτιον εις τον των όλων λογον ταχιςα αναλαμβανεται. l. vii. § 10.

cumstance, which seems to bear hard on the Opinion maintained by the learned Writer. It is this; the Soul, after its Separation from the Body, was immediately to return to the divine Nature. *Numerius* says, it would be re-united to God upon Death. *Antoninus* declares, "it would be resumed into the universal Nature *ταχιστα*, or immediately." I take this to be a considerable Objection to the Hypothesis I am here examining. For, if the Refusion was immediate upon the Separation of Soul and Body; what Room or Possibility, according to Mr. *Jackson*, for future Punishments?

It may be said, that, to compliment their *wise Man*, they taught that his Soul would hold out till the general Conflagration. "By this, says Mr. *Warburton*, we shall see they meant just nothing when we come to speak of their Opinion concerning the Nature and Duplicity of the Soul." But, not to insist on this, this very Objection would be no light Confirmation of the Notion I am here establishing. The *Stoics* taught that the Soul of their *wise Man* was to subsist till the general Conflagration. But then it was not to rejoin the divine Nature till this Period; it was in the mean time to exist separate and distinct from it. Now this will of itself overthrow every thing which the learned Gentleman has advanced on this Point. For, had this Refusion been considered as a State of the highest Perfection, would the *Stoics* have excluded their *wise Man* from it till the End of the World; while the Bulk of Mankind were admitted to it, immediately upon the Dissolution of the Body? Had the Exclusion from it been considered as a State of Punishment, would they have sentenced and condemned their *wise Man* to it for so long a Period?

† *Divine Legation*, vol. i. third Edition, p. 391.

But

But thirdly, we meet with very plain and open Descriptions of the State and Condition of the Soul after its Return to God. But to what do they amount? Why, to no very high Degree of Happiness and Perfection: All the Advantage they give the Soul, is, that it should be exempt from Pain and Misery; and it was to be exempt from Pain and Misery, only because it was deprived of Perception, and had lost its separate and distinct Existence.

The *Stoics*, I say, did not consider this Reunion, as a State of perfect and complete Happiness. And this may appear from the cold and lifeless Manner, in which they deliver themselves on this Head. *Reverti eo unde veneris, quid grave est?*

Epictetus, speaking of Death, says, “ But whither do you go? *No where to your Hurt*; you return from whence you came, to a friendly Consociation with your kindred Elements; what there was of the Nature of Fire in your Composition, returns to the Element of Fire; what there was of Earth, to Earth; what of Air, to Air; and Water, to Water. There is neither *Hell, Acheron, Cocytus, or Pyriphlegethon*.” *Magnus animus Deo pareat, & quicquid Lex Universi jubet, sine cunctatione patiatur. Aut in meliorem emittitur vitam, lucidius tranquilliusque inter divina mansurus, aut certe, sine ullo futurus incommodo, naturæ suæ remiscebitur & revertetur in totum.*

In the two first Passages the Notion of this Refusion, is, we see, stated in a very different Light, from that in which it is represented by the learned Gentleman, whose Sentiments I am here consider-

^a Seneca de Tranquillitate, c. xi.

^b *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 392.

^c Seneca, Ep. 72.

ing. All that can be collected from them, is, that the Soul, after its Refusion, will not be attended with any painful and uneasy Circumstance; that it will not be subject to any actual and real Misery: The very Language which they use, when they describe Death as a State of Extinction and Non-existence[†]. But that it will enjoy the least Degree of positive and real Happiness, is more than can be deduced from these Passages.

The third Citation seems to speak more fully to our Purpose: "The Soul, after its Separation from the Body, will either be exalted to a State of Happiness; or, without any troublesome Circumstance attending it, will rejoin the Substance, from which it was originally taken." This Re-union could not be considered as a State of positive and real Happiness, because it is clearly and directly opposed to such a State.

It was indeed a common Saying, "The Soul after Death will either be happy, or not be at all." *Mors nos aut consumit, aut emittit. Emiffis meliora restant.* And is not the Passage I am here examining of the very same Nature? and if it be of the same Nature, must not the Refusion here mentioned answer to that Part in the other Passage[‡], in which the Soul is said to be no more?

But what was to be the State and Condition of the Soul after its Resolution into the divine Being? Why, he says, *sine ullo futuris est Incommodis*. The very Description, which he gives of Death, when he considers it as a State of mere Extinction. ^{*} *Mors nullum habet Incommodum. Esse enim debet aliquid, cujus fit Incommodum.* To tell us then that this Refusion was considered as a State of

[†] *Mors nullum habet incommodum, esse enim debet aliquid, cujus fit incommodum, Seneca.*

[‡] *Seneca.*

^{*} *Seneca, Ep. 34.*

absolute and perfect Happiness, is in Effect to tell us that the Ancients knew nothing of their own Doctrine; for they are so far from representing it in this Light, that they in direct and express Terms oppose it to this very State.

4thly, All then the Soul could gain by this Refusion, was that it would be exempt from Pain and Misery: And this only because it was deprived of Perception, by its retaining no longer a separate and distinct Existence. The following Passages will not suffer us to doubt, but this was the very Case. *Quod si tanta cupiditas longioris ævi te tenet, cogita nihil eorum, quæ ab oculis abeunt, & in rerum naturam, ex qua prodierunt & mox processura sunt, reconduntur, consumi; desinunt ista, non pereunt. Et mors, quam pertimescimus & recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit. Veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponet dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret.* It is evident that he here speaks of the State and Condition of Men, after they rejoin and are resolved into the universal Nature. And his Description may suffice to shew, that, in the Opinion of the old *Stoics*, they were now deprived of all Perception, that they were supposed to lose their peculiar and distinct Existence. *Desinunt ista, non pereunt. Mors intermittit vitam, non eripit.*

They were to rise again after the general Restoration; but in the mean time, Life and all the Faculties of it were to be intirely suspended. *Antoninus*, speaking of Men departed out of this Life, says, "they will be no more for a very long Period." They were to be no more till the

Ἰοῦτως γὰρ συνεχῶς διασθ τα ἀνθρώπινα, καὶ τὸ πᾶν
μαλιστα εἰαν συμμνημονεύσης, ὅτι τὸ ἀπαξ μεταβαλὼν οὐκ ἐνίσταται
τῷ ἀπὸ τῶν χρόνων. l. x. 31.

general

general Renovation. Must they not therefore till then be supposed to be deprived of all Sense and distinct Existence?

In another Place², speaking on a certain Supposition, he declares “ that the Souls of the Dead, “ after they had remained for some time in the “ Air, would be absorbed by the divine Substance, “ and there be *changed, melted, and burnt.*” *Plutarch* applies these very Expressions to the inferior Gods; but then he evidently supposes, as will be shewn hereafter, that their separate and distinct Existences would be quite sunk and lost by the Resolution here mentioned. This will be proved on the Authority of *Cudworth*; but it is indeed plain from the very Words of *Plutarch*, who says, “ that the several Beings, which return “ to the universal Soul, were to be *melted* and “ *dissolved into it, like so many Substances of Wax “ and Lead.*”

Cleanthes himself, as we are informed by *Sto-bæus*³, said “ that all things were made out of “ one, and would be again resolved into one.” But if all things were to become one, what room for separate Perception, or distinct Existence? That the Soul was to be thus changed and resolved with the rest, will not be denied. “ You have as yet “ existed as a Part (or have had a particular Sub- “ sistence) you will afterwards be absorbed and lost “ in the Substance, which produced you; or you “ will be resumed into the divine Nature, or the “ spermatic Reasons.” The Soul was no longer to subsist as a Part, or to retain a distinct Existence, because it would be resumed into the uni-

² Μεταβαλλοι, και ΧΕΟΝΤΑΙ, και εξαπλῶνται, εις τον παν ολον περιμαλινον λογον αναλαμβάνομεναι. l. iv. 21.

³ Eclog. Phys. c. xx.

versal Nature. Is not the *Refusion* here plainly opposed to a separate and distinct Existence^b?

So much for this *Refusion*. What must we think now of the Doctrine that would obtrude it upon us as a State of absolute and perfect Happiness? What Appearance, let me once more ask, that the Souls of good Men were to be united to the *Anima Mundi*, by divine *Knowledge*, *Faith*, and *Virtue*? What Mark or Trace of the *beatific Vision*? We have shewn that the End and Purpose of this *Refusion* was *merely physical*; that it was designed only to repair the Losses and Decays of the universal Soul; that Gods, Men, and all other Substances were to be resolved into it with this only View. Besides, this *Refusion* was given to the Souls of the Good and Bad without Distinction. It was clearly and directly opposed to a State of future Happiness; it was described so as plainly to exclude all personal and distinct Existence.

Strange and extravagant as this Notion may appear to Mr. *Jackson*, it is confirmed by Writers, whose Rank and Distinction in the learned World may at least serve to screen them from his Insults and Contempt. The learned *Cudworth* speaks of this *Refusion*, as destroying the personal and distinct Existence of those Beings, who were supposed to rejoin the universal Nature. “The Stoical
“Pagans maintained, that all their other Gods,
“save *Jupiter* alone, were not only *Γεγονοτες*, but
“also *Φθαρσιμοι*, such as should be as well corrupted as they were generated, and this so also, as
“that their very Personalities should be utterly abolished and annihilated: All the Stoical Gods

^b ΕΝΥΠΕΣΤΗΣ, ΩΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ ΕΝΑΦΑΝΙΣΘΗΣΗ ΤΩ ΓΕΝ-
ΝΗΣΑΝΤΙ· μαλλον δε αναληφθησι εις τον λογον αυτου το σπειμα-
τικον κατ’αμειβαδην, Antoninus. l. iv. 14.

“ in the Conflagration being as it were *melted and confounded into one* ^b.” Even the Gods themselves were to lose their separate and distinct Existence, after their Return to the universal Soul; they were to be *melted down into it*; the very Phrase applied by *Antoninus* to the human Soul.

Accessere ad eundem de refusione animarum errorem etiam Stoici, quatenus existimantes animari mundum suo illo igne, quem dixerunt Jovem, censuerunt nostras animas particulas ex illo deductas, & in eundem cito tardeve reduci, aut reducendas certe esse in generali conflagratione, *quâ in unum Jovem universa reconstabuntur* ^c.

The learned *Le Clerc*, who was far from being prejudiced in Favour of the Argument I am here maintaining, speaks fully to our Purpose. He would vindicate *Euripides* from the Charge of holding the Soul to be mortal: He owns that his Author did assert the Re-union of the Soul; but then he insists that this Re-union, according to some Philosophers, did not destroy its personal Existence. However, with regard to the *Stoics*, he very frankly and readily acknowledges that it did destroy it ^d.

Dr. *Burnet*, the learned Master of the *Charter-house*, charges the *Stoics* home with this Sentiment: He indeed, and rightly, extends the same Charge to other Sects; declares that in their Systems all things were considered as so many several Emanations.

^b Intellectual System, first Edition, p. 425.

^c Gassendi Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, p. 551.

^d Quoi qu'il en soit, dire que les ames vont dans l'Æther, ou, si l'on veut, à Dieu, ne signifie pas qu'elles perdent leur Existence séparée, comme une goutte d'Eau se perd dans l'océan, lors qu'elle y est jetée; & rien ne nous oblige de croire qu'*Euripide* a été précisément dans les mêmes Idées, que les *Stoiciens* ont suivies depuis. Bibliothèque Choise, vol vi. p. 247.

tions from the Deity; from whom they were supposed to be taken, and into whom they were again to be resolved; but, as he strongly expresses it, *sine omni distinctione individuorum*.*

It is with singular Pleasure that I find this Notion of the Refusion confirmed by the worthy and learned Mr. *Jortin*, in his judicious Discourses concerning the Truth of the Christian Religion. "Some, who in Words acknowledge the Immortality of the Soul, seem in Reality to have taken it away, by imagining that the Soul was a Part of the Soul of the World, of the Deity, and that, upon its Separation from the Body, it was re-united to it." p. 247. He mentions the Refusion as destructive of a future State: And this is all I quote him for.

I have, I hope, by this time sufficiently made good the Point I undertook to prove: Mr. *Jackson* lays it down as an unquestioned Truth (and in this I entirely agree with him) that the Souls of good Men were to be resolved into the divine Nature. The Merits of the Dispute between us lie therefore within a narrow Compass; the Souls of good Men must be rewarded in and by this Refusion, or they cannot be rewarded at all. I have shewn that the *Stoics* (and my Argument is confined to them) did not consider this as a State of Retribution and Reward. I have therefore, so far as I am now concerned, effectually confuted his Hypothesis.

And here it is remarkable, that this Notion is destructive of future Punishments, in the very Sense, in which Mr. *Jackson* contends for them.

* *Archæol. Phil.* vii. speaking of things before their Appearance in this World, and after their Departure out of it, he says, *habebant semper suum modum subsistendi in divina natura, licet sine omni distinctione individuorum.*

He makes them consist in an Exclusion of the Wicked from the divine Nature. But we have shewn, that the old *Stoics* did, in Reality, suppose no such Exclusion, but that the Souls of the Good and Bad were to be admitted indifferently to this Refusion ^f.

CHAP.

^f And what Reply does Mr. *J.* make to this in his late Defence? Why, he roundly affirms that he never mentioned the Refusion in this Sense; that he never supposed it was considered as a State of Happiness. This *Denial* looks well. It looks as if he was ashamed: Not indeed of himself, which perhaps by this time one might expect; however of his favourite Hypothesis. And it was high time, unless, in Excess of Charity, he was resolved to stick by that which every body else was about to abandon.

P. 71, 72, 73, of his former Pamphlet, he tells us, that the Soul was to return to God; that this Return was not supposed to destroy its personal and distinct Existence. He has employed much Pains and Reasoning in Support of this last Position; and this in order to shew that the Author of the *D. L.* had not fairly represented the general Sentiment of Antiquity on this head. But what had Mr. *Warburton* advanced on this Point? Why, that the Refusion of the Soul was supposed to destroy its separate and distinct Existence. If therefore Mr. *J.* was not endeavouring to shew that this Refusion was consistent with a State of separate and distinct Perception, he was all the time fighting without an Adversary; he was only encountering a Chimæra, and yet he now boasts of a Victory misrepresented.

It is remarkable, that the Philosophers often mention a State of future Happiness in *Heaven*. And our Author assures us he was only labouring to prove, that this was a State of separate and distinct Existence. But against whom was he labouring to prove this? his Adversary mentions this very State; allows that it was represented as a State of separate and peculiar Subsistence, as much as that of *Tartarus* or *Elysium* itself, *D. L.* vol. i. p. 410, 11.

In his first Piece (p. 71.) when he speaks of the Return of the Soul to God, he mentions this as a *private* and hidden *Doctrine*. Now if he was describing a private and hidden Doctrine, he must have been all the time describing the Refusion; for as to the State of Happiness in *Heaven*, it has been shewn that this was a public and open Notion.

But

CH A P. VI.

Some Remarks on the Passages alledged by Mr. Jackson to prove that the Philosophers believed a future State.

THE Point asserted by our Author, is, that the Philosophers were *fixed* and *steady* in the Profession of this Doctrine; that they did
con-

But what will not this great Scholar say, unsay, and say again? and all to preserve an imaginary Name in Letters which he never had. In the mean time what a fine Task has the Answerer of one of these Men? They will *affirm* any thing: They are easily confuted. They will deny they had *affirmed*: They are confuted again. Then they begin to *distinguish*: And by that time the Matter is half over, the Reader, as may be well expected, grows weary of the Controversy. So that was it not that they sometimes, as here, afford Occasion for new Openings into Truth, one would no more pursue an *Answerer by Profession* for the Sake of the Victory, than one would hunt a Fox for his Carcase.

But I have not, as I say, been all this time amusing myself and Reader with a mere Argument *ad hominem pertinacem*, my Reasoning, if I mistake not, is plainly decisive of the Point in Question. I have shewn, that, according to the general System of the *Stoics*, the Soul was to be resolved into the *Anima mundi*, or divine Substance, *immediately* upon its Dissolution from the Body; and if so, there could be no room for the Belief of future Rewards and Punishments, since Mr. J. himself allows, that this Refusion was considered as a State of mere Insensibility.

And here let me ask this very learned Man, why he took no Notice of the Testimonies, which were alledged to prove that this Refusion was to be immediate upon the Separation of the Soul and Body. For these, as little as he may think himself concerned in them, will intirely clear up the Point against him. *Numenius* then, speaking of some *Stoics*, declares, "that, according to them, the Soul of the Universe would be immortal, but that *all others* would upon *Death* be blended and mixed with it." — "Every Body, says *Antoninus*, will

constantly and invariably declare for it. "One
 " may (says he) as reasonably doubt whether
 " any *Christians* ever did or do believe a future
 " State,

" be lost and buried in the universal Substance; every Soul
 " will be immediately absorbed and sunk into the universal Na-
 " ture," or God. In another Place he says, "*Alexander* and
 " his Slave would upon Death be reduced to the very same
 " State; for that they would either be resumed into the univer-
 " sal Substance (or God) or scattered and dispersed into mere
 " Atoms." *Ἀλεξάνδρος ὁ Μακεδὼν, καὶ ὁ οὐροκόμος αὐτοῦ ἀποθανόντες*
εἰς τ' αὐτὸ καλεῖσθαι ἤτοι γὰρ ἐληφθῆσαν εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς τε κοσμοῦ
σπερματικὰς λόγους ἢ δισκοιδαδῆσαν ὁμοίως εἰς τὰς ἀτομὰς, l. vi.
24. And *Seneca*, speaking of Death, says, Vade fortiter, vade
 feliciter.—*Nec rogaveris, nec timueris, nec te velut in aliquod*
malum exiturum tuleris retro. Rerum natura quæ te genuit ex-
pectat, et locus melior ac tutior. Nat. Quæst. vi. 32. *Rerum*
natura quæ te genuit expectat. There cannot, I think, be a
 clearer Proof that the Soul, upon the Dissolution of the Body,
 was immediately to be resumed into the universal Nature, or
 God. *Seneca* declares the same in another Passage already
 quoted. *Cogita nihil eorum, quæ ab oculis absunt, & in rerum*
naturam, ex qua prodierunt, & mox processura sunt, recondun-
tur, consumi; desunt ista, non pereunt. Et mors, quam per-
timescimus & recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit. Ve-
niet, qui iterum nos in lucem reponet dies. Ep. 64. How could
 Life be suspended and interrupted upon Death, by Means of
 the Refusion, unless the Refusion be supposed to be imme-
 diate? *Epicætetus* too, in one of the Passages already cited from
 him, says, "that at Death the Materials of which Men are
 " composed, will be resolved again into the Substance from
 " which they were originally taken," *Arrian*, iv. 7. And the
 same Writer in another Place declares "That the fiery Sub-
 " stance or the Soul, would, upon the Dissolution of the Body,
 " be resumed by the universal Nature, or God."

Now to apply these Testimonies directly to our present Pur-
 pose. It is agreed on both Sides that the *Stoics* held the Refu-
 sion of the human Soul. It is allowed, even by Mr. *J.* himself,
 that this Refusion was supposed to destroy its personal and distinct
 Existence. And the Passages just recited prove that this Refu-
 sion was to be made upon the Separation of the Soul and Body.
 Here then is a plain Proof, even upon the Gentleman's own
 Principles, that the Soul was to lose its separate and distinct
 Existence at Death.

Let's

“ State, as whether the Philosophers amongst
 “ the Heathens did believe it.” p. 99. And how
 does he prove it? Why, he brings several Pas-
 sages

“ Let’s now see what the learned Writer has advanced to shew,
 that the *Stoics* believed a future State: And here he tells us,
 that the Interval between Death and the general Renovation
 was considered as a State of Happiness and Misery. That it
 was often represented in this Light will be readily allowed.
 But then the Passages just cited, as well as those produced in
 the first Chapter, plainly shew that it was often represented as
 a State of mere Insensibility. Here then are two very oppo-
 site and contrary Accounts of a future State

Now the learned Gentleman himself allows that the *Stoics*
 had a twofold Method of teaching on this very Subject. The
 only Question then is, which was the public and exoteric,
 which the private and esoteric Notion. And luckily Mr. J.
 himself has determined this Point for us. As for the *public*
 Notion, he says it was contrived to inculcate the Doctrine of
 another Life in the most sensible and gross Manner; but the
 Refusion was supposed to take away all peculiar and distinct
 Perception; and, what is more, the learned Gentleman him-
 self allows that it was supposed to do this. This therefore,
 according to his own Reasoning, must have been the *private*
 Doctrine.

Again; the learned Writer says, that the Soul, according
 to the *Stoics*, was to return to God; that this Return was
 supposed to constitute the Happiness of good Men in another
 Life: However that this Notion was not to be imparted to the
 People, as being quite unfit and improper for their Know-
 ledge. Now if this Return to God, which was really and
 actually said to be a State of Happiness, could not be safely
 imparted to the People; much less could the Refusion, which,
 on Mr. Jackson’s own Principles, was considered as a State of
 mere Insensibility. We may then conclude, even according
 to his own Reasoning, that the Refusion must be ranged
 amongst the *private* and *hidden* Notions.

Upon the whole, the real Fact with Regard to the old
Stoics, was this: They sometimes speak of the Interval (or
 part of it) between Death and the general Conflagration as a
 State of Rewards and Punishments. But then it must not be
 dissembled, that they often speak of it as a State, in which
 the Soul was to be deprived of all Perception. It plainly ap-
 pears too, even upon the Gentleman’s own Principles, that

sages from the Ancients, in which, according to his Interpretation, they declare for another Life. This, I presume, he calls his *Demonstration*. In the

this last was the *private* and *esoteric* Notion; and after this I need not surely go about to prove that this was the only Doctrine of a future State *really* entertained and *believed* by the Philosophers themselves. But a Word or two more on this Part of the Argument.

“ The *Stoics* called Death a Separation of the Soul (which they thought to be of a fiery Nature) from the Body; and taught that, after that, the Soul returned to its congenial Element, and continued happy or miserable for certain Periods of Time, or till its Dissolution at the general Conflagration and Refusion into the supreme Soul of the Universe.” Mr. *J. Defence*, p. 62. The thing affirmed here is, that the Interval between Death and the general Renovation, was consider’d as a State of Rewards and Punishments. I must first take Notice that this flatly contradicts the several Passages, in which the *Stoics* represent Death as the very End and Extinction of our Being; but what I would chiefly observe here, is, that it is strangely inconsistent with the Testimonies alledged by our Author himself on this very Point. “ *Gleanthes* taught, that the Souls of all Men continued (after Death) till the Conflagration. But *Chrysippus* said, that the Souls of wise Men (or Heroes) only continued so long.” If *Diogenes Laertius* be right in this last Account; if the Souls of *Heroes only* were to subsist till this general Conflagration; how will our Author be able to prove that the Souls of *all Men* were to continue for this Period? if he can make good this Point against me, must he not make it good against *Diogenes Laertius* at the same time too? And is he, as I before asked, so desperately enamoured and fond of Controversy, that, rather than spare his Adversary, he will even answer and confute himself? In his first Pamphlet (p. 98) he urges the Testimony of *Arius Didymus*, who says, “ that the Souls of good Men were to exist till the Conflagration and Dissolution of the Universe; but those of the wicked to continue only to a certain Period.” And here too is not his own Evidence clear and express against him? For, with Regard to the Souls of the wicked, what can one collect, even from his own Translation, more than that they were *not* to subsist till the general Conflagration?

But

the following Sheets I propose to consider and examine it; and if I should say I will undertake intirely to confute and overthrow it, I shall hardly

2. But not to insist on his several Contradictions, the very Argument, which he brings to prove that the *Stoics* believed a future State, proves just the contrary. He tells his Reader, that the Soul, on their Principles, was to return after Death to its congenial Element; and let me tell him that this Return was looked upon by the old *Stoics*, as equivalent to a State of Non-existence. *Plutarch*, explaining their Notion, says, "that the Souls of the Unwise (and these must include the Body of Mankind) would mingle with the Elements at Death; but that of the wise Man would remain till the Conflagration." *D. L.* vol. i. p. 391. This Return to the Elements is here mentioned as a State of absolute Insensibility; it is opposed to a State of separate and distinct Existence, in very plain and exprefs Terms. The same is confirmed by several Passages already cited. *Magnus animus deo pareat, & quicquid lex universi sine cunctatione patiat. Aut in meliorem emittitur vitam, lucidius tranquilliusque inter divina mansurus, aut certe sine ullo futurus incommodo, naturæ suæ remiscebitur, & reuertetur in totum.* Seneca Ep. 72. *Cogita nihil eorum quæ ab oculis abeunt, et in rerum naturam, ex qua prodierunt, et mox processura sunt, reconduntur, consumi; desinunt ista, non pereunt. Et mors quam pertimescimus & recusamus, intermittit vitam, non eripit.* Ep. 34. There are many Testimonies to the same Purpose, both in this and the first Chapter. And yet our Author, unconscious of the Havock he was going to make in his own System, talks much of this Return to and Mixture with the Elements. When I first saw this Passage, (*the Soul will return to its congenial Element*) I was quite at a Loss to conceive to what Purpose of the Controversy he would insist upon this Circumstance. But what was my Surprise, when I found that he urged it as a Proof that the *Stoics* really believ'd another Life?

I must therefore tell this very learned Man, that he yields up the whole Question, when he asserts, "That the Soul was to return to its congenial Element upon Death." It appears from the Testimonies already cited, and Ten thousand others, that it was to be so blended and mix'd with this Element, as to lose its separate and distinct Perception. It was not therefore, even on his own Principles, to remain a particular Being after Death; and therefore what room for the Belief of future Rewards and Punishments?

It

hardly be thought to promise any great Matter.

But as our Author's Temper will never suffer him to do any thing by halves, nor his Judgment help

It will be proved in the Eighth Chapter, that the Soul was held to be strictly and properly a Part of God. If therefore it was *upon Death* to return to its *congenial Substance*, it was immediately to be resolved into God or the *Anima Mundi*; and this Resolution, as our Author himself allows, was held to be destructive of all personal and distinct Subsistence.

But he goes on. "The *Stoics* differ'd in two Points from the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists*, 1. In making the rational Soul to be material. 2. In limiting its Duration in the future State, which the others thought to be *unlimited and immortal*." p. 62. But did not the *Pythagoreans* and *Platonists* limit the Duration of the Soul in the future State as well as the *Stoics*? It is, I think, generally supposed that they did not. But surely without Reason. For did not the Followers of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* hold this Doctrine of *general Revolutions* as well as the *Stoics*? Did they not suppose that the same Men were to return again to the present State, and live in the very same Circumstances as before? And does not all this necessarily imply, that the Duration of the Soul in the future State could not be thought *unlimited and eternal*?

But let us return to the *Stoics*, from whom we have digress'd. As to *Zeno*, *Cleanthes*, and *Chrysippus*, Mr. J. insists much upon their Belief of a future State; and whatever Impression he may make upon his Reader, he seems at least to persuade himself that he has made good this Point. But how is it possible for him to prove, at this time of Day, what he undertook, that they were *constant and uniform* in their Professions on this Article? The few Remains of their Works still left us are so very slight and inconsiderable, that one cannot be enabled by them only to form a Judgment of their Practice and Opinion as to the Point in Question. However one thing is certain, *viz.* that the Philosophers of the same Sect pretty generally agreed in their main System. We may then conjecture from the Doctrine and Professions of the later *Stoics*, what those before them taught and thought with regard to a future State. And as *Epictetus* is commonly allow'd to have been a genuine and thorough *Stoic*, it is not unreasonable to suppose that he might speak the real Sentiments of this Sect.

It must not be denied that the later Philosophers did sometimes make Innovations in the old Systems; but then this was with

help him to know where to stop, he pushes his Principle out of Sight both of Reason and Antiquity; and throws out of Distance all who have taken

with a View to improve and refine them; to purge them of Absurdities, or clear them from Objections, which could not be easily removed. Now as the several Innovations were made with this View, it would be absurd to imagine, that the more early *Stoics* did either profess or believe the Doctrine of a future State in a more constant and uniform Manner than those who came after them. I do not say this, in order to decline any Argument our Author offers, or for want of a proper Reply to what he has advanc'd with regard to these three ancient *Stoics*. The Gentleman does indeed plume himself upon these Proofs; and as I am not sensible of the Force of them, I will give him an Opportunity of making his best of them, and explaining them to more Advantage. Let us see then what Mr. J. makes *Chrysippus* say: As for *Zeno* and *Cleanthes*, I must reserve them for the next Chapter. All this weight of Demonstration from *Chrysippus* amounts to one single Passage of *Diogenes Laertius*. "*Chrysippus* said that the Souls of wise Men only (or Heroes in Mr. Jackson's Interpretation) were to continue till the Conflagration." p. 6. What now does this come to? Why that, according to him, the Souls of Heroes were to subsist till the general Dissolution. But what is this to our present Argument? The Point our Author undertook to prove was, that the Souls of all Men would continue to this Period. Why then does the Testimony, on which he rests his whole Excuse, relate only to the Souls of Heroes?

2. I see no more in this Passage of *Diogenes Laertius*, than in one cited from *Plutarch* in the *D. L.* p. 391. which runs thus. "The *Stoics* taught that the Soul of the Weak and Infirm would die or return to the Elements at its Departure from the Body; but that the Soul of the wise Man would hold out till the Conflagration." The Souls of the wise Men and Heroes, as Mr. J. assures us, were the same. Suppose then *Chrysippus* believ'd that the Souls of Heroes were to continue till this time; he might very consistently believe too, that those of all other Men (*i. e.* the Bulk of Mankind) would die and perish with the Body.

3. It is, I think, pretty evident from a Passage in *Plutarch*, that *Chrysippus* denied all future Punishments. "He laughed, as *Plutarch* informs us, at the common and popular Accounts of another Life." Now we have shewn that

taken the same Road before him. His Master and Benefactor the late Dr. *Clarke* was as warm an Admirer of the old Philosophers as himself; contends

that several of the *Stoics* consider'd these *very Accounts* as the only Foundation and Support of future Punishments; that they thought themselves obliged to discard and explode the last, barely because they could not admit the first. As *Chrysippus* therefore so freely ridiculed the vulgar Notion of future Punishments, this will of itself be a fair Presumption that he believed no future Punishments at all.

The Passage from *Plutarch* runs thus. " He (*Chrysippus*) " laughed at *Plato* for endeavouring to deter Men from In- " justice by frightful Stories of divine Vengeance and Pu- " nishments after Death; for that these were the most childish " of all Terrors, as the Doctrine of Punishments in another " Life was subject to great Difficulties. This then was in " Reality, no more than the Bugbears of *Accho* and *Alphito*, " which Women employ to fright Children. And yet, adds " *Plutarch*, he maintain'd, that the Gods would punish " wicked Men." (*De Rep. Stoic.* p. 1040. Ed. *Xyl.*) And hence *Plutarch* accuses him of Contradiction. The Foundation of the Charge is, that *Chrysippus* supposed divine Punishments, and yet laughed at the Stories mention'd by *Plato*. And does not this plainly intimate that he was conceived to reject all future Punishments, as well as those recorded by *Plato*? For had he held any future Punishments whatever, what possible Ground could there have been for this Charge?

4. Mr. *J.* himself allows that the Notions of a Providence and a future State depend upon each other. Now we have shewn, in the Beginning of this Chapter, what very extravagant and absurd Notions this same *Chrysippus* had entertained of the first; and therefore we may conclude, on the Principle advanced by the learned Gentleman himself, that he could have no rational or well-grounded Hope of another Life.

5. In two Passages of *Plutarch*, cited in this very Chapter, we have the following Account of the Doctrine of *Chrysippus*. " According to him, the Soul of the World would " have consumed and wasted into nothing, had it not been " replenish'd with fresh Materials, in order to supply and re- " cruit its Losses. It was to increase and be enlarged, till it " had consumed all Things into itself; it was to augment con- " tinually, till all material Substances were absorbed into it."

Now

contends for their Belief of this very Article: But then as to the *Steddiuess* and *Constancy* of this Belief, he was not Zealot enough in the Cause of Paganism to say that. His great Knowledge of

Now as *all Things*, all *Substances whatever*, were to be daily absorbed into the *Anima Mundi* or Divine Being, it is evident that the Souls of Men were to undergo the same Fate; and if these were to be continually resolved into the divine Substance, it is evident from what has been said of the Refusion, that they were continually to die and perish.

To be serious with one who deserves it so little of me. If Mr. *Jackson* would aspire to the Character of an able and honest Examiner, infinitely preferable to that of a subtle Disputant, he must fairly weigh the *united Force* of these various Arguments; and not keep nibbling at the loose End only of one or two: A Practice that inevitably betrays either his Ignorance of their Force, or his Fear and Apprehension of their Weight. What I undertook to prove (against his Assertion oft repeated) was, that *Chrysippus* did not profess the Doctrine of a future State in the most *uniform* and *constant* Manner. I have done this: And let Mr. *Jackson* undo it, if he can.

At parting however I will tell him a Secret, if he will promise not to tell it again, as his own, as he did by the *Mysteries* (see p. 89. of his Pamphlet, *The Belief of a future State, &c.*) at the same time he was abusing his Informer.—In the ancient *Pagan* Theology, extraordinary Men were supposed to have Souls of a Nature and Species above the Common; which they distinguished into a higher and lower Class; the first called *Demonic* and the other *Heroic*, while the common Race of Men had only plain *human* Souls. The Philosophers, we have shewn, sometimes talk as Naturalists, sometimes as Theologists. Hence they sometimes speak of their *wise Man* as subject to the common Lot of his Species; sometimes as holding it out a good deal longer. In this latter Account they considered their *wise Man* as the same with him the People called a *Hero*; and supposed him of a Stuff that would indure longer than the Souls of common Texture. And this explains a Circumstance that the learned Reader could not but observe in their Accounts of the Duration of their *wise Man*, which is their speaking of it as a *natural* Advantage and Prerogative, not a *moral*. And thus we see the Principle of the *double Doctrine* clears up this Difficulty likewise. This is enough to remove Mr. *Jackson's* Embarrass. But would he know more of this Matter, he must call again.

Antiquity,

Antiquity, and much greater Regard for Truth, would not suffer him to bid so open Defiance to a notorious Fact; and, along with that, to common Sense and common Decency. He frankly owns, “that there was so much *Doubtfulness, Uncertainty, and Unsteadiness* in the Thoughts and Assertions of the Philosophers concerning this very Point, as could not but very much diminish its proper Effect and Influence upon the Hearts and Lives of Men^a.”

“It will not seem strange, says a celebrated Writer, to observe the wisest of the Ancients pushing this principle to so great a length, and considering Glory, as the amplest Reward of a well spent Life; when we reflect, *that the greatest Part of them had no Notion of any other Reward or Futurity*. And even those who believ’d a State of Happiness for the Good, yet entertained it with so much *Diffidence, that they indulged it rather as a Wish than a well-grounded Hope*.” In another Place he observes, “That the *natural Law* could serve as a sufficient Guide but to very few, that it

^a “The wisest Philosophers did indeed sometimes seem to have reasoned themselves into a Belief of it. But then one cannot, without some Pity and Concern of Mind, observe how strangely at other Times the Weight of the same Arguments seems to have slipped (as it were) out of their Minds, and with what wonderful *Diffidence, Wavering, and Unsteadiness*, they discourse about the same Things—even those great Philosophers themselves, the very best and wisest, and most considerate of them that ever lived, did sometimes express themselves with so much *Hesitancy and Unsteadiness* concerning a future State, as could not but extremely hinder the proper Influence and Effect, which that most important Consideration ought to have upon the Hearts and Lives of Men.” *Sermons preached at Boyle’s Lecture*, p. 294, 5, 6, 7.

“ was

“ was not discoverable even to those few, with-
 “ out great Pains and Study ; and could not pro-
 “ duce in them at last any thing more than a
 “ *Hope, never a full Persuasion ; whilst the great-*
 “ *est Part of Mankind, even of the Virtuous*
 “ *and Inquisitive, lived without the Knowledge*
 “ *of a God, or the Expectation of a Futurity.*”

History of the Life of Cicero, vol. ii. p. 519, 562.

These were the Sentiments of Men prepossessed, indeed, in favour of a vulgar Error, but advancing it with that Caution and Modesty, which became their Learning and Ingenuity. But to come to Mr. *Jackson* ; whose Authorities from Antiquity it is the Purpose of this Chapter to examine. And that we may be the better able to judge of their proper and real Force, we shall first state and define the Point they are produc'd to prove against the Author of the *D. L.* which is *that the Philosophers believ'd a future State.* As he undertakes therefore to confute the Doctrine of this Writer, it will be expected that he set directly and expressly about his Business. And now, since 'tis not improbable he may have never read his Book, I will just inform him in what Manner his learned Adversary states the Question.

1. When he charges the Ancients with the Denial of a future State, he confines his Charge to the *Philosophers* only : He further restrains it to the *Greek Philosophers* ; and, out of these, excepts *Socrates* ; and, all who lived after the time of *Christ*. As to these he owns that they improved and refined upon the Systems of those who went before them : And that, in consequence of this, they really believed the Doctrine of a future State.

To

To make our Author's Testimonies therefore come home to the Point, they must prove that *the Greek Philosophers before our Saviour* (I always except *Socrates*) entertained this Notion; he must prove too, as the necessary Support of his own favourite Position, that these Philosophers were *fixed and settled, steady and uniform* in the Profession of this Doctrine. This is the Point he undertakes, or should undertake, to prove; with what Success, let us now see.

He begins with his favourite *Jamblicus*. "*Jamblicus* says, that, in his time, all the *Galatians* and *Trallians*, and most of the barbarous Nations taught their Children to believe, that the Soul did not perish but continue after Death." p. 94.

"*Jamblicus* says, that, in his time," &c. If this will serve his Purpose, Mr. *W.* tells us more. He tells us, that, at all times, both barbarous and civil policed Nations taught their Children this Belief. But what is this to the Purpose? Were the *Galatians* and *Trallians* Greek Philosophers? Or did the Contemporaries of *Jamblicus* live before the Time of Christ? His *Galatians* and *Trallians* therefore he must keep for some other Occasion. And, if I might advise him, it should be to people his new erected Kingdom of SPACE. But to go on. "*Tully* (he tells us) says, that the Existence of the Soul after Death is the current Belief of all Nations; to which he [*Tully*] agrees." p. 94, 5. It's well he does, or this Testimony had been as little to the Purpose as the foregoing: We have now indeed got a Philosopher by Chance; but he comes in only by the by, and, as it were, *aliud agens*. But now we have him let us make the best of him. And therefore

therefore I must here desire our Author to recollect, what he is on all Occasions so apt to forget, the real State of the Question; which is not whether the Philosophers did sometimes profess the Belief of another Life, but whether they were *fixed and settled, constant and unvaried* in this Profession. When he comes to himself, therefore, we must necessarily suppose that he gives us *Cicero* as one, that was *uniform and steady* in what he advanced on this Point. I am sorry for his Sake, and my own, for I am sure the Public loses nothing by it, that he is so great a Stranger to *Tully's* Writings. Ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni consequamur, ut mortem, *quam etiam beati contemnere debeamus, propterea quod nullum sensum esset habitura*, nunc sic affecti non modo contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare. *Fam. Ep. v. 21.* Sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravior, qua te uti spero: ego certe utor. Nec enim dum ero, angar ullâ re, cum vacem omni culpâ; *et si non ero, sensu omni carebo.* vi. 3. Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea republica avellor, qua carendum esse doleam; *præsertim cum id sine ullo sensu futurum sit.* vi. 4. And again to his Friend *Toranius*, Cum consilio profici nihil possit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenierit, ferre moderate, *præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum.* vi. 21.

These Passages have already been produced in the *D. L.* but our Author intirely overlooks them, as not amounting, I suppose, to Proof against him, or not shewing that *Cicero* did sometimes declare his Disbelief of another Life. However, I chuse to rub his Nose with them once more, as this will serve withal to expose his Disingenuity

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and want of Candour, in thus meanly concealing from his Reader the Testimonies which have been urged against him ^b.

I must

^b These Passages have been alledged by the Author of the *D. L.* in order to confirm his Opinion, that *Cicero* did not believe a future State. He thinks that they bid fair to give us his real Opinion, as they came from him in the Season of Calamity and Distress. "These (says he) are Letters of Consolation to his Friends, when he himself, by Reason of the ill State of public Affairs, much wanted Consolation; a Season, when Men have least Disguise, and are most disposed to lay open their whole Hearts.

"Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo

"Ejiciuntur, et eripitur *persona*, manet res." p. 401.

The learned Dr. *Middleton* has since employed this very *Circumstance*, to the Support of the contrary Opinion. "In a melancholy Hour, says he, when the Spirits are depressed, the same Argument would not appear to him with the same Force, and Doubts and Difficulties get the Ascendant, and what humoured his present Chagrin find the readiest Admission. The Passages alledged were all of this kind, written in the Season of Dejection." (*History of the Life of Cicero*, vol. ii. p. 561.) To this Mr. *W.* replies, "It is allowed that a desponding Temper, like that of *Cicero's*, will in a melancholy Hour, be always inclined to suspect the worst. But to what is its Suspicion confined? Without doubt to the Issue of that very Affair, which occasioned the Distress. A melancholy Hour would have just the contrary Influence on his other Cogitations. And this is the wise Disposition of Nature; that the less Support the Mind has persuaded itself it shall find in one Quarter, the more it endeavours to make it up in abundance of Hope for another. So that unless *Cicero* was made differently from all other Men, one might venture to say, his Hopes of future Good (had his Philosophy permitted him to entertain any Hopes at all) would have risen in proportion to his Fears of the present. And this is seen every Day in fact. For it is nothing but this natural Disposition that makes Men of the World so generally fly even to Superstition for the Relief of their Misfortunes." p. 402. Nothing can be more true than what is here said, that our Hopes of Futurity are never so strong and vigorous, as in the Season of Calamity and Distress. Had *Cicero* therefore entertained any Notions of future

I must take Notice that the Evidence of these Passages comes with redoubled Force upon this learned Gentleman. He insists that *Seneca*, in his
Letters

ture Happiness, we might have expected the most clear and lively Declarations of them at this very Time. The Solution which the Doctor offers can hardly, I think, be esteemed *natural*, as it certainly supposes *Cicero* to have been made in a different Way from all other Men.

2. It is agreed on all Hands, that these Passages were addressed to Friends in Distress by way of Consolation. But then it is said, that *Cicero* would not have applied this Topic of Comfort, had not he himself been in a State of Dejection and Despair. As if he had only employed this Argument in his most gloomy and melancholy Hours; as if it had been occasioned only by his Chagrin; and the troublesome Situation of Things about him. Whereas he very frankly declares, in his *Tusculans* themselves, that this was the most real and effectual, the most solid and substantial Comfort that could be administered against the Fear of Death. In his first *Tusculan* he undertakes to prove, that Death was not an Evil; and this, 1st. Because it was not attended with any actual Punishment, or positive and real Misery. 2^{dly}, He rises higher, and labours to prove, that Men ought to look upon Death as a Blessing rather than an Evil, as the Soul, after its Departure from the Body, might be happy in another Life. In the first Part he supposes the Mortality and Extinction of the Soul at Death; in the second he plainly supposes, that it will survive the Body. Now the Question is, on which Doctrine does he lay most Stress; or, which of these two Notions, in the Opinion of *Cicero*, would serve best to fortify and prepare Men against the Fear of Death? And luckily *Cicero* himself has long since determined this Point for us; having in the first *Tusculan* brought several Reasons to prove the Immortality of the Soul, he after all very frankly declares, that they had no great *Validity* and *Force*; that the most solid and substantial Argument, which could be urged against the Fear of Death, was the very Consideration advanced in his Letters, or the *Doctrine which makes it the utter Period of our Being*: And in the remaining Part of the Book he proceeds to argue chiefly on this Supposition, as *being the best calculated to support Men against the Fear and Terror of Death*. The Arguments which he urged to prove the Immortality of the Soul, seem sometimes to have had great Weight with the Person, to whom they were immediately address'd; he declares himself fond of the Opinion, and resolves not to part with it. *Nemo me de immor-*

Letters to his Friends, would not dissemble his real Opinions. (Farther Defence, p. 26.) And will not the same Reasoning prove that we are to look for a strict

talitate depellet. To this *Cicero* replies, *Laudo id quidem ; etsi nihil nimis oportet confidere : Movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso : Labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus : In his est enim aliqua obscuritas. Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati. c. 32.* He does not seem to lay any great Stress on the Notion of a future State ; nihil oportet nimis confidere. He owns that the Arguments, alledged in support of it, were rather specious than solid : *Movemur enim sæpe aliquo acutè concluso.* That they were not plain and clear enough to make any strong and lasting Impression : *Labamus mutamusque sententiam clarioribus etiam in his rebus ; in his est enim aliqua obscuritas.*—That therefore the best Remedy at all Events, would be the Notion that the Soul dies with the Body : *Id igitur si acciderit, simus armati.* Having then explained what he had to say on the Immortality of the Soul, he proceeds to shew that Death could not be considered as an Evil, on the Supposition that the Soul was to perish with the Body.

When therefore he would teach Men to condemn the Terrors of Death, he grounds his main Argument on the Mortality of the Soul. As to the Notion of a future State, it was maintained by Arguments too subtle to work a real and lasting Conviction ; it was not thought clear enough to make any deep and strong Impression. He has therefore Recourse to the Extinction of the Soul, as the most comfortable Consideration that could be employed against the Fear of Death. This was not then a Topic that was peculiar to the Season of Dejection and Distress ; it was not only “ thrown out accidentally, when “ he was not considering the Subject,” but was used in the Works that were deliberately and professedly written on this very Point. It could not therefore be *occasional* only, and suited to the present Circumstances, as the learned Writer in his Reasoning all along supposes.

3dly. In his 5th *Tusculan* he mentions *Epicurus* by Name, and very frankly declares that his System might serve to fortify and arm Men against Death as well as any of the rest. *Quis enim parum est contra mortem aut dolorem paratus ? — Quid tandem ? isti grandiloqui contra hæc duo quæ maximè angunt, [mortem & dolorem] melius se habent quam Epicurus ? 31.* As to the Extinction of the Soul, he declares, that it was as solid and substantial a Topic as any that could be offered to remove the Fear of Death. And what does he say more in his *Epi-*
stles ?

a strict Declaration of *Cicero's* real Sentiments in HIS LETTERS: And if we are, the Passages just cited may serve to determine this Part of the Controversy.

Let

files? It is evident therefore, that his Advice in the last was not purely occasional and accommodated only to the Men he had to do with.

Again; when *Cicero*, in his sharpest Afflictions, undertakes to comfort himself, what is the Method which he proposes, the Remedy which he prescribes as the most certain and effectual Cure of his Misfortunes? Why, it was that he would kill himself. *Cæteri quidem, Pompeius, Lentulus tuus, Scipio, Afranius, scæde perierunt. At Cato præclare. Jam isthuc quidem, cum volemus, licebit. l. ix. ep. 18.*

Now this is the very thing he inculcates in his other Writings; the very Remedy he prescribes as most real and substantial in the Season of Calamity and Distress. *Ut enim si cui naviganti, prædones insequantur, deus quis dixerit, Ejice te navi, præsto est qui excipiat, vel delphinus, ut Arionem Methymnæum; — sic, urgentibus asperis & odiosis doloribus, si tanti non sit ut ferendi sint, quo sit confugiendum vides. Tusc. Qu. ii. 26.* What I would infer from hence, is, that *Cicero's* way of thinking and reasoning on this Point was much the same in the lowest Season of his Calamity and Distress, as at other times. For does he not in the first propose to put in Practice the very Precepts which he deliberately lays down in the last?

So much for the Circumstance which occasioned the Dispute between these celebrated Writers. With regard to Mr. *W.* let me observe, that before he produces these Passages, he employs some Pages to prove that *Cicero's* real Sentiments are to be found *only* in his Epistles. And surely what he has alledged in support of this last Point ought to be examined, before any one attempts to shew from his other Writings, that *Cicero* believed a future State. Here then, I think, the Adversaries of the *D. L.* are all guilty of Tergiversation; for they lay their main Stress on Testimonies taken from those other Writings, without so much as trying to disprove what has been advanced to shew that we are to look for *Cicero's* real Opinion only in his Letters.

However, till they confute what has been advanced on this Head, there will be no Danger of their proving that *Cicero* entertained the Notion of another Life. As to his Epistles, Mr. *Warburton* has given us a fair Specimen of what we are to expect from this Quarter. And if we look into his

Let us go to his third Passage. "*Lactantius* says that *Epicurus*, who held the Soul to be mortal and extinguished by Death, was herein confuted

philosophical Works for his real Opinion of future Punishments, we shall have no Reason to imagine that he *generally* espoused the Notion, which the learned Doctor imputes to him. But I have dwelt pretty largely on this Article in another Place. And Dr. *Middleton* himself allows that he had no fixed and well-grounded Hope, but only some faint Expectations of a State of future Happiness. "It was entertained with so much Diffidence, that they (the Philosophers) indulged it rather as a Wish than a well grounded Hope." vol. ii. p. 519. And in another Place he observes, "That *Cicero* himself had nothing more than a Hope, never a full Persuasion of this Truth," p. 562. Now if this be all that the learned Author contends for, as to this State of Happiness for the Good; if *Cicero* indulged it merely as a Wish, without any rational and well grounded Hope; if he never could gain a full and thorough Persuasion of this very important and necessary Truth; it will hardly be worth while to pursue the Dispute any further: The great Patrons and Admirers of the Law of Nature, will have but little to boast of, as the very Heroe of their Cause could rise no higher, without a superior and *more divine* Guide. And I could indeed wish that these Writers of a lower Class would reflect in what manner the very candid and learned Writer of the History above mentioned sometimes speaks of the Philosophers with regard to their Belief of another Life. This might teach them to entertain more qualified and moderate Sentiments of the *Light of Nature*; and not to magnify and extol, so extravagantly as they do on all Occasions, the Knowledge of the old Philosophers, with an equal Disregard to Truth and Modesty.

If it be only said, that *Cicero* might sometimes entertain Hopes of another Life, it would not, as I just observed, be worth while to pursue the Controversy any further. Should it be said that other Philosophers might sometimes entertain the same Hopes, I am far from denying it; nay, should it be said, that they sometimes believed this Notion, I would not dispute even this. All I contend for, is, that the general Persuasion was on the other Side. And this I impute to their metaphysical and absurd Speculations concerning the human Soul. That they were extremely fond of these Notions, and, in Consequence of these, ready to abandon the most evident and plain Truth, has been clearly and incontestably proved by

“ confuted both by ALL Philosophers and the
 “ general Persuasion of Mankind.” But does
 not our Author see that he cites this Authority
 in flat Contradiction to the very Doctrine which
 he himself lays down a Page or two before ?
 P. 93. he tells us, “ That all Philosophers, except
 “ *Epicureans, Sceptics*, and a few others, firmly
 “ believed a future State.” Strange Inconsisten-
 cy ! What ! did the *Epicureans, Sceptics*, and some
 others disbelieve a future State ; and yet was *Epi-*
curus singular in this Notion ? was he confuted in
 this Point by *all others*, while the *Sceptics* and
some others agreed with him ?

Besides does not Mr. J. know that this very
Lactantius gives a different Account of this Mat-
 ter in his Piece *De Ira* ? that he there charges
 the Philosophers with the Disbelief of future Pu-
 nishments ?

But to proceed. “ *Tully* relates of *Socrates*,
 “ that a little before he drank the fatal poisoned
 “ Cup, he expressed clearly and fully his Belief
 “ of a future State, and of the different Condi-
 “ tion of holy and unholy Men.” What the Gen-
 tleman would infer from hence, is, that *Socrates*
 believed another Life. And so Mr. W. said be-
 fore him. This being the excepted Case, which,
 suspecting our slippery Author would forget, I
 just now put him in Mind of.

by the Author of the *D. L.* However, I would not say that
 these Notions had always the same Force on their Minds, or
 that there might not be some Intervals, in which Doubts and
 Difficulties might get the Ascendant, and leave room for bet-
 ter Principles. There are many Passages, in which they speak
 on this very Subject with great Uncertainty and Doubt ; it is
 evident that at these Times their Notions of the Soul could
 not have their proper Influence and Force, because they them-
 selves allow that these Notions were inconsistent with the Belief
 of future Rewards and Punishments.

He next brings a Testimony from *Plato*. I did not chuse to say any thing of *Plato* in the foregoing Chapters; and this, because this learned Man here again, as usual, mistakes the very Point in Debate. The Doctrine of future *Rewards* and *Punishments* is of two Kinds; in the one they are supposed to be established by the immediate Direction and Appointment of God; to be a mere positive and arbitrary Designation, depending intirely on his Will and Pleasure: In the other, the natural and necessary Consequences of Virtue and Vice; and to flow from the very Nature and Reason of Things independent of the Will and Appointment of God. As to the latter of these Notions, Mr. *W.* allows that it was believed and entertained by *Plato*; as to the first, he contends that it was not. If then the Gentleman would attack his Argument with Success, he must shew that *Plato* believed the *first* Notion; as to the *second*, he is not charged with the Disbelief of it. But not having done this, what he said of *Plato* was too impertinent to deserve an Answer *.

However he has one Observation worth taking Notice of. "The first Passage (says he, from "*Plato*) shall be out of a Letter wrote to some of his Friends, in which we may be sure he delivered his real inward Sentiments." *Farther Defence*, p. 38. It has been often said, on the like Occasion, that *Great Wits have short Memories*. I believe we should be nearer the Truth, if we said, they have very *scanty Reading*. This

* Even, on this Scheme, pure and unpolluted Souls were to be resolved into the divine Substance immediately upon Death, and were to lose their separate and distinct Existence. As for the rest, or "those which had contracted much Defilement, they were sent into a Succession of other Bodies, to purge and purify them, before they returned to their Parent Substance." *D. L.* vol. i. p. 421.

Gentleman,

Gentleman, as much as he blusters with *Plato's Letters*, certainly never read any more than a few second-hand Quotations from them, or he never could have talked of our being sure that *Plato delivered his real inward Sentiments*, since in one of these very Letters he says, "As for the Sym-
 "bol or private Note, which you desire in order
 "to know my *serious Letters*, and *which con-*
 "tain my *real Sentiments*, from those that do not
 "so; know and remember that God begins a
 "serious Epistle, and Gods one that is other-
 "wise." Ep. 13. Can we ask a clearer Proof of *Plato's* not *always* speaking his real Opinion in his Letters? I will give the original below, when we treat of the double Doctrine.

But to come to his sixth Testimony. *Sallust* says, "it appears to me a manifest Truth, that
 "the Life of all Men is superintended by God;
 "and no good or evil Action of any one is dis-
 "regarded by him; but that, by the natural Con-
 "stitution of things, a different Recompence
 "HEREAFTER is appointed to good and evil
 "Men." Our Author, I am afraid, has managed this Passage with more ART than one would expect from so very candid and fair a Writer; from one, who professes to mind nothing but *Argument* and *Truth*, I once knew a Man who had no bad Talent at forging other Peoples Names, tho' he scarce knew how to write his own. Tho' our Author could not translate so as to express *Sallust's* Purpose, he knew how to falsify so as to serve his own.—A Recompence HEREAFTER, says he. But where is the *Latin* for *hereafter*? or what is there in the Original that implies the Sense of it? The Words are, *Mihi pro vero constat, omnium mortalium vitam divino numine invisi, neque bonum neque*
 3 malum

malum facinus cujusque pro nihilo haberi, sed ex natura diversa præmia bonos malosque sequi. *Orat. 2. ad Cæsarem.* All we are told here, is, that good and bad Men will be certainly punished and rewarded, but whether *in this Life or the next*, is not said, this must be determined only by the Context; and, unluckily for our Translator, the Context speaks only of the present Life. Profecto, si id accidat, neque tibi nox, neque dies curam animi sedaverit, quin insomniis exercitus, furibundus atque amens aliena mente feraris. Namque mihi pro vero constat omnium mortalium vitam divino numine invisi; neque bonum neque malum facinus cujusque pro nihilo haberi; sed ex natura diversa præmia bonos malosque sequi.

But Mr. J. has still a harder Task upon his Hands. He must not only falsify the *Text*, but the *Author* too, before he can make the Passage serve his Purpose. For *Sallust* may say what he pleases, or even what his Translator pleases; till he be changed into a *Greek* Philosopher Mr. W. is not answerable for any of his Opinions.

His seventh Passage is that from the Treatise *De Mundo*, of which I have spoken so largely in the first Chapter. The two next are taken from *Plato*, and I hardly need repeat the Answer which I have just made to a Testimony produced from the same Author. The tenth is the famous Passage of *Chrysippus* relating to the general Renovation, of which, too, if the Reader has not, Mr. J. I believe, has had enough. The next is from *Arius Didymus*, who says that, according to the *Stoics*, “ the Soul was generated and corruptible; but did not immediately perish, when it departed out of the Body, but continued to exist for a certain Term of Duration; that the Souls of good Men existed till the general

“ neral Conflagration and Dissolution of the Uni-
 “ verse; but those of the wicked continued only
 “ to a certain Period.—And that the Souls of
 “ Brutes perished with their Bodies,” 97, 98. Be-
 fore this Testimony can be of Service, Mr. *Jackson*
 must remove the following Objections. And
 as he seems to be much of the Humour of the
 Quack, who delighted in desperate Cases, I do
 not know but it may be doing him a Pleasure to
 propose them. Let us consider it then with re-
 spect to *future Punishments*. The Souls of the
 Ignorant (ψυχαι των αφρονων) were to subsist for a
 “ certain Term of Duration after Death.” And
 yet this Author almost immediately adds, “ That
 “ the Souls of the Ignorant and Brutes were to
 “ perish with the Body.” *Τας δε των αφρονων και*
αλογων ζων ψυχας συναπολλυει τοις σωμασι. And
 surely he bids as fair to be right in the last Ac-
 count as the first, since *Plutarch* himself assures
 us in very plain and direct Terms, “ That the
 “ Souls of the Ignorant or Unwise were suppos-
 “ ed to suffer the same Lot with the Body^d.”
 2. This is strangely inconsistent with several Te-
 stimonies alledged in the last Chapter, from Wri-
 ters of much better Credit and Authority, who
 declare that the *Stoics* consider’d Death as the
 final Period of our Existence. 3. This flatly con-
 contradicts the very Account which our Author him-
 self gives of the Doctrine of the *Stoics*. We are
 here told that the Souls of the Ignorant were not
 to subsist till the general Conflagration, but only
 for a certain Term of Duration: Whereas Mr.
J. asserts, that they were all to remain till the
 first Period. Since then this *Arius Didymus* thus
 flatly contradicts himself, several Writers of great-

^d De Plac. Phil. iv. 7.

er Name and Credit than himself, and lastly, the very Party in whose Favour he is made to appear an Evidence; with what Face can Mr. J. quote him as supporting his Opinion, and attempt to derive Credit to his System from a Passage which makes directly against it?—Let us next consider this Passage, as it relates to a State of *future Rewards*. In our Author's Translation we are told that the Souls of good Men were to subsist till the general Dissolution. But was this the Doctrine of the old *Stoics*? No, most of them assign this future Existence to their *wise Man* only, or to Souls of extraordinary and uncommon Virtue.

Our

* “ They taught, according to *Plutarch*, that the Soul of the Infirm would perish with the Body; but that that of the *wise Man* would hold out till the general Conflagration.” vi. 7. *De Plac.*

Chrysippus taught, that the Soul of the *wise Man* only would subsist till this Time. Κλεισθης μὲν οὐ πάσας ἐν διαίτῃ τὰς ψυχὰς μέχρι ἐκπύρωσις· Χρυσιππος δὲ τὰς τοῦ ΣΟΦΟΝ ΜΟΝΩΝ. *Diog. Laert.* l. vii.

Si, ut sapientibus placet, non cum corpore extinguuntur *magne animæ*. Tacitus in *Agricola*. It is generally supposed that *Tacitus* here alludes to the Doctrine of the *Stoics*; 'tis however certain and undeniable, that, according to the Principle he here employs, none but the *Magnæ Animæ* could possibly subsist till the general Conflagration. *Seneca* too, in a Passage that has been often cited on this Occasion, does indeed tell us, that some particular Souls were to exist till the general Dissolution; but then he all along supposes, that this future Existence did not belong to the Body of good Men; that it was to be the Portion only of a few choice and select Spirits. *Nos quoque felices animæ et æterna sortitæ, cum deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis, et ipsius parvæ ruinæ ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur.* *Ad Mar.* 26.

“ The *Stoics* fancied; that the Soul was a subtilized, fiery Substance, which survived the Body after Death, and subsisted a long time, yet not eternally; but was to perish at last in the general Conflagration.” *History of the Life of Cicero,*

Our Author in a Note adds the following Passage from *Lactantius*. *Esse inferos Zenon Stoicus docuit, et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas: & illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones; hos vero luere poenas in tenebrosis locis atque in coeni voraginibus horrendis. Idem nobis prophetæ palam faciunt. l. vii.* This is indeed but a single Passage, however, in the Opinion of our Author, of weight enough to supply the Place of many. P. 25. he says, "*I dare not examine it.*" P. 44. he says, "I vainly alledge that the Words of *Zeno* relate to the popular Account of a future State." Excellent Divine! he tells me *I dare not examine it.* And then, to prove his Words, shews I *examined it in vain.* But what is this wonderful Discovery in Antiquity which I dare not, and then dare examine to no Purpose? Nothing I will assure the Reader, but a Passage fairly produced and used to very good Purpose, by the Author of the *D. L.* in which Passage *Zeno* is made to profess the Doctrine of another Life. And who ever denied that he did this? Had Mr. *J.* produced a Thousand such Passages, they had been of no Use to his Argument. *Zeno* was a Man who busied himself much in Politics. What wonder therefore that he should declare for this Opinion? Had he real-

Cicero. vol. ii. p. 549. But with all due Deference to this fine Writer, this surely could not be the Case. As for the Bulk of Mankind, it plainly appears from the Passages brought in support of my Argument, that their Souls were to perish with their Bodies. And what will more particularly deserve our Consideration, *Cicero* himself gives this very Account of their Doctrine in the first *Tusculan*. *Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur—Si cor aut sanguis aut cerebrum est animus, certe, quoniam est corpus, interibit cum reliquo corpore; si anima est, fortasse dissipabitur; si ignis, extinguetur. Tusc. i. 9. 11.*

ly and actually disbeliev'd a future State, we may be assured he would have made the same Declaration. But hear, I pray you, the Words of the *Divine Legation*: “ *Zeno* the Founder of the *Porch* “ followed the Mode, in writing of *Laws* and a *Re-* “ *public*. Agreeably to this Part of his Character “ we find, by *Lactantius*, that he taught a future “ State of Rewards and Punishments in the very “ Terms of *Plato*, *esse inferos Zeno*, &c. And “ yet not to mention that his Follower *Chrysippus* “ laughed at these Things, as the most Childish “ of all Terrors, we know,” &c. vol. i. p. 391. 3d Ed.

2dly. But what did *Zeno* believe of the Account which he here gives? Did he believe it in the literal Sense? No, Mr. J. himself allows that he did not. But then he could believe it in no Sense at all; for that it was not an allegorical and figurative Account, has been already proved. What Force then can this Testimony have in the present Question?

However, our Author, on the Strength of this single Passage attempts to shew, that *Zeno* not only *constantly* professed, but *steadily* believed a future State. As if one single Passage would prove that his Profession was *constant* and *invariable*; as if his *firm* and *uniform* Belief of this Notion could be gather'd from a Passage in which he declares no Belief of it at all. For how can he be supposed to declare his Belief of a future State, if he did not consider the Account he here delivers as an Allegory, nor yet admit the common and popular Notion of another Life?

Before our Author can make any Impression in Favour of his Argument, he must reply distinctly to all this; and likewise to the following Objections.—If *Zeno* constantly profess'd and believ'd

liev'd this Notion, whence the following Reasoning of *Cicero*? *Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur—si sit ignis, extinguetur.—Interibit cum reliquo corpore.*

On this Supposition, whence comes it that the *Stoics* in general are charged by *Plutarch* with the Denial of a future State?

How shall we judge of the Sentiments of *Zeno* and the more early *Stoics*, of whose Works we have so little remaining; but by those of their genuine and undoubted Followers? And do we find from these last any Reason to suspect that the first were constant in the Assertion and Belief of this Doctrine?

But there will be no Occasion to dwell longer on this Article. It is easy to shew, even on the Gentleman's own Principles, that *Zeno* did not believe this Notion. "The *Stoics*, says he, "taught that the Soul at Death was to return to "its congenial Element." *Zeno* then held this Principle. Now I have shewn that the Soul, in Consequence of this Return, was to lose its separate and distinct Existence.

Zeno fancied that the Soul was a fiery Substance. What then was the congenial Element, into which it was to return upon Death? Why, it must of Course be Fire. And with what View did the *Stoics* send the Souls of Men into this Element? Was it with any moral Purpose and Design? No, it was, as *Antoninus* expresses it, "That they might be dissolved, melted, and "burnt; might be a kind of Food and Nourishment to the universal Soul; might supply "it with Materials, in order to produce new "Beings."

And what has our Author to oppose to all this? Why, *Zeno* sometimes declared for another Life:

Life : An Observation that cannot be pertinently alledged against any but those, who deny that *Zeno* ever profess'd this Notion. As to the present Argument, he allows that the Return of the Soul to its congenial Element, was the real Opinion or secret Doctrine of *Zeno*, and I have proved, that this was supposed to be a State of mere Insensibility.

I will now add a Word of two with regard to the Doctrine of *Cleanthes*. *Diogenes Laertius* does indeed say, " That the Souls of all Men, according to *Cleanthes*, were to subsist till the general Conflagration." But as this Account is contrary to the Testimony of much better Writers, I am far from thinking it an unexceptionable Proof of the thing asserted. We know that *Cleanthes* held the Soul to be a fiery Substance, as well as the other *Stoics*; and therefore in the Opinion of *Cicero* (if that have any weight with our Author) he must have held it to be mortal in the same Sense with them.

Plutarch assures us, that the *Stoics* assigned this long Duration only to the Soul of their wise Man. *Tacitus* and *Seneca* say the same.

Our Author himself must own, that *Diogenes Laertius* is mistaken in the Representations which he here gives. " The Soul, says Mr. J. according to the *Stoics*, was to return to its congenial Element at Death." If then *Cleanthes* agreed with Mr. J. in this, he could not agree with *Diogenes Laertius* too, that the Soul was to subsist till the general Conflagration. For I have shewn, that this Return to the Elements was to be immediate upon the Separation of the Soul and Body. I have shewn too, that it was supposed to be destructive of all personal and distinct Existence. It could not therefore be consistent with

with the Notion which made the Soul subsist till the general Conflagration.

Lastly, Does not our Author see that *Diogenes Laertius* represents this as a Doctrine peculiar to *Cleanthes*? That he does not give this as the common and general Notion of the *Stoics*? And could he prove that one or two *Stoics* believ'd a future State, what would this signify to the main Question? Or how would it prove that the general System of the *Stoics* was not such as I have represented it in the last Chapter?

We have next two Passages from *Clemens of Alexandria* and *Nemesius*, both which relate to the *Stoical* Notion of the general Renovation, and have been examined in the last Chapter.

We proceed then to "*Athenagoras* the Christian Apologist, who, he tells us, says that many of the Philosophers taught the Doctrine of the Resurrection." *Athenagoras* does indeed say this; but then the Reason, alledged in support of his Opinion, will not, I presume, add much to the Credibility of it. The Sum of what he says is this; "The Philosophers believed the Resurrection of the Body. For, according to them, at the Dissolution of the Body, the Atoms, which compose it, will not be intirely consumed and destroy'd; and if they be not intirely consumed, they MAY serve for the Formation of other Bodies^f." Admirable Reasoner! the Philosophers held Principles on which the Doctrine of the Resurrection of

^f Οτι μντοι ε καδ ημας μονον αναησεται τα σωματα, αλλα και κατα πολλας των φιλοσοφων, περιεργον επι τε παροντος δεκνυειν, ινα μη εξαγωνις τοις προκειμενοις επισταγειν δοκωμεν λογικη περι νοητων και αισθητων, και της τατων συστασιως λιγοντες. η οτι πρισβυτερα τα ασωματα των σωματος, και τα νοητα προαγει των αισθητων. και πρωτοις περιπληρωμεν τοις αισθητοις, συστα-

of the Body might be defended; therefore the *Philosophers* believed the Resurrection of the Body. One would imagine, from many Strokes of equal Force in Mr. *Jackson's* Writings, that he had learnt his *Art of Logic* from this Father. The *Philosophers* held that the Matter of the Body would not be annihilated and destroyed at Death. But must they therefore hold that it would be *united* again to the same Soul, and rise to a future State of Happiness and Misery? By this means we shall put *Epicurus*, *Democritus*, and all their Followers in Possession of this Doctrine, for they too maintained, that the Matter of the Body would not be annihilated and reduced to nothing at Death.

Huc accedit uti quidque in sua corpora rursum
Diffolvat natura, neque ad nihilum interimat res,

Cedit enim rerum novitate extrusa vetustas;
Semper et ex aliis aliud reparare necesse est,
Nec quidquam in barathrum, nec tartara decidit atra;

Materies opus est, ut crescant postera secla.

Lucretius, i. 216. iii. 980.

Hence our Author may, if he pleases, infer that *Lucretius* too believed the Doctrine of the Resurrection. His inference would be full as good as *Athenagoras's*.

But our Author proceeds: "Another *Christian* Writer says, that the ancient *Philosopher* and *Legislator Zoroaster* taught the Resurrection of the Dead." So then, *Zoroaster* too

ἄρουν ἐκ μεν τῶν ἀσμάτων, κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστάσιν τῶν νοσούντων
σώματων. Οὐ γὰρ κωλύει κατὰ τὸν Πυθαγόραν καὶ
τὸν Πλάτωνα, γενομένης τῆς διαλύσεως τῶν σωμάτων,
εἰ ὡς τὴν ἀρχὴν συνῆσθαι, ἀπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν
αὐτὰ καὶ πάλιν συστήσθαι. *Legat. pro Chris.*

is become a *Greek* Philosopher; or what does he do here? Mr. *W.* numbered him amongst the ancient Lawgivers, who not only *believed*, but *propagated* the Doctrine of a future State. But some are of Opinion, that there were several *Zoroasters*. Who knows, but that one amongst them might a be *Greek* Philosopher? And I believe Mr. *J.* has as good a right to make *his* a Follower of *Plato*, as another learned Man to make *his*, a *Servant of Daniel the Prophet*.

The last Passage runs thus,—“ *Cicero* says it “ was the fixed Opinion of the Ancients, that “ there was Perception in the State of Death &.” Of *what Ancients* does *Cicero* here speak? Of the rude and barbarous Inhabitants of old *Italy*. Now what have these People to do in a Question, which relates only to the old Philosophers of *Greece*? Is this then the Citation that is to pin the Basket, and knit up his other Proofs into a *Demonstration*? For a close Follower of his Point you will hardly find his Fellow. To shew us that he never loses Sight of the Question, which is, whether the *Greek Philosophers* believed a future State, he begins with the *Trallians* and *Galatians*, and ends with the rude and barbarous *Inhabitants of old Italy*. Were these put upon him for old *Greek* Philosophers? Or would he put them upon us for such? But it is no great Matter which. For I will do him the Justice to own, that the two Ends of his Evidence are just as much to the Purpose as the Middle. But, as he could not be so grossly ignorant, nor, I should think, so abandoned to Controversy; we must

§ Unum illud erat insitum priscis illis, quos Cascos appellat Ennius, esse in morte sensum; neque excessu vitæ sic deleri hominem, ut funditus interiret, &c. *Tusc. Q. i. 12.*

seek another Cause of so absurd a Management of this Dispute. We are to know then, that this mortified Confessor to Anti-nicene Principles has long dealt in that kind of Logic, called *Argumentum ad invidiam*. With this, his Pamphlets against Mr. *W.* begun. His Title Page of the first, professes to shew, *the Doctrine of the ancient Philosophers concerning a future State, consistent with Reason, AND THE BELIEF OF IT DEMONSTRATED*; insinuating that Mr. *W.* had written something *against* the *Belief* and Reasonableness of that Doctrine. When he was in so good a Train he pursued it; and not finding the *Philosophers* always at his Service, he supplies their Place with Lawgivers and their People, Orators, Historians, *Greeks, Barbarians*, Bond and Free; By which Address, he gained this further Purpose, of a *new* Insinuation, that Mr. *W.* denied that any of the Ancients believed a future State; And whatever Reader could be brought to think *that* of him, might easily be brought to think that he himself believed none at all.

I have examined several of his Quotations in other Places. I will just add one or two more here. *Celsus* in *Origen* says, "It was the Business of the Interpreters and Mystagogues of the sacred Mysteries to instruct those who were initiated in them in the Doctrine of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; *from the Belief of which Doctrine* (he adds) *no Mortal ought ever to depart.*" p. 90.

By these last Words, I suppose, he would intimate that *Celsus* here delivers his own Sentiments. But, is it not going a little too far in Favour of an Hypothesis to fetch in a Follower of *Epicurus* as a real Believer of a future State? for that *Celsus* was actually of this Sect seems

to be the general Opinion of the best Critics.

We have been told indeed in this Controversy, that he did not belong to this School. "As to *Celsus* (says Mr. Tillard) I absolutely deny that he was an *Epicurean*; he professes solemnly a great many times to believe in God, and a future State of Rewards and Punishments." *Reply*, p. 88. Had this learned Gentleman reflected on the following Passage of *Cudworth*, he would not, I dare say, have grounded his Argument on these Professions. "Tho' *Celsus* were suspected by *Origen* to have been an *Epicurean*, yet did he at least personate a *Platonist* too. The Reason whereof might be, not only because the *Platonic* and *Pythagoric* Sect was the divinest of all the *Pagans*, and that which approached nearest Christianity and the Truth; and by that means could with greatest Confidence hold up the Buckler against Christianity and encounter it." p. 558.

"*Pythagoras* (says Mr. Jackson) who was instructed in the Mysteries of *Egypt*, *Chaldaea*, and *Greece*, taught that the Souls of pious and good Men returned unto God, and that those of the wicked were punished in *Hades*." p. 91. and for this we are referred to *Jamblichus's* Life of *Pythagoras*, Sect. 178. If the Passage referred to

"And yet the Banter came more decently out of *Celsus* an *Epicurean's* Mouth, than out of *Julian's*." *Bentley's Remarks upon a Discourse of Free-thinking*, part ii. p. 24.

Celsi duo Epicurei—hic posterior is ipse est qui contra Judæos & Christianos scripsit librum sub titulo, quem ab Antiphonte mutuatus est λόγος ἀνδρός, quemque egregie opere eo quod extat confutavit Origenes, testatus eum in hoc Epicurismo dissimulasse, p. 141. 163. 200. *Fabricius, Biblioth. Gr.* vol. ii. p. 809.

The late Edition of *Lucian* will supply us with some fresh Authorities to the same Purpose. *Vid. his Alexander or Pseudomantis.*

proves any thing but the Quoter's *Inattention* to his Author, it is his *ill Faith*; who could give this as as Proof that Pythagoras taught that the Souls of pious and good Men RETURNED UNTO God. The Case was this, as his Hero *Jamblichus* tells the Story: "An impudent Fellow, with a
 "Design to ridicule the Doctrine of Pythagoras,
 "in which he asserted that the Souls of Men
 "would return again; desired him to carry a
 "Letter to his Father, as he was to descend
 "soon into the infernal Regions; and that he
 "would bring an Answer when he returned
 "again¹." Now does not the very Case supposed necessarily imply, that what Pythagoras is said to assert of the Soul's returning again, was its Return to the present World? how else was he to bring an Answer from the Father to the Son? Yet is this Passage produced by our candid and accurate Divine to prove that Pythagoras taught the Return of the Soul to God.

And now, Reader, you have what he calls his *Demonstration*. And, struck with the Force and Number of the Citations which make it up, he cries out, in an Air of Triumph, "After these
 "and Multitudes of other plain Passages, which
 "might be alledged, and wherein the Sentiments
 "of the Philosophers concerning a future State
 "are clearly expressed, one may as reasonably
 "doubt whether any Christians ever did or do believe a future State, as whether the Philosophers
 "did believe it." p. 99. But for all these big Words, his *Demonstration* is yet to make; and, I believe, as far off as ever. For as to these Passages, some

¹ Προς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, ὡς αὐτοῦ, καταγέλωντα διαλεῖσθαι, ἢ αἰς, ἀπεφανέτο Πυθαγόρας, ἐπαυδοῦν εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, καὶ φασκόντα πρὸς τοῦ πατέρα δώσειν ἐπιστολήν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν μίλλοι καταβαίνειν, καὶ κίλευντα λαθεῖν εἰρεῖαν, ὅταν ἐπανή παρὰ τῆ πατρὸς οὐκ, ἔφη, μίλλειν εἰς τοῦ τῷ αἰεῖσθαι τοποῖ παραβαλλεῖν, οὗ σαφὺς οἶδε τῆς σφαγῆς κοληζομένης.

of them we have shewn, do not relate to a future State; others do not relate to those Philosophers to whom the present Question is confined; and the Remainder relate to no Philosophers at all.

I was some time at a Loss for the Conceit of his chusing such an out-of-the-way Name for them as *Demonstration*. But I imagine he has observed that this Word, in Controversy, has the same good Effect that the Man in the Comedy found *Captain* to have in civil Life: It was a good travelling Name, and kept the Ostlers and Tapsters in Respect, just as this does the gentle Reader.

But had these Passages been ever so explicite and direct; what would they prove more than that the Philosophers did *sometimes* declare for a future State? But then it should not be forgot, that they did *sometimes* declare against it; it must be remembered too, that, even on Mr. Jackson's own Principles, the Passages in which they declare against another Life, must necessarily be referred to the *secret* and private Doctrine. The only Question then, is, whether we are to look for their real Sentiments in their secret and esoteric, or in their popular and common teaching^m.

CHAP.

^m The Gentleman, in his last Pamphlet, often repeats and insists, that none but the Disciples of *Pyrrho* and *Epicurus* can be charged with the Denial and Rejection of a future State. A Man must surely have a strange Passion for these old Philosophers, and an equal Contempt for his Reader, who will thus boldly and obstinately assert, to the very last, their Belief of this Notion, after what has been shewn to the contrary from the best Writers of Antiquity. If he was capable of Conviction, one might urge him with the Dialogues of *Plato*, from one of which we learn that the Patrons of the Mortality of the Soul were *very numerous*. Τα δὲ πλεῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ΠΟΛΛὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ, ἰσχυρὰν ἀπὸ τῆς φύσεως, εὐδαίμων εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἀκέραιον τὴν ψυχὴν διαφθεῖσθαι, καὶ ἀπολλύναι, ἢ αἰὶ οὐ ἀσθενέως ἀποθάνειν. — Afterwards this very Opinion is called, τοῦ τῶν

I Shall open this Chapter with the following Passage from the learned Writer, whose Sentiments I am here examining. Speaking of Mr.

Warburton,

πολλοί, ὅπως μὴ ἀμα ἀποδησέας τὴ αἰδέου, διακινδυνεύει
 ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπὶ τὰ τέλος ἡ. Phædo, p. 380, 384. Ed.
 Ficin. Cicero too assures us that the Number of those, who
 espoused this Notion was *very considerable*. *Ceteris enim videntur*
contradictentium; nec solum Epicureorum——acerrumē autem
 deliciæ mēe Dicaearchus contra hanc immortalitatem disse-
 ruit. *Tusc.* i. 31. It was the common Principle of *Epicurus*
 and his Followers, "that Death was nothing to us, or that
 "we have no real Interest in the State which is to succeed it."
 Now *Plutarch* assures us that many other Philosophers as-
 serted this very Principle as well as *Epicurus*. *De audiend.*
Postis, last page.

But what is the united Force of *Plato, Cicero, and Plutarch* against Mr. *Jackson*, when he is in the Humour of *Demonstrating*? He will *demonstrate* against them, as he has done already against the Author of the *D. L.* that *none but the Followers of Pyrrho and Epicurus can be charged with the Denial and Rejection of a future State.* But the Fit was strong upon him when he talked at this rate. In his sober Intervals, I would fain know what he thinks of the following Philosophers mentioned by *Aristotle*? He tells us, “ that according to the “ System of these Men, Matter was the first Original and “ Principle of all Things; that all Beings were made out of “ it, and would be again resolved into it.” And all this, as appears from *Aristotle*, without the Intervention of any intelligent or living Cause. For he objects to it, that it could give

Warburton, he says, " I desire he will try his
 " Talents against any thing I have wrote, and
 " that he will let the Public see whether he un-
 derstands

give no Account of the Origin of Motion; or of the Har-
 mony and Order which appears in the present Frame of Things.
Metaphys. 1. i. 3.

Here then was a Set of downright Atheists, besides *Pyrrho*
 and *Epicurus*, who were neither persuaded of the Being of a
 God, or a Providence. I need not therefore go about to shew,
 that they did not believe a future State. And I give this In-
 stance for two Reasons, first to shew this deep Man that the
 Philosophers who rejected a future State were *far more numer-*
ous than he seems to have imagined. Secondly, as I have to
 do with so very warm and zealous an Admirer of the old Phi-
 losophers, to shew his Readers that the Number of rank
 Atheists amongst them was far more considerable than he has
 thought fit to represent it. Many of the *Ionic* Order, if we may
 believe *Aristotle*, had not only sipped a little about the Edges
 of this poisonous Cup, but had drunk deep, and swallowed
 the very foulest of its Dregs.

But, as the Gentleman so strenuously insists, that all the
 Philosophers entertain'd this Notion except the *Pyrrhonists* and
Epicureans; I could wish he would inform us what he thinks
 of the *Cynics*. I do not find any clear Testimonies on Re-
 cord, that they constantly and uniformly believ'd a future
 State. When *Diogenes* was asked, " Whether Death was
 " attended with any Misery," he replied, " How can it be
 " attended with any Misery as it deprives us of all Sense?"

Ερωτηθεὶς εἰ κακὸς ὁ θάνατος; πῶς, εἶπε, κακός, οὐ παρὸς οὐκ
 αἰσθανομένη. *Diogenes Laertius*, vi. 68. *Ménage*, upon the
 Place observes,—*Epicurus* propterea mortem nihil ad nos pro-
 nunciavit: Nam quod dissolutum est, sensu caret: Quod sen-
 su caret, nihil ad nos.—It is reported of this same *Dio-*
genes, that, a little before he died, he declared, that Sleep
 and Death were two Brothers, or that we should be no more
 sensible of any Evil after Death, than during a deep and pro-
 found Sleep. Διογένης κατενέχθεις εἰς νύκτα, καὶ μάλλον ἐκλεπτεῖν
 τὸν βίον, διεγεράντος αὐτὸν τὰ ἰατροῦ, καὶ πυθόμενος μὴ τι περὶ
 αὐτοῦ εἴη χαλεπὸν. οὐδὲν (εἶπε) ὁ γὰρ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ προ-
 λαμβάνει, ὁ νύκτος τὸν θάνατον. *Plutarch* ad *Apollonium*, p. 107.
 That I have given the true Meaning of *Diogenes*, I may ap-
 peal to *Plutarch* himself, who brings this very Saying as a
 Proof that Death was consider'd as a State of mere Insensi-
 bility. One *Demetrius*, a Follower of this Sect, speaks to
 the

“derstands the Scriptures, and the primitive
 “Writers of the Christian Church, any better
 “than he does Plato and Virgil; for had he un-
 “derstood the former, he would not have said
 “that the Philosophers neither did nor could be-
 “lieve a future State of Rewards and Punish-
 “ments.”

But why is he invited to try his Talents? This was never his Motive in Writing. And if it was, he would chuse a very different kind of Men to

the following Purpose in Seneca: Si animus fortuita contemp-
 sit, si deorum hominumque formidinem ejecit, et scit non
 multum esse ab homine timendum, a deo nihil, si contemptor
 omnium, quibus torquetur vita, eo perductus est, ut illi li-
 queat mortem nullius mali esse materiam, multorum finem. *De*
Beneficiis, vii. 1.

But I must not omit, in Conclusion, to take Notice of a very extraordinary Charge of *Misrepresentation* brought against me by this much injured Man. His Words are these,—“He [the Author of the *Inquiry*] says that I undertook to demonstrate that the Philosophers believ’d a future State.—“It is pity but he had pointed out the Places where I undertook to demonstrate what he says I did.” p. 13.

What! after all this Bustle, ashamed of his *Demonstration* at last! But don’t think this will make him ashamed of himself. His *Shame* is equal to another Man’s *Affurance*. Otherwise he would never deny what not only every Reader, but every Buyer of his Book could convict him of; the *Title Page* of which runs thus, “The Doctrine of the ancient Philosophers concerning a future State shewn to be consistent with Reason, and the Belief of it DEMONSTRATED.”

“Mr. Jackson’s Defence, p. 52. These are his very Words. And yet, which is scarce credible, in his late Defence he says, “I made no Appeal to Antiquity; nor did I give our Critic any Occasion to shew his Extent of Learning among the Christian Writers upon this Subject at all.” p. 53. No Appeal! why ’tis a Challenge in the very Air of *Hockley-hole*, To say the Truth, there are Reasons why he should have no great Relish for an Appeal to the primitive Writers. But what then, I am not the first who have exposed his Ignorance in Antiquity; and am not likely, unless this cures him of the Humour of demonstrating, to be the last.

write

write against. He contents himself to demonstrate that the Philosophers did not believe a future State: And willingly leaves it to Mr. Jackson to persist in affirming that the *Sacred* and *Primitive* Writers did not believe a *Trinity*.

However, we now find that the Assertion, which gives so much Offence to the learned Writer, is, *that the Philosophers could not believe, or that their Notion of the Soul was inconsistent with the Belief of a future State.* And here we are told, that, had not Mr. Warburton been an utter Stranger to the primitive Writers of the Christian Church, he never could have fallen into so gross and palpable a Blunder. Now, after all, should it turn out that several of these speak for him; that they charge the Philosophers with the very same Notion, in respect to the human Soul; that they arraign this Notion of the Soul as inconsistent with the Belief of a future State; if this, I say, should appear to be the Case; what must we think of the learned Gentleman, who thus insults his Adversary with his Ignorance of ecclesiastical Antiquity; and sends him to these very Authors, for a full Confutation of all he has advanced on this Head? That this however was the real Fact, I shall now undertake to prove, how certain soever to incur the Censure and Contempt of this wonderfully learned Man.

The first Absurdity charged upon these ancient Sages, by the Author of the *Divine Legation*, is, that they maintained the Soul to be really and actually a Part of God; that they believed it to be of the very same Nature and Substance with God himself. This has been represented as a fanciful and idle Notion; as unsupported by every thing but a Fondness to weaken and destroy the Credit of the old Philosophers. But
groundless,

groundless and chimerical as this Notion may appear to Mr. Jackson, it is countenanced and avowed by those very Writers, to whose Authority he here refers us, *Tertullian* charges *Plato* with holding the Divinity of the Soul in so very plain and strong Terms, as to leave no room for Cavil and Dispute: *Primo quidem oblivionis pacem animam non cedam, quia tantam illi concessit divinitatem, ut Deo adæquetur*^b. *Arnobius*, ridiculing the Folly and Extravagance of this same Notion, says, *Nunquam, inquam, crederent Typho & arrogantia sublevati, prima esse se numina, & aequalia principis dignitati*^c. *St. Jerom* confirms the same in respect to the Followers of *Pythagoras*. *Juxta Pythagoritarum dogmata, qui hominem exæquant Deo, & de ejus dicunt esse substantia*^d. *St. Austin* charges them home with the same Sentiments, *Cedant & illi quos quidem puduit dicere Deum corpus esse, veruntamen*

^b De Anima, c. xxiv.

^c Adver. Gentes, l. ij. The very learned Dr. Chapman, in one of his Tracts, says, "How is it credible that all the Fathers, who censured and corrected the Philosophy of *Plato*, should yet have lower Notions of the human Soul than *Plato* himself, and his Disciples?" (Remarks on Christianity as old as the Creation, Par. ii. p. 36.) This was alledged against *Tindal*, who, with an Insolence and Folly peculiar to himself, had ventured to affirm that the Fathers did not maintain the Immateriality of the human Soul. Now the Weakness and Rashness of this Assertion the Doctor has exposed at large, and treated with the Contempt that it deserves. But when he declares it incredible, "that the Fathers should have lower Notions of the Soul than *Plato*," I suppose he only means that they did not carry their Notions of the Soul so low as to make it mere Matter: And it is undeniable, that most of them did not. However, it is certain that "they had lower Notions of the Soul than *Plato*;" as they censure his Philosophy on this very Score; blame him for extolling the Soul so high, and putting it on the same Foot with God.

^d Ctesiphon, adver. Pelagianos.

eiusdem naturæ, cuius ille est, animos nostros esse putaverunt; ita non eos movit tanta mutabilitas animæ, quam Dei naturæ tribuere nefas est. Thus far these learned Fathers; and what has the Author of the *Divine Legation* said more than they?

Now this prepares us for the chief Point which I propose to establish on the Authority of the primitive Writers of the Christian Church; and

* *De Civ. Dei. viii. 5.* I had designed to close this Head with the Citations abovementioned; but as the learned Writer insults us with the Authority of the Fathers, I must beg leave to recommend to his Notice, the following Passages of St. *Austin*. Ergo & Jovem, ut Deus sit, & maximè, ut rex Deorum, non alium possunt existimare quam Mundum, ut in diis cæteris, secundum istos suis partibus regnet. In hanc sententiam etiam quosdam versus Valerii Sorani exponit Varro, in eo libro, quam seorsum ab istis de cultu Deorum scripsit. Qui versus hi sunt,

Jupiter omnipotens, regum rex ipse, Deusque,
Progenitor Genitrixque Deum, Deus unus & omnis.

Exponuntur autem in eodem libro, ita ut eum marem existimarent, qui semen emitteret, scēminam quæ acciperet, Jovemque esse Mundum, & eum omnia semina ex se emittere, & in se recipere; quæ causa, inquit, scripsit Soranus, "Jupiter Progenitor Genitrixque." Nec minus eum causa unum & idem esse omnia. (*De C. D. ix. 7.*) And do not these last Words give us the very Language of *Spinoza*?

Again: Attendat;—si Mundi animus Deus est, eique animo Mundus ut corpus est, ut sit unum animal constans ex animo & corpore; atque iste Deus est sinus quidam naturæ, in seipso continens omnia; ut ex ipsius anima, qua vivificatur tota ista moles vitæ atque animæ cunctorum viventium, pro cuiusque nascentis forte fumantur, nihil omnino remanere posse, quod non sit pars Dei. Quod si ita est, quis non videat quanta impietas & irreligiositas consequatur. Ut quod calcaverit quisque, partem Dei calcet, & in omni animante occidendo pars Dei trucidetur. Again:—De ipso rationali animante, i. e. homine, quid infelicius credi potest, quam Dei partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat? Jam vero partes Dei fieri lascivas, iniquas, impias, atque aminina damnabiles, quis ferre possit nisi qui prorsus insanat? Postremo, quid irascitur iis, a quibus non colitur, cum a suis partibus non colatur. (*De C. D. iv. 12, 13.*)

that

that is, *that the Philosophers could not believe a future State.* When I say that the Philosophers *could not believe a future State*, I mean consistently with their Notions of the human Soul. This, I know, has been treated as a strange Paradox.—What! could the Philosophers hold the Immortality of the Soul, and yet reject a future State? Nay, what is most extraordinary, were they obliged to deny the last, barely because they believed the first? This is indeed the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and, what is more, 'tis the Doctrine of those very primitive Writers, to whom the learned Gentleman so gravely sends us for Information on this Head. And since they charge the Philosophers with giving the Soul the very same Nature and Substance with God himself; with making it immortal in the same Sense with him^f; or, which is the same, assigning it a Necessary and Self Existence; what Wonder that they should accuse this Doctrine of the Soul, as inconsistent with the Belief of a future State? That this is a plain and necessary Consequence, I appeal to a Writer, who will not be charged with Prejudice and Partiality in favour of the Argument of the *Divine Legation*. “It was a
 “strange Notion, indeed, when one considers,
 “that human Souls do much *Evil* here; that
 “they are *ignorant*; that they are *miserable*;
 “which cannot surely be said of God. How are
 “they to be detruded into Swine, or any Animal,
 “by way of *Punishment*? Is a Part of God,
 “capable of being *punished*? and capable of de-
 “serving this by *Misdemeanors*? or how must

^f Vultis, homines, istum typhum, superciliumque deponere, qui Deum vobis adsciscitis Patrem, & cum eo contenditis immortalitatem habere vos unam? Arnobius adver. Gentes, l. ii.

“ one Part of God punish another Part of Him?”
Sykes's Connexion of Nat. and Rev. Religion, p.
 394. Let it be observed, that I only cite this
 Authority to shew, that this Notion of the Soul
 was inconsistent with the Doctrine of a future
 State; and not to prove that the Philosophers
 really disbelieved another Life. But to come to
 the Fact I am engaged to support: Some of the
 Fathers, I say, agree with the Author of the
Divine Legation in this Notion. *Justin Martyr*,
 speaking of the Philosophers, says, “ Some of
 “ them, holding the Soul to be *incorporeal* and
 “ *immortal*, did not conceive that they should
 “ be punished for their wicked and immoral
 “ Actions; for that a Substance, which was not
 “ corporeal, must of Course be incapable of suf-
 “ fering; and a Substance, which was immortal,
 “ must be independent of God ^ε.”

Again: “ The Soul cannot properly be styled
 “ *immortal*, for, if it be immortal, 'tis evident
 “ that it must likewise be *uncreated*.” And soon
 after he adds, “ Now if our Souls were *uncreat-*
 “ *ed*, they would not sin, nor abound with Fol-
 “ ly, nor be subject to Fear, &c. nor would
 “ they voluntarily migrate into the Bodies of other
 “ Animals, as Dogs, Serpents, &c. and they
 “ could not be compelled to do this, contrary to
 “ their own Inclination, as they are uncreated.
 “ For one uncreated Being is equal to and the same
 “ with another; nor is one superior to the other
 “ either in Dignity or Power ^h.” To explain
 this

^ε *Dialogus cum Tryph.* p. 139. Ed. Thirlb.

Ἄλλοι δὲ τίτις, υποσησαμένοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν,
 ὅτι κακοὶ τι δράσαντες ἠγνῆσαι δώσειν διὰ, ἀπαθεῖς γὰρ τὸ
 ἀσώματον, ὅτι, ἀθάνατον αὐτῆς υπαρχούσης, δέονται τι τῆ διέσεσι.

^h Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀθάνατον χρὴ λέγειν αὐτὴν· ὅτι ἡ ἀθάνατος ἐστὶ καὶ
 ἀγνητός δηλαδὴ.

this Reasoning of *Justin Martyr*, we may observe, that when he here speaks of the *Immortality* of the Soul, he understands this Term in the

Επει οὖν ἀγεννητοὶ ἦσαν, ὅτ' αὖ ἐξημαρτάνον, ὥτι ἀφροσύνης ἀναπλεῖν ἦσαν, ὅδε δεῖλαι καὶ θρασυαὶ παλιν, ἀλλ' ὅδε κινεῖσθαι ποτὶ εἰς σπῆας ἐχωρῶν, καὶ ὄφεις, καὶ κύνες, ὅδε μὴ ἀνακαλεῖσθαι αὐτὰς θεμῆς, ἐπὶ ἐῖσι ἀγεννητοὶ· τὸ γὰρ ἀγεννητὸν τῷ ἀγεννητῷ ὁμοίον ἐστὶ, ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτο, καὶ ὥτι δυνάμει, ὥτι τιμῇ προκρίθῃαι αὐτὰς τερν τοῖς ἑτέροις. 147, 8, 9, 50.

Mr. J. has been pleased to criticise this Quotation in the following Manner: "How does it appear that he (I) understands the Martyr's Words? Not in the least. Does he think that the Martyr denied the *Immortality* of the Soul and a future State? Or does he think that *Plato* held the human Soul to be (ἀγεννητος) ungenerated? The Martyr then held the Soul to be *immortal by the Will of God*, but not of itself, or by an ungenerated Immortality or Independency of Existence; and this our Critics ought to know was the very Doctrine of *Plato* himself." p, 52, 53. It is not easy to meet again, in so few Lines, with so much Arrogance, and Contempt of the Reader's Understanding.

"Does he think that the Martyr denied the *Immortality* of the Soul, and a future State?" Why no, 'tis evident I thought nothing like it; and for this plain Reason, I quoted the Passage to shew that *Justin Martyr* condemned the philosophic Dream of the Soul's being ungenerated; and not to shew that he denied the *Immortality of the Soul and a future State*. Was Mr. *Jackson* sincere in this, he deserves ones pity: Was he not sincere, he deserves it much more.

"Does he think (says he) that *Plato* held the human Soul to be ungenerated?" To which, I beg leave to reply by another Question: Does Mr. *Jackson* think at all? For what, I pray, were the several various Arguments and Authorities in this, and the following Chapter, brought to prove, but this very Point, that *Plato* did hold the human Soul to be ungenerated? Has Mr. *Jackson* so much as attempted to confute one of them? He is past that Drudgery. His Place is the Moderator's Chair; and having gravely told us, what no Body denied, That the Martyr held the Soul to be immortal by the Will of God, he fastidiously concludes, and this our Critics ought to know was the very Doctrine of *Plato* himself. The Sentence had ended more naturally, and, perhaps, nearer to his meaning, in these Words,—And this our Critics ought to know was Mr. *Jackson's* Will and Pleasure that they should believe of *Plato* also.

proper

proper and strict Sense, as including an eternal Existence *a parte ante*, as well as *a parte post*; and that it was considered by the Antients in this Light, *vid.* the late excellent Editor of *Hierocles in Aur. Car.* p. 137. and *Cudworth*, p. 38.

Arnobius, speaking of this Doctrine of the Immortality, declares that it gave too much Encouragement to all Sorts of Wickedness and Licentiousness: that there would be nothing to restrain Men from Vice, as they must be persuaded, from the very Nature of the Soul, that it was secure from all Punishment. Non denique omnia suis cupiditatibus largiatur, quæ libido impotens iusserit, impunitatis præterea etiam libertate munita? Quid enim prohibebit, quo minus hæc faciat? Metus supernæ potestatis, iudiciumque divinum? Et qui poterit territari formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit persuasum, tam se esse immortalem, quam ipsum Deum primum? nec ab eo judicari quicquam de se posse; cum sit una Immortalitas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis possit æqualitate vexari?

Again: He threatens the Pagans with the Punishment of another Life, and bids them not flatter themselves with the Hopes of escaping it, *because their Souls were immortal*. Neque illud obrepat, aut spe vobis æria blandiatur, quod a sciolis nonnullis, & plurimum sibi arrogantibus dicitur; Deo esse se natos, nec sati obnoxios legibus, p. 86.

The famous Passage in *Synesius* may be very pertinently applied to the present Case, “*I can never prevail with myself to think that the Soul was made after the Body*. I will never affirm

ⁱ See *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 423.—*Arnob. Adver. Gent.* l. ii.

“ that the World, and all its Parts will be one
 “ Day destroyed. *I conceive that the Resurrec-*
 “ *tion contains some very holy and profound My-*
 “ *stery; I am far from thinking with the vulgar*
 “ on this Point ^k.” This learned Ancient could
 not prevail with himself to embrace the Scripture
 Doctrine of another Life; and this, because he
 believed that the Soul existed before the Body, or
 was immortal in a proper and strict Sense. Yet,
 for all this, the learned Modern tells us, “ That
 “ the Pagan Notion of a future State was very
 “ agreeable to the Doctrine taught by Revela-
 “ tion ^l.” True it is, that *Synesius* could not
 discover it ^m. He was so far from thinking the
 two Notions nearly allied, that he consider’d
 them as plainly opposite and repugnant to each
 other. But what then? This is not the first
 Discovery, by a many, which Mr. *Jackson* has
 made of the Opinions of Antiquity, in Spite of
 all itself could say to the contrary. Tho’ Cavi-
 llers may still make it a Question, whether the
 Old or the New Platonist was the ablest Judge
 of this Point; for, as they assert Facts directly
 contrary to each other, ’tis impossible that both
 of them should be in the right.

But here Mr. *Jackson* steps in afresh and tells
 us, “ That these *Christian* Writers do not say
 “ or argue that the Philosophers did not or could
 “ not believe a future State.” p. 58. What do
 they say then? For it seems they are not to be
 understood without their Druggerman in ordina-
 ry, Mr. *Jackson*. But I believe it would puzzle

^k Epistle cv.

^l The Belief of a future State, &c.

^m The Passage in *Synesius* is quoted at length, in Chap. xiv.

even his Invention, rank as it is, to tell us what they did say, if they said not this. However the Passages themselves lie before the Reader ; and if he thinks they now want an Interpreter, they are welcome to take Mr. *Jackson*.

Let us just recollect what has been here said. Mr. *Warburton* tells us, that the Ancients held a Principle inconsistent with the Doctrine of a future State. Mr. *Jackson* undertakes to be their Advocate ; contemns all Objections as slight and trivial ; imputes them to the mere Ignorance and Blunders of his Adversary ; and, in Support of his own Notion, thinks proper to appeal to primitive Antiquity. But what has been the Issue of this Appeal ? Why this ; the primitive Writers give all the Sanction and Authority that Words are capable of giving, to the very Doctrine they are brought to censure and oppose ; those Parts of the *Divine Legation*, which seem most doubtful and exceptionable, have received the clearest and fullest Confirmation from these very Writers. Whatever it was therefore that led Mr. *Warburton* into this Opinion, it could not be his Ignorance of, or want of Reverence for ecclesiastical Antiquity ; and the Reader, I hope, will be soon sensible that it could not be his Ignorance of the Pagan Systems. But here I must desire him to recollect the real State of the Question ; which does not turn on the *Truth* or *Falshood* of what the primitive Writers have said ; but on the single Fact, *whether they have said it or no*. If the Reader will be so kind as to take this Observation along with him, and apply it to the Passages above cited, I need be in no Pain for

the Judgment he will pass on this Part of the Controversy ⁿ.

CHAP.

ⁿ The Reverend Mr. J. has a notable Objection to what has been offered in this Chapter. " Mr. Warburton and his Critic can never get off by pretending at last, that they meant only *that the Philosophers could not believe a future State consistently with their Notions of the human Soul*,—yet both the Authors have charged the Philosophers, with not believing a future State in absolute Terms, without any Reserve or Limitation. Now they pretend they meant only they could not believe it consistently with their Notions of the human Soul." p. 68.

The Man took it into his Head, that Mr. W. had a Hand in my Book; and therefore loads him with Part of the ill Language he bestows upon me. This is his *demonstrative Eloquence*. But now, fancying he finds me prevaricating, he is not content to charge me with this Crime, a very bad one indeed, but throws it upon Mr. Warburton likewise. This is his *distributive Justice*. But to come to the Fact.—" I cannot get off by pretending, that I meant only that the Philosophers could not believe a future State consistently with their Notions of the Soul." The Cloudiness of Head! the Corruption of Heart! with which long Controversy rewards us poor Disputants! My Point was to prove that the Greek Philosophers before Christ, DID NOT believe a future State. Amongst the various Arguments I employed to this Purpose, one was, That they COULD NOT believe it *consistently with the Notions of the human Soul*. And this, I here, made the Subject of a distinct Chapter. And now, for my Pains, am told, that I prevaricate; that I undertook to prove they *did not* believe absolutely; and at last it comes only to this, that they *could not* believe conditionally. Nay, that I pretend I all along meant this latter Proposition only. And yet, to prevent all Chicane in this very Chapter, I made a cautionary Declaration at the Beginning, Middle, and End of it, implying that the Argument in this Chapter, which was employed to shew, *that the Philosophers could not believe a future State consistently with their Notions of the Soul*, was confined to this Chapter. In short, I did every thing in my Power to authenticate this Declaration, except signing it before a public Notary.

The General Proposition, That these Philosophers disbelieved a future State *absolutely*, I endeavoured to support by
other

Of the Spinozism of the old Philosophers.

MR. Jackson, speaking of his Adversary, says, "So he has nothing to charge the Philosophers with, as the ground of their pretended

other Proofs: For which I refer Mr. Jackson to Chapters i. ii. iv. v. and vi. which too, I should have had no Occasion to remind him of, had he been of so ingenuous a Memory as to recollect, that I declared my Purpose was not so much to give any Sentiments of my own, as to shew the Weakness and Insufficiency of what he had advanced against the Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*. But to insinuate that an Adversary is endeavouring to change his Question, is so common an Art where he is not; and so reasonable a Cause of Complaint where he is, that it always meets with the Reader's Encompragement or Excuse. Mr. Jackson has a more than ordinary Claim to the latter. He is so intoxicated with Passion, that (as is usual when Mens Heads turn) he ascribes his own Inconstancy to his *opposite* Neighbour. And how subject he is to change, will not be now soon forgot by those who remember, that he has given it under his Hand, *that he never offered the future Renovations of the Stoics as a Proof that they believed another Life; but that he confined their Notion of a future State to the Period that intervenes between Death and the general Restoration. And that he never mentioned the Resurrection of the Soul into the first Cause as a State of Happiness, nor ever considered it in that View.* On the whole, let him not flatter himself that he has been able to make the least Change in me, or in any of my Opinions, except in what relate to himself. I took him, as his Friends gave him to me, for a Man of Learning, who possessed his Argument; for a Philosopher, who possessed himself; but I have found him as short in Knowledge, and weak in Reasoning, as he is impotent in Temper; striving to hide his Errors in Chicane, and his Chicane, in Insolence and ill Language. As to this Notion of the Soul, I hold with Dr. Sykes, and the old Philosophers spoken of in this Chapter, that it is clearly inconsistent with the Belief of a future State.

“ tended Unbelief of this Doctrine, (a future
 “ State) but only their Philosophy, which he
 “ calls

As to the Arguments alledged by Mr. *W.* to shew that the Philosophers in general disbelieved another Life; they stand, I think, as firm now, as they did in the Beginning of the Controversy. What the Gentleman had advanced, in order to weaken the Force of them, has been examin'd in the last Chapter; and, fond as he might once be of what he called his *Demonstration*, he will not, I dare say, refer us again to the Proofs, of which I have there given so large an Account.

But it may be asked, why did I employ so many Authorities to prove, that the Philosophers could not believe a future State *consistently with their Notion of the human Soul*. To this I reply, that Mr. *J.* and other Advocates of the Law of Nature, have carried their Pretensions in favour of the Philosophers very high. They not only undertake to *demonstrate*, that the Philosophers believed a future State, but insist withal, that their Notion of it was CONSISTENT WITH REASON. Now how could I more effectually expose the Folly and Rashness of this Assertion, than by shewing that they supposed the Soul to be really and properly a Part of God? On this Supposition it will be impossible to maintain a future State *consistently with the Principles of Reason*. For is it reasonable to suppose, that a Part of God will be really and actually punished?

However, our Author contends that here was no real *Inconsistency*: And to make good this, he takes it for granted that the Soul was always consider'd as a *mere Creature*; that it was supposed to have no *Immortality*, but what was derived from the good Pleasure and Will of God. And here one cannot but take Notice that the Gentleman has *Prudence* in his *Anger*; for notwithstanding the Rage and Fury which he betrays in every Page, he is yet too cautious to mention those Passages, which might serve to clear up the Point against him. I will just repeat three or four. *Tertullian*, speaking of *Plato*, says, *Tantum illi (animæ) concessit Divinitatem, ut Deo adæquetur.* — *Juxta Pythagoricorum dogmata*, says *Jerom*, *qui hominem exæquant Deo, & de ejus dicunt esse substantia.* I may safely appeal to any one, not heated by Mr. *Jackson's* Fire, whether the Soul in these Passages is not consider'd as something more than a *mere Creature*. As to the Nature of the *Immortality* which the Philosophers assigned the Soul, take the following Passages. *Vultis homines typhum istum superci-*

" calls metaphysical Whimsies concerning God
 " and the Soul, *merely because he does not under-*
stand

superciliumque deponere, qui deum vobis adsciscitis patrem,
 & cum eo contenditis *immortalitatem habere vos unam?*

Et qui poterit territari formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit
 persuasum, *tam se esse immortalem quam ipsum deum primum;*
 nec ab eo judicari quicquam de se posse, cum sit *una immorta-*
litas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis possit aequa-
litate vexari?

But our Author goes on: " If it could be proved that the
 " Philosophers held something, in their Notions of the Soul,
 " that was really inconsistent with a future State of Happiness
 " and Misery, or even with a future Existence; would it
 " follow that they *who did not see or own this Inconsistency*, did
 " not believe a future State?" p. 60.

To this I reply, 1st, All I am *here* concerned to prove is,
 that there was something in their Notions of the Soul *really*
inconsistent with the Belief of a future State. That they *actu-*
ally saw this Inconsistency, is not the Point I am here upon;
 I am not endeavouring to shew, *in this Chapter*, that the Phi-
 losophers *did not*, or *could not* believe a future State *absolutely*,
 but only, that they could not believe it *consistently with their*
Notions of the human Soul.

2. The Gentleman affirms, without the least Hesitation,
 " That the Philosophers did not see or own this Inconsistency."
 But this is his way; 'tis his old Rout of Controversy, to ad-
 vance without Proof; and to conceal without Shame, what-
 ever makes for him or against him; otherwise he might have
 told us, that *Justin Martyr*, speaking of the Philosophers,
 says, " Some of them holding the Soul to be *incorporeal* and
 " *immortal*, did not *conceive* that they should be *punished* for
 " their wicked and immoral Actions; for that a Substance
 " which was not corporeal, must of course be incapable of
 " suffering, and a Substance, *which was immortal*, must be
 " *independent of God.*" And I dare say, his Reader would
 require no clearer Proof that several of the Philosophers *ac-*
tually saw and owned this Inconsistency. But to conclude, the
 candid Reader, who has no Interest to pervert and misrep-
 resent my Meaning, will easily see that I have only been endea-
 vouring to prove that the Philosophers Notion of the Soul was
 really inconsistent with the Belief of another Life. Whether
 they did, or did not, see this Inconsistency, is another Point.
 It appears, from the Testimony of the Fathers, that several
 did see and acknowledge it.

Mr. J. says, some ancient Christians held the Soul to be of
 the *same Substance with God*, and yet maintained a future
 State. To say nothing at present as to the Fact on which he
 grounds his Argument, I shall only tell him that this Instance

"stand it". I meet with nothing here but hard Words: Which, for want of a better Name, one may call, *Mr. Jackson's Logic*. One of the Whimsies charged upon the Philosophers by Mr. Warburton, is, that they maintained the *Soul* to be strictly and properly a *Part of God*. I do not find that his learned Adversary undertakes to confute the several Arguments alledged by him, in Support of this Charge: And with good Reason; for there can, I think, be no Question, but that this Principle, 'impious and detestable as it is, was really held by the ancient Sages.

To confirm this, I shall not go thro' the Opinions of the several Sects, but content myself with a few Remarks on one or two of the greatest Importance. We have already seen what the Fathers thought of this Matter; and what follows will not only serve to vindicate the Author of the *Divine Legation*, but *the Fathers themselves*, who, we now see, are equally involved with him in this Charge.

We find that the Works given to *Hermes* abound with the most gross and rank Spinozism^b: "The Soul is not *cut off* from the divine Substance, but is, as it were, a *Diffusion* or *Extension* of him." I shall transcribe another Passage as I find it in *Cudworth*, wherein God is said to be all things, not only *actual* but *possible*. "For what shall I praise thee? because I am does not come up to the Point in Question. For could these Christians espouse these two Notions *consistently* with themselves, or *consistently* with common Sense? This very *Consistency* is the single Point I am here disputing.

Pag. 8. of his *late Defence*, he says, "some Christians held "the Soul to be of the *same Nature and Substance with God*; "and that they took this Notion from the *Philosophers*." Does he not here plainly suppose that the Soul, in the Opinion of these last, was truly and properly a *Part of God*? With what Face then does he pretend that it was considered as a *mere Creature*; that it was not held to be *necessarily immortal*, and *ungenerated*?

^a Mr. Jackson's Defence, p. 7, 8.

^b Ο υς εκ εις αποτετμημένος της υσιότητος τς θες, αλλ' ως περ επλωμένος καθαρτς το τς ηλις φως.

“ my own as having something proper and distinct from Thee? Thou art whatsoever I am; thou art whatsoever I do or say; for thou art all things, and there is nothing which thou art not. Thou art that which is made, and thou art that which is not made.” In the same Place, before things were made, God is said to *contain and hide them within himself*: When they are made, he is said to *reveal and manifest them from himself*.

Here then I appeal to every Reader, whether it be possible for Testimonies to be more explicate and precise than these. I am sure this Notion is not express'd by any modern Spinozist in more plain, positive, and direct Terms than it is here. Let it be remembered too that these Books, according to *Jamblicus*^d, speak the *Language of the Philosophers*; and then, I think, it cannot be denied but that Spinozism must be ranked amongst the Principles of the old *Grecian Sages*, and, from thence, plainly transfused into the following Lines, without losing any thing of its Force or Energy.

Quicquid est hoc, omnia animat, format, alit,
auget, creat,

SEPELIT RECIPITQUE IN SESE OMNIA, OMNI-
umque idem est Pater:

Indidemque eademque oriuntur de integro, at-
que eodem occidunt^e.

^c *Intellectual System*, p. 347. 1st Ed. This too is the Language of the famous *Asclepias* Dialogue. *Nonne hoc dixi omnia unum esse, & unum omnia? utpote quia in Creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia. Nec immerito unus est dictus omnia, cujus membra sunt omnia.*

Idcirco non erant, quando nata non erant; sed in eo jam tunc erant, unde nasci habuerunt. *Apuleius*, p. 582. 594. Ed. Par.

^d De Mysteriis

^e De Divin. l. i. c. 57.

We

We are told here that all things will be lodged and buried in God, or the universal Substance; and that they will afterwards emerge and rise out of it again. The very Language of the Books of *Hermes*,—there God is said to *bide* things within himself, and here, *Sepelit recipitque in sese omnia*. If then the Books of *Hermes* are supposed to contain the rankest Spinozism^f, and one of the more sensible Writers against the *Divine Legation* readily allows that they do contain it, it will be difficult to shew that the Doctrine of these Verses is orthodox and innocent in this Point.

When *Cicero* has given us the Lines above-cited, he immediately subjoins, *Quid est igitur, quum domus sit omnium una, quumque animi hominum semper fuerint, futurique sint, cur ii, quid ex quoque eveniat, & quid quamque rem significat, perspicere non possint?* He here declares that the Soul was strictly and properly eternal; and he declares it to be strictly and properly so, in Consequence of the Doctrine laid down in these Verses. What then was this Doctrine? Why, that the Soul was taken originally from God. And if it was declared to be eternal *a parte ante*, in Consequence of this, we may be certain that it was understood to be taken from God in the most exact and proper Sense.

The following Passage will furnish some very

^f Bott's *Answer to the Divine Legation*, p. 227.—*Deum esse aliquo modo omnia, multoties & multifariam innuunt Platonici: & per Emanationes vel Irradiationes sui mundum produxisse. Crediderunt veteres cujuscunque ordinis, quantum mihi constant, ex nihilo nihil fieri, neque aliquid in nihilum reverti posse.—quasi ante mundum ortum, aut post ultimam abolitionem, non essent prorsus nihil rerum essentia, sed haberent semper suum modum subsistendi in natura divina, licet sine omni distinctione Individuorum.* Burnet. *Archæol. Phil.* c. vii.

plain and conclusive Proofs, in Support of this Charge against the Philosophers. Pythagoras qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnium intentum & commeanem, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi & lacerari Deum. Et cum miseri animi essent, quod plerisque contingeret, tum Dei partem esse miseram, quod fieri non potest. Cur autem quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus ? It is hardly in the

§ Cicero de N. D. l. i. c. 11. On these Words in Cicero Mr. J. thus remarks, " Any one at first Sight may see that " this is the Reasoning of a Man who neither fear'd nor car'd " what he said, in order to disparage the Opinions of other " Sects.—He is no other than an *impudent Epicurean*, call'd " *Velleius* in Cicero." p. 54, 55. Called *Velleius* in Cicero ! By this it appears our great Critic thought *Velleius* to be a fictitious Character. But the Observation is, that no Body but an *impudent Epicurean* would have put this Interpretation on the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*. And yet this very candid and learned Man could not but know, that St. *Austin* had charged this very Opinion with a Consequence quite as *impious* and *absurd*, as this press'd upon it by *Velleius*. De ipso rationali animante, i. e. homine, quid infelicius credi potest, quam Dei partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat ? Jam vero partes Dei fieri lascivas, iniquas, impias, atque omnino damnabiles, quis ferre possit nisi qui prorsus insanit ? Postremo, quid irascitur iis a quibus non colitur, cum a suis partibus non colatur : De C. D. iv. 12, 13. It seems then St. *Austin* too was an *impudent* Writer, who neither fear'd nor car'd what he said, in order to disparage the Opinions of other Men. But to save his dear Philosophers, we see, he will give up his very Fathers. The learned *Dacier* was far from any Thought of *disparaging* the System of the *Stoics* ; he was indeed a warm and zealous Admirer of the Sect ; and yet he presses them with an Objection of much the same kind. Animam divini spiritus portiunculam, ejusdemque prorsus naturæ autumabant Stoici ; tanquam Deus ipse a partibus diversis constare possit, aut in plura dividi sustineret ens omnium perfectissimum, & usquequaque simplex. In *Antonin.* ii. 1.

Bayle was very sensible that this Passage was delivered by *Velleius*, and yet he often appeals to it, as containing a fair and impartial Explanation of the Doctrine of *Pythagoras*. Le mal est que *Pythagoras* en se representant Dieu comme le moteur de l'Univers et l'ame du monde, vouloit, que nos ames

the Power of Language to speak in a more accurate and precise manner. Non vidit distractione humanorum animorum *discerpi & lacerari Deum.*

How

fulsent des portions de Dieu. L'objection qu' on lui propose là dessus dans Cicéron est insoluble. *Dis. PYTHAGORAS R. N.*

Mr. J. affirms in his last Piece, " that some Christian Writers thought the human Soul to be of the *same Nature and Substance with God*; and that they took this Notion from the *Doctrine of the Pagan Philosophers* " p.8. Does he not here suppose the very Thing asserted by *Velleius*, viz. that, in the Opinion of the old Philosophers, the Soul was truly and properly a Part of God?

Dr. Sykes in his *Connexion of natural and revealed Religion*, often charges *Pythagoras* with holding this Notion; and that in Consequence of this very Passage from *Cicero*. Is he too, at first Sight, to be adjudged an impudent Writer, who neither feared nor cared what he said?

One Part of *Velleius's* Objection is, Cur autem ignoraret quidquam animus hominis, si esset Deus. There is nothing more objected here than what the Philosophers themselves were ready to acknowledge and assert. It was supposed that the Soul *knew all things*, however this Knowledge might be clogged and obscured by means of the Body to which it was united. Animus — qui quia vixit ab omni æternitate, versatusque est cum innumerabilibus animis, omnia, quæ in natura rerum sunt, videt, si modo temperatis escis modicisque potionibus ita est adfectus, ut sopito corpore ipse vigilet. *Cicero de Div. i. 51.* What is there more in the Words of *Velleius* just mentioned, than what is expressly affirmed in this Passage of *Cicero*? And if the Philosophers were gross enough to assert the last Part of the Objection, why must we suppose that they could not swallow and digest the two first?

But it is not difficult to shew, even on Mr. J's own Principles, that this was the very Doctrine of *Pythagoras*. He allows that the Soul, according to *Pythagoras*, was taken from another Substance. The Question then is, what Substance this was. Audiebam *Pythagoram*, *Pythagoreosque* — nunquam dubitasse, quin ex universa mente divina delibatos animos haberemus. *Cicero de Senect. 21.* Mr. J. allows that the Soul was taken out of another Substance; *Cicero* tells us, that this Substance was the *Anima Mundi*, or universal Soul; and what would we have more? Will he say that *Cicero* mistook the Substance, out of which the Soul was taken? If not, why does not the Word *delibatus*, when used by *Cicero*, imply the same as *lacerari*, when employ'd by *Velleius*? But, what is best, *Velleius* agrees with our Author himself in this Point

How could the Deity be supposed to be *mangled* and *torn* by the Dissection of the human Soul, if the Soul was not held to be a Particle or Portion of him in the most rigorous and strict Sense? *Et cum miseri animi essent, tum Dei partem esse miseram.* How absurd and ridiculous must this Objection have appeared, if the Soul had been called a Portion of the Deity, only in a metaphorical and figurative Sense, as created by him? *Cur autem quidquam ignoraret animus hominis, si esset Deus?* Here a divine Attribute is ascribed to the human Soul, in Consequence of the Opinion, which declares it to be a Part of God.

We will go now to *Plato* and his Followers. *Plutarch* explains their Doctrine in the following manner. "The Soul is not so much the *Work* and *Production*, of God, as a *Part* of him;—nor is it made *by* him, but *from* him, and *out* of him." Let us attend to the first Part.—"The Soul is not so much the *Work* and *Production* of God, as a *Part* of him." If it was called a Part of God only in a figurative or popular Sense, why might it not have been considered as the mere *Work and Production* of God? Nay, how could it have been considered other-

Point. For what does this last say of *Pythagoras* and *Plato*? Why, "they speak of the human Soul, as congenial with and Part of the divine Substance: Not of the supreme God, but of the *universal and mundane Soul*." p. 57, 8. And does not *Velleius* make it Part of this same *universal Soul*? where then is the Difference between these two great Men? Will then our Author recal his soul Language, or own that he neither fears nor cares what he says, in order to disparage the Opinions of others?

Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἐκ σπέρματος τοῦ θεοῦ γίγνεται, καὶ ἀναμειγνύεται ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ' ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται. *Platonice Quaestiones*, Ed. Xyl. p. 1001.

wife? For figurative Expression relates not to the *Nature of Things*, but only to the *Mode of conveying our Ideas*. When therefore it is called a *Part* of God, and, on that very Account, opposed to the *Works and Productions* of God, what Way have we to understand the Phrase but as strictly literal?—Let us come now to the second Part: “It was not made *by* him, but *from* him, and *out of* him.” Is not God here represented as the *material Cause*, *out of which* the Soul is formed? And does not this necessarily imply that the human Soul was really and properly a *Part* of God?

Philo, a Man all over *Platonized*, speaking of the Excellence and Perfections of the human Soul, declares that it could not have possessed these great Talents, “unless it had been a Portion of the divine Soul; but such a Portion as could not be *separated* and *divided* from it. For no Part of the divine Nature is *cut off by Division*, but is only *diffused* and *extended*. Wherefore the Soul, *sharing the Perfections of the divine Nature*, launches out into the Universe, and does not confine itself within any Bounds.” Let us attend to this Passage: “But such a Portion, as could not be *separated* and *divided* from it.” Why does he talk of *Separation* and *Division*, but to imply that the Soul was really and properly a *Part* of God? “It was not *cut off* from, but was only an *Extension* of the divine Substance.” Does not this Language suppose it to be a *Part* of God? It is indeed the very Language of the Books of

ⁱ Εἰ μὴ τῆς θείας καὶ εὐδαιμονοῦς ψυχῆς ἐκείνης ἀποσπασμα ἦν ὃ διαίρετον· τεμεῖται γὰρ ὕδωρ τῇ θεῷ κατ’ ἀκέρησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκτείνεται· διὸ μεμορσάμενος τῆς ἐν τῷ παντὶ τελειότητος, &c. Quod det. poti. infid. soleat. p. 172.

Hermes; and these, I think, are allowed to contain the rankest Spinozism. Lastly, the Soul is said to *share* the divine Perfections, in Consequence of this very Doctrine.

Plotinus tells us ^k, “ that our Soul is of *the same Species* with the Soul of the Universe. “ That if we view it, as it is in itself, stripped and “ divested of every thing foreign to it, we shall “ find that it equally deserves our *Veneration* “ and *Esteem*.”

Alcinous says, “ The Souls of Men and the “ Universe do both partake of the *same Mission*!”

Stobæus, speaking of *Numenius*, *Plotinus*, and *Porphyrius*, explains their Doctrine of the Soul, and then adds, “ According to this Opinion the “ Soul does not really differ from the Mind, the “ Gods, and the celestial Natures; as to its Nature and Substance ^m.”

Another of the Followers of *Plato* declared, “ that the Soul *had the same Substance* with “ God ⁿ.”

It

^k Enn. I. i. c. 12. ΟΜΟΕΙΔΗΣ και ημετέρα, και οταν ανω των προσελδοντων σκοπης ευρησιν το αυτο τιμιον ο η ψυχη. *Le Clerc*, speaking of the *Platonists*, says, *Ils ont aussi souvent des Expressions peu exactes, comme quand Plotin dit, que nos ames sont de la même espece que l'ame du monde, qui est seulement leur sœur ainée. C'est confondre la Créature avec le Créateur, & ouvrir la porte à l'Idolatrie.* *Bibliothèque Choisie*, tome iii. p. 94. What this learned Critic means by *peu exacte*, amounts to no more than that their Notions do not agree with his: Tho' the Words insinuate that they did not express their own meaning with Precision; which (whatever he might think) was not the Case.

^l *Stanley's Lives of the Philosophers*, p. 190. 1st Ed.

^m *Phyl Ec.* p. 108. Κατα δη ταυτην εν και ΘΕΩΝ και των κρειττονων γενων εδεν η ψυχη διειρηχε, ΚΑΤΑ ΓΕ ΤΗΝ ΟΛΗΝ ΟΙΣΙΑΝ.

ⁿ *Theodorus Asinæus*, inter *Platonicos non obfcurus Philosophus*,

It appears from these Passages, that the Soul was supposed to be of the very same Nature and Substance with God himself. It must therefore either have been conceived to be a Part of him, or a separate and distinct Substance, equal to him. But Mr. Jackson himself insists that they did not hold any separate and distinct Substance to be equal with God^o; and therefore, by his Leave I would conclude, that they believed the Soul to be a Part of him.

The Reader will not be displeased to see this Reasoning confirm'd by almost as able a Judge of Antiquity, as Mr. Jackson. *Intelliges rursus quo sensu Plato voluerit, discere nihil aliud esse, quam reminisci; nempe quatenus anima mundi est omniscia, & quælibet ejus particula, tanquam homogenea, ejusdemque conditionis cum tota, omniscia similiter est: Tametsi quo momento demergitur in Corpus, obfuscetur & quasi lethæum bibens*

sophus, animam humanam Deo ipsi ΟΜΟΟΥΣΙΟΝ esse voluit. *Gale's Preface to Jamblichus de Mysteriis.*

Proclus (in Theologia Platonica, libro et capite primo) highly extols one Theodorus. Upon which Fabricius observes, Theodorum Asinæum puto a Proclo innui, quem sæpe laudat commentariis in Timæum. Græc. Bibl. vol. iv. Jamblichus et famâ et eruditione proximus fuit Theodorus Asinensis, cujus crebro meminit Proclus in Timæum: qui eum Ἰσραὴν, hoc est, virum egregium et magnum, sæpius autem Δαμασκον, sive admirandum, veluti peculiari cognomine appellat. Porphyrii discipulum fuisse ex Damascio didici; qui in Isidori vita de admirando ejus profectu sic scribit, α γὰρ ἐκιδιδουαι παδιν, ἐδ' ἡ αὐξιοδαὶ κατὰ πηχυν, ὡς πρὶς Θεόδωρον ὁ Ασιναιὸς νυκτὶν ὑπὸ τῷ Πορφύριῳ. Neque facile erat crescere, et ad cubitos proficere; quemadmodum Theodorus Asinens. sub Porphyrio profecit. Holstenius de vita et scriptis Porphyrii, c. vi. As the Testimony of this ancient Writer is very explicite and precise with regard to the present Question, I thought it might not be improper to shew, that he was a Man of considerable Name and Character; and highly esteemed among the old Philosophers.

• Page 8. of his Defence.

poculum,

poculum, obliviscatur omnia, variè deinceps per sensus excitanda, & in memoriam revocanda^p. To the Testimony of *Gassendi*, I shall just add that of *Sigonius*; speaking of some old Philosophers, he says, Quorum opinio constans fuit, demitti animos e cœlo, divinæque mentis eos esse non solum munus, sed etiam *partem* præcipuam ac *propriam*. "The Soul is not only a Gift of God, but even a Part of him." If the last part of the Sentence be not understood in the most literal and strict Sense, the former Part can be understood in no Sense at all: For it is evident that the Soul may very properly be said to be *only* a Gift of God, if it be *not* really and properly a Part of him. I need not say that I take the Passage, just recited, from the Piece going under the Title of *Consolation*, which we commonly see in the Collection of *Cicero's* Writings.

These Passages are surely very much to the Purpose, if any thing can be to the Purpose that is urged against a favourite Hypothesis. It would be endless to run through the several Arguments and Authorities, that might be produced in Favour of the Doctrine here supported. But enough surely has been said in Answer to the Little, the *Nothing*, I may say, that has hitherto been brought against this Part of the *Divine Legation*. For what, after all, has Mr. *Jackson* given us on this Point? Has he fairly examined any single Reason or Testimony alledged by his learned Adversary? No, not one; all he gives is the Ribaldry of ill Language. He charges Mr. *Warburton* with giving this Account of the old Philosophy, *merely because he did not understand it*. But what will the learned Gentleman say to

^p Gassendus in l. x. Diogenis Laertii, p. 551.

Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, and the other numerous Authorities abovementioned? Will he say that they too were all pure Smatterers in Learning? That they were not versed in the Schools of the ancient Philosophers of Greece and Italy? That they charged the old Systems with these Principles, purely because they did not understand them?

But 'tis now time to examine what the learned Gentleman has said in his *late Defence*, in opposition to the several Arguments which have been produced in this Chapter. Why, here he resolves to make short Work with me, and observes, with his usual Acuteness, that one single Distinction will serve to confute and overturn all I have here said. "After all, the Philosophers
 " did not think the human Soul was Consu-
 " stantial, or of the same Nature and Substance
 " with the supreme God; *which cuts the Sinews*
 " *of all Mr. Warburton's and his Critic's Demon-*
 " *stration on this Head*; they cannot prove it of
 " any of them out of their own Writings." p. 66. I told you before what he was able to do with his Distinctions. This before us is of his own native Growth, made up of half *Fallacy* and half *Blunder*. The *Fallacy* lies in this Part of the Assertion, "That I cannot prove the human
 " Soul was thought by the Philosophers Con-
 " substantial with the supreme God, *out of their*
 " *own Writings.*" Now almost all the Writings of the first Philosophers on this Subject are lost; and our best Accounts of it are from their Successors and Historians; and these, we see, he would shuffle away, and have pass for nothing. However, enough is left of their own Writings to do his Business.

Rode

Rode caper vitem : tamen hinc, cum stabis ad
aram,

In tua quod spargi cornua possit, erit.

The *Blunder* is in this, that, because the Philosophers supposed the Soul to be Part of the *Anima Mundi*, and some of them thought the *Anima Mundi* not the supreme God, that is, not the first Person in the Godhead, therefore the Philosophers did not suppose the Soul to be Part of the supreme God. But he should have known, what shall be presently taught him, that several of the Philosophers did hold the *Anima Mundi* to be the supreme God. This being premised, we now come a little closer to this *Sinew-cutter* of Demonstrations, who yet has neither the Force nor Skill of a Corn-cutter.

He says, *I cannot prove that any of the Philosophers, out of their own Writings, believed the Soul was of the same Nature and Substance with the supreme God.* Mr. W. had saved me this Labour long ago. Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere qui DEI PARS EST? Totum hoc quo continemur, & unum est & Deus: & socii ejus sumus & membra. *Seneca.* "The Souls of Men have the nearest Relation to GOD, as being PARTS or FRAGMENTS of him, decerpt and torn from his SUBSTANCE." *Epiſtetus.* See *Div. Leg.* iv. p. 428. These are both *Stoics*; and we know, that Sect held the *Anima Mundi* to be the supreme God. But without knowing this, their very Expression necessarily implies them to be speaking of the supreme God. But what is above all, the great Mr. *Jackson* himself says it, as we shall see presently.

I was some time puzzled to guess what it should be that could make him take all this Pains to prove, that human Souls were conceived

to be Parts of the *Anima Mundi* only, or universal Soul. But it seems he wants to *ungod* this *Anima Mundi*, and so bring in his Conclusion, *that the Soul was not Part of God*, at a back Door. But *Virgil* stands in his Way; who, tho' a Poet, yet deals less in Fiction than our severe Philosopher. He says,

*Deum namque ire per omnes
Terrasque tractusque maris, coelumque profundum.*
Geor. iv.

Varro confirms the same, as appears from a Passage cited in this Book: *Hi soli Varroni videntur animadvertisse quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem. August. De Civ. Dei, iv. 9.*

Dicit idem *Varro*, adhuc de naturali Theologia præloquens DEUM SE ARBITRARI ESSE ANIMAM MUNDI. l. vii. c. 6.

But now comes in the unlucky Part of the Story. Here we see he boldly affirms *that the Anima Mundi was not considered as God*. Yet no longer since than the writing his first Pamphlet he asserts, that the *Anima Mundi* was supposed to be the supreme God. These are his very Words,—“ And it was the received ancient Notion of the Deity, *That the supreme God was the universal Soul*, which comprehended and sustained all Nature. This was the old Egyptian Doctrine of the Deity, which *Orpheus, Homer, Thales, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato*, and the ancient *Stoics* learned in *Egypt* and propagated amongst the *Greeks* and *Latins*.”

p. 83.

¶ In this Passage we are told that God and the Soul of the World, in the Opinion of *Plato*, were one and the same. And yet we meet with a very different Account of this Matter in ancient Writers. *Cyrril* tells us in very plain and direct

p. 83. When this was wrote the *Soul of the World* was the *supreme God*. But standing in the Way of this Putter up and Puller down of Systems, it is now *no God at all*. A strange Revolution

Terms, "That the supreme God and the Good were said to be the same. That *Mind* was supposed to proceed from him, and was reckoned the *second* God, and that the Soul of the World was supposed to be the *third* God." ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΑΙΤΙΟΝ—ΤΑΥΤΟ ΔΕ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΦΑΣΙ Τ' ΑΓΑΘΟΝ. ΕΞ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΓΕ ΜΗΝ ΓΙΝΩΣΚΑΙ ΝΟΥΝ, —ΟΙ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΥΣΙ ΘΕΟΝ—ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΑ ΤΑΞΕΙ ΤΩ ΠΡΩΤΟΥ ΚΑΤΑΛΟΓΙΖΟΝΤΑΙ. ΚΑΙ ΜΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΡΙΤΗΝ ΛΟΓΟΠΟΙΟΥΣΙ ΤΩ ΚΟΣΜΩ ΨΥΧΗΝ. Cyril. contra Julianum. Ed. Spanh. p. 270. vid. too p. 147. *Porphyrus* too plainly distinguishes between the supreme God and the Soul of the World: Ο ΜΗΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΘΕΟΣ—ΧΡΗΣΙΝ ΨΕΥΔΟΥΣ ΤΩΝ ΕΞΩΘΕΝ, ΩΣΠΕΡ ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ. Ε ΜΕΛΩ Ε Δ' ΗΤΩ ΚΟΣΜΟΥ ΨΥΧΗ. De Abstinencia, ii. 37.

But positive as our Author is here, that the Soul of the World and the supreme God were, according to the System of *Plato*, one and the same; yet within the Distance of no more than one Page he himself declares, "That the Notion of an Unity and Mind, *superior to the universal Soul*, seems to have been the PECULIAR Conceit of *Plato* and his Followers." p. 85. What strange Shuffling and Inconsistency! How, Sir! did *Plato* hold the universal Soul to be the *supreme God*, and yet did he and his Followers hold an Unity and Mind *superior* to it?

But, what's still worse, he represents the *Stoics* as maintaining the same supreme God with *Plato* himself; tho' the contrary be as evident from Antiquity, as any thing can well be. *Origen*, speaking of the *Greek Philosophers*, declares, "That they suppose the whole World to be a God; some of them, as THE STOICS, MAKE IT THE FIRST GOD. As to the Followers of *Plato*, some of them affirm it to be the *second*, and some the *third* God." ΣΑΦΩΣ ΔΕ ΤΟΝ ΟΛΟΝ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ ΛΕΓΕΣΘΕΝ ΕΙΝΑΙ ΘΕΟΣ. ΣΤΟΙΚΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΤΟΝ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ. ΟΙ Δ' ΑΠΟ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΔΕΥΤΕΡΟΝ. ΤΙΝΕΣ Δ' ΑΥΤΩΝ ΤΟΝ ΤΡΙΤΟΝ. Con. Cel. l. v. p. 235. Ed. Spen. Thus we see whatever he affirms or denies, as he does it to serve a present Occasion, he is, as may be expected, when his Purpose is not to represent Antiquity but his own Fancies about it, constantly in the wrong. Before I dismiss this Article, I cannot but take Notice that some Fatality surely must attend our Author, whenever he undertakes the Question of a *Trinity*. We have seen long since in what Manner he thought fit to interpret the sacred and primitive Writers

volution in the intellectual World! But all must bow before the Throne of this *Prince of Space*.

C H A P.

on this Subject; but they, whose View the Clouds and Darkness of that Controversy intercept, may form a near Judgment of his Exploits by what they see of him in this.

But to come to his other Objections. "Our Critic (says he) in his seventh Chapter undertakes to prove the old Philosophers to be Spinozists. His two principal Authorities are a Passage from *Cicero*, and another from *Plutarch*." p. 54. But why *principal*? Only, I suppose, because he thought them most manageable. I have already answered his Objections against the first; and as to *Plutarch*, he tells me, "I must allow that *Plutarch's* is a crude Representation of *Plato's* Opinion; who certainly never thought the human Soul to be a Part of the one supreme God in any Sense whatsoever." p. 58. Need I desire my Adversary in a worse Case than to be reduced to say, that *Plutarch* is a CRUDE REPRESENTER of *Plato's* Opinion? But his Reason for this Censure is admirable. For *Plato* certainly never thought the human Soul to be a Part of the one supreme God. The Question is whether he did think so. *Plutarch* is brought to prove it; and *Plutarch* is disproved, because *Plato* did not think so. And this is called Reasoning. One would call it *begging* the Question, but that he does every thing with so high a Hand, that shews him readier to steal than beg. At least we must reckon him amongst the *sturdy Beggars*. But I will suppose him to have a Reason for what he says, (one of the least likely Suppositions I could make) and, that he said, *Plutarch* talked crudely, and that *Plato* did not think the Soul Part of the supreme God, because this same *Plutarch* in another Place says, that, according to the System of *Plato*, the Soul of Man was of the same Nature and Kind with the Soul of the Universe. Πυθαγορας, Πλάτων, αθάνατον είναι την ψυχήν. εξίστην γὰρ εἰς τὸ τοῦ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΨΥΧΗΝ ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ΟΜΟΓΕΝΕΣ. De Placitis, iv. 7. Now he had taken it into his Head, that this Soul of the Universe was not God, or not the supreme God. But he mistakes the Matter. The *Stoics* who held but one Person in the Deity, held the universal Soul to be the supreme God; and the *Platonists*, who held three, supposed the universal Soul to be one of them. The good or supreme was reckoned the first; the Mind the second; and the Soul of the World the third. Hence the Author of the *Divine Legation* says, "The Maintainers of the Immateriality of the divine Substance were likewise divided into two Parties; the first of which held

C H A P. IX.

That the Doctrine of another Life was delivered in the Mysteries in the most fabulous and gross Manner.

LET us proceed:—The learned Author in the next Passage says, “ And yet he allows that these Philosophers constantly professed their “ Belief

“ held but one Person in the Godhead, the other two or three; “ so that as the former believed the Soul to be Part of the “ supreme God, the latter believed it to be Part only of the “ second or third *Hypostasis*. vol. i. p. 418. So that we see the *Anima Mundi*, from whence the Philosophers took the human Soul, its not being held the supreme God by some, amounts to no more than that it was not the first Person in the Deity.

Page 58. he says, “ What signifies all our Critic has been “ arguing in his sixth and seventh Chapters, that the Philosophers neither did nor could believe a future State? ” Had he only read the very *Title Page* of the Book he undertakes to answer, he would have seen that the Doctrine establish'd in this Chapter, is very much to my Purpose, though it may not prove that the Philosophers disbelieved another Life. I proposed to *inquire into their Nations concerning the Soul and a future State*; what therefore could be more to my Purpose, than the several Testimonies which I have here urged, in order to illustrate and explain the Sentiments of the old Philosophers on the *first Point*?

However, as our Author has wrote *three Pamphlets* without ever coming to the Question, I will now shew him in three Sentences where the principal Difficulty lies. If then the Philosophers held that the Soul was really and actually a Part of God, discerped and taken from him in the most literal and strict Sense: If it was again to be *insus'd* and *resolved* into the Substance from which it was originally taken; will it not, on this Supposition, be necessary to conclude, that the Soul, after its Resufion, was to lose its separate and distinct Existence, and return to the very same State and Condition, in which it was before it was taken from the *Anima Mundi* or God?

“ Belief of this Doctrine, as well as the Legi-
 “ flators did ; and they had the fame Instructions
 “ concerning

What was the Instance which was commonly used to illustrate and explain this Notion ? Why, “ a Bottle filled with
 “ Sea Water, which swimming a while upon the Ocean, did,
 “ on the Bottle’s breaking, flow in again, and mingle with
 “ the common Mass.” Now on this Comparison could the Soul be supposed to retain a separate and distinct Existence, after it was blended and mingled with its parent Substance, any more than the Water, when, on the breaking of the Bottle, it flows again into the Ocean ?

And let me add, that the Case was exactly fimilar. In the Course of these Papers I have taken Occasion to examine the Doctrine of the *Stoics* on this Article. I have shewn by very clear and incontestable Authorities, that the Soul, after it was dissolved into the *Anima Mundi*, was no longer to have any peculiar and distinct Perception. It would be easy to shew the same with regard to *Pythagoras* and *Plato* themselves. And indeed as they held that the Soul was as truly and properly a Part of God or the *Anima Mundi*, as the *Stoics* themselves ; as they held too that it was to be resolved again into this same *Anima Mundi* or the Substance from which it was originally taken ; it is natural to imagine that the Resurrection, on their Scheme, was to be attended with the very same Consequences, as on that of the *Stoics*. It would not be difficult to confirm this by many very clear and exprefs Testimonies, did my Argument stand in need of them.

It was then of Importance to shew that the Soul was conceived to be of the very same Nature and Substance with God himself ; as this will be a fair Presumption that it was not to remain a separate and distinct Being, after it was resolved into the *Anima Mundi*. Much more might indeed be said for this separate and distinct Existence, had not the Soul been of the same Species with the *Anima Mundi* into which it was to be resolved. However, that all Personality was to be absorbed and lost by this means, is best proved by the several Authorities to which I just referred myself.

What then, after all, is the main Argument, by which the Author of the *D. L.* attempts to prove that the Philosophers did not believe a future State ? Why, ’tis because the Soul, on their Principles, was to be resolved into the *Anima Mundi*, and this Resurrection was supposed to be destructive of all personal and distinct Existence. And what does Mr. *J.* oppose to all this ? Why, he says, that the Philosophers talk of a State of
 Happiness

“ concerning God and the Soul in the Mysteries,
 “ as the Legislators had, who there learned the
 “ Truth

Happiness in *Heaven*; declare that the Souls of good Men are to return to God and celestial Beings, &c. and does not Mr. *Warburton* readily acknowledge all this? What then follows, from hence? Why, only that the Philosophers taught two Doctrines of a future State. One, according to which the Soul was to be absorbed and lost in the *Anima Mundi*; and another, on which it was to retain a separate and distinct Existence. The Question then returns, which I have had Occasion to ask so often, *viz.* Which was the public, which the private Doctrine? And here I need only refer myself to what has been advanced on this Point in the foregoing Part of these Papers. What was said of the *Stoics* in the fifth Chapter does equally hold with regard to the Philosophers of other Sects; and what has been alledged in Chapters ii, v, vi. may probably convince every candid and impartial Reader, that the Notion of future Happiness, for the Belief of which the learned Gentleman so zealously contends, was *merely popular*.

But to proceed. Mr. *J.* in order to amuse the Reader, and perplex the Argument, does all along charge me with saying, that the Soul could have no peculiar and distinct Existence in a future State, *purely because it was a Part of God or consubstantial with him.* p. 63, 64. And then arguing on this Supposition, he brings some Reasons and Instances to shew, that the Soul might be supposed to retain a particular Subsistence after Death, notwithstanding it was thought to be really and actually a Part of God. All this is very well. But if now the attentive Reader should ask him, Against whom he has been arguing, and for what End all this Expence of Logic? he would perhaps be puzzled for an Answer. For he has here to do, God knows, with no subtle Metaphysician, who can prove from the abstract Nature of *Refusion*, that there could be no *distinct Existence*; but with a plain Relater, tho' faithful Historian, of the Opinions of the *Greek Philosophers*: Of whom he ventures to affirm, that THEY UNDERSTOOD *this Refusion to take away all distinct Existence.* Now both the Mysteries of Metaphysics, and the Arts of Controversy are lost upon such an Adversary; who will neither go out of his Road, nor stay longer in it than is just necessary to set Truth in a fair Light. Therefore, according to the old Song, — *Put up your Trumpery, good noble Marquis.* If you would have any thing to say to me, it is your Business to prove one
 of

“ Truth of this Doctrine and believed it; and
 “ which was no other than a more rational Expli-
 “ cation

of these two things; either that *the Soul was not to be resolved into the Anima Mundi*, or that *this Refusion WAS NOT SUPPOSED to destroy its personal and distinct Existence.*

Again at p. 64. he says, “ If any CONSUBSTANTIALITY of the Soul, is inconsistent with a future State, it is, to *Demonstration*, equally inconsistent with the present State, or with any Subsistence at all. This I shew’d Mr. Warburton before, p. 72, 73. of my *Defence of the Jewish Revelation.*” But he must shew his *Demonstration* in another Light before Mr. Warburton will think himself concerned in it. For where is it that either he or I have said that any *Consubstantiality of the Soul with God was inconsistent with its future State, of distinct Existence.* Does Mr. Jackson think us such Idiots to deny that in one Case, which the most important Doctrine of our holy Religion has taught us to hold in another. Mr. W. and I believe, tho’ Mr. Jackson does not, that the Saviour of the World is *consubstantial* with the Father. And yet we have both the Grace and Sense to believe, that he had not only a distinct Existence here, but has it still likewise in Heaven. What occasioned this strange blundering Misrepresentation was our great Philosopher’s mistaking the Cause for the Effect; *Consubstantiality* for *Refusion*. For it must be confessed we both hold that the *Refusion at Death is inconsistent with a future State*: Now if he will undertake to demonstrate that *this is equally inconsistent with the present State*, Mr. Warburton, I dare say, will own, he will shew him something worth the seeing. In the mean time I have examined and explained at large the Sentiments and Principles of the Stoics concerning this Refusion. Mr. J. himself allows, that, according to their Reasoning, it was consider’d as the *Destruction of the Soul’s personal Subsistence*, p. 65, 66. But will the Gentleman infer from hence that this Notion of the Soul is *equally inconsistent with the present State, or with any Subsistence at all*? Is this evident to *Demonstration*, as our Author fondly imagines? If it is; why then our Author has demonstrated (how ready soever he may be to quarrel at the Term) not only that the Stoics disbeliev’d the particular Subsistence of the Soul in a future State, but even in the present; and, to use his own Words, that they disbelieved any *Subsistence of the Soul at all*. Now this, I apprehend, was not the Point, which he undertook to demonstrate in his first Piece.

But let him answer these plain Questions; if the Stoics might

" cation of it divested of Fable, than that which
 " was taught to the People ^a." He falsifies the
 Doctrine

^a Mr. Jackson's Defence, p. 8. 9.

might assign the Soul a separate Existence in the present State, and not in the future; why might not other Philosophers do the same? If the *Stoics* did not hold a separate and distinct Existence in this Life; how does it appear that the other Philosophers did hold one?

Again: "What, (says Mr. J.) if their metaphysical Notion of the Soul was not right or strictly Philosophical, &c." p. 59. Ay, so say I; what then? This concerns neither him nor me: Tho' he seems to think otherwise. But his chief Object in disputing is against *whom*, not against *what*, he answers. Otherwise he would have known, that both Mr. W. and I charged the Philosophers with this Opinion, not as it was *absurd or unphilosophical*, but as it *destroyed a future State*. I charge it upon them, that their Doctrine of the *Refusion* was actually *inconsistent* with all personal and distinct Subsistence; and what is more, that they themselves assert and contend for this very Inconsistency. *Antoninus* speaking of Death says, "You have hitherto existed as a Part (or have had a particular Subsistence) you will afterwards be absorbed and lost in the Substance, that produced you." To which one may add several other Passages produced in the fifth Chapter.

"I gave Mr. W. a Caution, says he, both of the Fallacy and Danger of drawing Consequences (*whether right or wrong*) from Men's speculative Opinions, &c." p. 69. I CAUTIONED HIM (says he)—*Satis pro imperio!* This Man's Caution is to pass for a Law; which whoever contemns is sure to be bespattered with his *Billinggate*. Like the Madman in *Don Quixote* to his Adversary, "I am Neptune, the God of the Seas, says he, and if you draw Consequences, *right or wrong*, against my Sovereignty, I will deluge the whole Town."—And so piss'd in his Face for a Sample. But that Caution, he gives his Adversary he would not take himself. For a small Degree of Attention would have shewn him, that his Adversary had charged no Consequences on the old Philosophers, but what they themselves maintain in very direct and express Terms. Of which, this the very Case of the *Refusion*, on which the whole Argument turns is a convincing Proof.

As to the Soul's being a Part of God, I did not touch upon what the *Stoics* thought of it, in this Chapter, taking it for granted

Doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; which says,
that the Legislators TAUGHT the Truth of this
Doctrine

granted that no Body would be hardy enough to assert their Orthodoxy, or maintain that they did not hold it. However, as Mr. J. in the Rage of Disputation, has pawn'd his Credit for them on this Head; and taken upon himself to clear them from so impious and absurd a Notion; I must beg leave to offer a few Remarks on this Head.

It may not be improper to premise that the *Stoics* were far more gross in their Conceptions of God and the Soul, than several of the other Sects: Some of which held four Elements of the material World, out of which all Things were supposed to draw their Being; but then they added to these a *fifth Essence or Nature*, intirely separate and distinct from them. And which was thought only to belong to God and the Soul. With regard now to this fifth Essence, the *Stoics* were far more gross than many of the old Philosophers, as they thought it to be only Fire.

Cum autem quæreretur res admodum difficilis, num quinta quædam natura videretur esse, ex qua ratio & intelligentia orirentur, in quo etiam de animis, cujus generis essent, quæreretur, Zeno id dixit esse ignem. Cicero de Fin. 1. ii.

2. Another thing asserted by the *Stoics* was, "That no thing could be made or formed out of nothing." This Maxim they understood in the gross *Epicurean* Sense. They held, in Consequence of this Principle, that all Beings must be formed out of Materials that existed before. They supposed that even the Deity could not make any thing out of nothing, or *create* in the strict and proper Sense of this Word; and therefore they assigned him Materials out of which Beings were to be made. The great *Cudworth*, fond as he was of vindicating the Credit of the old Philosophers on this very Point, allows that this was the Doctrine of the *Stoics*; expressly affirms that, on their Principles, "nothing was nor could be made by God, otherwise, than out of something pre-existing, as a Carpenter makes a House, or a Weaver a Piece of Cloth." p. 740.

3. Let us now see what they thought concerning the Soul and God. On their System the Universe or the World was supposed to be God. This World or God was indeed consider'd as an Animal, compounded of Soul and Body. The Soul was supposed to pervade and actuate all other Substances; and these other Substances or the several Systems of Matter were believed to constitute and form the Body of God. I need

Doctrine in the Mysteries, not that *they* LEARNED it there. But I shall concern myself only with the

need not go about to prove this, as Mr. J. himself seems to allow it. "The general Notion of the *Stoics* was, that God " was the Mind or Soul which was diffus'd thro' and actuated " all Things; as they supposed the Soul acted in the whole " human Body, so they thought the World was, as it were, " the Body of which God was the Soul." p. 67.

Cicero, speaking of *Chrysippus*, says, *Ait vim divinam in ratione esse positam, & universæ naturæ animo, atque mente: ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse, & ejus animi fusionem universam. De N. D. l. i.* Upon which the learned *Bayle* observes: On voit dans le Passage de *Cicéron* que j'ai rapporté un galimatias incompréhensible, & un caos plus confus que celui des poëtes: mais on ne laisse pas d'y voir clairement que selon *Chrysippe*, Dieu étoit l'ame du monde, & que le monde étoit l'extension universelle de cette ame. La conséquence nécessaire & inevitable de cela est que l'ame de l'homme est une portion de Dieu, &c. *Diſſion. CHRYSIPPUS. Rem. H.* Let me then ask, on this Supposition was not every Man and Animal, every Stock and Stone, as truly and properly a Part of God, as on the Notion and Hypothesis of *Spinoza* himself? How was it indeed possible that there should be any thing in this Case which was not really and actually a Part of God? But after all, what an extravagant, senseless, and gross Notion of the Divinity is this? It is indeed so extravagant and absurd, that the greatest Admirers of this Sect do sometimes speak of it with a proper Severity and Warmth. *Cæterum Stoici ita universum hoc Deum permeare, ut numen cum mundo unum ΥΠΟΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΝ constitueret; quod est a pietate Christianaque disciplina alienum. Gataker in Mar. Anton. l. iv. 40. De erroneo Stoicorum dogmate, quod Deum & mundum animalis instar anima & corpore confecti, in idem coalescere totum prodidit, alibi est dictum.*—And in another Place having described this very Doctrine of the *Stoics*, the learned Writer adds, *næ illi errorem errabant rectæ rationi nimium quantum abſimilem. Dacier in Anton. l. iv. 39, 21.*

4. In the foregoing Sheets we have said much of the *Stoical Renovations*; it has been shewn that Gods, Men, and all other Substances were to be resolved into the *Anima Mundi* or *supreme God* of this Sect, either before or at the general Conflagration; and that they were to issue and flow from him again at the general Restoration. I would ask then, were not the Souls of Men supposed to be so many Parts of God after their

the last Words. Therefore pray, Sir, where are your Authorities to prove this very extraordinary Fact?

their *Refusion*, or the time when they were dissolved into him? Must they not therefore be so many Parts of him when they issue and flow from him?

But, says Mr. Y. the Souls of Men were formed from the Body of God, and not from his Soul. P. 67. "God made or formed *all* things, as he will'd, out of this his *Body*; human Souls were formed from the *fiery Element*." So far then, tho' very unwillingly, we have brought him, that, according to the Principles of the *Stoics*, the Souls of Men were taken from the divine Substance; the only Question is, whether they were taken from the Soul or the Body of God; and the following Passages do, I think, necessarily confine us to the first: *Diogenes Laërtius*, explaining the Doctrine of the *Stoics*, says, Τινες (ψυχὴν) τῶν ὅλων, ἀθάνατον, ἢ ΜΕΡΗ Εἶναι τὰς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις, l. vii. § 156. Τὴν ψυχὴν δι' ὅλα τὰ κοινὰ διῃκεῖν. ἢ ΜΕΡΟΣ μετεχούσας ἡμᾶς ψυχεσθαι, *Hermias* in *Irris. Philos.* He there gives this as the Doctrine of *Cleanthes*.

5. "There is *only one Soul*, says *Antoninus*, *divided* amongst all irrational Animals; *one* intellectual Soul is *divided* amongst all reasonable Beings. As one Earth is common to all terrestrial Beings; as we all see by the same Light, and breathe one and the same Air." ix. 8. Again, "There is only one common Light of the Sun, tho' it be intercepted by Walls, Mountains, and a Thousand other Objects. There is but one common Substance, tho' separated and divided into an infinite Number of Bodies. There is but one Soul, tho' *divided* into several particular Natures. There is but *one* common intellectual Soul, *though it seem to be divided*." l. xii. 30. Why does he talk of this seeming or real *Division*, but to furnish and supply Souls to the several Individuals? And does not this *Division* imply that these several Souls must be the very particular and individual Parts of the *Anima Mundi*, or God himself?

Vossius understood this Doctrine of the *Stoics* in the very Sense I have here given. Eadem illustremus Stoicorum placitis; quibus natura est ingens animal, utroque sexu præditum. Prius igitur docebo, Stoicis hunc mundum sive rerum naturam esse animal divinum, constans mente divinâ, & corpore mundano: cujus singulæ etiam partes Dii vel Dei membra forent, quia divina illa mens partes singulas permearet. — Itaque animas etiam humanas, non pecudum modo, putabant esse illius animæ

Fact? You do indeed pronounce "that the
 " Doctrine of another Life, as delivered in the
 " Mysteries,

animæ (mundi) particulas. De Physiologia Christiana, et Theologia Gentili, p. 724.

6. It will, I suppose, be no Discredit to the Notion I have here explained, that several Writers of the first Name have given this as the real Sentiment and Principle of the old Stoics. *Super animæ statu memini vestræ quæstiunculæ: Utrum lapsa de cælo sit, ut Pythagoras philosophus, Platonici, & Origenes putant: an a propria Dei substantia, ut Stoici, Manichæus, & Hispaniæ Priscilliani hæreses suspicantur. Jerom Epist. lxxxii.* A learned Writer of our own speaks to the same Purpose. *Aiunt enim illi res omnes, suo modo, participare Deum, animasque nostras nominatim esse MOPIA ΔΕΥΣ καὶ ΑΠΟΣΠΑΣΜΑΤΑ.* Unde Seneca de animo, *Quid est autem cur non existimes in eo divini aliquid existere, qui Dei pars est? Archæologiæ Philosophicæ c. vii.* But the following Authorities will probably be thought decisive. *Et jam vides Stoicis unde sit anima: e cælo, a Deo, ipsam Deum. Elata & vana sunt. Lipsius de Phys. Stoic. l. iii. c. 8.* Antoninus sometimes calls the Soul a Dæmon, an Emanation and Disception from the Deity. Upon this Casaubon remarks, "That by that Word Antoninus doth intend
 " a Deity, he himself doth sufficiently clear, not only when
 " he calls ἀπογογίας and ἀποσπασματιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, but by other
 " Passages, where he plainly says of it, that it is God."
 l. ii. 8. The learned Dr. Stanhope says, "The Faults which
 " are justly to be found with Stoics are, the believing a Multitude of Gods; teaching that the Soul was a Part of the
 " Divinity." Preface to Antoninus.

Animam divini spiritus portiunculam, ejusdemque prorsus naturæ, autumabant Stoici; tanquam Deus ipse e partibus diversis constare posset, aut in plura dividi sustineret ens omnium perfectissimum. Dacier in Antonin. ii. 1. Again: Verentes interim, ne subarroganter faciamus, si mentem nostram utcunque præstantissimam divinæ mentis effluviū, aut portiunculam, similem usquequaque, & ejusdem Substantiæ cum Stoicis dixerimus. l. iv. 4. The Case, to sum it up in a word, was this, some of the Philosophers held two Substances in Nature; some but one. Of those who held only one, viz. Matter there can be no Dispute in the present Question. Those who held two, viz. Matter and Spirit, gave the human Soul to the Soul of God, not to the Body. And will now Mr. J. condemn all this as slight and trivial? Will he insist that Men of the first Name in the learned World knew nothing of the Philosophy

" *Mysteries, was divested of all Fable.*" But, Sir, the Confidence of your Assertion will not supply the Modesty of your Evidence, which is silent upon this Head. Why did you conceal from your Reader, that the *Divine Legation* tells us that the Ancients have given a very different Account of this Matter? Or have you really forgot it; Give me leave then to refresh your Memory. *Plato*, speaking of those who established the Mysteries, declares " that they were excellent
 " Persons,—that they there taught that all who
 " died before Initiation, *would descend into the*
 " *infernial Regions, and there be condemned to*
 " *grovel in Filth and Mire.* But that all who
 " had been initiated, would, upon their Arrival
 " at the same Place, be translated to the Habi-
 " tations of the Gods ^b."

When *Antisthenes* was initiated, the Priest told him " that all who were admitted to the
 " Mysteries, would be intitled to great Hap-
 " piness in the *infernial Regions* ^c." Thus, Sir,
 in

sophy of Greece or Italy? Or will he charge them with Prejudice and Partiality in the Case? But, unluckily, all their Prejudice must lie on the other Side of the Question. They were, we know, zealous Advocates for the old *Stoics*, ever ready to qualify and soften whatever in their System was most subject to Exception. What therefore but the Notoriety of the Fact, and the plain Testimony of all History, could oblige them to allow and assert a Truth, which, in their own Opinion, reflects so much Shame and Discredit on their favourite Sect?

^b In Phædone.

^c *Diogenes Laertius*, l. vi. Μυούμενος τότε τα Ὀρφικά, του αερίως ειπώντος ότι οι ταυτα μυούμενοι πολλών αγαθών ΕΝ ΑΔΟΥ μετισχούσι, τι οὐν, ἔφη, οὐκ ἀποθνήσκεις;

" Our Critic (says Mr. F.) vainly alledges that the Words
 " of *Zeno* (*Sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas; illos quidem*
 " *quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones; hos vero luere pœ-*
 " *nas in tenebrosis locis atque in cœni voraginibus horrendis*)
 " relate

in direct Contradiction to what you maintain, some of the best Writers of Antiquity assure us, that the Doctrine of another Life was delivered in

“ relate to the popular Account of a future State. What! because there is a figurative Expression in the latter Part of them, something like the Scripture Phrase of *being cast into outer Darknefs*, &c. could not he see that *Zeno* spake the Language of one initiated into the Mysteries? Where future Punishments were scenically represented by *Darknefs*, *wallowing in Mire*, and other Emblems of Terror; as Happiness was by *Light*, and sensible Delights and Entertainments. But does it follow from hence, that the Doctrines of the Mysteries were *exoteric* and *vulgar* Notions only, contrary to the Design of them? And that Men were there taught to disbelieve a future State?” *Farther Defence*, 44. 5. Our Author insists that the vulgar Notion of a future State was not taught in the Mysteries. But why then does he make no Reply to what *Plato* and *Diogenes Laertius* have advanced on this Point? There can surely be as little Occasion, as there would be Difficulty, to defend these two learned Ancients against such a Writer as Mr. J. However, as he is not convinced by the Authority of these two Writers, I must refer him for his further Satisfaction to this Passage of his own. “ These two future States were also represented figuratively and *exoterically*; the one by Regions of Light, and delightful Entertainments of the Senses; and the other by Scenes of Horror and Darknefs, wallowing in the Mire; and being terrify’d with dismal Sight, and tormented in Flames of Fire.” (*Defence*, p. 8.) But what then was the public and exoteric Doctrine? Why, according to Mr. J. it taught that the Wicked were to wallow in Filth and Mire. And is not this the very Language of *Zeno*? And does not Mr. J. himself say it was the very Language of the Mysteries, “ where future Punishments were scenically represented by Darknefs, wallowing in the Mire, and other Emblems of Terror?” And does he not contend that this was the Language of the Mysteries? Why then is he angry with me for saying the same thing? Or is the Gentleman so very captious, that, rather than agree with me, he will even quarrel with himself? But this will always be the Case when a Man steals what he does not understand; as he here, who pretends to talk of the Mysteries after Mr. W. The ground of his Mistake, with which he so strangely embarrasses himself and insults me, is this: He takes it for granted, that the Nation of a future State

in the Mysteries *in the most popular and gross Sense*; they were so far from refining on the common Ideas, that they give us those very Ideas as the whole of the Matter. The Reader will make a proper Reflection on a Fact thus roundly asserted, contrary to the clear and express Evidence of the Ancients themselves.

CHAP. X.

That the Refinements of the Philosophers on the common Notion of a future State, went much farther than the learned Writer imagines.—The Metempsychosis of Pythagoras explained, and shewn to be destructive of all future Rewards and Punishments.

“Supposing, says this learned Man*, that
 “the Philosophers, in their Explanations,
 “refined upon this Doctrine, which was both
 “reasonable in itself, and taught in the Myste-
 “ries by Priests who were also Philosophers,
 “would any Writer but this Author draw such
 “a weak and absurd Inference, as that they nei-
 “ther

* Defence, p. 9.

taught in the Mysteries, must of course be concealed from and unknown to the People. But here, I apprehend, he had forgot the Distinction between the *greater* and *less* Mysteries. The first did indeed contain a grand Secret, which was not to be revealed to the People; but then this was the *Unity of God*, and not the Doctrine of a future State. As to the Notion of a future State, it was indeed taught in the Mysteries; but then it was taught to all the initiated without Distinction. It never was supposed to be the main Secret of the greater Mysteries; it was indeed taught indifferently to *all* who were initiated, in the *lesser*, as well as the *greater* Mystery; it was only one of the Foundations which was to open and prepare the Way for the *grand Secret*?—As then this Notion was

"ther did nor could believe it?" What is the *Refinement* here meant? Why, that they had stript the Doctrine of another Life of the common Fables of *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*. In this Case, says Mr. *Jackson*, "would any Writer but such an Author, draw such a weak and absurd Inference," &c. Why, yes, Sir; the same *Inference* has been drawn by other Writers. I have shewn as plainly as Words and *Fact* can do it, that the *Inference*, with respect to future Punishments, was made by *Cicero* and *Ovid*, *Seneca* and *Epietetus*; and will you prove from *Reason* that it could not be made? Or will you *insultingly* tell us, that none but *such Authors* could have made it? It is indeed happy for Mr. *Warburton* that so many learned Ancients must incur your Censure before it reaches him, or he had been in a sad Pickle. However it must needs be a Reflection on his *Wit*, if not on his Judgment, and a Proof of his *Dullness*, if not of his Ignorance, that he represents ancient Facts just as he finds them, without one Dram of *Invention*, or systematical Imbelishment.

But as the learned Gentleman talks of *Refinements*, I will beg leave to give another Instance, which, in my Opinion, bears hard upon the No-

was imparted to all in the *lesser* as well as the *greater* Mysteries, it would be as contrary to Reason, as I have shewn it to be to History, to suppose that it was a private and secret Doctrine; and that Men were there taught to *disbelieve* a future State. Would not any one now conclude, that, according to the Argument of the *D. L.* "Men were taught to *disbelieve* a future State in the Mysteries?" So far from it, that that Argument supposes the very contrary. But what then? Is an *Answerer by Profession* to be debarred of his Privileges? One of which is, that when you give him an Argument that he cannot answer, he may return you another that he can; and face you down that 'tis your own, just as he received it.

tion he is here maintaining : I mean the *physical* and natural Metempsychosis ; this excludes all *moral* Purpose and Design, all future Rewards and Punishments, in the strict and proper Meaning of those Terms. The common and popular Opinion was, that the Soul, after its Departure from the *present*, would successively pass into *ether*, Bodies ; this Migration was purely moral ; it^b was considered as a State of future Retribution. “ The Coward was to be thrust ignominiously into the Body of a Woman ; the Murderer imprisoned within the Fur of a Savage ; the lascivious condemned to animate a Boar or Sow.” And this, as *Timæus* says, *ποτι κολασιν, by way of Punishment*, for the Demerit of their preceding Lives^c. But then this *moral* Purpose and Design was distinguished and explained away in the secret Doctrine on this Subject, A Metempsychosis was taught which could not be considered in this Light. *Aristotle*, speaking of some old Philosophers, says, “ They only attempt to explain the Nature of the Soul, but state and define nothing with regard to the Body, in which it is to be lodged, as if it was possible, according to the Fables of Pythagoras, that Souls should pass indifferently into all kind of Bodies, or that every Soul might descend into every Body without *Distinction*^d.” Now is not this directly contrary to the Notion given us

^b Divine Legation, vol. i. p. 377.

^c The whole Passage from *Timæus* may be seen *Div. Leg.* vol. i. p. 377, 8.

^d Οἱ δὲ μοι ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν, ποῖον τι ἡ ψυχὴ περὶ τὸ διζόμενον σῶματος οὐδὲν ἐπὶ προσδιορίζουσιν, ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς πυθαγορικοὺς μύθους, τὴν τυχούσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχόν ἐναίεσθαι σῶμα, *De anima*, l. iii.

by *Timæus*? According to him, the Soul was to pass into other Bodies *ποτι κολασιν*, by way of Punishment: And, for this Purpose, proper and peculiar Bodies were assigned it, such as were best suited to punish and torture the Soul itself; but, according to this other Account of the *Pythagoric* Doctrine, Souls were to pass into all Bodies without *Distinction*; every Soul might pass into every Body.

Diogenes Laertius confirms the same. In his Life of *Pythagoras* he tells us, “ That he was reported to be the first who taught the Migration of the Soul, from one Body to another by a *Physical Necessity*.” And to the same Purpose *Servius* speaks of a Transmigration, which was supposed to be made only *propter Fati Necessitatem*^f. *Seneca*, speaking of this Notion of *Pythagoras*, seems to suppose the Migration of the Soul to be as purely *physical* and *necessary*, as the Motion of the heavenly Bodies. Non credis, inquit, animas in alia corpora atque alia describi? et migrationem esse quam dicimus esse mortem? Non credis in his Pecudibus ferisve aut aqua merfis illum quondam hominis animum morari? Non credis nihil perire in hoc mundo, sed mutare regionem? *Nec tantum cœlestia per certos circuitus verti, sed animalia quoque per vices ire, & animos per orbem agi.* (Ep. 109.) Does he not put the several Revolutions of the Soul on the same Foot with those of the heavenly Bodies? And was not the Motion of the last supposed to be purely natural?

I will close this Head with those famous Lines of *Ovid*,

^e Πρῶτον δὲ φασὶ τούτου ἀποφθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΑΜΕΙΒΟΥΣΑΝ, ἀλλοτε ἀλλοις ἐνδύσθαι ζώοις. L. viii. § 14.

^f *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 387.

O Genus attonitum stolidæ formidine mortis !
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, & nomina vana ti-
metis,

Materiem vatum, falsique pericula mundi ?
Corpora sive rogos flamma, seu tabe vetustas
Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis.
Morte carent animæ, semperque, priore relictâ
Sede, novis domibus vivunt habitantque re-
ceptæ^g.

These Words are here given to *Pythagoras* himself; it is certain that they contain his No-
tion; and it is equally certain that the Transmi-
gration here described was barely *physical and ne-
cessary*. This appears from the Purpose for
which these Verses were introduced; and that
was *Seriem evolvere Fati*^h.

2dly. It is so far from being consider'd in a
moral View, that it is directly oppos'd to the
common Doctrine of another Life. It will be
to no Purpose to reply, that it strikes only at the
poetical and fabulous Accounts of future Punish-
ments: If it destroys these, *we have proved* that
it must, of course, destroy all future Punishments
whatsoever. Besides, it was the Purpose of *Py-
thagoras*, in these Lines, to prove that Death was
no Evil; and to do this, he must necessarily
prove, that Death is not attended with any future
Punishments whatsoever. If therefore his Argu-
ment does not exclude all possible Punishments,

^g Metamorph. l. xv.

^h ——— Juvat ire per alta
Astra; juvat, terris & inertî sede relictis,
Nube vehi; validique humeris insistere Atlantis:
Palantesque animos passim, ac rationis egentes
Despectare procul, trepidosque obitumque timentes
Sic exhortari; SERIEMQUE EVOLVERE FATI.

And then follow the Lines I have just quoted.

as well as those of the infernal Regions, it does not come up to the Point for which it is produced.

We see then, the *Refinements* of the Philosophers went much farther than the learned Writer seems willing to allow; they went indeed so far as to destroy the proper Notion of a future State.

As to the School of *Pythagoras*, our Author assures us, "That it produced the most *eminent* " *Philosophers of Greece and Italy.*" More Shame for him then, who left their *Eminencies* in the Lurch, when a Charge of so heavy a Nature was brought against them. But though he has not offered one Syllable in their Behalf, yet he boasts of his having *CONFUTED* all I advanced against them. But he has been so long used to this Sort of Language, that it comes in as naturally and necessarily, at the End of his Pamphlets, as the Word *FINIS*; and with as little Truth or Meaning: For, as he *never could confute* his Adversary; so he *never would make an End* with him.

Let us now go to the *DOUBLE DOCTRINE*. Whether the Philosophers did actually practise it, Mr. *Jackson* may, if he pleases, dispute: But after what has been said of their Notions concerning the human Soul, it will hardly be denied but that they really wanted it. For we see that they held Principles, which would have been very dangerous and hurtful to Society, if they had been publish'd and divulged to the World at large. We know too from their own Professions, from their great Regard and Tenderness for the Interests of Society, that they never would impart these Notions to the Vulgar. When therefore they were obliged to speak on these Points, what

was left for them, but to *profess one thing, while they believed another?*

And, on the other Side, if they actually said one thing when they thought another; if they practised the *double Doctrine* in that Extent, in which it is charged upon them by the Author of the *Divine Legation*, we may be certain that they entertained some very hurtful and pernicious Notions. Why else were they so studious to cover and conceal them from the Body of the People?

C H A P. XI.

Mr. Jackson's *Notion of the Double Doctrine examin'd.*—*His Objections to the Divine Legation, on this Point, explained and confuted.*

LET us first examine what Mr. Jackson's Notion of the double Doctrine is; and here let him be heard in his own Words. "The Exoteric and Esoteric Philosophy had only a Reference to the Difference of the vulgar and political from the philosophical Notions of the future State, and not at all to the Reality and Belief of it, which was always believed in different ways of Explication by the Learned and Unlearned; by the Poets and Philosophers, as well as by the common People." P. 93.

Having said that the Philosophers taught the common and fabulous Doctrine of a future State, he adds, "As they themselves had more rational Notions concerning a future State, they taught their Disciples a different Doctrine about the Soul,"

“ Soul, and the Happiness and Misery of the
 “ State after Death. This was called the esoteric
 “ or secret Doctrine, in Distinction to the exote-
 “ ric, or public and vulgar Opinion,” p. 71.

“ They taught that the human Soul was con-
 “ genial with the Soul of the World; and that
 “ the Happiness of it after Death consisted in
 “ its Return to and intimate Union with God,
 “ from whom it was derived; on the other hand
 “ that the Misery of it consisted in being exclud-
 “ ed from the Union with God, and having no
 “ Communication with him.” He expresses
 himself to the same Purpose, p. 89, 90. and
 tells us, “ That after Death the Wicked and
 “ Ungodly were to be for ever miserable, by
 “ being separated and alienated from the blessed
 “ Communion and Fellowship of the immortal
 “ Gods.”

In his second Piece he tells us, “ That the
 “ Souls of virtuous Men were to reside in some
 “ luminous Orb, were to enjoy the Society of
 “ celestial Beings; were to be united with and
 “ have Communion with God; were to be blef-
 “ sed with the beatific Vision of the divine Per-
 “ fections. That the Souls of wicked and un-
 “ godly Men after Death were banished from
 “ the Communion both of God and all holy Per-
 “ sons; were associated with evil Dæmons, and
 “ condemned to a State of Misery and Punish-
 “ ment. These were the Doctrines concerning
 “ God and the Soul, which were taught in the
 “ Mysteries, and were the esoteric Doctrines of
 “ the old Philosophers.” p. 8.

In the two last Passages the learned Writer
 undertakes to give us the secret or esoteric Doc-
 trine with regard to future Punishments; “ The
 “ Wicked, it seems, were to be banished from
 “ the

“ the Society and Assembly of the Gods.” This was, according to him, the Substance of that Doctrine. But does he then think that this Exclusion from the Seats and Assemblies of the Gods was a *secret* and *bidden* Notion? *Cicero*, speaking of the rude and barbarous Inhabitants of *Italy*, says, “ They did not look upon Death “ as a State of Non-existence, they considered it “ only as a Change of one Life for another. “ They thought that Persons of great and singular Accomplishments would be raised and “ exalted into Heaven, *while all the rest were “ fixed and confined to these lower Regions.* We “ are here told, that the Bulk of Mankind was “ to be banished from Heaven^a,” and excluded from the Society and Assembly of the Gods. We are told too that this was the general and received Notion of the old Inhabitants of *Italy*. Was then this barbarous and illiterate People actually possessed of this Opinion? If so, the Inference is certain, that this was a *popular* and *exoteric*, not a *private* and *secret* Doctrine.

But what is still worse, this will, when examined, be found to be no Doctrine of future Punishments at all. We are told in the Passage just recited, that all but Men of great and eminent Endowments, were to be excluded from the Assembly of the Gods. And if so, the Body of good Men must be excluded too. Now what plainer Proof can there be that this was not considered as a State of Punishment? For surely most good Men were not sentenced and condemned to a State of future Punishments promiscuously with the wicked.

^a *Vid.* the Passage from *Cicero*, p. 44.

2dly. Another thing advanced in the last Citation, is, *that the secret Doctrines of the Schools of Philosophy and Mysteries of Religion, are one and the same thing.* I meet indeed with a very different Account of this matter in the *Divine Legation*. But different as that Account is, 'tis confirmed by what Mr. Jackson himself has, in the Heat of Opposition, advanced on this Head. The Mysteries, he tells us, taught "that the Wicked and Ungodly should be for ever miserable." But what say the Philosophers? Did they too embrace this Notion of *eternal Punishments*? Cicero, speaking of the Souls of the Wicked, after their Departure from the Body, says, *Corporibus elapsi circum terram ipsam volutantur, nec hunc in locum [Cœlum] nisi multis exagitati seculis, revertuntur*^b. And Mr. Jackson himself speaks of the *Stoics* as believing that *the Souls of good Men would exist till the general Conflagration, but that those of the wicked would continue only to a certain Period*^c.

He will therefore suffer me, if not on Mr. Warburton's, yet on his own Authority, to distinguish between the hidden Doctrines of the Schools of Philosophy, and those of the Mysteries of Religion. He himself tells us, that the *Mythagogues* taught the Eternity of future Punishments. But did the Philosophers teach the same? I have proved by very clear and full Authorities that they did not.

So far on Mr. Jackson's own Notion; on the Supposition that the hidden Doctrines of the Schools included the Belief of future Punishments. In this very Case the hidden Doctrines of the

^b Somn. Scip. c. ix.

^c *The Belief of a future State, &c.* p. 98.

Schools and the Mysteries of Religion, would be very separate and distinct things; as separate and distinct as the Doctrines, which teach *temporal* and *eternal* Punishments.

I have often wondered that the learned Writer should represent the Ancients as actually believing *eternal* Punishments. If this was their firm and real Persuasion, the Doctrine of temporary Punishments must be considered as merely political and civil. Now it is highly improbable, or incredible rather, that this should be the Case. Mr. Jackson allows that the public Doctrine was contrived for the Sake of the Populace; that it was clothed with all those Terrors and Fictions, which were most likely to strike their Imaginations. And what more effectual for this Purpose, than the *eternal Duration* of future Punishments? Can we conceive that they would have stript the popular Doctrine of this Circumstance, had they thought it to be strictly and really true? The learned Gentleman must therefore pardon me, if I cannot agree with him, that they really and actually believed *eternal*, and yet preached up only *temporary* Punishments.

3dly. Mr. Jackson himself furnishes another unanswerable Argument to prove, that the secret Doctrines of the Philosophers, and the Mysteries of Religion, were not one and the same thing. The *esoteric Philosophy*, according to him, taught a State of future Rewards and Punishments; but divested of those Fables and fictitious Circumstances with which this Doctrine was delivered to the People. Did it so? Why then we may be certain it did not teach the same Notion of another Life with the *Mysteries*. For will any one say that the Notion of another Life, as delivered in the Mysteries, was stript of these Fables? Mr.

Jackson

Jackson has indeed said it. But then he opposes his own Authority to the Testimonies of *Plato* and *Diogenes Laertius*. And what Adversary could wish him in a worse Case?

And here it may not be unpleasant to observe, how the Scene is now changed. The learned Writer tells us, that the *external* Doctrine taught future Rewards and Punishments in the most popular and gross Sense. This is, it seems, the distinguishing Mark and Character of that Doctrine. But has it not been shewn that the *Mysteries* taught another Life, after the very same Manner? It will therefore unavoidably follow from his own Description of the popular or external Doctrine, that this was the very Doctrine of the Mysteries.

What then, after all, has this formidable Writer proved? What mighty Feats or Wonders has he wrought, to justify so much Haughtiness and Contempt? As for his own Hypothesis, there is nothing in *Antiquity*, *Reason*, or the Nature of things to countenance and uphold it. With regard to *Antiquity*, it is not only unsupported by proper Evidence, but contrary to the plain and direct Testimony of *Cicero* himself: *Mr. Jackson* gives us that for a *secret*, which *Cicero* plainly shews to have been a *public* and external Doctrine. And what is more unlucky still, this, when examined, proves to have been no Doctrine of future Punishments. Nor is his Hypothesis grounded on Probability of *Reason*; it supposes the future Punishments taught and preached up to the Populace to have been *barely temporary*, while those confined to the Schools of Philosophy were *eternal*: A Position, which the very Nature and Design of the *double Doctrine* will not suffer us to admit. Again; he sets out with

with a Distinction between the *philosophical* and *vulgar* Notion of a future State. But when he sends us to the Mysteries for the *first*, he must suppose them both to be the same. Strange Inconsistencies ! first to distinguish between the two Doctrines, and then immediately to consider them as one ; first to make their Difference consist in the *particular Fables* annexed to the one, and then to assign these very Fables to both Doctrines.

There is something as gross and flagrant in what he says with respect to a State of future Happiness. In his first Piece the secret Doctrine places it in the *Refusion into the divine Nature*, p. 71. But in the second he speaks another Language ; " The Souls of good Men were to reside in some luminous Orb ; to enjoy the Society of celestial Beings," &c. p. 8. Now is it not a little inconsistent to give two such opposite and contrary Accounts of this *secret Doctrine* ? I say, opposite and contrary Accounts ; for that these here mentioned, were conceived by the Ancients to be very different and distinct States, has been already proved. In this Case, the secret Doctrine would have been as different from *itself*, as the learned Author supposes it to have been from the public and external Doctrine.

But, not to insist strictly on this Contradiction, let him give us which he pleases as the *secret Doctrine*. If he sends us to the *Refusion of the Soul*, I must beg leave to remind him, that he has not proved, that this was considered as a State of Rewards : That therefore it does not appear that the secret Doctrine included the Belief of future Happiness. We have indeed only examined this Notion with regard to one Sect ; and then it was considered as equivalent to a State

of Non-existence. If he refers us to the *State of Happiness in Heaven*; I reply, this is nothing to the Purpose of our present Argument, as it was not supposed to include the Body of good Men.

But, after all, what is most unlucky, this was not a *private*, but a *public* Doctrine; it was taught openly in order to incite Men to Acts of heroic and uncommon Bravery. And as to the Philosophers, we have shewn, upon their own Authority, that they made it in their Business to preach it up to the World at large.

But to convince Mr. *Jackson* that this was a *public* Doctrine, I shall now offer an Authority which, I dare say, he will not dispute: I mean his own. For he himself, in direct Opposition to his whole System, asserts the very thing. “ In the *Egyptian vulgar and political* Theology also, the human Soul was taught to be immortal, and to subsist after Death; and those which were pure and religious were believed to reside amongst the Gods; and wicked Souls were believed to pass through various Degrees of Punishment by a Transmigration,” &c. p. 70. The Vulgar, by his own Account, were taught, that the Souls of good Men were to *reside amongst the Gods*. And does he not therefore in effect tell us, that this Exaltation to the Seats and Assemblies of the Gods, was a public and open Doctrine?

Having examined the Merit of his own Hypothesis, let us now see what he objects to the Author of the *Divine Legation*.

“ Our Remarker’s Explication also of the esoteric and exoteric Philosophy is all a mere Blunder, owing to his not being able to distinguish between a Proposition of a Subject, and the

“ *the Explanation of it.* The Terms Exoteric
 “ and Esoteric, with respect to the Doctrine of
 “ a future State, had no Relation to the Doc-
 “ trine, or Subject itself, which was taught and
 “ professed equally amongst the Philosophers,
 “ and amongst the vulgar. But the Philosophers
 “ explained it in a different manner in their po-
 “ litical and popular Discourses, from what they
 “ did in their Lectures to their Disciples; the
 “ first was the exoteric Way, the second was
 “ the esoteric. *And this was the Case in respect*
 “ *of Theology in general:* And this is all the My-
 “ stery of Exoterics and Esoterics, which our
 “ Remarker has made so much work about; and
 “ infers from it most absurdly that the Philo-
 “ sopers, tho’ they professed and taught, did
 “ not believe a future State of Rewards and Pu-
 “ nishment.”

“ Our Remarker’s Explication is all a mere
 “ Blunder.” I could wish the learned Writer
 had expressed himself with more Civility: Not
 for the Sake of Mr. Warburton: for how, alas!
 can any thing of this kind be supposed to affect
 him? but with regard to his own Character as a
 Writer. For, after all, what is it that he ob-
 jects to the Author of the *Divine Legation*?
 Why, it seems, that, out of *pure Ignorance and*
Blunder, he has given two contrary Propositions
 to the two Doctrines? And has not Mr. Jackson
 himself done the same? It appears from his own
 Citations, that the one taught *temporary*, the
 other *eternal* Punishments. If so, must they not
 proceed upon contrary Propositions? As certainly
 as *temporal* and *eternal* are not one and the same
 thing. If then the giving two contrary Propo-

* Mr. Jackson’s Defence, &c. p. 54.

sitions to the two Doctrines, was so egregious a Blunder, it will fall as heavy on the learned Mr. *Jackson* as on the Author of the *Divine Legation*. He does indeed assign to each Doctrine a different Proposition from Mr. *Warburton*: But still he assigns contrary Propositions to the two Doctrines. Why then all this ill Language? If not to shew his Talent at *Billingsgate*, it must be to disguise his Theft, in the following Accounts he gives of the Mysteries. And such Writers seldom rob but they abuse.

“ And this was the Case with respect to Theology in general.” Would any one now imagine that the learned Mr. *Jackson* himself had shewn, in these very Treatises, that this *was not the Case in respect of Theology in general*; that the vulgar and philosophical Theology did really and actually proceed upon contrary Propositions? And yet, if he has proved any thing, he has proved this. “ The grand Design of all the ancient *Phœnician, Egyptian, and Chaldean Mysteries*, “ seems originally to have been to discover to “ those, who were initiated in them, *that the* “ *Gods, whom the vulgar worshipped, were no* “ *other than dead Men:—And to teach that the* “ *true Object of Adoration was the one Supreme* “ *God and Author of Nature* ^d.”

He here tells us, *that the Gods, whom the vulgar worshipped, were no other than dead Men.*—In another Place he says, the Populace were taught “ that the Gods they worshipped had “ once lived amongst Men^e.” This was the vulgar Theology.

^d *The Belief of a Future State, &c.* p. 89.

^e *Vid.* Mr. *J.* p. 69.

But the more knowing and enlighten'd Pagans were taught, that the one supreme God was the true Object of Adoration.

If now the *vulgar* were taught that deceased Mortals were the proper Objects of Adoration; must not their Theology have been contrary and opposite to that which taught that the one supreme God was the proper Object of Adoration? Will the learned Writer insist that these were only *different Explanations of the same Notion*? He must first prove that the one true, and the many false Gods, were one and the same Object.

Again: "The *Egyptian* Priests indeed had
 " more Sense than to believe there was any real
 " Divinity in their Symbolic Images or sacred
 " Animals; but then they let the People go on
 " in their gross and senseless Superstition, and
 " encouraged it by their own Practice and Ex-
 " ample. They made and consecrated their
 " Gods for them; and pretended by Amulets,
 " Divinations, and magical Charms, to animate
 " the Images with *Genii* and *Dæmons*, and to
 " confine them to their Symbols, and make
 " them propitious to the Worshippers of them."
 p. 109.

And here again, how easy is it to turn his own small Arms upon him? "The Priests pretend to animate the Images with *Genii* and *Dæmons*," and yet, "they have too much Sense to imagine that there was any real Divinity in these very Images." If so, is it not necessary to suppose that they *professed* one thing when they *thought* another; or, that the two Doctrines were, in this Case, grounded upon Principles, directly opposite and repugnant to each other? Will the learned Gentleman say, that the Notion which *asserted*, and that which *denied* the
 Divinity

Divinity of the Images, did contain only one and the same Proposition ?

C H A P. XII.

Mr. Warburton's Account of the double Doctrine cleared from the Misrepresentations of Dr. Sykes, and confirmed by fresh Authorities.

BUT as this is a Matter of Importance in the present Controversy, we will add a Word or two more before we dismiss it. The Writers against the *D. L.* seem all to concur in one Point; they urge and insist that the two Doctrines were only Explanations of the same Notion; and that they did not go upon opposite and repugnant Principles. Mr. *Jackson* alone is the *Drawcansir* of the Cause; and as he is in the Humour, sometimes *confirms* this Point against his Adversary, and sometimes *confutes* it against himself. It may therefore be worth while to dwell a little longer

§ I have here examined at large Mr. *Jackson's* Account of the double Doctrine; I have shewn that it was contrary to *Reason*; to *History*; and even to *his own System*. And how does the good Man answer all this? Like a baffled Scold, who only repeats her Story, and rails afresh because no Body will believe it. He gives us his former Account over again, and abuses me for not allowing it, p. 45. His Point, the Reader sees, is to vindicate the Credit of his own Judgment. To carry this, he should alledge some new Arguments, or confute the old ones. For whatever he may think of *me*, yet surely *Plato*, *Cicero*, and the other Ancients, to whom I have appealed on this Occasion, are not beneath his Notice. But there is a greater Authority against him, still behind. I mean honestly, it is his own: And by no means to be slightly handled, for 'tis the sole Instance in this Controversy, where his own Word could do him any Credit.

on this Article ; and I do it with the greater Pleasure, as the learned Dr. Sykes has given us a long Discourse on this very Subject : We have his main and principal Objection in the following Words. “ *What Proof now can be produced, that in the twofold Doctrine, they [the Philosophers] actually said one thing and believed another? What Instance is or can be produced of this Fact.*” Dr. Sykes’s *Examination*, p. 124. Here then we strike Hands : If such an Instance *can* be produced, the Doctor, I am persuaded, according to his own Reasoning, will allow himself mistaken. If it *cannot*, I readily give up the Doctrine of the D. L. as chimerical.

But now the Doctor not only insists that his Adversary has not actually proved his Point, but goes so far as to say that he never can prove it ; “ for that he has given *such* an Account of the *double Doctrine*, as makes it impossible for him ever to shew, that in *That* the Ancients ever *said one thing and meant another*.” This indeed is coming to the Point. And he proves it thus, Mr. Warburton it seems says,—“ nor were they (the external and internal, the vulgar and the secret) *different Doctrines, but one and the same, that was handled thus differently, viz. popularly and scientifically*”^b ;” on which the Doctor thus ingeniously comments : “ The internal and secret Doctrine then was not a different Doctrine from the vulgar and external ; it was *one and the same* that was handled differently”^c. He has done his Business like a Workman. Mr. W. as appears from his whole Argument, by *one and the same Doctrine*, meant the *Object* or *Subject* of a Proposition, (from

* Vindication, p. 4.

^b Ibid.

^c Ibid.

which

which Object or Subject many different and contrary Propositions may be drawn) and this *Answerer* makes him mean, by one and the same Doctrine, *one and the same Proposition*.

This is his hackney Sophism; which he rides out of Breath, and almost out of Sight. And with this he keeps stumbling on from one End of his Pamphlet to the other. To expose it as it deserves, it will be necessary to examine more at large, what Mr. *W.* means by the Word *Doctrine*. The Word sometimes signifies a Proposition, and sometimes, the Object or Subject of a Proposition. If we take it in the first Sense, if the two Doctrines are supposed to relate to one and the same Proposition, and to be nothing more than different Explanations of it: In this Case it would be ridiculous and absurd to imagine, that the Philosophers “said one thing and thought another,” when they employed the double Doctrine.

If the Word *Doctrine* means the Subject or Object of a Proposition, the two Doctrines may be confined to one and the same Subject, and yet go upon contrary Propositions; because very different and contrary Propositions may be drawn from one and the same Object or Subject. Now if the two Doctrines are founded upon contrary Propositions, it will be necessary to suppose that the Philosophers “said one thing and thought another,” when they had Recourse to the double Doctrine.

What then does Mr. *W.* mean by the Word *Doctrine*, when he says “they were not different *Doctrines* but one and the same, that were handled thus differently, popularly, and scientifically.” Let us consider the Point he is upon. He is endeavouring to shew, that it was

the Custom of the Philosophers to *speake one thing when they believed another*; and for this he appeals to the double Doctrine. If by *Doctrine* he means only *Proposition*, this Practice will be nothing to his Purpose. If he means the Object or Subject of a Proposition, it then comes up to all that he contends for. Since then the Word *Doctrine* will bear either of these Senses, and the avowed Design and Purpose of the Argument he is upon, requires us to understand him in the last, I would fain know by what Rules of Construction Dr. Sykes would oblige us to understand him in the first.

But there was still more than this, tho' this was more than enough to prevent an ingenuous Reader from mistaking his Meaning; he declares in direct and express Terms, that the two Doctrines were actually grounded upon contrary Propositions. "If the external Teaching was for the People, and the internal what the People could not be trusted with, *and both about the same thing*, the two ways of teaching must certainly proceed upon contrary Propositions^d." In another Place he says, "the two Doctrines had *one single Object*." Again; "I had all along affirmed the Philosophers, both in their *external* and *internal* teaching, held a future State (here is his *one and the same thing* for him) in their *external*, a future State with Rewards and Punishments; in their *internal*, a future State *without* them^f." What then does Mr. W. mean, when he declares that *one and the same Doctrine* was handled in the twofold teaching? Why, only that the *Subject* of each Doctrine was *one and the same*. It would be unnecessary to collect and point out more Passages

^d Appendix to vol. ii. p. 13.

^e p. 34.

^f p. 13.

in order to prove this, as nothing can be more evident than that he all along supposes the two Doctrines to contain opposite and contrary Propositions, and yet confines them to the *same Subject*.

Let us go now to his Observation on the Words *popular*, and *scientific*, or *philosophical*. Now by the *different handling*, viz. *popularly* and *scientifically*, Mr. *W.* (as his whole Discourse shews) means talking to the People according to the People's Notions; and talking to their Disciples on theirs. And these Notions being contrary to one another, he thought they must needs speak one thing to the Populace, while they believed another. No, says Dr. *Sykes*, "the popular manner of handling of a Subject, is so
" to handle it, that the common People may
" easily understand what is said: The philosophical manner is to make use of nothing but
" close abstract Reasoning; to argue in such a
" strict manner of deducing Consequences from
" Principles, that those only who understand the
" more subtle and recondite Philosophy, can
" comprehend what is said." And thus our Answerer carries all before him. It would be hard indeed, if he could not make out something of an Argument, when he takes the Liberty of putting what Sense he pleases on his Adversary's Words. But conscious, as it were, of his ill got Advantages, he drops the following Symptoms of his Guilt. "If Mr. *W.* means by *popular*
" handling a Doctrine, the saying what a Man
" does *not think* or *mean*; and by *scientifically*
" treating it, or *philosophically*, the speaking a
" Man's *inward Sentiments* in Opposition to an
" *external Profession* of what he does *not believe*;

* Vindication, p. 5.

“ This is at least a *new Language*.” p. 5. That is, it is a *new Language* to mean by the Word *Doctrine* the Subject or Object of a Proposition: ‘Tis a new Language to mean by *handling popularly*, speaking or writing according to the Notions of the People; and by *handling scientifically or philosophically*, speaking or writing according to the Philosophers’ own Notions. Could this now be believed? But let it be a new Language; and what then? while Mr. *W.* explains his own Meaning, this is a Liberty that has always been allowed on philosophical Subjects. But the Truth is, the Language is as old as common Sense; and it never became *new*, till Dr. *Sykes* had affixt to it his own Meaning. Then indeed it was so in the full Sense of *new*, according to the *Greeks*, who by their *καινος* meant both *new* and *absurd*. But what is all this shuffling and fencing to avoid? the very thing he pretended most to value himself upon, the ALWAYS LYING OPEN TO CONVICTION.

On the whole, the grand Question, we see, is, *whether the Philosophers said one thing and thought another, when they exercised the double Doctrine?* And what a formidable Adversary have I here to deal with? He engages to disprove the THING asserted by Mr. *W.* and contents himself with falling upon his EXPRESSION. But had his Expression been as inaccurate as the Doctor himself is pleased to represent it; what is all this to the Point? Several Facts and Instances have been alleged to shew, that the Philosophers were actually guilty of the Practice, with which they are here charged. Now if these Facts and Instances come up to the Point for which they are produced, *the Charge upon the ancient Sages is made out*, whatever becomes of the *Terms*, about which

we have been so long a squabbling. But a sinking Cause will catch at *Words*, tho' they be only the Shadows of things.

What Return shall I make him for all this? A literary Commerce with such an Adversary will always be carried on with loss. For his three stale Quibbles, therefore I return him three fresh Testimonies: Which, if he be wise, he will know how to make a good use of by receiving in Silence.

1. I begin with *Parmenides*. We are told that he had two Doctrines concerning the Nature of the Universe; one, in which he taught that the World had been *made*, and would be *destroyed*; another, in which he said that it was *ungenerated* and would never be *dissolved*. We are told that the first was his public; the second his private Doctrine^h. Let the Doctor now see, as he is an Artift in his way, whether, of this here, he can

^h The Author of the philosophical Piece commonly ascribed to *Origen*, says, "that he sometimes complied with the popular Opinion, and declared that the *Universe* would be one Day destroyed." Καὶ Παρμενίδης ἐν μὲν τῷ πρῶτῳ ἀποτίθεται, Αἰδὼν τε, καὶ ἀγεννητὸν, καὶ ὁφαιροειδὲς οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἐκφύγων τὴν τῶν πολλῶν δόξαν, πρὸς λέγει καὶ γὰρ τὰς τοῦ παντός ἀρχὰς, τὴν μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ὕλην τὸ δὲ πρὸς, ὡς αἷον, καὶ ποιεῖν τὸν κόσμον εἶπε φθεῖρεσθαι. It appears too from this Passage that he spoke *popularly*, when he says that the World was made, or had a Beginning; and that this Doctrine was *merely popular* may be seen too from the following Words of *Themistius*. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ θεῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀρχαί, ἐν τῷ μὲν πρῶτῳ, τὸ δὲ γὰρ προσάγειν. It is then evident from these Passages that, in his *Exoterics*, he gave the World both a Beginning and an End. But then in his other Writings he denied that it had either. I need not quote *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, or *Eusebius* to prove this; the following Verses of his own are sufficient for my present Purpose.

Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μέγαλόν ἐν ποιεῖσσι δισμῶν
ἔστιν ἀνάρχον, ἀπαύστον, ἑκαὶ γένεσις καὶ οὐλοῖτο
τῆδε μάλ' ἐπαγγέλλουσα, ἀπῶσι δὲ πῶσις ἀνέστη.

make

make only two different Illustrations of the same Notion : Or whether he must not confess, tho' fore against his Will, that the two Doctrines really proceed upon contrary Propositions : If the one asserts the Beginning and End of the World, and the other denies that it ever had a Beginning or will have an End, do they not exactly suit the Definition of the double Doctrine given above ? Have we not two Doctrines founded on contrary Propositions, and yet do not they both relate to the same Subject ?

2. The next is a Passage from *Galen*, which is, I think, as conclusive. “ *Plato* (says he) declares that Animals have constantly a Soul, which serves to animate and inform their Bodies : As for Stones, Wood, and what we commonly call the inanimate Parts of the Creation ; all these, he says, are quite destitute of Soul. And yet in his *Timæus*, where he explains his Principles to his Disciples and select Friends, he there gives up the common Notion, declares that there is a Soul diffused thro' the Universe, which is to actuate and pervade every Part of it. *Now we are not to imagine that in this Case he is inconsistent with himself, or maintains contrary Doctrines, any more than Aristotle and Theophrastus are to be charged with Contradiction, when they delivered to their Disciples their astroatic Doctrines, and to the Vulgar Principles of another Nature* ⁱ.”

We

ⁱ Πλάτων μὲν αὐτὸς ἐμψυχὰ μὲν αἰεὶ λέγει τὰ ζῶα, τὰς λίθους δὲ, καὶ τὰς ψόας, καὶ τὰ ξύλα, καὶ καθόλου φαναι τὰ φυτὰ πάντα τῶν ἀψυχῶν σωματῶν εἶναι φησὶν· ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν Τιμαίῳ τὴν φυσικὴν θεωρίαν ὀλιγίστοις ἀκροαταῖς, κατακυλῶθεν ἐπισημοῖσιν, λόγοις δυναμένοις ἀποχωρήσας τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκῶντων, εἰς ὅλον τὸν κόσμον ἐκτεταῶσαι λέγει τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ διαφώνων, οὐ χεῖρ τῷτο νομίζειν εἶναι τ' ἀνδρὸς ἐαυτῷ τανταῖα λεγόντος, ὥσπερ οὐδ' Ἀριστοτέ-
λης

We may see plainly from hence what the great *Galen* thought of the double Doctrine. And after that *what* signifies *what* Dr. S. thinks of it. *Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus, are not to be charged with Contradiction*, because they say one thing to their Disciples, and another to the World at large. But what ground could he suppose for the Charge of Contradiction and Inconsistency on this Score, if the two Doctrines had been only Explanations of the same Notions, and had not contained Principles opposite and repugnant to each other? Now if he supposed that they contained opposite and contrary Propositions, I hardly need go about to prove, that, according to him, the Philosophers “spoke one thing and “thought another,” when they practised the double Doctrine.^k

3. My next Testimony is from one of *Plato's* Epistles; his Friends desire him to insert some peculiar Mark and Character by which they might distinguish those Letters, which contained his real Sentiments from those which did not. “As “for the Symbol or private Note you desire, to “know my serious Letters and which contain

λοις η Θεοφραστου, τα μιν τοις πολλοις γεγραφοτας, τας δε ακροασεις τοις ιτατοις. Galeni de substantia naturalium facultatum Fragmentum.

^k “I very well understand (says Dr. S.) how one and the “same Doctrine may be handled *popularly* and *scientifically*: “*Popularly*, by using Topics suited to the Peoples Capacities; “by arguing and dilating upon a Subject; by spreading the “Matter, and setting it in different Lights. *Scientifically*, by “abstract close reasoning; by arguing from the more subtle “and recondite Nature of things. And thus, I think, the “twofold Doctrine was understood by the Ancients.” Dr. Sykes's *Vindication*, p. 12. And was it thus understood by *Galen*, when he wrote the Passage abovementioned? Does he not carry the Difference *much farther*, and evidently suppose that the two Doctrines are founded upon *contrary Propositions*?

“my

“ *my real Sentiments* from those that do not so ;
 “ know and remember that *God* begins a serious
 “ Letter, and *Gods* one that is otherwise.” *Re-*
marks on a Discourse of Free-thinking, part ii.
 p. 40. I chose to give the Passage in the Tran-
 slation of this learned Critic ; his Authority will
 prove that it speaks strongly to the Purpose for
 which it is produced. If his Translation be just,
 this single Testimony may serve to decide the
 whole Controversy. For had not *Plato*, in the
 Opinion of his Friends, sometimes given out
 Notions, which did not intirely correspond with
 the real Sentiments of his own Mind ; what oc-
 casion for the private Mark or Symbol, which
 they here desire ¹?

4. The Writers against the *D. L.* confirm this
 Doctrine by plain and clear Facts, at the very
 time they labour most to confute and overthrow
 it. Mr. *Y.* has supplied us with some very strong
 and unexceptionable Arguments in support of it,
 as I have observ'd in the last Chapter. The Re-
 verend Mr. *Botte* very frankly acknowledges,
 that *Cicero*, and other Ancients believed nothing

¹ Περὶ δὲ δὴ τὸ ἔμβολον τοῦ περὶ τὰς ἐπιστολάς, ὅσας τι αὐ-
 τοῖς ἐπιτελλῶ ΣΠΟΥΔΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΣΑΣ ἂΝ ΜΗ, οἶμαι μὴ σὶ μνησθῆναι·
 ὁμῶς δ' ἔπειτα, καὶ παύει προσεχῆς τοῖς νοῦν· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ κλεινοὶ
 γραφεῖν, οἷς οὐ ραδίον φανερώς διωδεῖσθαι· τῆς μὲν γὰρ σπου-
 δαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἀρχεῖ, Θεοὶ δὲ τῆς ἡλίου. *Epist.* 13. the follow-
 ing Words of *Cudworth*, as well as those of *Bentley*, may serve
 to shew, that I do not endeavour to make this Passage of *Plato*
 bear more than it will strictly carry. “ There is also a Pas-
 sage cited out of that thirteenth *Epistle* of *Plato's* to *Diony-*
 “ *sius*, wherein he gives this as a Mark, whereby his serious
 “ *Epistles*, and such as were written according to the true
 “ *Sense* of his own Mind, might by his Friends be distin-
 “ *guished from those which were otherwise.* When I begin
 “ *my Epistles with God,*” &c. *Intellectual System*, p. 402. But
 the very symbolic Mark made use of is sufficient to determine
 his Meaning.

of future Punishments^m. And yet it is obvious to every one that they often inculcate this very Doctrine in so forcible a manner, as plainly shews they would have others think they did believe it. Here then is a plain Proof that they exercis'd the double Doctrine, and that they exercised it on the very Point in Question.

I do not know how far the Names of Mr. *J.* and Mr. *Botte* will go with Dr. *Sykes* in the present Case; however, I think they all three ought to be of sovereign Authority with one another: It is indeed very surprising, that Mr. *Botte* should oppose the Notion of the double Doctrine explained in the *D. L.* and yet assert that *Cicero* and the old Philosophers really disbelieve'd all future Punishments. For when they teach this Doctrine, how is it possible, on his own Supposition, to skreen them from the Imputation of "saying one thing when they thought another," or of using the double Doctrine in all the Latitude and Extent, in which it has been charged upon them?—As for Mr. *J.* he indeed brings several Instances, which make directly against both the Dr. and himself. But as it is his Custom, *to say one thing and prove another*, which is the better half way to that philosophic Perfection of *saying one thing and believing another*, I am far from being surprized at any thing he has advanced on this Point. However, let the

^m "Tully—always spoke of the future State (in his Philosophical Works) as either a State of Happiness, or of no Sense at all; and could never conceive how a third could be. Nor is there any thing wonderful in this; for the Ancients might be much too easily led to think, that a State of NO SENSE, i.e. something tantamount to Annihilation, was a Punishment sufficient for the Transgressions of a short Life." Answer to D. L. p. 175.

Dr. either confute and disprove the Instances al-
 ledged by Mr. J. or confess that this Charge
 against the Philosophers is just.

C H A P. XIII.

*The Question with Dr. Sykes fairly stated,
 and the Instances produced in the first Edi-
 tion clear'd from his Exceptions.*

WE have seen enough of the Doctor to be
 upon our Guard, whenever he undertakes
 to state and represent Facts; and the following
 Instance, will, I think, shew that we cannot be
 too cautious how we trust him. He tells me,
 with much Haughtiness, that I “*intirely* alter
 “ the Question.” (p. 7.) That I “ grossly mis-
 “ represent the Point in Debate”—calls upon
 Mr. W. “ for *his own* Sake, for the Sake of
 “ *Truth*, for the Sake of common *Justice* not
 “ to make himself responsible for such Repre-
 “ sentation.” p. 8. These, we see, are well
 joined. I believe he has pretty much the same
 Regard to *Truth* and *Justice* that he has to Mr.
Warburton: And is equally solicitous that none
 of the three suffer in my Hands. But what has
 an *Answerer by Profession* to do with any of them,
 unless to misrepresent them. One may give a
 reasonable Guess how he stands with the two
former, by his noble Interpretation (just now
 spoken to) of the Term *Doctrine*, &c. in the
 Writings of the *latter*. However, I come at
 his Call; and am here ready to see what he has
 to say to me.

The Doctor had said, “ What Proof now can
 “ be produced that in the twofold Doctrine,
 “ they

“ they (the Philosophers) actually said one thing
 “ and believed another? What Instance is or
 “ can be produced of this Fact?” To this I
 replied, “ Here then we join Issue; if such an
 “ Instance can be produced, the Doctor, I am
 “ persuaded, according to his own Reasoning,
 “ will allow the Mistake to lie on his Side.”
 Now this, he tells me, is a gross Misrepresentation
 of the Point in Debate. How so! Why,
 “ If I join Issue with him here, I am to produce
 “ an Instance, 1st. In the *twofold Doctrine*.
 “ 2^{dly}. In *one and the same* Doctrine, handled
 “ only *popularly* and *scientifically*. 3^{dly}. Where
 “ the *popular* Manner of handling a Subject is
 “ *the* only Ground for conceiving a Man to *say*
 “ *what he did not* believe. For a Man may
 “ handle, I conceive, any Subject *popularly*, and
 “ yet believe it; or he may handle it *scientifically*,
 “ and yet not believe it.” *Vindication*, p. 7.

Was ever plain Proposition so clouded and in-
 veloped, as this, (I had like to have said) before
 us; but now vanished under the triple Cover of
 Blunder, Sophistry, and Prevarication?

The first Remark is, that I ought to have
 produced an Instance in the *twofold Doctrine*.
 To this I reply, that every Instance I have pro-
 duced is actually of this kind. As to his second
 Remark, I have explained at large what Mr. *W.*
 meant by *one and the same Doctrine*; and after
 this Explanation I need not go about to prove
 that my several Instances come up to the Point in
 Question. To his third Remark I answer, that
 I have all along been producing Instances, in
 which the Philosophers taught two contrary Doc-
 trines on *one and the same Subject*; one to their
 Disciples; another to the People. In this Case
 (and this is the only Case I am considering) I do
 indeed suppose that the public Doctrine was not
 P 8 believed,

believed, and that the private was. And so would the Doctor, too, if he had not found it necessary, in order to save himself from *Conviction*, to put a perverse Meaning on Mr. *W.*'s Words of *bandling popularly*, as if they signified *speaking to a Point immethodically*, when Mr. *W.* tells us, he means, *speaking according to the Opinions of the People*. Nay, in his unguarded Hours, that is, when he does not lie at catch for an Evasion, he can suppose it as well as I. For talking of *Plato*, he says, "Let him speak for the popular Opinions at some times, and even laugh at them at other times, all that will follow is, that *Plato* disbelieved the popular Opinions of the Gods, not that he disbelieved the Being of a God." *Sykes's Examination*, p. 127. Upon what Grounds now does the Doctor conclude that *Plato* disbelieved these popular Opinions? What Reason can he possibly assign for this, which will not equally hold for the Disbelief of popular Opinions, with respect to the Philosophers in general?

However the Doctor often repeats, that we must not conclude Notions were not really entertained, *barely because they are bandled in a popular Manner*. And how does he suppose that Subjects were *bandled in a popular Manner*? "Why, by using Topics suited to the Peoples Capacities; by arguing and dilating upon a Subject; by spreading the Matter, and setting it in different Lights." But who, let me ask him, ever supposed that Notions were disbelieved, *purely because they were treated in this Manner*? However, had he himself reflected, it may be thought possible he would have reminded his Reader, that I only make this Supposition *in Cases*, where 'tis evident that the Philosophers had two contrary Doctrines on the same Subject, one for the Multitude, and the other

other for themselves: And *in these Cases* the Doctor himself does agree with me, that the popular Opinion was not believ'd. Now this very Observation, if carefully attended to, will be a sufficient Answer to almost half his Pamphlet.

Sect. 1. So much for the Charge of *false Representation*. To come now to the Argument. I have observed that the *D. L.* does indeed charge both Legislators and Philosophers with the Practice of the double Doctrine. And it were easy to produce several Instances, with regard to the *first*, which every reasonable Man must allow to be decisive. But at present I will confine myself to one only. As to *their Laws*, they are so far from representing them as the mere Suggestions of human Policy and Wisdom, that they often assert their divine Origine; *they impute them to the Invention of the Gods*. Here then let the learned Doctor tell us, did they themselves believe this to be the real Fact? Did they suppose that their Laws were dictated and framed by some Deity? Or was this, after all, a pure Fiction and Contrivance of their own? He must say, of their own. And therefore it is certain by his own Confession, that the Ancients in this Case *did say one thing, when they believed another*. To this the Doctor objects; 1. "This is not an Instance *in the twofold Doctrine*. It should have been an Instance in *one and the same Doctrine* taught *popularly* sometimes, at other times *scientifically*: And in course *not believed* when taught *popularly*, but *believed* when taught in the other manner." *Vind.* p. 9. This is not an Instance *in the twofold Doctrine*. Why so? Because "it is not an Instance in *one and the same Doctrine* taught *popularly* sometimes, at other times *scientifically*." Now what is the

Q

Subject

Subject of each Doctrine, in the present Case, but the *Origin and Institution of the Laws*? One Doctrine makes these *divine*, the other *human*. Here then are two contrary Propositions drawn from one and the same Object or Subject.

When Mr. *W.* says that the same Subject was handled *popularly* and *philosophically*, what does he mean more, than that the ancient Sages spoke to the People, according to the common Notions; and to their Friends, according to their own? And was not this the very Case in the present Instance?

But he tells me, "I should have produced an Instance in one and the same Doctrine not believed when taught *popularly*, but believed when taught in the *other* manner." Admirable! and did Mr. *W.* or I ever pretend to say, that when *one and the same Doctrine* was taught to the People without method, that then it was not believed; but that when taught scientifically, and the Discourse divided in logical Form, then it began to be believed? Well might he say that *such an Account of the double Doctrine makes it impossible ever to be proved.*

When this wondrous Disputant says *one and the same Doctrine*, he means, we see, one and the same Proposition. Now why would he have me bring an Instance in which the two Doctrines contain one and the same Proposition? Is it because I have asserted the contrary? But he mistakes. The Contagion of those (with whom I have had so much to do of late) who bring Authorities to confute themselves has not yet reached me. I would not so far imitate even his Example, as to overturn the Doctrine I lay down by the Testimonies I produce in Confirmation of it. What he

he objects farther to this Argument shall be considered in the Note below.

Sect.

The Doctor proceeds; 2. " This is an Instance of Men asserting or teaching a downright Lie. Now I do not know, nor ever heard of any one that ever maintained that the Ancients never told a Lie, or never spoke what they knew to be false." What! and are the *Philosophers found Liars* at last? This is hard upon them. And by their Advocate too! Well, they have their Revenge however. I know who must bear them Company. For who would have thought it, that one of the main Points insisted on by this very Writer, was, that the Philosophers could not be guilty of so base a Practice as Lying? hence he infers, that they would not use the double Doctrine in that Extent, in which it has been charged upon them by the Author of the *D. L.* " This," says he, gives us an Idea of the old Philosophers as a Pack of strange People, BELIEVING ONE THING AND SAYING ANOTHER: It treats them as gross LYARS, so insincere, so dishonest, so imposing on the People, that, were any Man to act such a Part now, he would be condemned as guilty of the wickedest Craft, and would be detested by all honest Men as justly chargeable with Cunning, Hypocrisy, Dissimulation, and the Height of Wickedness and Immorality. Vices! which *Plato* and the *Hæthen* Philosophers in general condemned, and from their Souls abhorred." *Examination*, p. 111, 112.

He would do any thing he could, you see, for his Philosophers. But when matters come thus home, they must pardon him, he must take care of himself. Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed magis amicus ille ipse. But not to leave him, as he leaves his Philosophers, let me ask what is the Drift and Purpose of this last quoted Observation; but to shew, that the Philosophers would not practise the double Doctrine in the Latitude in which it is charged upon them, because they held lying to be an infamous and mean Custom? How therefore could I more effectually disprove and weaken the Force of what he here says, than by shewing that the Ancients did not scruple to lie, whenever the Good of the Public was thought to require it? To this I may add, that they not only held it to be lawful, but assert it to be *honourable* too, as we learn from *Plutarch*, in his *Life of Numa*.

3. " Supposing (says the Doctor) that the Ancients held it allowable to lie for the Good of the Commonwealth, if they had treated this Falshood in a scientific Manner, would

Q 2

" that

Sect. 2. Let us come to the Philosophers. The Gentleman affirms, that they never *teach one thing and think another*. Pray, what then was *Pythagoras* doing, when he gave out that he had descended into the infernal Regions; that he had visited the Seats and Abodes of departed Souls; that he had seen with his own Eyes the Tortures and Punishments inflicted on the Wicked? Must he not, in this Case, have employ'd the very Fiction, which the *D. L.* ascribes to the double Doctrine? Is it not necessary to imagine that he *said one thing and believed another*? To this, the Doctor replies, "Here is a *second Instance* labouring under all the Defects of the "first. *What was Pythagoras doing, when he "gave out that he had descended into the infernal "Regions?* Why, he was telling a *Lie* in the

"that have proved that they *believed* what they knew to be false, "more than their treating a Falshood in a *popular* Manner "would prove that they did *not believe* it?" His old *Sophism*, we see, still keeps uppermost. And this I'll say for him, no Confessor ever stuck closer to a Truth than he does to a Falshood. But a little Modesty, a little Regard for his Reader, would have done well. Can CONTROVERSY have so far got the better of him, as to persuade him it was possible for him to make any one believe, that, when Mr. *W.* said the Ancients lied for the public Good, and, that, to cover their Lye, they invented the Method of teaching by the *double Doctrine*, in which Matters were handled *popularly and scientifically*, that he meant, that their Belief or Disbelief was affixed to the Closeness or Looseness of the Form of their Discourse, and not to their Subject and Auditors? *Popularly and Scientifically* were not essential, but accidental Circumstances. And the Words only used as a shorter Way to signify *Discourses to their Disciples*, and *Discourses to the People*.—But I will drop so wretched a Subject, tho' the Doctor has half a Page more upon it, for fear the Reader, in a pardonable Disgust at Controversy, should here stop short, and throw aside the Book: And I am much inclined, for the Good of the Public, that our Doctor should be thoroughly known.

“ gross immoral Sense of that Word : He was
 “ guilty of an *Imposture* ; not of using the *two-*
 “ *fold Doctrine*, I mean the *esoteric* and *exoteric*
 “ *Doctrine* of the Ancients. Does any one of
 “ them make the *twofold Doctrine* consist in tel-
 “ ling such *Lies* as this ? It would be easy for
 “ Men of so much Reading as Mr. *W.* and this
 “ Author ; to produce some Instances, where the
 “ Words *Esoteric* and *Exoteric* are applied, (if
 “ ever they are applied) to Cases of such noto-
 “ rious *Falshoods*.” *Vind.* p. 11.

Pythagoras (says he) *was guilty of a gross im-*
moral Lie. Does he then allow that the Philoso-
 phers told *gross Lies* ? And this after he has taken
 so much Pains to clear them from the Imputation
 of this very Charge.

But observe now the Consistency with which
 he reasons on this Topic. In his *Examination* he
 contends that the Philosophers could not practice
 the *double Doctrine*, in the Latitude for which
 Mr. *W.* contends, because it would have involved
 them in the Guilt of Lying. In his *Vindication*
 he affirms that they did lie in the most gross and
 immoral Sense, and thence he infers that they did
 not use the *double Doctrine*. So that our Doctor's
 definitive Sentence against the *double Doctrine* con-
 cludes at last with a Keenness of Logic, that cuts
 both Back and Edge ;—They did not lie grossly,
 therefore they did not use the double Doctrine ;
 And again, They did lie grossly, therefore they
 did not use the double Doctrine. Many a Man
 can make out his Conclusion from *his own*, or
 from *one Set* of Principles ; but commend me to
 him who can make it out from his *Adversary's*,
 or from *any Set* of Principles.

For *what*, says he, *is this to the double Doctrine?* And does he then seriously suppose, that the double Doctrine was not employed in this Case? *Pythagoras* taught the People, that he had really descended into Hell; as to his select Friends, it must of course be supposed, that amongst them he treated this Descent as a mere Fiction. And what was this but practising the double Doctrine?

“ It would be easy for Men of so much Reading, to produce Instances, where the Words “ *Esoteric* and *Exoteric* are applied to Cases of “ such notorious Falshood? ” We won’t stand with him for an easy Matter. Let him turn to the Passage cited from *Galen* in the last Chapter. We are there told that the external and internal Doctrine did really contain opposite and repugnant Notions? Must it not then be supposed that one of them was not believed? But take which you will, the double Doctrine must necessarily contain *many* Instances of as gross and notorious a Falshood, as that I have been here exposing.

Well, but he will prove that there was no secret or hidden Notion in this Case. “ The *esoteric* Doctrine was what the Disciples of the “ Philosophers were let into. Now, how does it “ appear that *Pythagoras* ever let his Disciples “ into the Truth, that he only *pretended* to have “ gone into the infernal Regions? Did his famous *ipse dixit* prevail here? ” p. 11.

How does it appear that *Pythagoras* had any Disciples at all? If he had no other News to tell them than what he taught the People, he had no Need of any, nor they of him. But I had best stop here. For in the Humour he is in, his next
Question

Question perhaps may be "How do we know
 " that *Pythagoras* himself did not believe his
 " own Story?" And then, I confess, he would
 gravel me. "Or did his famous *ipse dixit* pre-
 "vail here?" Does the Doctor then really think
 his Disciples so supinely credulous that they would
 have believed this strange Story, unless their
 Master had interposed his *ipse dixit*? From what
 strange *Sympathy* of Heart or Understanding, I
 would fain know, does he infer, that these Disci-
 ples were so violently given to the *believing* Side?

But to convince us that the double Doctrine
 had no concern in the present Case, he adds,
 "Is his Descent into the infernal Regions, and
 " his no Descent, *one and the same Doctrine*?
 This is the old Quibble over again. Mr. *War-*
burton uses Doctrine in the Sense of the *Subject*
of Debate: Dr. *Sykes* in the Sense of *Proposition*.
The Subject of Debate is, the Descent of *Pytha-*
goras into *Hell*. The public Doctrine affirms that
 this Descent was actual and real: The private
 treats it as a mere Fiction. But surely both Do-
 ctrines relate to *one and the same Subject*: If the
 Doctor be disputing against himself, much may
 be said. But if he will argue against me or against
 Mr. *W.* he must use the Words in Mr. *W.*'s Sense.
 For all Mr. *W.*'s and my Arguments rest on that
 Sense^b. Sect.

^b "It was a popular Doctrine, says Dr. S. used by *Pytha-*
 " *goras*, that there were Punishments in the infernal Regions.
 " Take now the *same* Doctrine, *one and the same*, and treat it
 " *scientifically*, you cannot here say there will be no Punish-
 " ments hereafter, or that the Soul will be absorbed or anni-
 " hilated. For this is not the *same* Doctrine, handled in a
 " different Manner, but quite a different Doctrine." p. 12.

I am so tired with this senseless, shameless Sophism per-
 petually blundered in to cloud and darken the clearest Propo-
 sition that ever was advanced, (namely "that the Philoso-
 " phers said one thing while they believed another, and to

Sect. 3. I will now proceed to another Instance in the same Sect. The common Doctrine taught that the Souls of Men were doomed to pass into other Bodies, as a Punishment for their Sins in this Life. The Philosophers themselves sometimes inculcate this Notion; but then they sometimes give a different Account of this Doctrine: Souls are to migrate into other Bodies, by a mere *physical* and *natural* Necessity, and not by way of Punishment. Here then are two contrary Notions of a future State; the one supposes a moral Purpose and Design; the other gives all to *pure Necessity*. Must not these Doctrines be founded on opposite and repugnant Principles? Must not the Philosophers, when they preach

“ cover their Commerce of Deceit employed their Method “ of the *double Doctrine*”) that I should not have quoted this Passage but for another Purpose, which is to illustrate our Doctor’s great Knowledge in the Principles of the *Greek Philosophy*. “ You cannot say, here will be no Punishments, “ or the Soul will be *absorpt* or *annihilated*.”—“ Absorpt or “ annihilated.” He considers them, you see, as one and the same thing; and supposes that the Soul was to be *annihilated*, when it was resolved into the divine Nature. The *Refusion* we do indeed often hear of; ’tis mention’d as the Doctrine of *Pythagoras* and his Followers: But as to this Principle of *Annihilation*, it is, I apprehend, a Discovery of our Author’s own.

Deum namque ire per omnes

Terrasque tractusque maris, cœlumque profundum.

Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,

Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.

Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac resoluta referri

Omnia, nec morti esse locum.

Virgil Georg. iv.

We see here that the Soul was not to be annihilated or reduced to nothing. And, what is more, we see that the *Refusion* was the very thing which was to prevent it. It is therefore evident that these, in the System of the Ancients, were consider’d as very different and distinct things. In the Doctor’s they are one and the same. And who would not leave Antiquity, for this new Guide, and his simple System?

What he talks here of *future Punishments* is quite foreign to the Purpose of the present Argument: As to the private Doctrine on that Head, it properly belongs to the next Section.

up the popular Notion, *say one thing and believe another?*

With regard to these two Migrations, it may perhaps be said (for what is there that has not been *said*, and what is there that has been *proved* on the Occasion?) how do we know which was the popular and external, which the secret and internal Doctrine? But surely the very Nature of the Doctrines is sufficient to point out this Distinction. The physical Migration was of no real Use and Service to Society, nay, was intirely destructive of it, and so could be only taught because it was really and actually believ'd. The moral Migration was so eminently useful to the State, that the Philosophers would not have scrupled to teach it, tho' they had really disbeliev'd it. And that this was the very Case, we have the exprefs Testimony of *Timæus Locrus*, who mentions this last as an Opinion, that was cultivated *merely on the Score of its Utility*.

And that the physical Migration was a secret and hidden Doctrine, is evident from the Manner, in which it is introduced by *Ovid*:

Et quoniam deus ora movet, sequar ora mo-
ventem

Rite deum, Delphosque meos, ipsumque re-
cludam

Æthera, & augustæ referabo oracula mentis.

Magna, nec ingeniis evestigata priorum,

Quæque diu latuere, canam, &c.

Metam. l. xv.

Let us examine what the Doctor objects to this Reasoning. He tells me, " I overlook the No-
" tion of the *twofold Doctrine* as Mr. *W.* had
" given it, and which was the Foundation of all
" that was said on this Head. The *twofold*
" *Doctrine*

“ *Doctrine was one and the same, differently handled.* Now a Transmigration for Punishment, “ *is a different Doctrine from a Transmigration by pure Necessity; and therefore not to the Purpose.*” p. 13. The Doctor’s *Sophisms* are not for once, and away, like the Politician’s Lie, that lasts its Hour, and, when it has done its Work, is heard of no more, but gives Place to a new *Invention*. You shall sometimes have your Disputers of this World of so fertile Imaginations, or so weak in Judgment as to present you with a new *Sophism* on every fresh Exigency. But this waste of good things our parsimonious Doctor condemns; and when he has been at the Expence of a *Sophism indeed*, he knows when he is well. There he rests, and employs it as constantly as the Monks do their *plain Song*, at Matins, Noon, and Vespers. The Honour of celebrating this Master *Sophism* falls to my Lot. Mr. *Warburton* has done Justice to just such another; of the same Growth and Size, and out of the same Nursery, the Doctor’s *Examination*. But mine now meets me so familiarly at every turn, that I am grown ashamed of my Acquaintance; and shall henceforth treat it as a Stranger, with much Ceremony, wherever I find it. Suppose us, then, to be grown unacquainted, while I answer it as if I had never seen it’s Face before.

All that was meant by the Author of the *D. L.* was, that the double Doctrine had a *single Object*, or that one and the same *Subject* was handled in different Conclusions. The Subject, in the present Case, was the Migration of the Soul from one Body to another. One way of teaching it was by a Migration by *Punishment*; the other a Migration by *pure Necessity*. Here then we have given

given us, the *same Doctrine*, under *two* different Considerations.

"Or if, says the Doctor, you say that the Transmigration by Necessity was not a Transmigration, but Refusion of the Soul,—this will be so far from being the *same Doctrine*, that it will be quite *another*." What would this learned Doctor be at? Whence does he imagine any one will say that the physical Migration and Refusion of the Soul were one and the same thing? have they not all along in this Controversy been consider'd as very separate and distinct States? The thing asserted in the *D. L.* is, that the Soul after Death was to migrate successively from one Body to another for a certain Period; and was *after this* to be resolved into the divine Substance.

"I must ask here (continues the Doctor) which was the popular, and which was the scientific Manner of handling the Doctrine of Transmigration? The Answer, I suppose, will be, the Transmigration for Punishment, held on the Score of Utility, was the Popular. What then was the scientific Manner of handling the same Doctrine? *The Answer must be, that there was no Transmigration at all.*" p. 13. Pray, Sir, answer for yourself; You will find you will have enough to do: And let me tell my own Story. I will assure you, I shall make no such Answer. But shall tell you plainly that the secret Doctrine taught a Transmigration, *which was not supposed to have any moral Purpose and Design.*

"Hence then (says he) one must conclude, that no Transmigration, (he should have added, with Punishment) and a Transmigration for Punishment, were one and the same Doctrine, handled differently." p. 13. And where would
be

be the Harm, if you did? Was not your Dispute with Dr. *Twells* about one and the same Doctrine, *the Doctrine of Devils*? He thought the Devil was in the Scripture Demoniacs; and, (if that would make more *Doctrines* than one) perhaps, in you too, for denying it. You thought the Demoniacs were no Demoniacs. These, I suppose, you will grant were only different Explanations of the same Doctrine. For the Scripture Doctrine of Demoniacs, was the Question. Be but so good then as to allow Mr. *W.* the same Latitude of Expression, in using *Doctrine* for the Subject in question; and you would give much Ease both to yourself and your Reader. For it must needs be ungrateful to you both to keep a poor miserable Sophism so long upon the Stretch.

Again: He tells me, "I should remember that this physical Migration was still a continued Life." p. 15. But how does this shew any Absurdity in my Reasoning, or at all affect it? Do I not all along suppose that the Soul was to *live*, during the Course of these Migrations? If the Doctor would speak to the Purpose, let him shew that it was to live in a State of future Rewards and Punishments.

"*Pythagoras* (says he) might give this Transmigration to pure Necessity, and yet think it consistent with moral Designation." p. 15, 16. But where was the Difference between the common Transmigration and that of *Pythagoras*, if the last had a moral Purpose and Design? Or how could *Diogenes Laertius* mean to distinguish it from the other, by calling it a Transmigration *by Necessity*, if it was supposed to include a moral View, as well as the other?

"He (*Pythagoras*) tells us of a constant Change, of things, and of Souls migrating in-
" to

“ to Beasts, and Birds and other Forms. *Sup-*
 “ *pose* now that he meant by the constant Change
 “ and Succession of things of the World no
 “ more than an *establish'd Order of Providence,*
 “ which appointed things to go on in this Man-
 “ ner,—then these two Opinions of a future
 “ State may not be *repugnant, but consistent.*”
 p. 16.

Ay, but hold a little, I may chuse whether I will allow our Doctor to suppose any such thing. And, this by the fairest Laws of Disputation; because it is supposing the very thing in Dispute. And I am not at present in an Humour to give him more than his Due. And his telling me what he intends to do with it, will be no great Inducement to my Compliance. For he says, that, on this *Supposition,* he will shew *these two Opinions of a future State to be consistent;* or in other Words, If I will be so kind to grant him, what he cannot prove, that the Metempsychosis of *Pythagoras* had a *moral Purpose and Design,* he will then prove against me, what at present he is forced to take for granted, that it was not merely *Physical* ^c.

Sect.

^c Another Argument, alledged to shew, that these Migrations had a moral Purpose and Design, is, “ that they might, “ in the Notion of *Pythagoras,* be consistent with the Soul’s “ Return at last into God, after it has undergone these va- “ rious Changes.” p. 16. Who ever pretended to say that these two Notions were not consistent? Or that the Soul was not to be resolved into the divine Substance, when these Migrations were over? But how will this prove, that these Migrations had a moral Purpose and Design?

But, “ supposing, says the Doctor, that there is a real Op- “ position between this Metempsychosis and the Doctrine of “ future Punishments; yet the Philosophers might not see it.” p. 15. To this I reply, it is a plain Fact that they really did see it, because they represent this Transmigration, as inconsistent with the Belief of future Punishments.

Again:

Sect. 4. We will go to the *Stoics* for a fourth Instance: As to the *Refusion* of the Soul, we have shewn that they supposed it to be a State of mere Insen-

Again: "*Pythagoras* says, *Souls always live*, which could not be, if the Refusion into God implied a State of Insensibility." p. 16. This, I suppose, is urged to shew that the Refusion of the Soul into the divine Substance was not to destroy its personal and distinct Existence. To which I may answer, that this Notion of the Refusion, whether it be true or false, is of no Consequence to the main Point we are here debating. We are only inquiring what *Pythagoras* thought of the Soul, during the Time of its Migrations from one Body to another; during the Interval between Death and the time, when it was to be resolved into the divine Substance.

I will just take Notice of some remarkable Passages in the fourteenth Page. "The popular Notion of a future State taught by *Pythagoras* was, that Transmigration was for Punishment; that a Coward's Soul was to pass into a Woman's Body, &c. This, it seems, *Pythagoras* did not believe. But how will this be proved." How proved, does he say? Why, as all past Facts are, or should be proved, by good credible Evidence. And, of this, we have the best, if that will satisfy him, the ancient *Timæus*, who expressly says, that all this was a mere Fiction, and inculcated only in order to restrain the Populace from Vice.

"We have, from *Ovid*, Words given to *Pythagoras* himself; and it is certain (this Author tells us so) that they contain his Notion." If this was said to support what I contend for, it might have been done with something more Ingenuity: If it was said to confute me, he has strange ill Luck; for, to use his own Words, *Can any one, not wilfully, blind help seeing*, that *Pythagoras* could not believe the moral Account of a future State, if these Words contained his real Notion?

But does not *Ovid* say, "the Soul is to live after it is gone out of the Body?" To which I reply, the Question is whether it was to live in a State of Rewards or Punishments. He asks again, "How is it possible to prove that *Pythagoras* did not believe what he here says?" But against whom is he disputing? Do I not all along affirm that *Pythagoras* did believe it? Does not my Argument receive its whole Force from this very Supposition?

"His Account of his own Transmigration, (says the Doctor) his Assurance that the Soul was always the same, &c. shew the Reason of his rejecting the common Opinion of a future

Insensibility. It is however allowed on all Hands, that this was the *secret* Doctrine with regard to a future State. If so, must not the private have been directly opposite and repugnant to the public Teaching? The one mentions a future State with Rewards and Punishments; the other a future State without them. Do we not again meet with contrary Propositions? Was it possible for the Philosophers in this Case, *not to say one thing and think another?*

To this the Doctor replies; "I do not think myself concerned to explain what the *Stoics* meant by, *being remixed in the divine Nature, or returning into the whole,*" p. 17. It is difficult to know what one of these Answerers *does,*

"ture State." What was his Account of his own Transmigration? That he had been first *Æthalides* the Son of *Mercury*; and, having got leave of that God to beg whatever he pleased, he asked to remember his several Transmigrations. Sometime after he was *Euphorbus*, then *Hermotimus*, then a Fisherman of *Delos* named *Pyrrhus*, and last of all *Pythagoras*, with the Memory of all these things, and what he had suffered in *Hell*, and what other Souls suffer there. Was this rejecting the *common Account* of a future State? Why, it was the very *common Account* itself.

The Doctor, in this very Page, asserts, that *Pythagoras* rejected the Notion of *Styx*, and all the other Figments of the Poets, and substituted in their room another Doctrine of a future State. He rejected all the Figments of the Poets. And for what? to substitute in himself, if you will credit our profound Doctor, the Belief of a Figment of his own. I mean of his own adopting. For in reality it was one of these very Figments of the Poets from which our Doctor would withdraw it, and set it in Opposition to them.

Lastly he says, that *Pythagoras* made an Innovation and Refinement in the common Doctrine of a future State; and this by introducing the *Metempsychosis*. *Pythagoras* must therefore have invented either the moral or the physical Nation on this Point. Now the *moral* was known long before his time, he must therefore be Author of the *physical*. And thus in good time the Doctor and I are agreed.

or does not, think himself concerned to do. And more difficult, still, to understand him, when he has done it. Otherwise I should think it hard that he will neither answer the most essential Articles of my Defense, nor yet give up the Point. "Only this (says he) I would observe, that Pythagoras conceived the Soul to live, notwithstanding his Notion of the Refusion of it into God." *Notwithstanding*, does he say? Why this very Refusion supposed *Life*. Matter is a dead, and Spirit, a living Substance; according to them, discerped from the Fountain of Life. This discerped Portion had Life before its separate Existence, and must have Life after it. The Question then is not whether the Soul *always lives*; but whether it *always lives in a distinct Existence*. Could he bring Pythagoras saying this, it had been to the Purpose.—But our Doctor's Criticism is as bad as his Philosophy. He thus proves that Pythagoras said "Souls *always live*."

Morte carent animæ, *semperque*, priore relicta
Sede, novis domibus vivunt, habitantque receptæ.

He takes the Word *semper* in the most strict and rigorous Sense. And now see the Consequence; he must of Course confine the Soul to these Migrations, from one Body to another, *during the whole Period of its Being*. On this Supposition it was *never* to be resolved into the divine Substance; how then will he prove that it was to *live after this Refusion*?

But supposing the *Stoical* Notion of a Refusion was inconsistent with the Belief of a future State, "it must (he says) be proved that the *Stoics* saw this Repugnancy before you can infer that they openly held one Doctrine, and privately believed another." p. 18. But now, what have I been

I been doing, if I have not shewn that they not only clearly and *fully* saw this Inconsistency, but even *contended* for it; urging this Refusion as a Proof that the Soul was no longer to remain a separate and distinct Existence? And what was he doing, if he did not see this? Doing? Why he was *answering*.

Page 19. he asks, "Whether these repugnant Doctrines are maintained by the same Persons, or by different ones." Next to the egregious Impertinence of this Question, would be the answering it. Let us think then we only hear old Mother *Chicane* in her Dotage; and proceed. "But this (says the Doctor) might be owing to want of Accuracy, Rant, Carelessness, change of Sentiment, and not to the double Doctrine." As well as he loves his Philosophers, I believe he would give them every Sin in the Decalogue to charge it upon, so he could keep off the *Double Doctrine*. But I will shew him presently, that, even upon his own Principles, this Refusion was a private and hidden Doctrine.

But the Language of the *Stoics* on this Article is so very dark and mysterious, that, in the Opinion of the Doctor, "it is very hard to say what they meant." 19, 20. Was this, now, a Fact, what plainer Account could be given of the Cause of it than the Use of the *double Doctrine*? And for this very Reason, not to mince the Matter, I suspect the Doctor himself of the *double Doctrine*. Nor let this offend him; for I know no other way of saving his Credit than by supposing these Pamphlets to be in the Number of his *Exoterics*. However, as dark and mysterious as the *Stoical* Language may appear to *him*, I have shewn that several Writers of the first Name thought it very plain and easy; that they understood it in the

very Sense I here contend for. And, what is more, I have proved, by numerous Testimonies, that they understood it rightly. And does the Doctor fancy, his thread-bare saying that the Language of the *Stoics* is *dark and mysterious* is a sufficient Answer to all this? The *darker* the better, methinks, for such a Writer, whose Talent lies not in confusing what his Adversary does say; but in making him say, what he thinks he can confute. If then a Writer so fond of Controversy, and so framed for groping in the Dark, leaves me in Possession of all my Facts and Testimonies, I can think but of one Reason for his Forbearance.

But to come to his capital Objection; “How
 “(says he) does it appear that the Refusion of
 “the Soul was the *secret Doctrine* with Regard
 “to a future State, when this Notion is *published*
 “*openly* in their Books, and made *no Secret* of?
 “Or which way shall we distinguish a *secret Do-*
 “*ctrine* from an open one, if both are equally
 “published in their Books?” p. 18. Again:
 “Was it then (the Refusion) a *secret Doctrine*,
 “and yet openly avowed in all their Books?
 “And *discreetly* publicly declared by them all?
 “Could a Doctrine be more properly vulgar,
 “than to have it divulged in all their Books?
 “Strange Secret! that every Body knew, and
 “that every Body was let into, and every Book-
 “seller’s Shop contained a full Account of.”
 p. 20.

As to the metaphysical Principle, which teaches that the Soul is truly and properly a Part of God; that it was taken from him, and will be again absorbed and resolved into him; I did indeed offer it as a private Notion, imagining that I had the Doctor’s Leave to do so: As he himself has considered it in the very same Light.
 For

For what does he make the secret Doctrine of the Soul? Why, 'tis a "deep, subtile, metaphysical, abstruse Notion" on this Point. Now what "deep, subtile, metaphysical, abstruse Notion" of the Soul was there besides that I am here explaining? In another Place he tells us "*the philosophic Notion was that all things arose from one, and would be resolved into one again*". I do not apprehend (says he) that "*the People of the Jews, or any other Nation, enter'd into the philosophical Notion of the Soul's returning into God, or into the $\rho\acute{o}\varsigma$ or $\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\omega\nu$, or whatever Whims much later Ages than what we are now speaking of produced.*" Examination, p. 52. He is, I hope, sensible by this time, that I have all along been arguing on his own Concessions; that I have only been enforcing an Argument *ad hominem*. It is then a

^f Sykes's Examination, p. 86. 102. &c. *Connexion of Nat. and Revel. Religion*, p. 393. "If he treated a Subject esoterically, he treated it according to the strict Reasons of things, according to the Nature of the Soul; in short, according to the Rules of the more profound and subtile Philosophy, in which esoteric Doctrines consisted." Examination, p. 100. "Notions of the more abstruse and profound Philosophy, such as are properly esoteric," pag. 102. Vid. too p. 103. 4, 6. Now does it not appear from all these Characters and Descriptions of the secret Doctrine, that the metaphysical Speculations of the Philosophers about the Soul were so many hidden and private Notions? These taught that the Soul was of the very same Nature and Substance with God, truly and properly a Part of him, actually discerped from him and would again be resolved into him. Now are not these very *subtile abstract* and profound Doctrines? Do they not treat the Soul according to the most *subtile* and *profound* Philosophy? are they not therefore, by his own Definition, private and esoteric Notions?

^g In his *Connexion*, &c. p. 363. &c. he gives this as the metaphysical and philosophic Notion of the Soul. It was therefore, even upon his own Principles, the private Notion.

Point agreed between us, that this Refusion was a private Doctrine. Whatever therefore the Doctor urges to prove the Negative, will have the same Force against his own Hypothesis as against mine. It is equally incumbent on him, as on me, to shew that this was really and actually a private Doctrine. If this *open Publication*, as he calls it, makes any thing against my Notion, how can it possibly support his?

2. The Difficulty does not rest here : It is easy to point out other Principles, which are clearly and fully mentioned by ancient Writers, and yet the Doctor himself will confess that they were private and hidden Notions. “ *Plato thought there were some Truths which it was not fit the People should know ; e. g. that the World is not to be intrusted with the true Notion of God. Scævola in like manner thought, that the People were not to be intrusted with the Secret that Hercules, Æsculapius, Castor, Pollux, were not Gods, but had been mortal Men.*” *Exam. p. 127.* Let me then ask the Doctor, does not *Plato*, do not a thousand Authors of Antiquity, mention this very Notion of the true God in their Writings? Does not *Scævola*, do not many of the most celebrated Writers in the old World, explain and open in their Books *this Secret* with regard to the popular or Hero Gods?

I may add here, that these two Doctrines were the very Secret of the *great Mysteries* ; no Body therefore, I presume, will imagine that these were popular and common Notions.—It is then notorious and allowed on all Hands, that these two were secret and hidden Notions ; this is evident from the Doctor’s own Concession ; from the Testimonies of *Plato, Scævola, &c.* I must therefore call upon *him* to explain, whence it comes

comes that they are published in the Writings of the Ancients? Any clear Solution that he shall please to afford us of this Difficulty, will equally serve to give us an Account, why the *Refusion* too might be considered as a private Doctrine, and yet be actually inserted in the ancient Writings.

And here I could wish the Doctor would look about him, and consider what Sort of Argument he is employing: If it proves against me that the *Refusion* was no secret Doctrine, it will with equal Force prove the same against himself. What indeed will it not prove? It will prove that the very Secrets of the Mysteries, the Notion of the one God, &c. were all public and open Doctrines.

To consider it again in another View. The good Doctor is puzzled to account for this ancient Management, that *the secret and hidden Doctrines of the Philosophers should be publickly avowed in their Writings which lay open in every Bookseller's Shop*. Yet if his Word may be taken, he has himself supplied us with the Solution of his own Difficulty; for of the *Stoics* he says, *that their Language is so very dark and mysterious, that it is very hard to say what they meant*. We find then the *esoteric* Doctrine might be well intrusted to Booksellers Shops, nay even to the Doctor's own Study, and no body the wiser for it.

3. But again, the Supposition, on which the Doctor all along argues, is, that no Principle could be published in the Writings of the Ancients, and yet escape the Knowledge of the Vulgar. I have just shewn that this is strangely inconsistent with the very Account which he himself gives of the secret Doctrines. I will now shew that it plainly contradicts what the best Wri-

ters of Antiquity have said on this Subject. When *Plato* opens and explains the true Notion of God, did he design this for the *Information* of the People, and yet declare that *the People were not to be intrusted with it*? When *Scaevola* says that the Populace was not to be acquainted with the true and real Origin of the Hero Gods, is it possible to conceive he intended that *this very Passage* should come to the Knowledge of the Vulgar? When *Cicero* expressly says that the Points discussed in his Books could not be debated before the People, will any one suppose that he would suffer these very Books to be in the Hands of the People; to lie *on every Bookseller's Stall*, open and exposed to all who would chuse to read them ^h?

Galen
^h Intelligebat Cicero falsa esse, quæ homines adorarent; nam cum multa dixisset, quæ ad everisionem religionum valerent, ait tamen, non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat. Lactantius Div. Inst. 2, 3. And here let the Doctor turn to *Plato*, *Scaevola*, and *Cicero*, and question them with the same *Insolence* of Superiority that he does me. "Were these then secret Doctrines, and yet openly avowed in your Writings? Could Doctrines be more properly vulgar, than to have them divulged in your Writings? Strange Secrets! that every Body knew, and that every Body was let into, and every Bookseller's Shop contained a full Account of." Would this be deemed good Reasoning against *Plato*, *Scaevola*, and *Cicero*? if not, what is it to the Purpose of our present Argument?

In another Place, speaking of the Refusion, he says, "Do not the *Stoics* openly in their Books own this Doctrine? does not *Seneca*, does not *Antoninus* publicly teach it? it is published in their Books, and their Books were common to all." p. 17.

But, let me ask in my Turn, whence did the Doctor learn that *Antoninus* designed his *Meditations* for the Public, and did not compose them for his own Use?—I had brought too two Passages from two of *Seneca's* Epistles with regard to this very Point. And whence does the Doctor know that *Seneca* published

Galen and *Clemens of Alexandria*, both inform us that the Philosophers designed some Books for their Disciples only and select Friends. Does the Doctor admit this Distinction? If he does, upon what grounds does he infer, that whatever was published, was published *to every Body*. And if Books might be published, and yet not published to every Body, what becomes of the Argument I am here examining?

What will our Doctor say to the Verses of *Parmenides*? Do not the Ancients themselves tell us, that when he addressed himself to the Multitude, he was forced to deliver a quite opposite and contrary Doctrine? But what occasion for this, if the People had been actually possessed of the Principles laid down in these Verses?

As to the philosophical or secret Notion of a future State, the Doctor himself is pleased to assert that it excludes the Notion of *Styx*, *Acheron*, &c. (*Exam.* p. 99.) and, I dare say, he will not deny, that this Exclusion is often mentioned in the Writings of the old Philosophers.

Where then is the Difference between the Doctor and myself? Does not he suppose that the secret Doctrine of a future State is published in the Books of the Ancients, as well as I? If then it be said that the Philosophers would not insert a private Notion in their Writings, the Doctor himself is as much obliged to reconcile and explain

lished these Epistles to *all the World*? Does he not remember the Passage, in which *Seneca* himself declares that he practised the double Doctrine on this Subject. *D. L.* vol. i. p. 346, 7.

With respect to these two Writers, I must inform the Doctor, that the true Notion of God is sometimes mentioned in their Books: But will he infer from hence, in direct Contradiction to his own Hypothesis, that this was a public Doctrine?

this as I am ; it is his Business to supply me with a proper Answer to this Objection, as his own Hypothesis cannot stand without one.

But after all, this is a mere imaginary Difficulty; and arising, as most Difficulties of this Nature do, from an utter Ignorance of Antiquity. It is sad that at this time of Day, he must be told, that in early Antiquity the forwardest Writer or most enterprising Bookseller never had such a Thought as of a general Publication to furnish Shops and Warehouses. If a Man wrote any thing for the People, those who would might take a Copy of it : If, only *a Word to the Wise*, it was communicated under the Seal of Secrecy. As to those Works, which were fit neither for one nor the other, they came and went unobserved just as the Doctor's Pamphlets do now. And where is the difficulty in all this ?

CHAP.

I must take Notice of two things with regard to the double Doctrines. 1. I do not imagine, it was ever exercised in so constant and uniform a manner, that the private Notions were never disclosed, or came to the Knowledge of the People. *Empedocles* and several others are upon Record for having publish'd and divulged them, contrary to the general and common Custom of those Times.

2. As the Times grew more licentious and corrupt, they were concealed with less Care and Circumspection than before. *Cæsar* indeed ventured to declare against a future State in full Senate; and the most sober Writers of that Age took greater Freedoms in ridiculing the national Religion than would have been allowed in better Times. However we are not to imagine that the double Doctrine was intirely laid aside. *Cicero*, in one of his philosophical Discourses, takes great Pains to ridicule and expose the popular Divinities; but then he declares that he would not have used the same Liberty in public, or have made the same Declarations before the People. *Seneca*, long after this, laughs very freely at the Religion of his Country, and yet inculcates a constant Adherence to its Rites as the Duty of all good Citizens. *Quæ omnia sapiens servabit, tanquam legibus*

CH A P. XIV.

The other Instances alledged in the first Edition vindicated from the Exceptions of Dr. Sykes.

LET us proceed to my fifth Instance. We have shewn in the foregoing Sheets that the

gibus iussa, non tanquam diis grata. — Omnem istam ignobilem Deorum turbam, quam longo ævo, longa superstitio congeffit, sic adorabimus, ut meminerimus cultum ejus magis ad morem, quam ad rem pertinere. Augustin. De C. D. vi. 10. Would he thus press and recommend the Observance of the public Religion, while he himself considered it as a mere Fiction, unless he had *still* practised the double Doctrine, or held it lawful to say one thing, when he thought another?

3. It appears therefore that they were very careful to secrete and preserve their real Notions from the Knowledge of the People. And the very Reason assigned for the Concealment of these Principles does, I think, hold equally for the Concealment of that, by which they denied a future State. The first were not to be opened and discovered, because they would have been very hurtful and pernicious to the People. And was not the last Notion as improper for their Information as the first could possibly be? It certainly was, because the Ancients looked upon a future State as the main Bulwark and Support of Civil Society.

I have the Pleasure to find this Reasoning confirmed by a Writer exquisitely well skilled in the Systems of the Ancients. The learned *Bayle* collects many Instances, in which they deny all future Punishments; however he supposes that this Doctrine, *tho' publish'd in their Writings*, was kept from the Knowledge of the Vulgar. *Je ne croi pas que les ignorans aient connu ce Systeme, &c. Reponse au questions d'un Provincial, vol. iv. p. 324.*

On the whole, what I must chiefly desire the Reader to recollect and take along with him, is, 1. That the double Doctrine was never practised with so much Vigilance and Care, as *constantly* and at *all times* to keep the secret Notions from the Knowledge of the People.

2. That as the times grew more degenerate, it would of Course be exercised with less Caution and Reserve; however the Instances abovementioned do plainly prove that it was *still* practised.

Ancients

Ancients sometimes make the Soul *God*; but it is likewise obvious that they sometimes urge and insist that the Soul is *not God*. Here then are two different Doctrines on the very same Subject; and is it not evident that they must of Course proceed on contrary Propositions? For the Fact, on which I build this Argument, I appeal to the following Passages of *Cicero*. *Mens cujusque est quisque; non ea figura quæ digito monstrari potest. Deum te igitur scito esse; siquidem Deus est qui viget, qui sentit, qui meminit, qui providet, qui tam regit et moderatur, et movet id corpus, cui præpositus est, quam hunc mundum ille princeps Deus. Somn. Scip. 8.*

In his first *Tusculan* he speaks another Language, *Ergo animus (qui, ut ego dico, divinus) est, ut Euripides dicere audeat Deus. c. 26.* Do not the two Passages relate to the very same Subject? does not the last censure and arraign the Doctrine of the first? does not the one plainly assert, and the other as plainly deny the Divinity of the human Soul? Had I not therefore Reason to say that the two Doctrines must necessarily go upon contrary Propositions?

To this the Doctor objects two things. 1. *Cicero* in the first Passage uses the Word *Deus* in a metaphorical and figurative Sense: Let him speak for himself. “He says the Ancients sometimes “make the Soul *God*. *For this no other Instance is produced but a Passage of Cicero.*” p. 21. But why does he say, I have produced *only one Passage*? “We have shewn (say I) in the *foregoing Sheets*, that the Ancients sometimes make “the Soul *God*.” When I refer to the *foregoing Sheets*, must I not be supposed to mean the *viith* and *viiith* Chapters of this Book? and in these I have

I have alledged between twenty and thirty Authorities to prove, that the Soul was believed to be really and actually a Part of God.

In these Chapters, I have proved, by clear and undeniable Testimonies, that *Plato* was one of those who entertained this Notion. Now *Tully*, in the Passage I have just cited, was actually explaining the Sentiments of *Plato* on this very Subject. And is not this enough to shew that *Tully* understood the Word *Deus* in the most literal and strict Sense?

However to confirm my Interpretation, I will offer the only unexceptionable Authority I can think of. He himself contends that *Pythagoras* held the Soul to be truly and properly a Part of God^a. He will allow too that *Pythagoras* and *Plato* had the same Opinion on this Point. Now *Cicero*, in the Place from which this Passage is taken, is delivering the Doctrine of *Plato*: We may therefore presume that he calls the Soul God, in the Sense I have been establishing.

2. Whence, says the Doctor, do you know, that this was a private Doctrine? Here then I must remind him that I was all the time urging a mere Argument *ad hominem*; that I was rea-

^a *Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion*. "The old Notion maintained by *Pythagoras* and others was that there was one great Soul pervading all things, and that human Souls were Segments, Avulsions; or Parts of that, some how or other separated and divided from it." p. 82. And for this he refers us to *Cicero De N. D. l. 1.* and quotes the famous Passage, *Pythagoras, qui censuit animum esse per naturam rerum omnium intentum &c.* Observe now the Perversity of this learned Man. He will not allow that more than twenty Passages, when alledged by me, are enough to prove this very thing; and yet one, when produced by himself, is sufficient for this Purpose; and, what is most remarkable, it is one of those very Passages I myself cite.

soning on the very Principles which he himself lays down. *Cicero* states and explains the famous Argument of *Plato* to prove the Immortality of the Soul; and has not the Doctor himself told us that this was a private and esoteric Notion? Why then does he quarrel with me for saying the same thing?

I will now beg leave to inforce an Argument of Mr. *Warburton's*, which the learned Dr. *Sykes* has not vouchsafed to answer, or even to mention. But how light soever he may make of it, the Public may possibly be of Opinion, that it did not deserve to be treated with so much Neglect. However let the *Divine Legation* speak for itself.

“ We have seen the Philosophers of every Sect,
 “ one while speaking directly for, and another
 “ while as directly against a future State of Re-
 “ wards and Punishments, without intimating
 “ the least Change in their Principles, or mak-
 “ ing the least Hesitation in their Professions;
 “ so that either we must hold them guilty of the
 “ most gross and visible Contradictions, which
 “ their Characters will not suffer us to conceive
 “ of them; or else admit the Explanation given
 “ above of the *double Doctrin*e, and the differ-
 “ rent Methods of the exoteric and esoteric Dis-
 “ cipline ^b.”

The Doctor will not charge these *various Professions* to the Fickleness and Inconstancy of the old Philosophers. His Reverence and Regard for the Men will not suffer him to do this; besides, this would intirely defeat his own Scheme, as he undertakes to prove that the Philosophers believed a future State of Rewards and Punishments ^c.

^b *Divine Legation*, vol. i. p. 403.

^c See his *Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion*.

He must then have Recourse to the *double Doctrine*. And here I would know what he will do with those Passages in which the Philosophers profess their Disbelief of another Life. They must either make part of the public or the private Doctrine. Will he assign them to the *first*? No: They contradict the very Purpose and Design of this Doctrine; as it used constantly to recommend and inforce the Notion of a future State. And yet if he gives them to the private Doctrine, he himself overturns his whole Argument; he himself gives a Proof that the Philosophers *actually said one thing and believed another*. For it is observable, that these Passages strike at the very Essence and Foundation of a future State; they do not only explode the common and popular Accounts; they not only discard the Fables of *Elysium*, *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*: They evidently go much further, they exclude *every possible Mode and Notion of another Life*^d. If therefore he gives these to the private Doctrine, he must suppose that this Doctrine excludes the Belief of another Life; he must therefore suppose that it goes on a contrary Proposition, to what he himself calls the public Doctrine; or, in other Words, he must confess that there are several Instances, in which the Philosophers *actually said one thing and believed another*.—And yet he has challenged all the World to produce one such Instance; he has himself employed about eighty Pages, to prove that no such Instance can possibly be produced.

^d *Epicharmus* represents Death as a State, in which he could have no possible Interest or Concern.—*Aristotle* says “that it is the final Period of Existence, and that there is neither Good nor Evil for the dead Man to dread or hope.” And as to the *Stoics*, their Language is, *Nullis defunctum malis adfici. Mors omnium dolorum & solutio est & finis.* *Seneca ad Marc.* c. 19.

I have ever thought that these Passages, with others of the same Import, are clear Proofs that the two Doctrines did really go upon *contrary Propositions*; that they were not mere Explanations of the *same Notion*. The Gentlemen on the other Side allow, that the public Doctrine supposes the Reality of another Life; and will they say the same of these Passages? If not, why do they insist that the two Doctrines are barely an Explanation of one and the same Notion?

But what have Dr. Sykes and Mr. Jackson replied to this? And here I am sorry to acquaint the Reader, that they have acted with more Art and Finesse, than one would expect from Men whose *Minds were open to Conviction*. They all along argue on a Supposition that the Ancients have only disclaimed the common and fabulous Accounts of another Life; they take not the least Notice of those Passages, in which they deny the very Being and Reality of the Life itself. Strange, that these zealous Advocates for *Sincerity*, should act in so very disingenuous a Manner! But common *Answerers*, like common Women, do every Day those things which good Manners will not suffer us to call by the right Name.

To this the Doctor replies, that, "I have produced Contradictions in several of the old People; and no doubt one might produce Inconsistencies and Contrarieties in Men of the best Character among the most eminent Moderns; and happy is he, who keeps clearest from such common Failings. But why must we recur to a *double Doctrine* to solve this Matter?" p. 23.

Let me ask, 1. Is it natural to imagine that the Philosophers would be *constantly* and *perpetually* shifting their Opinions on this Question? Let the Doctor point out the same Inconsistencies

in our best modern Writers; let him shew that they continually vary on Subjects of *this Importance*; and let him shew too that they do it, without giving the Reader the least *Notice and Information* of it.

2. Is it allowed that these Moderns practise the double Doctrine? if it is, it will be very unreasonable to charge them with Contradiction, whenever they deliver opposite Doctrines. If this is not allowed, the Case is not parallel.

3. It is evident that these various Professions were owing to the Practice of the double Doctrine, and not to any real Contradiction and Inconsistency in the Men themselves. For what is the Doctrine, which I contend was private and esoteric? Why, the metaphysical and abstruse Notion, which the Philosophers had entertained concerning the human Soul. According to them, it was strictly and properly a Part of God; was to be absorbed and resolved into him; and was, in Consequence of this, to lose its separate and distinct Existence. This I give as a secret Doctrine; and in this, I am supported by the express Declaration of Dr. Sykes himself. For have I not shewn that he maintains the very same thing?

4. As to the Followers of Pythagoras, they had two Doctrines with regard to the Metempsychosis. In one they taught a State of future Punishments; in the other they denied it. As to the first Notion, *Timæus Locutus* assures us, that it was merely popular and external; contrived and invented only for the Sake of the People. Now after so plain and explicit a Declaration, it would be ridiculous to imagine that they believed this last Notion, whenever they preached it up to the People. And if we are not to imagine this, there will be no room to charge them with Contradiction.

5. Our

§. Our Author himself allows that the Philosophers had two Doctrines on this Subject; one for themselves, another for the Populace. But then he insists withal, that the first rejects only the Stories of *Styx*, *Acheron*, &c. Now, I apprehend, he will be obliged to allow that it extends much farther. It is evident from *Galen* that the two Doctrines were founded on *opposite* and *contrary* Propositions; but how can this be in the present Case, unless the private Doctrine be supposed to exclude all future Happiness and Misery whatsoever, as well as that of *Tartarus* and *Elysium*? It appears therefore, on his own Principles, that the Passages, in which the Ancients discard all future Rewards and Punishments, must necessarily belong to the private Doctrine.

I have, if I flatter not myself too much, in these Papers brought several other Observations, sufficient of themselves to prove, that the various Declarations of the Philosophers on this Point must be imputed to the *double Doctrine*.

But indeed Mr. *W.* had sufficiently obviated so silly an Evasion long ago, in the Words quoted above: "We have seen the Philosophers of every
 " Sect, one while speaking directly *for*, and an-
 " other while as directly against a future State of
 " Rewards and Punishments without intimating
 " the least Change in their Principles, or making
 " the least Hesitation in their Professions: So
 " that either we must hold them guilty of the
 " most gross and visible Contradictions, which
 " their Characters will not suffer us to conceive
 " of them; or ~~else~~ permit the Explanation given
 " above of the *double Doctrine*." *Div. Leg.*
 vol. i. p. 403. 3d Ed.

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 " Why must we recur to a double Doctrine (says he) to
 " solve

Sect. 3. The following Instance of SYNESIUS will, I apprehend, add great Light and Strength to our general Argument on this Head. As to his Philosophy, he was a determined *Platonist*, however it might be candied over by a Bishoprick: And adhered so closely to his System, that, in Consequence of it, he gave up some of the most clear and evident Articles of the Christian Faith. He did indeed set the Authority of *Plato* far above that of the inspired Penmen; he believed the Pre-existence of

“ solve this Matter? *Cicero*, e. g. in an Oration of his, said something about a future State, which contradicted what his Sentiments are, as they lie expressed in other Books. Now the Notion of a double Doctrine will not explain this; for surely upon this Scheme the Denial of the popular Notions of a future State must be an esoteric Doctrine.” p. 23. Would not any one now believe, when I quote this Passage of *Cicero*, that I quote it as belonging to the double Doctrine; that I undertake to account for his mentioning this Notion in so public and open Manner, from this very Principle? So far from it, I never give the least Hint of any such thing.

“ But if this was a secret Doctrine, is it to be conceived, that *Cicero* would have imparted it to the People? ” To this I reply: It is not supposed that the secret Doctrine was concealed in so regular and exact a Manner, as never to reach the Knowledge of the People. The very Secret of the Mysteries was sometimes divulged; the grand Arcanum, that their Hero Gods were no more than dead Men, was sometimes disclosed, and mentioned openly: But will our Author infer from hence, that these were not private Doctrines?

2. In the Days of *Cicero* the double Doctrine was not practised with so much Care and Attention, as it had been before. But the Question is, was this carried so far, as intirely to take away and destroy its Use; or are there no Traces of it remaining, even in these Times? Will *Cicero*'s mentioning the Point we are here upon in a public Oration, prove that he never considered it as improper and unfit for the Information of the People? I apprehend it will not. In one of his Orations, he laughs at the Worship of dead Men. And yet he sometimes represents this as a private Doctrine; as a Notion, that was not to be debated and explained before the People. *Non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat.*

the Soul with the first, and therefore could not believe the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection with the latter. But let him be heard^f in his own Words, “ It is difficult, if not impossible, to
 “ change and alter Opinions, which are fixed
 “ in the Mind by the clearest and brightest Evidence. You know that Philosophy contains
 “ many things opposite and contrary to the common and received Notions. I can never prevail
 “ with myself to think that the Soul did not exist
 “ before the Body. I will never affirm that the
 “ World and its several Parts will be one Day
 “ destroyed. As to the Resurrection, I believe
 “ that it contains some very venerable and holy
 “ Mystery. I am far from acquiescing in the
 “ common Doctrine. However, *Philosophy,*
 “ *when it has attained the Truth, allows the Use*
 “ *of Lies and Fictions.* For Light answers to
 “ Truth, and the Eye to the People; the Eye
 “ would receive too great a Quantity of Light to
 “ its own Prejudice and Hurt. As Darkness is
 “ most proper and commodious for those who
 “ have weak Eyes, *so I hold that Lies and Fictions*
 “ *are useful to the People,* and that Truth
 “ would be hurtful to those, who are not able to

^f Epistle 105. Καλῶς ἐστὶν, εἰ μὴ καὶ λιαν ἀδυνατοί, εἰς ψυχὴν
 τα δὲ ἐπιστήμης εἰς ἀποδείξει εἰδόντα δογματὰ σαλευθῆναι· οἷα δ’
 ἐστὶ πολλὰ φιλοσοφία τοῖς θρυλλομένοις τούτοις ἀντιδιατάσσεται
 δογμασίν· ἀμελεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀξίωσιν ποτὲ σώματος ὑπερύκειν
 δομίζεν. τὸν κόσμον εὐφροῦ καὶ τ’ ἄλλα μέρη συνδιαφθείρει· τὴν
 καθυμνήθησιν ἀνάστασιν ἱερὸν τι καὶ ἀπορρητὸν ἡγήσασθαι, καὶ πολλὰ δυνά-
 ταις τῷ πλῆθει ὑπελθῆσιν ὁμολογῆσαι· τοὺς γὰρ φιλοσοφῶντες ἐποπ-
 τῆς αὐτῆς ταλῆδους συγχωρεῖ τὴν χρεῖαν τῷ ψευδεῖ· ἀναλογοὶ γὰρ
 εἰς φῶς πρὸς ἀληθεῖαν, καὶ ὁμῶς πρὸς λήθη· καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ εἰς κακὸν
 ἀπολαύσασθαι ἀπληγῆς φῶτος· ἢ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖσι τὸ σκοτεινὸν ἀφελῆ-
 ται, ταῦτα καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὀφελος εἶναι τίθεμαι δῆμον, καὶ ἀναβίον
 τὴν ἀληθεῖαν τοῖς οὐκ ἰσχυροῖσι νατῆναι πρὸς τὴν τῶν οὐρανῶν ἰαργίαν·
 ἢ ταῦτα καὶ οἱ τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἱερῆς συνήξεως ἐμοὶ νόμοι, δύ-
 ναι μὴν ἱεράσαι, τὰ μὲν οἰκοὶ φιλοσοφῶν, τὰ δ’ ἐξ ὀφθαλμοῦ.

“ bear

“ bear its Light and Splendour. If the Laws of
 “ the Church will dispense with this, I shall be
 “ ready to accept of the Bishopric; partly philo-
 “ sophizing by myself at home, partly talking
 “ abroad in the common Train, and preaching
 “ up the general and received Fables.”

It cannot surely be doubted, but that this Instance comes up to the very Point in Question; that it exactly answers the Purpose for which it is produced. It is brought to prove that it was the Custom of the Ancients *to say one thing when they believed another*. And was not this the very Case of *Synesius*? He does not scruple to acknowledge that he did not believe the *Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, and the Doctrine of the Resurrection*. But no matter for that; *Philosophy allows the Use of Lies and Fictions*; he will think by himself at home, and in public preach up these very Fables. Was it not then necessary for him to *profess one thing and think another*?

It may be said, we have shuffled in a Christian Bishop on the Doctor for a Pagan Philosopher. But this Bishop went into the Church a *Platonist*, and *Platonist* he continued when he was there, as extravagant and absurd, as any he had left behind him. But be he what he will, it matters little, while he tells us what *Philosophy* was; where he says, that *it would allow the Use of Lies and Fictions in this Case*; and is not this telling us in Effect, that *Philosophy* allows all with which it is charged by the Author of the *Divine Legation*? If it would suffer him to preach up the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, the Doctrine of the Resurrection, while he believed them to be mere Fables, it is evident that it would dispense with his *saying one thing when he believed another*.

Since much Pains has been taken to discredit the Force of this Argument, I must beg leave to enlarge a little upon it. One main Point is, whether *Synefius* determin'd to be *barely silent* on these Articles, or actually to speak and discourse upon them. Let us consider his own Words: "However Philosophy, when it has attained the Truth, *allows the Use of Lies and Fictions.*" — "As Darkness is most proper for those who have weak Eyes, so I hold *that Lies and Fictions are useful to the People.*" — "Abroad I will talk in the common Train, and countenance and support the common Fables," τα δ' ἐξω φιλομυθων. Now does not this necessarily imply, that he was not to be intirely silent on this Head. The Words *ψευδομαι, ψευδος, φιλομυθων*, do, I say, necessarily imply this. For what Occasion to use any *Lie, Fable, or Figment* (take which Term you please) had he never designed to say any thing on this Subject?

2. Since then *Synefius* was resolved to handle these Points in Public, let us consider next in what manner he must be supposed to do this. We will confine ourselves to the Doctrine of the Resurrection. Now what remained for him but to countenance and avow this Principle before the People, and to insist on its real Certainty and Truth, contrary to the Persuasion of his own Mind? This is the only Notion; which, in his then Character, he can possibly be conceived to have delivered on this Subject. And if he delivered this Notion, does it not of course follow, that he *said one thing when he thought another*?

3. It does, I think, appear that I have fairly charged them with *Lying*, and have given no more to the Words *ψευδος* and *ψευδομαι*, than they will strictly bear. As to *Synefius*, it is evident that

that he could not prevail with himself to embrace the Doctrine of the Resurrection; and yet he promises to maintain and assert it in Public; and to this Conduct he himself gives the Words, *ψευδος*, and *ψευδομαί*: Now does not the applying of them to this case necessarily confine us to the very Sense I have here given?

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I must take Notice that the Resurrection was consider'd as a mere *Metaphor* and *Allegory*, by some Philosophers in the more early Times. "For being in their moral Lectures in their Schools, accustomed to call vicious Habits *Death*; and Reformation to a good Life *αναστασις* or a Resurrection, they were disposed to understand the *Resurrection* of the *Just* in the same Sense." *D. L. v. i. 449, 450.* As *Synefius* then determin'd to speak of the Resurrection in public, he must either preach up the philosophical Notion just described, or the popular and common one. It would be absurd to suppose that he could Harbour any Thought of preaching up the allegorical and figurative Notion, as this could not possibly answer any Purpose or Design. "It would have been contrary to his own Declaration, unteaching the People what they had learnt, and not suffering them to continue in their preconceived Opinions." This would have been delivering the *Truth* (as he thought it) "naked and without any Cover;"—it would have been "pouring in Light upon those who had not Strength to bear it," contrary to the Maxim, which he all along inculcates in this Letter. It is then necessary to conclude that he intended to preach up the popular and common Notion; and if so, it is equally necessary to conclude that he resolved to *say one thing, when he thought another.*

Having explained this philosophical and refined Doctrine of the Resurrection, let us now consider the Doctor's Interpretation of the Words *ψευδος*, *ψευδομαί*, *ψευδομαί*. And in what Sense would he understand them? Why, "they don't mean *Lies* and *Fictions*, but *Truths* told in *Fictions*, *Parables*, *fabulous Narrations*, such *Covers* of *Truth* as he judged best for his Auditors" p. 31, 32. They imply no more "that to cover over Truth by certain artificial Ways of Speech, which may make it better received, or better retained, or make it enter into Peoples Minds better than by a direct and naked Narration." 32. *Synefius* never thought of lying or of the Use of Lies, but of such Means of conveying Truth by apt Fiction, as would be most useful to

The Doctor has produced some Instances to shew, that these Words do not *always* signify, what implies an immoral Act, p. 31. But he might have spared his learned Pains. The Que-

“ the People.” 33. He thought he had demonstrative Evidence for the Points he declared himself convinced of; but “ he could be silent upon them, or he could cover over Truth “ with some fabulous Representation.” 30. What now were the Truths, of which he thought he had such clear Evidence, and which he was to cover over with some fabulous Representation? Why, one was (for the System of *Plato*, I presume, had furnish’d him with *demonstrative Evidence* on this Point) that *the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection was a mere Fable*.

1. Let then the Doctor tell us, how it was possible to convey this Truth in such a Manner, as to make it useful to the People? Would not it, under every Representation, in every Dress of Language, be a very dangerous and hurtful Notion? Did he desire that this Truth might be *better received* or *better retained* by the People? Or does not common Sense dictate, that it was his Business and Design to hide and conceal this Notion from the Multitude?

2. “ If the Laws of the Church, says *Synesius*, will dispense with this—I will accept of the Bishopric.” Now could so wise a Man gravely ask, whether the Laws of the Church would dispense with the Use of *bare Allegories*? A Mode of Speech allowed every where. Or were the primitive Fathers so utterly averse to all allegorical Interpretations, as to make the Question seasonable?

3. Supposing the Doctor’s Interpretation to be true, let us consider what was the Figment or fabulous Representation? What the Truth, that they buried and concealed beneath it? *Synesius* says that, as to the Resurrection it contains some very profound and venerable Mystery. Now, upon this Supposition, the Resurrection itself was the very *Veil* and *Cover*, the *Figment*, or *fabulous Representation*, under which the *Truth* was disguised and secreted from the People. And what was the Truth signified by the Resurrection? Why, a *Reformation of Manners*, or a *Return to a better Life*. In this Case it was impossible for a Man to preach up the Allegory or fabulous Representation, while he did not believe it, and yet not incur the Charge of *saying one thing when he thought another*. For in the Allegory or fabulous Representation he must talk of *another Life*, and yet his own private Meaning could extend only to the *present*.

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tion is whether they signify an immoral Act *in this Place*. Let him then shew that the Context does not require the Sense I here contend for.

As to the Word *φιλομυθων*, the Drift and Purpose of the Argument *Synesius* is here upon, confine it to the very Sense I am establishing. What are the *Fables* and *Fictions* here mentioned? Why, in the Opinion of *Synesius*, they were “the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, and the Doctrine of the Resurrection.” These he considered as so many popular and common Superstitions, or gross and rank Errors. But notwithstanding he did not believe them, he resolved in Public to countenance and support them. And how was a *Christian Bishop* to countenance and avow these Notions in Public, but by preaching them up to the People? The Doctor indeed says, “there is not a Letter, or Tittle, that intimates *preaching up the general and received Fables* implied in that Word.” p. 33. Sure no Cavil was ever so trifling; does not the Context shew that he speaks of the general and received Fables? Does not his Character of Bishop prove that he was to *preach* them up to the People?

In support of this Exposition I must beg leave to add, that the learned *Petavius* understands these Words in the very Sense I have here given. He charges *Synesius* with acting in a double and unfair Manner, *with saying what he did not think*, as appears from his Note on this very Passage ^b.

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^b Eleganter hanc *διπλω*, et *varietatem* exprimit Cicero ii. de Fin. “Quod si vultum, ait, tibi, si incesum fingeres quo gravior viderere, non esses tui similis; verba tu fingas, & ea dicas quæ non sentias, aut etiam ut vestitum, sic sententiam habeas aliam domesticam, aliam forensem, ut in fronte

This is the true, as well as plain State of the Case. And for this the well bred Doctor exclaims in these very Terms, "WHAT SHAMEFUL REPRESENTATION. ONE CANNOT BUT BE AMAZED THAT ANY ONE SHOULD MAKE THIS MAN (the sincere and pious Bishop of *Ptolemais*) AN INSTANCE OF ONE WHO THOUGHT THAT PHILOSOPHY ALLOWS THE USE OF LIES AND FICTIONS." 'Tis ten to one, Reader, but that the next time you hear of him, you find him AMAZED that I have quoted these Words as *his*; and call it, as indeed it is, a SHAMEFUL REPRESENTATION. For, after this Essay of what his Reader will bear, you may expect him to stick at nothing. But is it come to this at last, that the great Advocate of *Sincerity as such* turns Apologist for a shifting, cogging *Platonist*? I suspect he has himself been longer at that Trade than was imagined; which (like the Gilders upon Brasses) he tells us, consists in *covering over Truth by certain artificial Ways of Speech*: So that, when he was crying up *Sincerity as such*, he was all the while recommending *such a Sincerity*—as was consistent with his Interest. Or was this warm Defence of the grossest Diffimulation to shew us, that however he may condemn the *Jesuits* for their *Parts* and *Learning*, the Order has still *one Maxim*, that may serve to recommend them to his Favour and Esteem?

But what then is there no Ground for this great Outcry, this Charge of Misrepresentation, which the Doctor so often repeats and insists upon so much in this Article? I answer, none but that he has long walked upon, his own Mistakes. *Syne-*

"ostentatio sit, intus veritas occultetur, vide, quæso rectumne sit."

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sius has been represented as a Man of a *virtuous* and *honest Character*; hence the Doctor infers that he could not think it lawful to say one thing to the People, and another to their Leaders. But the Doctor would not reflect that he might be a Man of the *nicest* and *strictest* Honour on the *Pagan System*, and yet hold it innocent to instill Notions into the People, which he himself did not believe. The best Moralists of the *Heathen* World thought this Practice lawful, and would have undertaken to defend it by their Principles, how warmly soever Dr. Sykes and his good old Friend Mr. P. may *admire the Morality* of these ancient Sages.

Well, but does not *Synesius* in this very Letter express a great Regard and Reverence for Truth; does he not speak of his Obligation to follow it in the most feeling Manner? He does so. And did not *Plato*, *Cicero*, and *Plutarch* the same? did they not make as frequent and solemn Professions on this Head? And yet it is owned that they allowed themselves the Liberty to invent Fictions, and propagate such Stories as they did not believe, for the Sake of their Utility.

But we are told, that when *Synesius* was invited to accept of the Bishoprick, he was very willing to decline the Office; he made several Excuses. To say nothing of his Fondness for his Wife, his Aversion to Business, his Love of his Dogs and Country Diversions; one main Point was, that he had deeply imbibed the Philosophy of *Plato*, that therefore he could not believe the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, or the Doctrine of the Resurrection. And he declares that he would not dissemble or abjure these Opinions for a Bishoprick. But let us remember one thing, that this Letter was addressed

addressed to his Brother; that he recommends it to *Theophilus* to determine, whether he could be admitted to this Office, as he was resolved not to renounce his Opinions. All that can be inferred from hence is that he acted fairly by his Friends¹.

And

¹ It may be asked, whence do we conclude that this previous Declaration was made to his Friends, and the Leaders of the Church only, and not to the Body of the People? To this I reply, the Contents of the Letter itself shew, that it could not be designed for the Multitude. It is here said, "What have Philosophy and the common People to do with one another?"—"The Truth of divine Things ought not to be divulged to all, *The Commonalty is necessarily to be kept under other Management.*" Was this now Language proper for the People? "I do not believe the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, the Doctrine of the Resurrection. I suppose it contains some venerable and profound Mystery. *I am far from acquiescing in the Notions of the Multitude on this Point.*" Could he intend this for the Use of the People, when he says at the same Time, "He would not unteach them what they had learnt, but suffer them to remain in their preconceived Opinions;" when he says that these very Truths (*demonstrative* Truths he thought them, for the Credit of the old Philosophy) were not to be mentioned or imparted to the People?

2. "*Synefius* resolved to indulge himself, says the Doctor, in the Search after Truth: And as he thought that he had demonstrative Evidence for the Points he declared himself convinced of, he resolved not to pretend to teach Notions, which he did not believe: *But as he could be silent upon them; or he could cover over Truth with some fabulous Representation,* or in short discourse so as he thought best and most profitable to his Hearers, so he resolved to do." *Vindication*, p. 30. As then to the three Points mentioned in this Letter, the Doctor contends that he "resolved to be silent upon them, or to cover them over with a fabulous Representation," in all his Discourses to the People. Hence I would infer, that he could not design to address this Letter to them. He is so far from being "silent on these Points, or covering them over by a fabulous Representation," that he mentions them in very plain and direct Terms.

These I take to be plain Proofs that this Letter was not intended for the People. When therefore *Synefius* says, he dictated

And what Knave is there, that does not open himself to his Confidants? The Crime I charge him with is *dissembling with the People*: With those who, as his Flock, and under his spiritual Direction, had the best Right to all his religious Opinions. Insincerity and Fraud towards those, to whom he bore so sacred a Relation as the *Bishop of their Souls*, was a Crime that no *Declaration on subscribing* before his Brother Rulers could wipe out, tho' authorized even by the new Divinity of *Sincerity as such*. And yet our severe Casuist absolves him from all Guilt, as if it was of no Consequence what he said to the People, so he did but open himself to the Priest. The *People*, for whom *Christ* died, and over whom the Holy Ghost appointed us Overseers, are to pass for nothing. *Odi profanum vulgus et arceo*, says the honest Theology of Dr. Sykes. And what was once only a wild Rant of an *Epicurean Poet*, is now sober *Christian Divinity*. *Synesius*, says the Doctor, *was resolved to indulge himself in the search after Truth; but as he could cover it over with some fabulous Representations, so he resolved to do*. A worthy and a wise Resolution, doubtless, in a *Christian Bishop*, to lie for the Sake of Truth! And for this he is put into the Doctor's Calendar of *Sincerity-Saints*. But his Friends amongst the modern Prelates will con him no Thanks for this Apology: Who, to their Honour be it said, never preach to their People what they disbelieve themselves. After this, who will be surpris'd that he comes next to defend the

for himself don't want to say that it is not true
tated it, "that the thing might be known to all;" 'tis evident he could only mean his Friends and the Leaders of the Church. The original Word is often taken in a limited and confined Sense; the Doctor's Argument, as well as my own, confines us to *this Sense in this Place*.

Reputation

Reputation of two Greek Words of evil Fame, *ψευδος*, a Lie, and *ψευδομαι*, to lie. These, he says, the Ancients had in honourable mention. If they had, the more Shame for them. But, had the Doctor bethought himself, that the true Cause of this perverse Use of so bad Words was the common Practice of *lying for the publick Good*, it might have saved him a World of Trouble. As it is, see his Talent at Argument. It is affirmed, in discredit of ancient *Heathen* Wisdom, that it made no Bones of *lying for the public Good*: To support which, a Passage of *Synefius* is produced, in which *Lies* and *Lying* are spoken of with great Complacency and Self-satisfaction.— And well he might, says Doctor *Sykes*, for *Lies* and *Lying* were no bad Words in a *Heathen's* Mouth. To this I reply, how should they, when the Practice was esteemed honourable? Which was the Point I had to prove. But does their Opinion change the Nature of Things? Or do I charge them with what sometimes common Answerers will do, *Lying for Lying's Sake*? If they lied, tho' for any End or Purpose whatsoever, they did enough to deserve, and therefore had, the severest Censures of *Christ's* holy Apostles.

But to come to particular Passages. Having said that he could not digest the Doctrine of the Resurrection; that Truth “ would be hurtful to
 “ the People, that Philosophy allows the Use of
 “ Lies and Fictions.” — He then proceeds.—
 “ If the Laws of the Church will indulge me in
 “ this, I may then take the holy Office upon
 “ me.—But if they say that a Priest should act,
 “ and be in his Opinions just as the People are,
 “ I cannot for my Part but discover *myself* to all.”
 As to the Practice of saying one thing when he thought another, he declares that it was agreeable

able to the Rules and Precepts of Philosophy ; but then he suspects that it might not be thought fair and reasonable by the *Christian Church*. And here we see the true Ground and Foundation of all his Scruples ; as a *Pagan Philosopher*, he deems this Practice innocent and honourable ; all the Difficulty is that he does not know, whether the Laws of the Church would dispense with it. A very knowing *Christian* truly : And, for a Bishop, well versed in his Bible : But this he left to the People. However, *if those Laws would not*, he very generously declares that he would not submit to it ; “ that he would discover and “ explain his Sentiments to all.” Observe, he does not *strictly* and *absolutely* say that he would open his Sentiments to all, but only that he would do this, *if the Laws of the Church required it*. Now does not this imply that he was content not to do it, if these were not so strict and rigorous, as to demand it ? As to the Fairness and Reasonableness of the thing itself, he has no Objection to it. The only Point is, whether it was consistent with the Rules and Orders of the Church ^k.

But

I had said that *Synesius* set the Authority of *Plato* far above that of the inspired Penmen, and adhered so closely to the System of the first, that, in Consequence of it, he gave up some of the most clear and evident Articles of the *Christian Faith*. But here the Doctor, with his usual Acuteness and Gaiety observes, “ one may ask this Author, whence “ all this *new Light* concerning *Synesius* has sprung ? What “ *new Intelligence* has he got ? He cites no Body but *Synesius* himself.” p. 24.—This Remark has a Look so odd as may make a common Reader stare.—*No body but Synesius himself* ? Why, who should know his Mind so well ? Or was he, after all, such a Dissembler that he imposed upon himself ; or such a Keeper of a Secret, that he would not trust his own Pen with it ? But this is all a Refinement of which the Doctor is innocent. *Synesius* was here less in his Thoughts, than himself :

But to proceed. "When this Author, or any one else, (says the Doctor) speaks of the Philosophers, as holding or not holding a future

himself: And knowing from whence *he* gets his Intelligence of *Greek* Authors, he imagined that I had run upon tick for *Synefius*: And finding I did not quote the Author from whom I had borrowed my Account of him, concluded, and very rightly, that I spoke of my own Head. But "I cite only one Letter." But does not this Letter confirm the Point for which I cite it in very direct and express Terms? As to the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, the Resurrection; the Doctor himself will, I hope, allow that these were *Christian* Doctrines; and does not *Synefius* declare that he could not admit them, because they were contrary to the Principles of Philosophy, or the System of *Plato*. Now what was this, but setting the Authority of *Plato* above that of the inspired Penmen?

Again, "Is it not Matter of Wonder that this Man should be represented like a Knave; as if he were ready to do any thing for a Bishoprick? As if he did in Fact give up some of the most clear and evident Articles of the *Christian* Faith for the Sake of Preferment?" p. 27. But he mistakes; it was not the *Bishop*, but the *Platonist* that I represent *Synefius* so fond of, as to be ready to give up to this Character plain Articles of Faith. My Charge against him is that he gave them up, or would not admit them for the Sake of his dear Philosophy. And did not *Synefius* himself say the same thing before me? And what was the Difference, in point of Virtue, whether he gave up his Faith for a Bishoprick in the Church, or a Professorship in the School of *Plato*? And where Ambition is the Point, they are equally capable, as I take it, of laying a Man open to Conviction.

But now, what must we think of the Philosophy of *Plato*, which could keep Men from the Belief of such plain and reasonable Truths as these are? However, the Doctor mentions it as an high Encomium on *Synefius*, that "he had arrived at the very highest Top of the *Platonic* Philosophy." How envied a Prerogative! And what did his Eminence, I pray you, see from thence? A glorious Sight indeed! no less than this, That the Creation of the Soul, the Destruction of the World, and the Resurrection of the Body, were mere Fables, contriv'd and invented for the Sake of the People; and, what is more, he had a full View of that demonstrative Evidence which was to prove they were so. *Hymeneus* and *Philo-*

ture State of Rewards and Punishments, it is
 hardly Justice to them to argue from Consequences

us too had arrived at this highest Top of the Platonic Philosophy, and if it did not raise them to a Bishoprick, tho' they avowed their Principles as frankly as *Synefius*, yet they had their Encomiast as well as he. And this no bad Divine neither, for his time; tho' his Language be something different from Dr. *Sykes's*. "But shun profane and vain Babblings (says St. Paul to Timothy) for they will increase unto more Ungodliness. And their Word will eat as doth a Canker: Of whom is *Hymeneus* and *Philetus*; who concerning the Truth have erred, saying, that the Resurrection is past already." 2 Ep. ii. y 16. & seq. But such was the Apostolic Purity of the fifth Century, that those whose Conversation St. Paul directs us to avoid, were now sought after to govern the Church. On the whole, I can indeed conceive that there are Men who would be highly pleased and delighted with this Platonic Prospect; but what it can have to recommend it to a Believer, I must call upon the Doctor to explain at his Leisure.

But whence, says the Doctor, does it appear that *Synefius* ever preached up this Notion? To this I reply, before he enter'd upon his Office, he promised and engaged to preach it; declared that this Practice was agreeable to the Rules and Precepts of the best Philosophy. And after this can any one doubt whether he would really teach this Doctrine. After such Declarations what should hinder him but another Bishoprick?

2. Had the Gentleman attended to the following Passage, he would have seen, that whether *Synefius* did or did not propagate this Doctrine, the present Passage is of great Importance to my main Argument. "But be he (*Synefius*) what he will, it matters little, while he tells us what Philosophy was, where he says that "it would allow the Use of Lies and Fictions in this Case; and is not this telling us in effect that Philosophy allows all with which it is charged by the Author of the D. L.? If it would suffer him to preach up the Doctrine of the Resurrection, &c. while he believ'd them to be mere Fables, it is evident that it would dispense with his saying one thing when he thought another." Now what is the Drift of this Observation, but to shew, that Philosophy, in the Opinion of *Synefius*, allowed every thing with which it is charged by the Author of the D. L.? And is not this supported for want of better Authority, by the express Declaration of *Synefius* himself?

"It

“ *quæntes which we do not know whether they admitted or not.* ” “ A Man should be very tender how he reasons without having the full Words of an Author himself.” *Vind.* p. 34, 35.

I have shewn that the Stoics held the Resurrection of the Soul, and that this Notion was inconsistent with the Belief of future Rewards and Punishments. But then I have shewn too by plain and direct Testimonies, that the Stoics them-

“ It is said by *Photius*, (continues the Doctor) that after he was made a Bishop, the Doctrine of the Resurrection was believed by him.” Look you there now; did not I say what a strange Power a Bishoprick has of opening Men’s Eyes? — Now admitting (says he) that he preached up this Doctrine, after he had made so strong a Declaration against it, — this was consistent with his known Honesty. For it only shews that he refused to preach it, when he was not convinced of its Truth; and afterwards when he was convinced, he did in Fact preach it.” *Vindication*, p. 28. But how does it shew this? What *Photius* affirms, is, that *Synesius*, after he was possess’d of his Office, did really entertain the Doctrine of the Resurrection. But does he say that this Change was wrought immediately? As he did not say this, *Synesius* might very consistently, with all this Writer says, teach this Doctrine previous to his Belief of it.

2. The Stress of my Argument, as I just observed, lies in quite another Point. *Synesius* promis’d and engaged to preach up this very Doctrine, when he did not believe it. Must he not therefore hold it lawful to say one thing and think another? — He undertakes too to justify this by the strict Principles of Philosophy. And does not this shew that the Author of the *D. L.* has imputed nothing more to the Philosophers in this respect than what is strictly true? This, I think, can hardly be disputed, as the Doctor himself allows that *Synesius* was excellently well skilled in the ancient Systems; that he had reached “ the very highest Top of the Platonic Philosophy.”

“ This only shews that he refused to preach it when he was not convinced of its Truth.” But how does it appear that he ever refused to preach it? To use the Doctor’s own Words, let me ask him, “ whence all this new Light concerning *Synesius* has sprung? What new Intelligence has he got? He cites no Body, not even *Synesius* himself.”

selfes

selves did admit this very Consequence; and to support this I appealed to the clear and express Words of the Authors themselves. With what Face then could this Writer insinuate that I had all along been inforcing a *mere Consequence of my own*; that "I had not the full Words of the Authors themselves before me?" Did he believe that no Body *had read* my Book? Or had he the more reasonable Expectation that no Body *would read* his?

Page 35, 36. he repeats his old Objection, that the secret Doctrines were not inserted and published in the Writings of the Ancients. But here I need only refer myself to what has been advanced on this Head in the last Chapter.

Sect. 4. But to close with an Instance above all Exception, even from this Doctor's own Writings; nay, from that very Treatise, in which he has exerted all his Strength and Learning to prove, that no such Instance can possibly be produced. With regard to *Plato* he says, "Let him speak for the *popular Opinions* at some Times, and even laugh at them at other Times, all that will follow is, that *Plato disbelieved the popular Opinions of the Gods*; not that he disbelieved the Being of a God: And so in the other Case, supposing that he did not believe the *popular Opinions* of a future State of Rewards and Punishments, that there were three Judges in *Hades*, &c. it will not follow that he did not believe a future State of real proper Rewards and Punishments." Did he then speak sometimes for the *popular Opinions of the Gods*, or insist on the Divinity of *Hercules*, *Æsculapius*, &c. and yet at these very Times *disbelieve these Opinions or this Divinity*? Here then is a plain Instance that *he said one Thing and thought another*.

ther. Should you, Sir, preach up the Divinity of a deceased Mortal ; should you, for Instance, in *China*, maintain that their *Fo* was really and actually a God ; might you not be fairly charged with saying one thing and thinking another ? and yet how would your Case differ from that of *Plato*, teaching the Divinity of *Æsculapius*, *Hercules*, &c.

“ All that will follow is, that *Plato* disbelieved “ the popular Opinions of the Gods, not that he “ disbelieved the Being of a God.” But what is this to the Purpose ; or how does it confute what *Mr. Warburton* has advanced on this Point ? Has he any where said that *Plato* disbelieved the Being of a God, merely because he laughed at the popular Divinities ? And yet the Argument of his learned Adversary receives all the little Force it has from that very Supposition. The Doctor might believe the Being of a God, at the very Time he preached up the Divinity of *Fo* ; but would this prove that he did not say one thing and think another, when he insisted that *Fo* was truly and properly a God ?

And here, let it be observed once for all, that, when we say the Philosophers disbelieved the Divinity of *Hercules*, *Romulus*, &c. we do not bring this to prove that they did not believe the Being of a God ; we only bring it to shew that they thought one thing, and spoke another, with respect to the national Gods. And must not this necessarily be the Case, if they asserted that these last were Gods, while they believed nothing of the matter ? It will be to no Purpose to reply, that they believed the Being of a God ; if you would clear them from the present Charge, you must shew that they believed the Divinity of *Hercules*, *Romulus*, &c.

I am

I am at a loss to conceive what clearer Proof can be required, that the external and internal Doctrines were founded upon Propositions opposite and contrary to each other. It is agreed, that the Philosophers did inculcate the Worship of the true God, to their intimate and select Friends: It is agreed too, that, when they addressed themselves to the Populace, they taught and enforced the Worship of dead Men. Do they not therefore preach up one Object of Adoration to their Friends, and *another* to the People? And if the public and private Doctrines relate to these different Objects, must they not necessarily go upon contrary Propositions?

I cannot see what the learned Doctor will reply to this, unless he says that the Philosophers did really inculcate the Worship of the true God, under the Names of *Hercules, Romulus, &c.* Upon this Supposition, the two Doctrines would indeed contain only one and the same Proposition. But the Supposition is false and groundless; we are as certain as History and Fact can make us, that the Philosophers, in their public teaching, endeavoured to advance these dead Men into real Deities; that they did not scruple to declare them to be true and proper Gods. This appears from the Passage of *Cicero* cited, p. 53. 54. *Magis est in Romulo admirandum, quod cæteri, qui Dii ex hominibus facti esse dicuntur, minus eruditis hominum sæculis fuerunt, ut fingendi proclivior esset ratio, cum imperiti ad credendum facile impellerentur. Romuli autem ætatem minus his sexcentis jam inveteratis literis, atque doctrinis, omnique illo antiquo ex inculta hominum vita errore sublato fuisse cernimus.* It is the whole Purpose of this Argument to assert and prove that *Romulus* was really and actually be-

come a God. The Circumstances of the Time and Age, in which his Divinity was admitted, confine the Argument to him only.

Again, "*Quod autem ex hominum genere consecratos, sicut Herculem et ceteros coli lex jubet, indicat omnium quidem animos immortales esse; sortium bonorumque divinos.*" Cicero *De legg.* ii. 12. Does not this Passage clearly suggest, that *Hercules, &c.* were now erected into so many actual and real Gods? Is it possible to inculcate the Worship of dead Men in more plain and strong Terms?

"And so in the other Case, supposing that he did not believe the popular Opinions of a future State, it will not follow that he did not believe a future State of Rewards and Punishments." What Dependence the Doctrine of a future State had on the common Fables, has been considered already; I mean, (for my Argument confined me to that single Point) so far as regards future Punishments. That the Ancients could not believe the first and yet maintain the last, has been proved upon their own Authority. If the Doctor insists on the contrary, all he has to do, is to shew that *Cicero* and *Ovid*, *Seneca* and *Epictetus* knew nothing of the Matter; for, if they were right, the clear and inevitable Consequence is, that he must be wrong.

2dly, Why is he so industrious to stifle and suppress the Evidence against him? He all along supposes that the Testimonies alledged on the other Side, reject only what he calls the popular Opinions of a future State: But most of them go much deeper.

Death is the final Period
 § These Passages have been already quoted from *Aristotle* and *Seneca*.

" of

“ of Existence ; beyond that there is neither
 “ Good nor Evil for the dead Man to dread or
 “ hope.” *Brevis morbus aut extinguet, aut ex-*
tinguetur. In utroque finis dolendi est.—Ad-
 mone nullum mali sensum ad eum, qui periit,
 pervenire.—Is the Scope and Tenour of these
 Passages consistent with the Belief of any future
 Rewards or Punishments whatsoever? If it be
 not, it is plain the esoteric Doctrine (for no Man
 surely will give these Passages to the exoteric)
 did really and effectually exclude the very Possi-
 bility of all future Happiness and Misery ; the
 plain and necessary Consequence of which, is,
 that the learned Writer, in his Treatise on the
double Doctrine, has all along been labouring to
 maintain an Hypothesis against Fact and plain
 Testimony.

But, before we conclude, it may be necessary
 to consider this Objection more at large, as the
 learned Writer often repeats it with an Air of
 uncommon Triumph and Complacency. He asks,
 If the Philosophers disbelieved the popular Divi-
 nities, and yet really believed the Being of a
 God ; why might they not reject the popular
 Opinions of a future State, and at the same hold
 a future State of real Rewards and Punishments ?
 “ Now as they who did not believe *Hercules* and
 “ *Æsculapius* to be Gods, did not for that Rea-
 “ son disbelieve the Existence of a governing
 “ Mind ; so they that did not believe *Æacus* or
 “ *Minos* to be Judges of Hell, did not for that
 “ Reason disbelieve all future Rewards and Pu-
 “ nishments.” *Sykes's Examination*, p. 98, 9.
 This is well put ; and looks like Reason ; which
 is more than we can say of any thing in Mr.
Jackson. However, on Examination it will be

found to have nothing in it; the two Cases being widely different.

First, When we explained their Doctrine of the Soul, we shew'd that they held a Principle inconsistent with the Belief of a future State. But will the learned Doctor undertake to point out any particular Notion or Sentiment of theirs, which cannot be reconciled to the Belief of a God?

2dly, At the very time that they condemn and arraign the popular Divinities, they declare for the Being of a God. Thus *Varro* says, "that *Hercules* and *Æsculapius*, *Castor* and *Pollux* were not Gods:" But he says too, "they only seem to have a right Notion of God, who conceive him to be a Soul, actuating and governing all things by his Wisdom^b." But was this the Case with regard to *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*? When they disclaim these, do they ever substitute, in their room, any future Punishments, separate and distinct from them, in the infernal Regions? Will the learned Writer pretend they did? One would hardly believe him so adventurous but for some weak Efforts he makes, which look that Way.

3dly, As to the popular Stories of eternal Torments, they give us these as the *only Foundation and Support* of future Punishments. If therefore they explode these, they must of course explode

^b Quæ sunt autem illa, quæ prolata in multitudinem nocent? Hæc, inquit, non esse deos Herculem, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem. Proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, & humanâ conditione defecerint. — But this same *Varro* says, Quod hi soli ei videantur animadvertisse, quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu ac ratione mundum gubernantem. *Augustin*, de Civ. Dei, l. iv, 27. 31.

all future Punishments whatsoever; and (what would we have more?) they tell us, that they did so. But was this the Case with regard to their popular Divinities? Do they ever represent these last as the *only Reason*, the *single Ground*, on which they could believe the Being of a Deity? The learned Writer will not say they do. Why then does he give these as Cases exactly parallel?

Lastly, We have brought several Passages, in which the Philosophers disclaim all future Rewards and Punishments whatsoever. But has the learned Author brought any, in which they deny the Being of a God? No; all he shews is that they sometimes discard the popular Divinities, or reject the common Polytheism. What is there therefore that can excuse a candid Writer for representing these as parallel and like Cases? When he produces as plain Proofs of their Denial of the Being of a God, as I have of their Denial of a future State, it may be pertinent to consider how far this will affect our present Argument. But I predict, that this, and his *Openness to Conviction* will come together.

Turn we now again to our Doctor. "Let us first, says he, suppose what will not be allowed, that *Plato* did in this Point, *say one thing and think another*; yet it will not come up to the Point in debate, unless it first be proved that this was done in consequence of the *double Doctrine*." p. 36, 37. 1. Why will he not allow that *Plato* in this Point said one thing and thought another? Should the Doctor himself preach up at *China* that their *Fo* was really and actually a God; might he not be fairly charged with saying one thing and thinking another? And yet how would his Case differ from that of *Plato* teaching

teaching the Divinity of *Æsculapius*, *Hercules*, &c.—2. But allowing that *Plato* and the Philosophers did in this Point say one thing and think another; why do I impute this to the *double Doctrine*? To this I reply, that I do it merely out of a Regard to Truth; purely because *Plato* himself and the Philosophers have done the very same thing. When *Plato* tells us that the true Notion of God could not be safely intrusted to the People;—When *Scævola* says that the true and real Origin of their Hero Gods could not be publish'd and made known to the Multitude, do they not plainly intimate and suggest, that these were private Notions? And, what is more, does not the Doctor himself offer these as two secret Doctrines? Why then all this Clamour against me for only repeating his own Assertion?

3. As the Philosophers believ'd the Being of a God, and yet disclaim'd the popular Divinities; so the Doctor contends they might discard the Stories of *Styx*, *Acheron*, &c. and yet hold the Reality of future Punishments. Now I have urged several Arguments to shew that the Case was not parallel. And how came “the Hand so “accustomed to Slaughter” to forbear attacking them? But however the Doctor may affect to overlook them, every Body else, I dare say, will allow that they are out of his reach.

Let me observe, that if any single Instance comes up to the Point for which it is alledged; this of itself will be sufficient to confute and overthrow his whole Hypothesis. What he contends for, is, that *no such Instance* can possibly be produced; it is therefore his Business, if he expects to make any Impression on his Reader, to examine every particular Instance, that has been urged against him.

But,

But, this Repetition, again, of the old Song —the *double Doctrine*, gives me an Opportunity of doing the Doctor Justice; and acquainting the Public with what I have learnt of him: Which is a *choice Recipe* for the Management of a close Reasoner, the most intractable of all kind of Writers. *Answerers* have their various Gifts and Graces to profit withal; some in this Manner, and some in that. But I know of nothing that equals the Simplicity and Force of our Doctor's Magisterium. Your close Reasoners generally found their System upon some one great Principle; from whence all flows, as from it's Source, with Clearness and Abundance. Now the Doctor's way is this, he pollutes, and by polluting turns away, the Fountain; and so leaves the *Leviathan* of a System on dry Ground. 'Tis done too with a Trifle of Expence; only putting a *perverse Sense on the Proposition in which the Principle is contained*. And now, as fast as Consequences and Deductions arise, apply your sophisticated Proposition to them, and they go as easily as they came. The whole performed without any kind of Trouble to the Answerer; and with little more to the Reader than the Nausea of frequent Repetition. Which is no more than one expects in the present Practice of Physic, whether of Mind or Body. Now of this Master-piece of Address our Doctor has given two inimitable Examples in his Practice upon the *Divine Legation*: The one in the Case of the *extraordinary Providence of the Jews*; and the other, in the *double Doctrine of the Philosophers*.

CHAP. XV.

Some Remarks on Dr. Sykes's own Account of the double Doctrine.

THE Doctor sometimes takes upon him to assert that the popular Doctrine was suited to the *Capacities*, and not to the *Prejudices* of the Vulgar. But then he in other Places as plainly tells us, that it was taught in Compliance to their *Prejudices only*^a. How is it possible to hold him, while he thus at every Turn gives up his own Principles; while he takes up contradictory Notions on the very same Subject? Or rather what occasion for any Hold of him at all, while he thus hampers himself in his own Contradictions?

2. *Aulus Gellius* is one of the Writers, on whose Authority the Doctor lays great Stress. And what is his Account of this Matter? Why, according to him, "*Exoterics* were such Discourses as related to *Rhetoric*, the *Art* or *Faculty of speaking acutely*, and the *Knowledge of civil Affairs*. *Acroatics* were called such Discourses, in which the *more profound and subtle* Philosophy was concerned; such as related to the *Contemplations of Nature* and dialectical

^a "Nor was the exoteric Doctrine accommodated to the *Prejudices* of the Vulgar, but to the *Capacities* of them." p. 98.

"*Plato* thought there were some Truths, which it was not fit the People should know: *Scævola*, in like manner, thought that the People were not to be intrusted, that *Hercules*, *Castor*, &c. were not Gods, but had been mortal Men. In this Point then they complied with popular *Prejudices*, believing the Existence of God and his Providence, though not believing the popular Opinions of the national Gods." p. 129.

"Disputes

“ Disputes ^b.” What now is the Sum of all this? Why, that the popular and secret Doctrines relate to *different* and *distinct* Subjects. But does not the Doctor see, that if this Testimony has any Force, it intirely overthrows his own Account of the double Doctrine? For what is his own Account, but that the popular Doctrine was only a bare Metaphor or figurative Representation; invented as a Veil and Cover of the secret Doctrine, which could not be safely conveyed to the People in an open and direct Manner? But does not this evidently suppose that the two Doctrines relate to one and the same Subject? And is not this contrary to the express Testimony of *Aulus Gellius*, on whose Authority the Doctor labours to erect his main System? Again, in the Beginning of his Treatise on this Point, he tells us that the two Doctrines had *different* Subjects; that “ the Difference between the *exoteric* and “ *esoteric* Doctrines was founded on the Persons, “ Subjects, Times.” p. 83. However, he afterwards declares, “ that *the very same Nations* “ treated in a different Manner, might, and very “ probably did, make the *esoteric* and *exoteric*.” p. 108. How, Sir! did the two Doctrines relate to *different* Subjects, and yet contain the *very same* Notion? And have we this Account from one, who undertakes to explain and clear up all the Difficulties belonging to the double Doctrine?

3. “ The Philosophers, or some of them, (says “ he) might find Reason to reject the *poetical* or “ *political* Gods, and to reject too the vulgar No- “ tions of *Styx*, *Acheron*, and *Cocytus*.” p. 99. What then did *only some of the Philosophers* really

^b *Syke's Examination*, p. 78.

discard these Fictions? What Pity it is, that the Doctor would not point out the Passages, on which he builds this wonderful Discovery? The mere Novelty of the thing will make one expect it with a little Impatience. But after all, how came this strange Assertion from so warm, so strenuous an Advocate for the old Philosophers?

4. The Doctor, in his great Zeal to support the Credit of these ancient Sages, assures us, that THEIR POPULAR DOCTRINE WAS OF THE SAME NATURE WITH THE PARABLES USED BY OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR^c. But was it then the Custom of our Saviour *to say one thing to the People, and quite the contrary to their Leaders?* or are there in the *New Testament* any Traces (pardon the Mention!) of that gross and knavish Dissimulation, of which we have so many Instances in the Writings of the old Philosophers? TOLAND, "who made it (as Mr. W. truly observes) "the Business of a wretched Life to shed his "Malignity on every thing great and venerable," did not, however, carry his Insolence and Folly so far, as to brand the preaching of the holy *Jesus* by so odious and detestable a Comparison. "FAR BE IT FROM ME, says he, TO MAKE "ANY COMPARISON BETWEEN THEM (our Lord "and his Apostles) AND THE NATIONS OR "SECTS I HAVE BROUGHT ON THE STAGE IN "THIS DISCOURSE^d."

5. "It is well known (says he) how zealous "the Fathers of the Church were against the "Heathens; they charged them with every "thing that could make the World have a light "Esteem for them or their Notions. Now what

^c *Examination*, p. 96. &c. *Vindication*, p. 30.

^d *Tetradymus*, p. 78.

" a noble

“ a noble Field would here have been opened,
 “ could they have charged their Sages and Phi-
 “ losophers with the Diffimulation, which Mr.
 “ *Warburton* has here done? Could they have
 “ loaded them with the Crime of *believing one*
 “ *thing, and teaching another*, with *lying*, with
 “ imposing on the Credulity of the People; what
 “ a Display of Rhetoric should we have had?
 “ Could there have been a more fit Occasion for
 “ Satire, or for Declamation, than what such
 “ Conduct would have afforded? They knew
 “ of the double Doctrine; but they were so far
 “ from imagining that *Plato*, or *Aristotle*, &c.
 “ were guilty of any Crime, or deserved any
 “ Blame, that they never reproach them on that
 “ Account.” *Examination*, p. 88.

To this I reply, 1. I have shewn that the Phi-
 losophers were guilty of this gross Diffimulation,
 by plain and unquestionable Facts; which every
 reasonable Man, I dare say, will allow to be de-
 cisive: And must we reject these clear Facts,
 purely because they are not mentioned by the Fa-
 thers? Is this dumb and foolish negative Evi-
 dence to be heard before the loud Voice of posi-
 tive Testimony, speaking too against itself?

2. But to come to *those new Favourites* of the
 Doctor, the Fathers of the Church: And here if
 the contrary to what he says, be true in every
 Particular; if these primitive Writers charge the
 Philosophers with *the very Diffimulation and Hy-*
pocrisy here mentioned; if they *load them with the*
Crime of believing one thing and saying another;
with lying; *with imposing on the Credulity of the*
People, — What will become of the Argument
 which the Doctor here displays with so much
 Pomp and Ostentation? Very unlucky is our
 learned

earned Doctor : He has been at great Pains to shew his Reader he knows nothing of *Prophane* Antiquity ; and, in the Bustle, has betrayed an equal Ignorance of the *Ecclesiastic*.

Eusebius does not scruple to reproach *Plato* with this very Practice ; charges him with mean Dissimulation, for teaching Doctrines which he believed to be false, merely out of Reverence and Regard to the Laws of his Country *. *Lactantius*, mentioning *Cicero* on this very account, says †, Quid ergo ipse in eodem versaris errore ? Video te terrena, et manufacta venerari : Vana esse intelligis : Et tamen eadem facis, quæ faciunt ipsi, quos ipse stultissimos confiteris. Quid igitur profuit vidisse te veritatem, quam nec defensurus esses, nec secuturus ? Si libenter errant

* Καὶ το παρὰ ἡρώων δι ταῦτα λέγει τὸν νόμον σίκα, διαρρη-
δν παρρησιᾷ, ομολογῶντας, οτι θεοὶ ἐπομινεύει τῶ νόμῳ πιστεύειν
αὐτοῖς. Præp. Evang. xlii. 1. — Ἀλλὰ γὰρ τέτοιαι δι χάριν ἀπο-
κρίσις ἡμῶν ἐστίν, διὰ θανάτου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων δήμου καὶ ἀποκρίσις
μαθ. c. 15.

† *Divin. Instit.* 2, 3. He begins the Chapter thus : Sed quid prodest ad vulgus, & ad homines imperitos hoc modo concionari ? Cum videamus etiam doctos, et prudentes viros, cum religionum intelligant vanitatem, nihilominus tamen in iis ipsis, quæ damnant, colendis, nescio qua pravitate perstare. Intelligebat *Cicero* falsa esse, quæ homines adorarent : Nam cum multa dixisset, quæ ad eversionem religionum valerent ; ait tamen non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat : Quid ei facies, qui, cum errare se sentiat, ultro ipse in lapides impingat, ut populus omnis offendant ? Ipse sibi oculos eruat, ut omnes cæci sint ? qui nec de aliis bene mereatur, quos patitur errare ; nec de seipso, qui alienis accedit erroribus ; nec utitur tandem sapientiæ suæ bono, ut factis impleat, quod mente percepit.

Arnobius, mentioning this Custom, says, nunc vero, cum aliud creditis, & aliud fingitis, & in eos estis contumeliosi, quibus id attribuitis, quod eos confitemini non esse : Et irreligiosi esse monstramini, cum id adoratis quod fingitis, non quod in re esse, ipsaque in veritate, censetis. l. iii. p. 109. *Lug. Ed.*

etiam

etiam ii, qui errare se sentiunt, quanto magis vulgus indoctum? St. *Austin* too spoke of this Case with great Severity and Sharpness, but surely not with more than so base and profligate a Practise deserved. Quod utique non aliam ob causam factum videtur, nisi quia hominum velut prudentium, & sapientium negotium fuit populum in religionibus fallere, & in eo ipso non solum colere, sed imitari etiam Dæmones, quibus maxima est fallendi cupiditas. Sicut enim Dæmones nisi eos quos fallendo deceperint, possidere non possunt, sic et homines principes non sane iusti, sed Dæmonum similes, ea quæ vana esse noverant, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera suadebant, hoc modo eos civili societati velut arctius alligantes.

And

De *Civit. Dei*, iv. 132. Speaking of *Varro*, he says, Si contra præjudicia consuetudinis liber esse possit, unum deum colendum fateretur, atque suaderet; c. 31. He gives the following Account of *Seneca*, Sed iste quem philosophi quasi liberum fecerunt, tamen quia illustris populi Romani senator erat, colebat, quod reprehendebat; agebat, quod arguebat; quod culpabat, adorabat: Quia videlicet magnum aliquid eum philosophia docuerat, ne superstitiosus esset in mundo, sed propter leges civium moresque hominum, non quidem ageret fingentem scenicum in theatro, sed imitaretur in templo: Eo damnabilius, quod illa quæ mendaciter agebat, sic ageret, ut eum populus veraciter agere existimaret. vi. 10. The famous Maxim of *Varro* was, Multa esse vera, quæ non modo vulgo scire non sit utile, sed etiam tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat; upon which St. *Austin* observes, Hic certe totum consilium prodidit velut sapientium, per quos civitates & populi regerentur. Hoc tamen fallacia miris modis maligni dæmones delectantur: Qui & deceptores & deceptos pariter possident: L. iv. 31. The learned *Bentley*, referring to this very Passage of *Varro*, says, "this is flat and plain Priestcraft.—" St. *Austin* presses hard upon *Varro*, for glozing and soothing the Civil Religion contrary to his own Sentiments and Conscience.—The Christian Father speaks home, and condemns the civil Theology equally with the poetical; but
" the

And now, to use the Doctor's own Words,
 " Do not these Passages give us an Idea of the
 " old Philosophers, as a Pack of strange People
 " believing one thing and speaking another? Do
 " they not treat them as gross Liars, so insincere,
 " so dishonest, so imposing on the People, that,
 " were any Man to act such a Part now, he
 " would be condemned as guilty of the wickedest
 " Craft," &c. However the Doctor, with his
 usual Gravity, assures us, that the Fathers have
 not charged the Philosophers with these Vices.
 But here, in the Name of *Sincerity*, for at least
 he will allow us the *Name*, let me ask him what
 he was thinking of when he gave us this Account
 of the Fathers? Did he know he was imposing
 on his Reader, or did he not? These are trite
 Questions. They have been often asked on the
 like occasion. The more is the Pity. But I have
 never heard an Answer to them consistent either
 with the Honour or Credit of those most con-
 cerned to give it.

It is obvious that the Philosophers, in these
 Passages, are supposed to have two Doctrines, one
 for the People, and the other for themselves;
 and this is all that Mr. *W.* meant when he charged
 them with the Practice of the double Doctrine.

" the learned *Pagan*, who was himself a Minister of State, and
 " fearful of giving Offence, used great *Reserve* and *Diffimu-*
 " *lation*; and tho' in many things he corrected the public
 " Superstition, in the main he *fixed* and *promoted* it; not that
 " *he himself was superstitious.*" Remarks on a Discourse of
 Free thinking, part ii. p. 60.

However tender Dr. *Sykes* may be of his Philosophers on
 this occasion, he does not scruple in other Places to brand its
 Practice in the manner it deserves; p. 244. he gives it the
 plain Names of *Knavery* and *Forgery*. Thus the very same
 Practice is laudable and innocent, or base and infamous, merely
 as the *Business of answering* requires.

But, without any Regard to the Authority of the Fathers, let the Doctor tell us, whether there are not some SMALL Marks of Dissimulation and Hypocrisy in the Conduct of these ancient Sages. It is a known and allowed Fact that they every where saw through the Forgery and Cheat of the popular Religion; and yet it is certain they every where comply with the established Rites, and recommend a Submission to them to every body else: And was not this downright *Priestcraft*? Such however were the Men, for whose Credit the Doctor seems to be so extremely anxious; and with whose *Morality* the good old Gentleman Mr. P. is so deeply smitten. I readily allow that there are several as fine *Precepts* of Morality delivered in the Writings of these ancient Sages, as in those of the modern Advocates for *Sincerity*. But the Doctor was a little mistaken, when he thought their *Practice* would set them off. The Truth is, that the Comment disgraced the Text: and shewed they had no more Sincerity than just served them to talk of; Sincerity in Speculation, or which, in more modern Language, we may call, *Sincerity as such*. But by the Surprise with which this Proposition is received, that the Philosophers *spoke one thing while they thought another*, we see how little the Doctor knows of the Characters of these ancient Sages, who knew so well both how to lye and speak Truth; while his awkward and perverse Defense of them shews he knows not how to do either one or the other.

I have gone through the several Articles which I proposed to debate with these learned Writers; If I have any where mistaken their Meaning for want of Attention (I am sure I have no where misrepresented it by Design) I shall be ready, upon Conviction, to make them all the Satisfac-

tion and Amends, that they themselves can require: The manner in which Mr. J. has been pleased to pursue this Controversy, will fully justify any Freedom or Severity of Expression, which my own necessary Defence, and Candour ill-retained, have, in this last Edition, extorted from me. But at the same time that I thus *repeal* what is offensive, far be it from me to *complain*. Nature, I know, has given to every Creature its proper Arms, and shewn their proper Use.

*Its inbred Pow'r to hurt each Creature feels:
Bulls aim their Horns, and Asses lift their Heels.*

Thus some Writers reason, as Dr. Clarke; while others, again, rail like Mr. Jackson. And we ought not to complain of what neither of them could help. As for that stale Suggestion, always at hand when every thing else fails, that these Sheets, slight and trivial as they are, are not my own, he might safely make it without any Fear of Recrimination. For he stamps upon his own such indelible Marks of Property, that, as no other Man would chuse the Repute of them, so no Man can possibly mistake in ascribing them to their proper Parent.

Upon the Whole, I am far from any Thought of depreciating the Merit, or undervaluing the Systems of the old Philosophers. I have only produced a few *plain Facts*, supported by clear and express Evidence; and as to the Consequence, let the Makers and the Menders of Hypotheses look to that. I fixed upon the particular Points here debated, because I thought the true stating of them might be of Service to the Cause of Christianity. For if the *Philosophers* ran into these extravagant and absurd Notions concerning the *Soul and a future State*; if their favourite Doctrine,

on

on these very important Points, was so flagitious and destructive of all Morality, that they did not dare to impart it to the People; this will surely vindicate all *St. Paul* has said of them, and at the same time will serve to demonstrate the Usefulness and Necessity of the Christian Revelation. "It is
 "a very strong Proof of the *Necessity* of the Gos-
 "pel of *Jesus*, that the Sages of *Greece*, with
 "whom all the Wisdom of the World was sup-
 "posed to be deposited, had philosophized them-
 "selves out of one of the most evident and use-
 "ful Truths, with which Mankind is concerned.
 "Nor need we seek any other Justification of the
 "Severity with which the holy Apostles always
 "speak of the Philosophers or Philosophy of
 "*Greece*, than this, the shewing it was directed
 "against these pernicious Principles; and not,
 "as both *Deists* and *Fanatics* have concurred to
 "represent it, a Condemnation of human Learn-
 "ing in general." *Mr. Warburton's Remarks*,
 part i. pag. 91.

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F I N I S.

ERRATA et ADDENDA

CHAP. I. p. 6. l. 37. for *they* will say, read
Che will say.

P. 7. after l. 22. add, But for a fuller Explanation
 of this Argument, I must refer the Reader
 to Chap. XIII. Sect. 3.

P. 11. l. 16. for *Heaven*, read the *Heavens*.

P. 14. l. 37. for *doubful* read *doubtful*.

P. 16. l. 11. for *slipperty* read *slippery*.

Ibid. l. 14. for *Epicharmus* read *Empedocles*.

Ibid. l. 29. read OT NOMIZONTEZ.

Ibid. l. 33. add, However, whether *Plutarch* be
 consistent with himself or no, is of very little
 Consequence to the Argument I am here upon:
 If he be not, his Testimony will furnish us with
 nothing decisive in the present Instance; it will
 make as much against Mr. J. in one Case, as
 it makes for him in the other.

P. 18. after l. 7. add, These Testimonies are
 brought only to prove, that he sometimes speaks
 of a future State with *Diffidence* and *Doubt*.

P. 20. l. 36. read thus. "Sense of either Good
 or Evil." — "Death is the most, &c.

P. 24. l. 36. read *Xyl. Ed. p. 109.*

P. 30. l. 17. *dele* indeed.

P. 33. l. 27, 28. read, For if it had been reason-
 able that the State and Condition of Things
 should have been disposed otherwise, it would
 have been possible.

P. 33. l. 33. for *Page* read *Pages*.

P. 36. l. 20. for this Doctrine read the double
 Doctrine.

Cb. ii. p. 46. l. 12. read de Castris.

Ibid. l. 19. read Vivite.

P. 48. after l. 19. add, For that these last were unknown to the People, is the very Principle advanced by the Gentleman himself in his first Piece.

P. 50. l. 24. for Words read Word.

P. 52. l. 38. read Ficin.

P. 53. l. 35. for answer read attack.

Chap. IV. p. 69. l. 25. read accidentally.

Ibid. Last Line, read this Doctrine.

Chap. V. p. 81. l. 37, 38. read But who ever thought these two Accounts were inconsistent with each other; or that they related to two contrary and distinct States?

P. 84. l. 10. add, as having nothing to hope or fear from God.

P. 105. l. 24, 25, 26. " Seneca, the Stoic, has " a remarkable Passage to this Purpose, which " illustrates that of Cbrysippus." N. B. These are the Words of the Author here quoted.

P. 117. l. 24. read and of Water, to water.

Chap. VI. p. 129. l. 18. read, lex universi jubet.

Ibid. l. 26, 27, 28. These Passages may be seen, c. i. p. 29, 30, 31, 32.

P. 30. l. 18. for this Doctrine read the Doctrine.

P. 131. l. 19. for from Cbrysippus read with regard to Cbrysippus.

Ibid. l. 28. for Excuse read Cause.

P. 132, after l. 38. add, What I would infer from this Passage of Plutarch, is, that Cbrysippus did sometimes explode all future Punishments whatsoever; and that therefore he did not declare for a future State in so constant and uniform a manner as our Author has ventur'd to affirm.

P. 135. l. 27. dele 1.

Ibid.

Ibid. l. 29, 30. "he further restrains it to the *Greek Philosophers*." It was necessary to make this Observation, because Mr. *J.* asserts that a future State was believed "by the *Egyptian* and "*Chaldean Philosophers*." (Farther Defence p. 12) But why this to the Author of the *D. L.*? where has Mr. *W.* affirmed that these ancient Sages did not believe it? or what have they to do in a Question which relates only to the old Philosophers of Greece? It is to the *metaphysical* and *refined* Notions of these last concerning God and the human Soul, that Mr. *W.* imputes the Disbelief of another Life. As for the *Romans*, it was very late before they began to philosophize; and when they did, their main Business was only to teach and explain the *System* of the *Greeks*.

P. 138. l. 32. for "Hope for another" read, "Hope from another."

P. 145. l. 5. after Sentiments add in them.

P. 149. l. 21. dele Passage.

P. 151. l. 30. read, as *Chrysippus* and *Antoninus* express it.

P. 154. l. 25. add, Observe here how uniform and consistent our Author is in his Accounts of the old Systems. In his last Piece he affirms that "the Denial of the Resurrection of the Body arose out of the Gentile Philosophy." p. 7. and he produces this Passage of *Athenagoras*, in order to prove, that "the Belief of the Resurrection of the Body arose from this same Gentile Philosophy."

P. 155. l. 3, 4. read, who not only propagated, but believed.

Ibid. l. 7. for a be read be a.

P. 156. after l. 22. proceed thus, I have examined several of his Quotations in other Places.

I did

I did not indeed propose to consider every single Passage; this would have been unnecessary as he often urges the Authority of the same Writer more than once; and what has been said is enough to shew that we are to expect nothing very formidable from him on this Point. I will just add one or two more of his Citations here. *Celsus* in *Origen* says, &c.

P. 157. l. 20. *add*, but also because the *Platonic Principles*, as they might be understood, would, of all others, serve most plausibly to defend the *Pagan Polytheism and Idolatry*.

P. 158. l. 3. *for as as read*, as a.

P. 159. l. 32, 33. *for* after what has been shewn to the contrary from the best Writers of Antiquity, *read*, without any regard to what may be shewn to the contrary from the best Writers of Antiquity.

Chap. VII. p. 162. l. 31. *for the Belief of it demonstrated*, *read*, *their Belief of it demonstrated*.

P. 168. l. 36, 37. *dele the Words* one of, and *read*, has Mr. J. so much as attempted to confute them?

Chap. VIII. p. 173. l. 10. *read* insinuate.

Ibid. l. 25. *after* considered it in that View, *add*, and that he never undertook to demonstrate that the Philosophers believed a future State.

P. 186. l. 1. *dele Aristotle*.

P. 187. l. 26. *for decerpt read discerped*.

Ibid. l. 27. *for Div. Leg. 4. read Div. Leg. 3.*

P. 188. l. 32. *for God read the supreme God*.

P. 190. l. 24. *last Word*, *for that read as*.

Chap. IX. p. 191. l. 7. *add*, so that we see as to.

Ibid. l. 17. *for this Chapter read these Chapters*.

Ibid.

- Ibid.* l. 34. for *necessary* to conclude, *read*, *reasonable* to conclude.
- P. 192. l. 9. *read* blended.
- P. 194. l. 25. the Refusion whether made at or after Death.
- P. 195. l. 38. *dele* the.
- P. 196. l. 8. for Head *read* Article.
- P. 199. l. 3. *read* Christiana.
- P. 200. l. 23, 24. "all their Prejudice must lie
"on the other Side of the Question;" I apply this only to *Lipsius, Casaubon, Stanbope,*
and *Dacier*.
- P. 201. l. 36. *dele* And, *read*, Does he not, I say, contend that this was the Language of the Mysteries?
- P. 202. l. 31. *read* Mysteries.
- P. 203. l. 30. *begin a fresh Section and read thus*,
"And that Men were there taught to *disbelieve*
"a future State," would not any one now conclude, &c.
- P. 207. l. 35. for never would impart *read*
would not readily impart.
- P. 208. l. 18. *read*, esoteric.
- P. 210. l. 13. the Quotation ends with the Words,
lower Regions.
- Chap. XII. p. 219. l. 10. *dele* all.
- P. 222. l. 25. *dele* I.
- P. 223. l. 13. for they *read* the Philosophers.
- P. 233. l. 33. *read*, He must say, it was a Fable
of their own.
- P. 244. l. 1. after if you did? *add*, For are not a
Transmigration with Punishment, and a Transmigration without Punishment, two different Modes of the same State; or do they not represent the same Doctrine of Transmigration under two different Views?

Ibid.

Ibid. l. 25. for and read or.

P. 256. l. 20. read Doctrine.

P. 258. l. 25. The second Objection is consider'd
at the Bottom of Page 259.

P. 262. l. 22. read disingenuous.

P. 268. l. 1. read discredit.

Ibid. l. 35. for them read him.

P. 269. l. 38. for that read than.

P. 270. l. 31. for they read lay.

P. 281. l. 21, 22, &c. *Vid.* Sykes's Examination,
p. 127.

P. 287. l. 24. read, turn we again to our Do-
ctor, and let us see what he has advanced in
Reply to this, in his *Vindication*.

P. 296. l. 34. for its read this.

Ibid. l. 36. The Doctor, in the Place referred to,
speaking of the Hero Gods, and the Ancients
who employed so much Pains to cultivate and
promote their Worship, calls the last "*kna-*
"*vish Inventors*, who were resolutely deter-
"*mined at all Adventures to maintain their*
"*superstitious Follies ?*" Again, speaking of
this very Case, he declares, " that their Ad-
"*versaries had Truth on their Sides*, and that
"*direct Knavery and Forgery was on the E-*
"*gyptian Priests Side.*" *Examination*, p. 243,
244.



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